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Abstract 
This doctoral thesis entitled 'Inherited Networks, Economic Embeddedness and 
Developments in Corporate Governance: Post-Communist Czech and Slovak 
Republics with supporting evidence from Eastern Germany', aims to assess the issues 
of organisational change and its management primarily in the first two countries and 
to a lesser extent in the last. 
The area of study is located at the micro-economic level of state enterprises 
undergoing privatisation based on interviews carried out by the author with 
management in sixteen firms across the three countries from 1993 to 1994. These case 
studies are assessed from the point of view of their embeddedness in the macro- level 
changes which are affecting simultaneously all other sectors of social action in 
East/Central Europe, especially the economic and political spheres. 
The study initially outlines the state socialist system and how this influenced 
organisational structures and management as compared with market systems. 
Subsequently the case studies and investigation of macro-economic policies raise 
questions with regard to the continuing impact of the inherited value systems, 
organisational patterns and adaptive networking within enterprises undergoing 
change. Finally tile study asserts the important principle of economic embeddedness 
in a political, cultural and social reality with implications for the evolution of 
corporate governance systems in these respective countries. 
Keywords: inherited networks, economic embeddedness, corporate governance, 
Czech, Slovak, Eastern Germany. 
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Chapter One 
Freedom, Economic Systems and Enterprise 
Management 
SiebenHihriger 
In jeder Hand hiilt er einen Revolver, vor der Brust hat er eine Spielzeugmaschinenpistole 
hang en. 
,Was sagt denn deine Mutter zu diesen Waffen?" 
, ,Die hat sie mir doch gekauft." 
,Und wozu?" 
, Gegen die Bosen. " 
, Und wer ist gut?" 
,,Lenin." 
,Lenin? Wer ist das?" 
Er denkt angestrengt nach, weiB aber nicht zu antworten. 
"Du weisst nicht, wer Lenin ist?" 
,Der Hauptmann." 
Reiner Kunze. "Die Wunderbaren Jahre". 1 
The Seven Wonders of Czechoslovakia 
Everybody has a job . 
. Although everybody has a job, nobody works. 
Although nobody works the plan is fulfilled up to 105 percent. 
Although the plan is fulfilled up to 105 percent, there's nothing in the shops. 
Although there's nothing in the shops, we've got enough of everything. 
Although we've got enough of everything, everybody steals. 
Although everybody steals, nothing ever goes missing anywhere. 
And the Eighth Wonder of the World is that it has been working for forty-one years. 
Slogan recorded by Bernard Wheaton in Bmo on November the 28th, 1989.2 
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Introduction: Freedom and its Relevance to Management 
Management of organisational change in East/Central Europe is functioning under 
severe economic, political and social pressures. Changes in people's behaviour are 
necessary for a successful adaptation to the new situation. However adaptation does 
not mean striking out the old completely and heralding in the new 'western' ways. 
To effect real change requires acceptance of the inherited conditions and adapting 
with this inheritance in mind. The Czech philosopher, Ladislav Hejd:inek 
emphasised the importance of accepting inherited realities when he said: 
" any attempt to solve the situation in Central and Eastern Europe is an 
attempt to find its .. solution in a pan-European framework. "3 
Why is freedom so important to understand in this context? What does freedom 
have to do with management? The concept of freedom held by a society influences 
the value systems which permeate that society and the organisation and people at 
work within them. Freedom became a rallying cry throughout the area of 
East/Central Europe leading up to and during the transformations of 19894 • It 
echoed around Western Europe also, carefully contained, however, within a critique 
of the former communist bloc and its projected rejuvenated future. The political and 
economic interpretations of the term 'freedom' have informed the debate within the 
area under discussion and amongst its Western advisors. The role for managers 
within the context of economic transformation and organisational change must be 
assessed within the context of inherited concepts and value systems from the 
2 
command economy and contemporaneously evolving ones. What was the concept of 
freedom within the previously prevailing socio-economic and political culture, a 
rationale in which economic organisationswere embedded for the past 40 years in 
East/Central Europe? How do these inherited value systems continue to impact upon 
present day attempts at economic transformation and organisational culture and 
change? 
Freedom has been the basic currency of the Cold War. It is a coinage much 
publicised in one form by the likes of the Free Voice of America and Radio Free 
Europe which broadcast into East/Central Europe and the old Soviet Union from the 
safety of Western Europe. A different interpretation of freedom has been 
proclaimed by the varying official interpretations and practical applications of 
Marxism/Leninism in the states of Eastern Europe, the USSR, Cuba and China. 
This is an indication of the two sets of official value systems which permeated 
societies and which competed with each other for the greater part of this century. It 
is within this context that the peoples of the post-communist states of East/Central 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States locate the changes in 
everyday life and in the personal and the working spheres. Jiti Dienstbier, Foreign 
Minister of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, stated in August 1991, 
"The changes in Central and Eastern Europe, intensified by the recent 
dramatic events in the USSR, represent a challenge of freedom, not only for 
this region but also for the West, and thus for the European Community, as 
a pole of economic prosperity and political stability. "5 
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Chapter Outline 
This chapter aims to highlight one of the most important factors in the political 
culture of the old Eastern Europe, which influenced its economic system and thus 
also its organisational culture: freedom. The chapter will then aim to examine the 
resulting value systems inherited from the past regime and outline its effects on 
enterprise and managerial culture under the old regime, and to note the important 
role this plays in contemporary organisational change. 
Freedom and Priorities 
The general outlook, value systems and expectations of the populations and the 
policy-makers of East/Central Europe have all been strongly influenced by the 
experience of the last 40 years. This experience has been dominated by variations 
on the classic centrally planned economy (CPE) and an authoritarian state system. 
Whether this combined influence can be seen as benign or not, the interpretation of 
freedom that has prevailed until recently in Eastern Europe is one embedded in the 
official interpretation of ideology and its practical application to the functioning of 
'state socialism'6• 
In comparing 'Eastern' and 'Western' Europe, two sets of freedom priorities can be 
identified. Both sets are the results of the adoption of different philosophical 
interpretations of freedom and different assessments of their values. It is necessary 
to point out here that neither system produced a complete homogeneity of values 
across all countries contained within them for cultural and historical reasons which 
are not within the scope of this work. Thus the command economic systems were 
4 
not blanket, monotone systems but ranged in type over time and country. The 
totalitarian systems of the 1950s in Eastern Europe gave way to national adaptations 
of so-called 'state socialism' or 'state capitalism'7• Kornai distinguishes between 
three prototypes in the 'socialist' system: 1. The revolutionary-transitional model, 
2. the classical system and 3. the reform system8• The 'reform system' is indicative 
of the periods when each country ventured, within the limited framework of the 
command economy and monopoly party control, into the application of itsown 
variants. Sometimes this resulted in Soviet led intervention, when it was felt it had 
gone too far as in Hungary 1956 or it was allowed to continue for example in 
economic areas because of ideological guarantees of loyalty, for instance in 
Hungary under the economic reforms of Kadar from 1968 onwards. Having noted 
the fluctuations of political and economic freedom within the confines of the 
command economy the following discussion will centre on a discussion of freedom 
generally in the command economic system and political system of centralised state 
socialism and thus some general statements can be made with regard to the inherited 
value systems in the Czech and Slovak Republics and in eastern Germany. 
The Theory 
When talking of 'freedom' as when we talk of 'democracy', we must ask ourselves 
what type of freedom and what type of democracy? The concept of freedom is the 
very basis to the differentiation of communist-socialist and classical liberal thought. 
Society is organised both politically and economically according to priorities 
ascribed to and interpretations of freedom. It is important to note here the 
5 
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discrepancy between proclaimed freedom priorities and actually achieved freedoms 
in any society. 
Kant (1798) first identified two types of freedom which have formed the pivot of 
later political and economic debates ever since: negative freedom (freedom from) 
and positive freedom (freedom to )9• Freedom from external danger and curtailment 
and freedom to develop and project out into the world. Definitions of what 
constitutes an humane and fair society and ideas as to the achievement of such a 
society differ depending on the interpretation and importance given to these two 
aspects of freedom. 
Negative versus Positive Freedom 
Kant's Moral Theory identifies freedom as being synonymous with autonomy. One 
is free when one judges and acts in both the positive and negative senses of 
freedom. Sullivan interprets Kant's 'negative freedom' as: 
'our ability to act in complete independence of any prior or concurrent 
causes other than our own will or practical reasoning, our "power to 
restrain and overcome inclinations by reason" ', 
and his 'positive freedom' as: 
'the power of absolute causal self-determination, enabling us to judge and 
act autonomously, only on the basis of our own reasoning.' 10 
6 
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There is also an important moral component to Kant's definition of freedom which 
does not concern the discussion in hand here but without mention of it any 
description ofKant' Moral theory would be incomplete11 • 
It is these two definitions of positive and negative freedoms and their moral 
component which influenced Kant's political theory and in turn political theory after 
him. 
Political Theory and Negative Freedom 
Kant's own political theory is in keeping with the "classical" liberal political 
tradition. The classical liberal tradition is: 
' .. individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the 
claims of any social collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all 
men the same moral status ... universalist, affirming the moral unity of the 
human species and according a secondary importance to specific historic 
associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of the 
corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political 
arrangements. '12 
It is within this tradition that Kant sees the state's role as that of ensuring 'negative 
freedom', that is limiting government intervention into the private sphere so that 
individuals may act autonomously as they see fit. Political authority may act 
through legal coercion to prevent one individual's pursuit of happiness from 
limiting another individual's pursuit. In this definition of political authority 
7 
happiness and self-realisation are highly subjective and the state cannot be 
concerned with the individual's striving for either, but with creating a framework of 
justice for such pursuit. Kant finally, for our purposes, sees a welfare state as 
encouraging 'tutelage' to a paternalistic model of government so that citizens act 
'like immature children unable to distinguish between what is truly useful or 
harmful to them. '13 
Kant does make one exception to this line of argument on ethical grounds, taxing 
citizens for the looking after of the needy and orphans, but does not allow this to 
develop into a political system of 'welfare state'. Thus Kant's 
'limited-government political theory emphasises both political liberty and the 
contractual consent of citizens regarded as free, equal, and autonomous 
individuals, and it restricts civil laws to either universal negative principles 
of justice or laws compatible with such principles.' 14 
This is the view shared largely by other classical liberals such as Hobbes, Locke 
and Hume. Negative freedom is described by the Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences as socialfreedom. It links to political and religious freedom with respect to 
the government, state or church. The emphasis is on legal restraints allowing the 
individual freedom from outside control and power. Locke claimed, 'where there is 
no law there is no freedom'. Later political theorists such as Voltaire, John Stuart 
8 
Mill and Jeremy Bentham revised the classical form of liberalism, basing their 
views on utilitarianism, arguing for more state intervention policies, as in the 
modern welfare state15 • It has been adapted theoretically again in a more classical 
sense in more contemporary works by Hajek, Friedmann and van Mises to the 
present political and economic debate16• An example of a recent political 
embodiment of the revived classical liberal ideas can be seen in the form of 
'Thatcherism' in Britain. In this philosophy the emphasis is placed upon social 
freedom. Freedom from state interference, freedom from external danger and 
threat. Freedom from curtailment of free speech, writing, political and/or religious 
association. Hence in Britain the legal changes were made requiring trade union 
members to choose either to pay the political fee as part of their union dues to the 
Labour Party or to another party, rather than it being an unchangeable statement of 
block union political affiliation. 
Both thatcherism and the philosophies of Hayek and Friedman hold a special 
fascination for many East/Central European politicians and also by the left in these 
countries17 • 
Political Theory and Positive Freedom 
Kant' definition of positive freedom has already been given as the 'absolute causal 
self-determination'. Other definitions, as Sullivan points out, are the humanist 
theories of Abraham Maslow, Car! Rogers and Lawrence Kohlberg. Here positive 
freedom is defined as the 'psychological ideal of a mature- a "self-actualising" or 
"fully functioning"-personot 8• Erich Fromm also explored this definition of freedom 
9 
when arguing that human naturesometimes has a preference for authoritarian states 
due to fear of complete autonomous self-determination19 • 
In political theory positive freedom has been identified at different times and by 
different theorists as economic freedom and economic democracy as well as 
self-determination and fulfilling personal potential in the social sphere. Positive 
freedom or 'freedom to' in its economic sense was seen by Marx in his critique of 
capitalism as the most important aspect of freedom. Other writers from the centre to 
the left of the political spectrum also see this type of positive freedom as an 
important ingredient of complete freedom with a greater or lesser emphasis given to 
negative freedom. 
Positive freedom in Marxian terms is defined as economic freedom. Freedom to 
extend and develop oneself and project oneself onto the world is only seen as 
possible with democratic economic control of the means of production. Marx' s view 
of a fully communist society, in which " the free development of each is the 
condition for the free development of all", valued positive freedom above the 
negative freedoms enshrined in western European and the North American 
constitutions or political arrangements. 
Marx' s works are often contradictory and can be variously interpreted as carrying 
democratic and antidemocratic tendencies20• In his description of the contribution of 
each person's unalienated labour to the development of a free and equal society, he 
is democratic, and this can be seen especially in his earlier work. He also describes 
state authority as withering away under communism. Mouzelis writes: 
10 
"What Marx had envisaged was the transcendence of capitalism by means of 
establishing a highly decentralised social system, major features of which 
were the end of alienation and the withering away of a state authority. From 
this point of view it would be more justified to criticise Marx for anarchic 
and libertarian tendencies than for authoritarianism". 21 
However an antidemocratic tendency can be seen in his critique of parliamentary 
and democratic (i.e. competing parties and direct electoral representation of diverse 
interests) political structures. Marx criticises these structures as bourgeois control of 
capitalist production relations. The superstructure according to Marx, is determined 
by the dominant mode of production. This dominant mode depends on the stage that 
that particular human society has reached in its development. Change occurs as a 
result of growing contradictions which automatically force the collapse of the old 
order and transition to a new one. Thus slow incremental change through a 
parliamentary system never really changes class divisions and production relations 
as it is determined by a very positivistic brand of historic materialism. Again 
contradictions can be found to this view in other writings of Marx, but generally it 
can be said that Marx viewed parliamentary (democratic) political systems as 
reflective of economic divisions. He questions the value of this type of political 
democracy, as opposed to a dictatorship of the proletariat, if there is no economic 
democracy. 
Social Democracy also sees positive freedom, in terms of economic power, as 
important. However the emphasis is on wealth distribution and incremental reforms 
11 
through continued democratic parliamentary representation rather than revolution 
restructuring the political representation arrangements and complete ownership of 
the means of production by the proletariat. In order for everyone to enjoy the 
opportunity to exercise their freedoms to the full, it is necessary for a general level 
of economic wealth including access to health care, welfare services and education 
to be available. Beatrice and Sidney Webb stated: 
' Personal freedom means, in fact, the power of the individual to buy 
sufficient food, shelter and clothing'. 
However economic freedom or the satisfaction of basic needs is not always 
sufficient in ensuring 'free development'. Social democracy values both positive and 
negative freedoms or rights as ingredients in true freedom. Thus, in this view, 
democratic political structures (i.e. competing parties and full electoral suffrage) are 
not opposed to social justice. 
Generally those who value 'positive freedom' or 'rights', in whatever context, see 
'negative freedom' or 'right' as not sufficient alone to ensure full freedom for all. 
Thus it is not adequate to have a law protecting one's rights, for example as a 
woman or ethnic minority, in the workplace, if economically and socially one is so 
disadvantaged as to be effectively barred from certain jobs. In this instance one's 
right to legal protection cannot be exercised not because protection does not exist 
but because one is not in a position to use it. Thus the idea of positive 
discrimination, of providing support for the unfairly disadvantaged links into the 
12 
idea of positive freedom. However once one is sufficiently free from economic 
restraints and social disadvantage as to exercise one's rights fully the idea of 
positive freedom or 'freedom to' broadens to include self-realisation through 
effective interaction with the world outside. Harold Laski went further than the 
Webbs's definition and in an article on liberty in 1933 when he argued that " 
'Freedom' becomes a synonym for 'self-realization' " and later that, 'Liberty may 
be defined as the affirmation by an individual or group of his or its own essence.' 
This links to the humanist theories mentioned at the beginning of this section on 
Political Theory and Positive Freedom. 
Theory and Practice in East/Central Enrope 
Political Theory and Political and Economic Structures 
Thus those convinced of the importance of positive rights (positive freedom) 
develop a view of state and society organised accordingly. The introduction after 
the second world war of the Welfare State in Britain acknowledged the relevance of 
the positive aspect of freedom to people, especially the working classes and poor. 
The fact that the parliamentary system remained intact is indicative of the influence 
of social democracy and the value given to 'negative rights' or 'negative freedom'. 
Sweden has attempted to embody and develop further the ideals of the welfare state 
within a market economy framework. The states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union attempted to embody this same principle (of positive freedom) in their own 
vision of its form- the centrally planned economy and the one party state, that is 
without parliamentary political structure of competing parties and free elections and 
13 
universal suffrage. Taking the Marxist-Leninist view that a parliamentary or 
similarly defmed political democracy is part of the superstructure, representative 
only of those owning the forces of production, these states justified a one party 
system in terms of proletarian dictatorship which would cede eventually to fully 
democratic Communist society based on economic democracy. Competing parties 
would not be necessary as the full economic democracy would wipe away all class 
antagonisms. The aim for an free and fair society would in theory appear to be the 
same and yet the practical roads taken differ vastly22• 
Economic and Political Freedom (Positive and Negative Rights) 
It is important to note here the difference between proclaimed priorities and actually 
achieved priorities. The ability of the states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
in achieving greater economic and political freedoms for their populations than the 
'capitalist'West has been disproved but the principle used to legitimise their political 
and economic systems was the idea of providing 'freedom to' at least on an 
economic level. Thus in the constitution of the GDR, Artikel 2, 3 states: 
'Die Ausbeutung des Menschen durch den Menschen ist fiir immer beseitigt. 
Was des Volkes Hande schaffen ist des Volkes Eigen. Das sozialistische 
Prinzip "Jeder nach seinen Fahigkeiten, jedem nach seiner Leistung" wird 
verwirklicht. 023 
14 
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Therefore in its practical application in Eastern Europe 'freedom' was confined to 
the economic sphere and political freedoms (negative rights) were limited to the 
definition given by the state. Thus freedom from state interference was limited if the 
state so wished and successive central committees alternately widened and reduced 
the limits negative rights or freedom. Until Stalin's death in 1953 the limits for 
negative political freedoms were very narrow, conforming closely to Arendt's 
classification of totalitarian state24• With the assumption of power by Khrushchev 
after Stalin's death and until 1964 and the ensuing 'Thaw' events such as the 
Hungarian Uprising (1956) and the Prague Spring (1968) occurred25 • The direct 
implication of this type of centralised political system was that 'autonomy' was 
controlled by the state and guided by a relatively static ideology. Personal 
'autonomy' as Kant defined it or 'positive freedom' as humanist theories defined it, 
e.g. Fromm, was compromised. Freedom to project out onto the world 
independently and as wished from a secure economic base was made effectively 
impossible. 
Kant' s personal autonomy could not be exercised and Kant' s political theory of a 
social contract entered into by both the citizen and the state was therefore also 
rejected. As Jones points out, citizens in a centrally planned economy entered into 
'an obligatory socialcontract', one in which the state attempted to satisfy positive 
rights and on the basis of this function felt legitimised in rejecting the citizens 
claims to negative rights from the system26• 
A strong and secure economic base cannot be underestimated in providing people 
with the 'freedom to' develop, but if they have limited 'negative freedom' or 
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'freedom from' then they cannot act independently in a political sense. They are 
then curtailed in their full expression of their 'freedom to'. 
The example of the situation of women in the GDR and Czechoslovakia under the 
old regime serves as useful example of this. Under the old regime the socialist 
rhetoric of gender equality was supported by the state and government in terms of 
legislation in both the political and economic fields. The social policy was 
formulated with all working women in mind, providing kindergartens for every 
child and the 'baby year', where women were allowed to take a year out of work on 
full pay after the birth of a child. In the GDR and Czechoslovakia abortion existed 
on demand and the health service was free. Women were encouraged in education 
and enjoyed positive discrimination in the political process and in the workplace. 
However the state and party hierarchies were predominantly male dominated. In 
the GDR from 1950 to 1980 only four women reached candidate membership of the 
politburo of the SED, Elli Schmidt, Edith Baumann, Margrete Miiller and Ingeburg 
Lange. In 1980 only three women were heads of the forty-three departments of the 
Central Committee and none were in high profile departments27 • It is important to 
note that in the lower echelons of public life, such as the legislative assemblies at 
state, county and city levels, over a third of East German deputies and city 
commissioners were women. These was a similar situation for mayors and judges. 
(Shaffer compares this with only 7% to 9% in the former West Germany) 28 • 
However real power due to the highly centralised nature of the system resided in the 
male dominated higher echelons of both spheres. The small proportion of women 
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inthese higher positions in the GDR differs little from the rest of Europe, market or 
command system. 
Due to the authoritarian nature of these political systems and their claims to have 
swept aside class differences and social antagonisms, no independent political 
interest groups were tolerated. Thus no (independent) feminist movement developed 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
The idea of freedom under the old regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
was defined primarily as an economic problem and its resolution as achievable 
through equal and fair distribution of the fruits of production through state 
ownership of the means of production. As already discussed, state ownership was 
seen theoretically as a stepping stone on the road to a fully communist society when 
the state, according to Marx, would wither away. However this was never achieved 
and Communist Party led states progressively described themselves as dictatorships 
of the proletariat, socialist societies and advanced socialist societies or developed 
socialism (razvitoy or zrely sotsializm), in order , some would argue, to overcome 
the problem of explaining away unresolved problems without questioning the 
legitimacy of the system in place29• In this way the term 'developed socialism' was 
used to describe a society based on Marxist-Leninist theory which had not yet 
achieved full communism. 'Developed socialism' expanded the basic four basic 
components of the Soviet ideology of socialism without challenging their essential 
meaning or application to Soviet society. Lane outlines these four basic components 
as follows: 
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'1. that the class relations to the means of production have been socialised 
following the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks and the nationalisation of 
the means of production; 
2. that state planning has replaced the bourgeois market as a method of 
coordination of the economy and allocation of resources; competition 
between capitals has been superseded and labour has lost its character as a 
commodity; 
3. that, following the major socialist industrialisation process (during the 
first Five-Year Plan in Russia) the level of productive forces was sufficient 
to define the economy as being at the socialist stage; 
4. that, given the hegemony of the Communist Party and its control of the 
major institutional systems (ideology, science, education), the superstructure 
is socialist and the remaining incongruities or 'leftovers' (religious views, 
personality cults, petty crime) from other modes of production will gradually 
disappear with the maturation of Soviet society. '30 
Although this interpretation of Marxism-Leninism very much represents Russian 
experience it is one which was initially imposed on Eastern European states during 
the 1950s under Stalinism especially and in later 'extensions' influenced 
significantly the official ideology framework of all the Communist states of Eastern 
Europe. 
Due to this ideological mind set the study of sociology in Western terms generally 
did not exist (there are the exceptions of course, most notably the example of 
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Elemer Hankiss in Hungary). Society was a product of a class system based on the 
primary role of capital. Advanced socialism had destroyed the class system and only 
had some 'non-antagonistic contradictions' left, which were on the way to being 
resolved. 
Political Freedoms and Regime Legitimisation 
However apart from the economic argument the political wisdom of the respective 
regimes pre- 1989 also defined freedom for their populations in terms of political 
propaganda or at very least in terms of the interpretation of history according to 
historic materialism. Marx had described societies as moving from one social form, 
e.g. feudalism, through other forms, e.g. capitalism, until it reached communism. 
He envisaged England and Germany as the two most likely candidates for this latter 
and final transformation through a proletarian revolution and dictatorship of the 
proletarian. However it proved to be Russia -a predominantly rural and tradition 
bound empire, only recently born from the womb of feudalism, which first 
completed a successful revolution31 • The states of Central and eastern Europe 
followed after the Second World War. It therefore became very necessary for the 
regimes to justify their mono-party systems by means relevant to that nation. It was 
necessary to appropriate an ideology developed by a German for advanced capitalist 
societies and put into practise by an underdeveloped empire to vastly different 
national cultures and stages of socio-economic and political development. This 
caused a tension never really resolved until the 1980s when Gorbachev dismantled 
the influence and control exerted by the Soviet Union over the states of Eastern 
19 
Europe. Until this point the regimes of the former GDR, the Czech and Slovak 
republics had to balance two most important requirements for their survival. Firstly, 
that of national regime legitimisation, which involved retaining political and social 
control, and maintaining the popular support necessary for effective functioning of 
the economic system 
thus justifying the prevalent mono-party system. This in turn legitimised the regime. 
Secondly, the national regimes were required to maintain perceived ideological 
integrity and loyalty to the Soviet Union. This involved maintaining links with the 
Soviet Union as the ideological motherland and as the power system that had 
liberated the various countries andput the eastern European leaders into their 
present positions. It was also necessary to pacify any fears the Soviet Union may 
have had of loss of buffer zone or ideological empire. The GDR, Czech and Slovak 
republics did this in different ways according to the respective national requirements 
and situations. 
The Case of Czechoslovakia 
The crushing of the Prague Spring of 1968 in Czechoslovakia was never described 
as an invasion but as a united Warsaw Pact attempt to protect the gains of socialism. 
The reform movement was a Communist Party led reform aimed at achieving 
greater freedom of expression in both political and social spheres as well as 
reforming the economic system in order to attempt to improve efficiency. Although 
it was a movement supported by both the Czechs and Slovaks, indeed the leader of 
the reforms was a Slovak named Alexander Dubcek, the main power centre was 
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Prague. It has been criticised as an intellectual and youth movement , unsupported 
by "workers", but the Prague Spring did not run long enough to test this criticism. 
It was a national movement which the Soviet Union felt threatened by and which 
received full support from the indigenous population when Warsaw Pact tanks 
began the invasion. 
It was in the wake of this invasion that the new head of the Czechoslovakian 
Communist Party, Husak, attempted to regain legitimisation through a process of 
'normalisation'. Part of the strategy was to satisfy long called for Slovak demands 
for increased autonomy within the federation. This provided the regime with some 
leverage power by isolating the reform elites in Prague. 
Soviet led intervention in both Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 
came about for a number of reasons, the most important probably being the 
potential loss of buffer zonein both ideological and physical terms for the Soviet 
Union. After re-establishing its power base through force and control it is clear that 
the national leaderships which took power after both these events within an 
unchanged and top heavy power structure had to find new ways of reinventing 
justification for its existence. Ramet suggests that it was the regimes failure to do 
this effectively in the 1980s that resulted in the events of 1989. The political 
legitimisation of the regimes through effective economic management and political 
integrity or the relevance of regime ideology and policy to society was discovered 
to be irredeemably bankrupt. 
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The Case of the German Democratic Republic 
In the GDR, as in Czechoslovakia, the people were liberated by the Red Army at 
the end of the Second World War ('die Befreiung') but suffered at the hands of the 
Western Allies. 
A conunon utterance of the same piece of folk wisdom from people of all (private) 
political persuasions in the GDR up to 1989 was as follows; 
'Die Russen haben uns befreit, aber die Engllinder und Amerikaner haben 
Dresden bombardiert.' 32 
Although the horror of the bombings of refugees in Dresden by the 'western' Allies 
during the war was openly discussed, no mention was ever allowed of the mass 
rapes of about 2 million German women in the first few weeks of the 'liberation' by 
the Red Army33 • As Timothy Garton Ash points out, although the Nazi atrocities 
were fully explored in the GDR, the responsibility of the German people of the time 
was never discussed34 • The Third Reich was considered to be the ultimate political 
expression of the bourgeoisie capitalist class andtherefore far removed from the 
GDR and its workers' state of the day. Indeed the prelude to the GDR constitution 
defines its existence as a state on exactly this basis: 
'In Fortsetzung der revolutionliren Traditionen der deutschen Arbeiterklasse 
und gestiitzt auf die Befreiung vom Faschismus hat das Volk der Deutschen 
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Demokratischen Republik in Ubereinstimmung mit den Prozessen der 
geschichtlichen Entwicklung unserer Epoche sein Recht auf 
sozial-6konomische, staatliche und nationale Selbstbestimmung verwirklicht 
und gestaltet die entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft.' 35 
Wolf Biermann, GDR citizen, singer, left-wing commentator of the GDR was 
eventually expelled from the GDR on the 17th of November 1976 after giving a 
concert in Koln at the invitation of IG Metall , the West German union. The 
decision was taken, amidst much outrage amongst the writers community of the 
GDR, on the basis of 'feindseliges Auftreten' against the GDR and for displaying a 
lack of loyalty to the state. 
An example of his wide repertoire are the following lines, which highlight the way 
in which the GDR defined its existence: 
'Die DDR, mein Vaterland, ist sauber immerhin. Die Nazizeit ist absolut 
nicht drin. So griindlich haben wir geschrubbt mit Stalin's hartem Besen, 
dass rotverschrammt der Hintern ist, der vorher braun gewesen. '36 
Summary of Freedoms in the Centrally Planned Economies 
So the term 'freedom' was defined and described by the state in order to justify the 
relevance of its chosen political ideology. As already discussed the central theme to 
this ideology was Marx's dictum 'Jeder nach seinen Fahigkeiten, jedem nach seiner 
Leistung' and this became the leitmotif for the society in which people found 
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themselves living. When this ideology was inappropriate to the practical situation or 
actual decisions taken the definition was based on sometimes crass political 
propaganda. And yet it was people brought up and socialised in the above system 
who were ultimately involved in the 'refolutions' which were aimed at bringing 
about freedom from an oppressive state and consequently heralded in a transition to 
a democratic political system and also to a market economy37• 
Transformation and Organisational Change in East/Central Europe 
Something about the pre-1989 state definition of 'freedom' did not ring true and 
provoked action. To what extent, however were aspects of the above definition of 
freedom accepted by the populations in principle, but rejected in the form expressed 
by the state? Neues Forum, a GDR reform movement of '89, for one called for a 
realignment to the socialist ideal at the same time as rejecting the totalitarian system 
they were forced to live under. Events overtook such organisations but the situation 
since 1989 suggests that reunification has not brought about a total identification 
with the values of the Bundesrepublik. Forty years of a different value system in the 
GDR and Czechoslovakia have inculcated certain behaviour and expectations in its 
citizens which cannot be swept away overnight but rather needs to be worked 
through and adapted by those who have inherited it to the new conditions. 
The old institutions may have been demolished but the political, social and in 
general organisational culture takes longer to be modified. Adler J. Mortimer 
reports a Hungarian entrepreneur, Imre, saying 
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~~---
'Under the Soviet system, no one gets rich. To us, that is stupid. Under 
American capitalism, some get very rich, but others remain very poor. We 
don't think this is fair. But in Finland and Sweden, everybody gets rich. 
Now,. to Eastern Europeans, that sounds smart and fair!' 38 
The question which is really being asked here is: how are the new political and 
ultimately social cultures developing and how does this affect the workplace 
culture? How do these people view 'freedom'? Which concepts of freedom do they 
still hold as important and which do they now feel hold greater relevance to their 
working lives? Do they feel the new political and economic organisation of their 
countries as being freer than before or do they see some freedoms being satisfied at 
the expense of others held dear? Do they perceive a trade-off occurring between 
freedom of speech and freedom to earn a wage? How does their view affect their 
commitment to the new system and the new workplace organisation? 
Power has begun, nominally at least, to shift from the state to private ownership, 
from a political system of centralised party power monopoly to a parliamentary 
system with competing political parties and interest groups. Whether this 
transformation has actually been fully achieved throughout East/Central Europe is 
questionable, however the institutions and systems are potentially open to change 
and innovation. The transition carries with it implications for the operation of 
enterprises in the economy and the actors within the enterprise itself. In order to 
assess the impact upon management the roles in and priorities ofthe 
enterprise/company East and West need to be assessed. As already discussed, the 
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previous system was not purely one of state ownership of production. It also 
assumed other duties, such as welfare, housing, holiday provision, providing full 
and stable employment. Regardless of whether these responsibilities were carried 
out efficiently or not, they were perceived as the state's responsibility. A type of 
stakeholder model was in place, at least nominally. 
Table 1: 1 presents Prokopenko 's description of the priorities of East European 
managers versus West European managers39 • This 'bureaucratic' stakeholder model 
suggests that the economic system of state socialism was both unsuccessful in a 
practical sense of supplying goods to the market as opposed to a capitalist system 
and also, in its bureaucratic nature, failed to legitimise the political systems of the 
Communist era. Prokopenko's stakeholder model can only be seen as a very general 
indicator of the value systems in enterprises in state socialist countries. 
Table 1:1 Prokopenko's East/ West Economic Stakeholder Comparison 
Priority Bureaucratic Entrepreneur 
(East) (West) 
I Managers Customers 
thenseJves 
2 Employees Shareholders 
3 Shareholders Employees 
4 Customers Management 
themselves 
It is inappropriate in that it does not cater for a completely different socio-economic 
system, but rather judges the stakeholder model from a position of using the West 
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European entrepreneurial system or more precisely, as closer analysis reveals later 
in this thesis, an Anglo-saxon stakeholder model as the norm, against which to 
measure all other systems. It does not allow for different European cultural 
interpretations of the market system, i.e. the German social market model, nor does 
it allow for the differing developments in forms of managerial capitalism and 
hierarchies within the firms as discussed by Chandler (1992) in his comparison of 
managerial capitalism in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and 
Germany40• The above stakeholder model also emerges as rather oversimplified if 
applied to both the subtleties of internal workings of enterprises and the numerous 
firms both East and West which do not conform to these patterns of priorities. The 
current criticism of management of the newly privatised public utilities in the 1990s 
in the United Kingdom has pointed to the priority of satisfying first of all the 
interests of managers themselves via share distribution, higher wage packages and 
golden handshakes, to the direct detriment of other shareholders, customers and 
even the company itself. These phenomena turn the above model 
on its head. This model is also questionable in its ability to cope with the 
complexities of the economic embeddedness situation of East/ Central Europe and 
civil society. Rather a more complex system of conflicting and converging 
stakeholder interests can be drawn. Chapters Ten and Eleven elaborate on this 
theme. However, an initial alternative comparative model of external and internal 
stakeholders in market versus command economies can be draw based on the 
author's first round of interviews with managers in the Czech and Slovak Republics 
and the former GDR, in Spring and Autumn 1993 (See Table 1:2 Stakeholder 
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Power and Actual Influence: An East/West Comparison). This enables a view of the 
impact of the past political system and political players on enterprise/company 
operation. 
Inherited Influences from the State Socialist Value System and Organisational 
Arrangements 
For the last 40 years the perception of the role of the enterprise in East/Central 
Europe has differed vastly from that perception now required and current in 
Western Europe. In the past meeting the planned production targets and thereby 
satisfying the population's requirements was central to the legitimisation of the 
leading role of the Communist Party. This took precedence over all other 
considerations of financial profitability, reinvestment, health and safety and working 
conditions or environmental damage. Jones (1993) reports: 
'The state therefore sought to legitimise itself through the welfare system, 
and through government monopoly of production, distribution and exchange, 
creating a system of organised dependence. '41 
The highly centralised state set the political and economic agenda and passed down 
its instructions to the enterprises to be fulfilled. Diagram 1 below displays this 
action in the context of the German Democratic Republic. This affected both the 
scope of activity of the enterprises and their mission as perceived by all those 
28 
-
Table 1:2 Stakeholder Power and Actual Influence: An East/ West 
Comparison 
Command System Market System 
Political System on Enterprise Political System on Firm: 
High Power/Low influence: Medium Power/ Low Influence: Depending on state sector and 
High Influence-monopoly control of all production and state influence in economy. No direct involvement outside 
political power. Sets plans at Party Plenums. Planning state sector on functioning of firm. 
Commissions and Ministries carry out plans. 
Low Influence-trapped by own interpretation of ideological 
tenets and need to retain control. Therefore unable or 
unwilling to address problems of shortage economy. High 
level political power cannot improve an inherently deficient 
system through threat and tinkering with system 
State Owners Private Owners (predominantly) 
High Power/Low Influence: Variety of Power and Influence levels dependent on national 
High Power- in setting plans and giving instructions. Highly and specific organisational culture and owners. Shareholders 
centralised power system and control tools. Low Influence- generally interested in return on investment. Board of 
effective influence in securing plan fulfilment. Only two tools Directors concerned with monitoring company activity and 
open to it- 1) political ideology (appeals to co-operative) and success. Most power for day to day rutming devolved to 
2) Party cadre system (administrative promotion) management. 
Managers Managers 
Medium Power/Low Influence: Medium Power/High Influence 
tight hierarchical structure, overcentratised decisions See above. 
(Plalllling Commission/Ministry located). No latitude for Usually held for professionally responsible for company's 
illllovative decision-making at lower levels, i.e. from General success or failure. 
Director to lower management levels. No incentive lower 
down for effective management in terms of salary or 
promotion (Party Cadre most important criterion). 
Customers Customers 
Low Power/Low Influence Low Power/High Influence 
Shortage economy, little choice. Access to goods determined 
by supply irrespective of ability to pay. (Excluding black 
market economy). 
Interest Groups Interest Groups 
External: Low Power/Low Influence. External: Low Power/Medium Influence. 
Groups outside Communist Party organisation or actual power May/may not have institutional power base. Level of influence 
orbit non-existent. dependent on company's sensitivity to issues and cultural 
Internal (politically linked organisations) weighting given, e.g. consumer groups may carry more 
High power in enterprise functioning, on political control and weight than environmental groups and environmental pressure 
general organisation culture. groups may carry more weight in Germany than in Britain. 
Internal: Power and Influence dependent on national legislation 
and culture and specific organisational arrangements and 
culture, e.g. trade unions. 
Financial System/Investors Financial System/Investors 
Credit Sources, Tax System, Accounting and Audit: Credit Sources, Tax System, Accounting and Audit: 
Low Influence- internalised by state system. "Soft budget Medium Power/High Influence 
constraint" means subsidies given in order to secure Company's main internal and external success criterion is 
production regardless of fmancialloss-making activities or profitability. Company's activities may not be directly 
wastage. controlled by the above systems but is strongly influenced by 
them. 
Table : Ongmal S. Bygate 1993. 
NOTE: It is important to note here that some direct parallel comparisons cannot be made due to 
radically different organisation of systems. 
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employed there. The working roles allocated to managers were especially shaped by 
this aspect in comparison to alternative systems. Lastly this arrangement affected 
the value system internalised by each employee in terms of both 'official' values 
voluntarily internalised, and 'compensatory' private value systems and related 
actions. 
The Role of the Enterprise in the Command Economy 
Professor Teichman of Warsaw University makes the point that enterprises under 
the old regimes of command economy had additional and sometimes more important 
functions to the apparent primary function of manufacturing and thereby fulfilling 
demand42 • She lists these functions in order of priority as: 
1. the political function 
2. the social security function 
3. the manufacturing function 
SlanskY (1951) also referred to these functions in his speeches of November 1948 to 
early 1949, and Myant also mentions these priorities43 • The reason for this declining 
order of priorities was that fulfilling demand was a political and economic 
imperative. Where manufacturing fell short of fulfilling demand due to structural 
inadequacies, the political and social security functions bridged the gap between 
demand and supply. The centrally planned economy has been described as one of 
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'shortage' and due to the ideological straitjacket little could be done to reform the 
'shortage' system and put manufacturing at the top of the priority list of functions 
fulfilling demand44• The official interpretation of the chosen ideology of the time 
predetermined the functions and nature of enterprises to a degree unimaginable in 
the West. When the state did attempt reform it appeared sometimes to be operating 
on a seesaw principle: sometimes rejecting necessary changes to the system because 
it did not conform to its ideology and sometimes bending the official 'rules', or 
reinterpreting ideology, in order to bring about certain limited changes necessary to 
retain effective control and apparent legitimisation. Kornai has described this as 
'The Constant and Variable Elements in theOfficial ldeology' 45 • The varying 
national interpretations and applications of ideology do not fall within the scope of 
this doctorate, however a discussion of the effect of these national differences on 
the form of privatisation undertaken since 1989 will be dealt with in chapter two. 
Generally, however, it is true to say that once the above system became established 
the State and party's identification with the bureaucratic structure and the political 
investment in its functioning usually reduced reforms to basic tinkering with the 
machine rather than overhauling it46• 
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for work and wages; training and education; office for prizes; office for standardisation, weights and 
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Source: Transfated by S. Bygate from the Deutsches institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung. Berlin: 
Handbuch DDR Wirlschaft. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verfag GmbH. Nov. 1977. 
The Political Function 
When asked about the annual loss made by 'his' enterprise under the previous 
regime, a manager in a small town in Northern Slovakia shrugged his shoulders 
with a smile, 
"Who knows, no-one counted, it didn't matter, the state always bailed you 
out!" 
And now? 
"We have had to search for our own markets. Before that it was the state's 
responsibility. Now we know our debts. "4s 
An ex-Meister previously employed at a steel fitting factory in the former GDR 
recalled how those who did work were usually promoted, as she was after further 
training to Meister, but then came under pressure as part of the 'elite' to join the 
Communist Party in order to set an example to the 'workers' 49• A curious idea as 
the party was described as the Peasants and Workers Party and yet attracted more 
career minded personalities. However payment was not commensurate with 
increased responsibility. It was only after years of sacrifice that anindividual 
reached a position such as Managing Director from which they could reap the 
personal rewards of connections. 
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Connections enabled individuals to supplement their lifestyle needs materially or in 
the sphere of increased choices which remained unfulfilled by the command 
economy. From these examples it is clear that the state was concerned primarily 
with production as a tool of political legitimisation from the bottom up and political 
control from the top down, not as a process of production in line with cost 
effectiveness and profitability and efficient allocation. 
The Social Security Function 
The same Meister recalls how as a highly trained part of the workforce with 
supervisory functions she was often required to spend her mornings rounding up the 
'Asozialen', that is recently released criminals and alcoholics allocated to the 
factory and/or the workshy, and drive them to work. She reports that it was a 
farcical situation as little work was achieved and most of these types of employees 
only waited for the end of the month pay packet in order to be able to disappear into 
certain alcoholic haze. The politically defined social order detracted from efficient 
functioning within the economic sphere. 
Generally the enterprises also provided certain welfare functions such as 
accommodation and kindergarten facilities. One personnel manager in eastern 
Bohemia in the Czech Republic noted that the company still had problems now as it 
awaited privatisation in trying to rationalise its accommodation responsibilities 
towards employees inherited from the past. Another company in eastern Slovakia 
had changed its kindergarten into a showroom as immediate pressure to be 
profitable, and therefore to survive, outweighed the social costs, and yet was in the 
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process of retraining 16 middle managers most of whom were surplus to 
requirements. Under the previous system and as part of the 'Vyrobnohospodarska 
jednotka'50 (or 'Economic Production Unit') for furniture production, these two 
branches had employed 3500 shop-floor employees and 150 in management. The 
firm employed, together with a sister branch in a neighbouring village, 
approximately 800 people on the shop-floor and 50 managers: this level already 
represented a drastic cut in personnel. In an informal discussion with 14 of the 16 
young middle managers, attending an on-site retraining seminar organised by a 
Swiss firm, the managers themselves voiced an awareness of their still top heavy 
structure. This example displays the dilemma of many enterprises who recognise the 
need to restructure but whose continuing attaclnnents to old value systems inform 
for better or for worse attempts to do so. Madhavan and Fogel (1992) report from 
their own experience, and with reference to Alien, Miller and Nath, that: 
'the ties between individuals and the organisations have moral components in 
collectivist societies. Extremes of this value, in Romania and the former 
Soviet Union, will prohibit rapid change to a market economy. '51 
Although the conception of the social security role of the enterprise is not 
preventing change to a market economy in the Czech and Slovak Republics and in 
the GDR it has influenced the process, speed and perception of the transition. 
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Manufacturing Function and Working Roles 
As for managerial roles, certain functions carried greater importance than others. 
Material procurement in shortage economies were more important than marketing 
for instance which was completely unnecessary as the state organised distribution 
and there was no competition. Under the restitution law the original owners of a 
small brewery south of Leipzig in easternGermany regained control of a family 
business which had passed into state hands in the 1970s. As with many other 
businesses in 'eastern' Germany they had absolutely no experience of marketing nor 
the functioning of a market economy. As a result they had to buy in external 
marketing advice from 'western' Germany in order to fill the information and 
experience gap. Naturally this is a large outlay for such a small firm but at least 
there is greater access to these skills in Germany than in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics. Indeed the imbalance of skills is quoted by Prokopenko (1992) as one of 
the advantages of Joint ventures undertaken between 'east' and 'west', in that such 
an arrangement can capitalise on 'western' marketing and sales skills and the 
'eastern' skills of material procurement52• 
The political, social and economic roles of the enterprise practised in the command 
economy, as outlined above, suggest a general outline of enterprise character, 
portfolio and success indicators which diverges from the usual model found in a 
market economy. The table below attempts to show these major differences. 
From these examples it is clear that management always involves functioning in a 
society which has certain values and an accepted framework of practices. It is 
during the present transitions to different practical frameworks that the societies of 
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'eastern' Germany and the Czech and Slovak Republics are in the process of 
reaffirming or rejecting certain values inherited from the past political, economic 
and social arrangements. Management involves dealing with people both in the 
market place and as owners, creditors and employees. What people think and feel 
about the mission of the enterprise or company they work for, their roles within this 
mission as well as the external environment all affects their functioning and the 
choices they make. There is a clear ambivalence evident in this transition process 
from one set of values to another. Madhavan and Fogel (1992) have noted that: 
'Hungarian managers are feeling constant pressure to both reduce 
workforces yet preserve the values and benefits of full employment. 
Managers are identifying a need to absorb unique managerial skills to cope 
with the job stress created by this pressure coupled with the pressures of 
radically shifting economic and political structures. '53 
However the very skills that are appreciated as essential are ones emanating from a 
society whose values for so long have been both ideologically and culturally 
different from the indigenous ones of East/Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. The above two authors concluded that although 'mangers are enamoured 
with American management practices' theyare also 'simultaneously being critical of 
its effects in American society or its relevance to the "local situation" '. 54 
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Table 1.3 Enterprise Comparison: Command Versus Market Systems 
Character/Portfolio and Success Indicators 
GENERAL CRITERIA COMMAND SYSTEM MARKET SYSTEM 
1. Main Success Cn'teria Fulfllling Plan: conunand driven. Set in the Profitability: market driven 
GDR by the Staatliche Planlwmmission (State 
Plarming Conunision) and by a corresponding 
fwdy in Czechoslovakia 
2. Location of Success External Interna 
3, Ownership Forms GDR, largely state: Vo/kseige11er Urgely private shareholders, individual or 
Betrieb(VEB) or Nationalised Enterprise, corporate. Limited state sector, varying in 
Vo/k.seigenes GuJ(VEG) or Nationalised size and function according to country and 
Farm, Vereinigung Volkseigener form of market economy, e.g. social market 
Betrieb(VVB) or Association of Nationalised economy of the Federal Republic of 
Enterprises, Landwirtschaftliche Gennany, the Japanese model or the 
Produktionsgenossenschaft(LPG) or anglo-saxon model of the United Kingdom 
Agricultural Production Cooperative. Few and the United States of America. 
private entities. 
C:rechoslovakia, largely state: ntirodn( 
podnik or People's Enterprise (which became 
sMtn( podnlk or state enterprises after 1988/ 
89),some collectives, especially in 
agriculture, jednotn£ zem'MNske dru!stvo 
(Standard Farming Cooperatives). Few 
private entities. 
4. Finance Capital investment determined by central Respons.ibility of firm to organise internal 
planning authorities, sometimes tacking and finances and external support when required. 
inadequate, or plentiful due to political and/or 
social reasons. 
When state subsidies freely available, the soft 
budget constraint not channelled tQ 
restructuring. 
5. Prices Set completely by state according firstly to Set by market and company with little 
political criteria, e.g. cheap bread, housing government intervention. 
etc. Then set to cover basic running costs 
only. 
6. Labour Production process labour driven. Quantity Quality the main criteria, 
and basic quality (training in production 
process skills encouraged) required. 
Stockpiling of labour for stom1ing (gluts in 
production) and as compensation for low 
technology base, Management prestige when 
presiding over large workforce. 
7. Technology Low technology level (often outdated and Production process technologically driven. 
inefficient) due to low capital investment High technology avai[able depending on 
priority. Reliance on labour. This due to company's priorities and ability to pay. No 
investment function being located within overt structural impediments. 
Ministry {or Kombinat/ Vhj). Prices set at 
insufficiently low 1eve!s and administration 
not structured to redistribute profits 
accurately. 
8. Marketing and DisJribution Marketing non-existent. State guarantees Matketing highly important. Distribution 
sale. Due to nature of the command economy networks re.o;ponsibility of firm. These 
or the so-called 'shortage' economy: networks reliant on infrastructure planned 
monopoly production, no tompetition, and paid for in most cases by the state as 
captive customers, Distribution a distinct from the <:ompany. JrnJustry may 
responsibility of the state at both company lobby state or attempt to influence slate 
level (Ministry) and at infrastructure level decisions which. affect it. 
(State). Distribution in some sectors 
(especially consumer goods and services) 
slow and patchy. 
Table: Ongmal S. Bygate 1993. 
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A Rough Outline of the Inherited Influences of the State Socialist Value System 
at the Functional Level 
Formal Education and the Centrally Planned Economy and Certain Organisational 
Aspects 
The two quotes at the beginning of this chapter emphasise the authoritarian 
influence of the official ideology and the inefficient organisational functioning 
dominant unti11989 in Eastern Europe in both the past and present. The transition 
which was heralded in almost overnight for many countries, including the German 
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia marks the start of a long process of 
change towards a democratic system and the accompanying introduction of some 
sort of market economy.· The adaptation of a radically different personal value 
system and social currency to fit the demands of a new social order is not an 
overnight transformation but rather a slow and sometimes painful process. This can 
be seen even on a practical level of the formal education system. 
The received formal education of the present adult population, including of course 
present day managers, was tailored to the propagation of the legitimising ideology 
and to servicing the centralised command economy. Thus the education system was 
ideologically based on Marxism-Leninsm, or as Reiner Kunze describes this 
Weltanschauung was indoctrinated throughout the years of formal education into 
children and young adults to a degree that removed any critical thinking and 
produced knee jerk responses. Randlesome notes withrespect to Anweiler (1990)55 , 
that this aspect was a conscious aim of the education system as well as that of 
providing a firm practical preparation for slotting into the economic system 
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'The state also claimed the unity of education and the economy, and this 
led inter alia to a system of ideological homogenisation in all schools, 
colleges and universities: ... '56 
The Effect on Managers 
The effect on managers as recipients of such an education system is twofold. Firstly 
they have been ideologically educated 'against' the market economy and secondly 
their basic and higher education under the old regime has not equipped them 
practically for functioning within this type of economic system. A group of 
managers on an in-house management training scheme in Eastern Slovakia visited 
by the author in Spring 1993, had difficulty in understanding that market economies 
may function differently in different countries. Their conception of capitalism was 
one still influenced by a strict interpretation of Marxist historic-materialsim, where 
capitalism is a stage in the inevitable development of each country and is not 
differentiated according to culture, political system or national economic priorities 
and arrangements. CBI News noted in 1993 that: 
'Up until three years ago "sales" did not exist as a profession, except in the 
sense of black marketing. Any western company that now buys a production 
facility in the Czech or Slovak Republics, has to set up a sales team from 
first principles. '57 
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The same report also notes the behavioural effects of a technocratic education 
system as encouraging categorical skills, "everything is measured and in boxes"58• 
'As a result Czechs and Slovaks can typically describe a product well, but 
are less good at selling the benefits. '59 
Hence the influx of management training schemes from western Europe and 
America into present day East/Central. However, a mistake of many of these 
training schemes has been to ignore both the indigenous skills and knowledge and 
the socio-economic cultures peculiar to enterprises in a reforming command 
economy. In many respects the process of transformation has been underestimated 
by the West. In order to be able to properly assess the degree of influence of the 
indigenous culture on present day management and organisation, an accurate picture 
of the previous command economy must be gained. What exactly was the old 
system under the centrally planned economies for which managers were previously 
educated? 
Certain Organisational Aspects 
Certain organisational aspects were characteristically different in East/Central 
European organisations when compared with 'western' Europe, including 
organisational responsibility, concepts of equity, status, motivation, collective spirit 
and control. In command economic systems, with Marxism-Leninism as the 
defining ideology, the right to economic well-being through such principles of job 
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allocation, cheap housing, or on site kindergartens, etc., were incorporated into 
organisational responsibility of the firm, to the detriment of "negative"rights such as 
non-interference by the state in political choices. Economic organisations in many 
instances were expected to provide many of these conditions for its work-force. 
As concerns ideas of equity and status in East/Central European organisation had 
their own patterns. Ideas of equity were considered more important than 
encouraging individual achievements. This is reflective in the wage scales where 
there was little significant difference between a shop floor worker income and lower 
level management income60• The former GDR Meister referred to above commented 
that people laughed at those who spent years studying engineering at university as 
once they set to work in an enterprise they were rarely earning more than skilled 
shop-floor workers. Their economic status was low although their potential to move 
up the ranks was arguably higher if they played the political game long enough. By 
her estimation it could take 15 years of political manoeuvring to ensure general 
management status61 • 
Issues of motivation, the 'collective spirit' and control strongly influenced 
organisational operation. Achievements were to be completed through collective 
efforts and appeals to Marxist-Leninist spirit. Thus the Parteitags and Czech and 
Slovak party plenums appealed to the masses for increased efforts to fulfil the 5 
year plan. Motivation was politically fuelled in two ways, firstly through the 
extrinsic self-congratulatory method of ideological correctness and secondly through 
the intrinsic method of Machiavellian use of party and state contacts for personal 
benefit. The former Czechoslovakia and GDR conferred various titles on its well 
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performing workers, such as 'shock worker' in Czechoslovakia, as defined by the 
Trade Union Congress in December 1949 and the Hero of Labour, Banner of 
Labour for Individual, Meritous Activist, Activist of Socialist Labour in the former 
GDR62 • However it became clear to all that unless ideological allegiance was 
displayed by an individual any improvement in production levels would result in 
little personal reward. 
Issues of political legitimisation of the regime and of political control of society 
shaped job security along with economic issues. Each individual had the legally 
enshrined right to a job (as stated in the constitutions of the respective countries) 
and since the workplace was the only channel of socialisation after full-time 
education, the state had no intention of losing this as a means of control. Constant 
labour shortages due to insecure and patchy supplies of raw materials and old and 
inefficient machinery led to hoarding of employees also, regardless of their 
effectiveness. They were necessary as extra employees when 'storming' was 
necessary. 
Influence of the Issues on the Present 
These problems and many others are still facing companies in the Czech and Slovak 
republics. Motivation was cited in many interviews with company directors as one 
of the biggest problems and is linked not only to the internal motivation 
arrangements of the past and/or the transition period but also to outdated 
interpretations of the role of production in society. 
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In the Czech and Slovak republics state enterprises, or enterprises still in the 
process of privatisation, were for the initial years of this study still legally bound to 
operate under the government set wage bands. Consequently the scope for 
improving employee efficiency was limited. One company in northern Bohemia in 
September 1993 cited this issue as the reason for the difficulty in recruiting and 
retaining high quality personnel. Newly set up private companies were not bound by 
old legislation and therefore were plagued to a lesser extent by inadequate personnel 
calibre. In a number of breweries in eastern Germany managersreported difficulty 
in "getting employees to pay attention". In one such brewery in Saxony in 1993 a 
whole consignment of bottled beer had to be disposed of as the installation of new 
machinery in another section of the brewery had diverted attention from the 
labelling process resulting in serious mislabelling. Employees, still rooted in the 
shortage economy were unable to appreciate that the beer could now no longer be 
sold. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to describe the different value systems of Eastern Europe 
as opposed to Western Europe. The role of the enterprise in the old system has been 
shown to have a fundamentally different role. This role was reflective of the 
political and economic arrangements of the states of the time, which is in turn 
reflective of their ideological world view. The success indicators of the enterprise 
and the emphasis given to different enterprise activities are a direct result of these 
different ideological stances or interpretations of freedom. 
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The present day effects on management and management functions will be dealt 
with in greater detail in a later chapters o Finally the chapter has attempted to outline 
the relevance of this inheritance to the present and is best summed up by Jones 
(1993): 
'0 0 .it is certainly not sufficient to abolish the old institutions and introduce 
icons of capitalism, such as stock exchanges, chambers of commerce, or 
Macdonalds: these are the external manifestations of the phenomenon, not 
the phenomenon itself. The debates about 'shock therapy' versus gradualism, 
or of reform sequencing, are at least about tangible phenomena: the problem 
of changing values, attitudes and behaviour patterns is far more difficult. ' 63 
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Nature of Research 
Chapter Two 
Methodology 
The nature of this research can be described briefly as a longitudinal qualitative 
study based primarily on case study interviews carried out over two consecutive 
years with management in enterprises undergoing, or being prepared for, 
privatisation, supplemented by a smaller questionnaire sample for each firm. The 
firms were predominantly chosen from the brewing and furniture-making industries 
across three countries in order to maintain sample cohesiveness and cross-country 
comparisons. 
The particular field of study was problematic because the whole geographical area 
was undergoing rapid and unexpected change. Thus there was no historical 
precedent for transition from a state socialist or command economy to a market 
economy and therefore no established body of literature on the subject of this type 
of economic transition or transformation. The nature of the change also meant that 
it was not always a stable process especially as it affected all sectors of society and 
all types of social, political and economic activity simultaneously. Thus, although 
this study was initially (at the end of 1992) conceived of as a two-country study of 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany, it became a three-country study on the 1st 
January 1993 when the Czech and Slovak Republics split, and thus the emphasis is 
primarily in the latter two, with a more summary analysis of East Germany for 
comparative purposes. 
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Despite the difficulties all research must be carried out under real conditions, 
however unsuited they are to 'pure' methodological deliberations. Essentially all 
social science research is driven by snapshots, but to ensure greater validity, 
supporting evidence must be found from other similar studies and sources of 
knowledge. Thus the aim of this research isto build a picture based on its own 
snapshots derived from the case studies and corroborated by other contemporary 
and significant studies of issues in transition and generally by information on the 
unfolding events and problems in the area. 
As already pointed out, background literature on the nature of transition from a 
state socialist economy to a market driven one was non-existent prior to 1989. 
However, important and valuable background literature does exist on the nature of 
state socialism and of previous practices and issues in the field of economy 
(including organisational issues), society and politics. For example, Komarek's 
criticisms of the Czechoslovak economic problems in the 1980s highlight aspects of 
continuing concern during transition1• This study refers to these sources as they 
provide a secure basis from which a logical estimate can be made of present issues. 
The Case Study Interviews 
The choice of case study was selected as a research method because it best enables 
the researcher to understand 'the dynamics present within single settings' 2 and 
allows both study of multiple cases and numerous levels of analysis (Yin 1984)', 
and a combination of data collection, in this instance interviews, questionnaires and 
other literature and observations (Eisenhardt 1989)4 • Case studies have been used in 
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this case to generate theory (as with Gersick [1988] and Harris and Sutton [1986], 
as opposed to providing description as in Kidder [1982] or testing theory as in 
Pinfield [1986], Anderson [1983]), that is, that in organisational restructuring 
ownership change has little importance if not combined with a view of inherited 
networks, economic embeddedness and forms of corporate governance5• 
The interviews were initially aimed at the brewing and furniture industries but due 
to difficulties in access also included one computer programming firm and one 
heavyengineering firm with a specific brewing machinery construction department 
and brewery attached. The first round of interviews with enterprise management 
took place in 1993 and the second throughout 1994. The first interviews were 
unstructured ones usually lasting at least two hours and often much more and 
required of management to reflect on their working roles generally and the changes 
they and their organisation had encountered since 1989. Management was left to 
identify and concentrate on the areas it deemed as important. The second round of 
interviews were semi-structured, in that certain areas had been highlighted by the 
researcher as being most important to management and as the most salient points in 
the researcher's analysis of the existing data. 
The table below displays the names, country and characteristics of each firm 
interviewed. The firms were guaranteed anonymity and have consequently been 
given pseudonyms. 
The two case studies described in Chapters Seven and Eight and those more 
generally referred to in the East German chapter, Chapter Nine were chosen from 
the above selection. These particular case studies were chosen because it was felt 
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that they best displayed the issues and problems typically being faced by 
management and organisations. 
It is important to remember that the firms were initially chosen for the purposes of 
studying national phenomena of economic transition at organisational level and thus 
enterprises with indigenous management and ownership were preferred. However, 
due to the rapidly changing nature of the economic situations in the countries under 
discussion it has not always been possible to maintain this exclusivity of the sample. 
For the Czech and Slovak Republics most case studies, especially the two described 
in detail later, were of the indigenous type, although some with foreign ownership 
and/or management were included in the sample. In the case of East Germany the 
very nature of the transition made study of firms with 'foreign', that is usually West 
German, ownership and management inevitable and this was built into the study 
from the beginning. 
Despite these qualifications, it is interesting to note that those interviews with firms 
which do possess a foreign element in their ownership or management pattern 
actually reinforce the findings of the study on the salient issues of organisational 
change and its management in indigenous firms. They did this by highlighting 
similar problems or their means (almost always unavailable to domestic 
ownership/management teams) to overcome these difficulties. 
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Table 2:1 Case Study Interviews 
Name of Activity Size Ownership Interviewees 
Enterprise (prior to 1989) 
Czech Republic 
Firm furniture medium indigenous Managing 
D!evod~lny manufacturer 360 employees, strategic lPF, Director. 
reduced in NPF (National Finance 
1993 to 156 Property Fund), Manager, 
newspapers, External 
individual Management 
shareholders, Advisor 
later strategic 
interest bought 
by private Czech 
entrepreneur 
computers large indigeous Managing 
4000 mostly JPFs, Director, 
FirmVM employees NPF, individual Pesonnel 
reduced by shareholders Manager 
1993 to 3200 
brewery and large indigenous Personnel 
Firm Hrad brewery 3500 NPF, individual Manager 
engineering employees shareholders 
brewery medium foreign Country 
1200, later strategic owners, Director 
Firm Pivo 
reduced indigenous IPFs, 
banks, 
individual 
shareholders 
brewing research not available indigenous Managing 
(part of old Ministry of Director 
FirmRibi Vhj) Agriculture and 
51% individual 
shareholders 
Slovak • • • • 
Republic 
Firm Kreslo furniture medium 760 indigenous Managing 
manufacturer employees, (Slovak) NPF, Director, 
later reduced later Technical 
Management Manager, 
Buy-Out Economics 
Manager, 
Production 
Manager, 
Marketing 
Manager and 
Deputy, 
Personnel (also 
Accounts 
Manager), Legal 
Advisor 
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furniture medium indigenous Managing 
manufacturer 850 employees mostly IPFs and Director, 
individual Economics 
Firm Nabytok shareholders Manager, Marketing 
Manager and 
later Marketing 
Director 
furniture export not available indigenous Import Manager 
FirmHasra (part of old privatised 
Vhj) 
furniture medium indigenous Managing 
Firm Spas manufacturer (Slovak) NPF Director and Personnel 
Manager 
furniture small indigenous President (also 
manufacturer and 33 employees local part-owner and 
Firm Kaps sellers of printers entrepreneurial legal advisor) 
and copiers set up and Technical 
Manager (and 
also part-owner) 
brewery medium indigenous Commercial 
FirmRassoc 135 employees (Slovak) NPF, Director 
later privatised 
East Germany * * * • 
brewery small foreign the two 
Firm Flasche 85 employees west German owners-partners (1992, 20 and British (also managing 
emp.) entrepreneurs directors) 
brewery small indigenous part-owner (also 
40 employees, restored to Manager of 
Firm Dunkles later reduced to family Commercial, 11 ownership Accounts and 
Administrative 
Departments) 
brewery medium foreign Marketing 
FirmBrauer 450 employees west German Manager and (1993-120 breweries Sales Manager 
emp.) 
furniture medium foreign Managing 
Firm manufacturer and 900 employees west German Director (also 
Lichtbrann interiors (1993-150 entrepreneurial part-owner) 
emp.) partnership 
Firm Sessel furniture medium indigenous Managing 
manufacturer 410 employees THA Director (also 
later reduced to (Treuhandanstalt Marketing 
80 emp. ) later attempted Manager) and 
MBO Manager of 
Personnel (also 
Accounts and 
Purchasing) 
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Corroborative Interviews 
Many other interviews were also carried out with academics, business people, both 
native and Western, shopfloor workers, representatives of international 
organisations etc, all of whom were independent of the firms interviewed but 
provided important corroborative information and analysis of the general picture 
being constructed as a result of the research. Not all these people can be mentioned 
but a selection are as follows: in the Czech Republic conversations with the head of 
the Faculty of Economics, VSST (Technical University) of Liberec, Prof. Dytrt; the 
Life President of the Czech Society for Quality Control, Mrs Zaludova Mr. and 
Mrs. Avieser Tucker, lecturer in philosophy at Oloumoc University and Publishing 
Executive respectively; Czech representative of the Moore-Stephens management 
consulting company, Prague; in Slovakia, meetings were held with Mr. Stefan 
Vratny (Slovak management consultant for an independent Swedish run management 
consultancy firm in Kosice); head of the Bratislava, Economics and Business 
Departments, Bratislava University; Mr. Bill Denne, PHARE representative to 
Slovakia; director of the Chamber of Commerce in Kosice, and a Green Party 
representative in Bratislava. In Germany supplementary interviews were held with 
Mr. A.-Frederick Freiherr von Domberg, managing director of Felix Scholler in 
Osnabriick (dealing in speciality papers and with subsidiary offices throughout 
East/Central Europe and the former Soviet Union), Dr. Hans Gemert, Economics 
Professor, Berlin and Frau Christina Heyder, unemployed Meister in Dresden and 
Mr. Mike Geppert, PhD student at the Humboldt University, Berlin in industrial 
sociology. 
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Analysis of Case Study Interviews 
Codification 
The codification process carried out by the author is similar to the Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) approach6• The codes for the case study analysis were developed by 
studying the unstructured interview notes in depth and identifying 12 general areas 
of concern highlighted by managers. These findings influenced the questions in the 
second semi-structured round of interviews. The codes were then adjusted to 
include new categories or reinforced the validity of categories already chosen. The 
codes were then noted against contributions in each interview, and areas of 
intersection and interrelationship were then noted by means of a flow chart where 
each contribution was designated a coded box and links were made to related boxes. 
Hutchinson (1986) describes this clustering of codes into categories and 
theircomparison with each other as a means to 'ensure that they are mutually 
exclusive and cover the behavioral variations' 7 • Thus through this distillation 
process the major recurrent themes underlying the areas highlighted were identified, 
these being mostly issues of control (extent and nature of and legitimacy of) and the 
pertinent process of ownership change through privatisation and the effect or lack of 
effect of both on organisational restructuring. Baker, Wuest and Stern (1992), 
referring to Stern and Pyles (1986), call this the formation of a 'tentative conceptual 
frarnework' 8• Thus the highly relevant and related issues of inherited networks, 
economic embeddedness and corporate governance emerged as the 'core process' 
which 'is the guiding principle underlying what is occurring in the situation and 
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dominates the analysis because it links most of the other processes involved in an 
explanatory network' 9• 
Questionnaires 
An in-depth questionnaire survey was also carried out between July 1994 and 
completed by Spring 1995 among managers and also other employees, including 
shop-floor employees at all the firms originally interviewed. The findings support 
the interpretation elicited from the analysis of the case studies. A copy of the 
questionnaire in both Czech and Slovak, as well as German, can be found in the 
appendices (See appendices 3, 4, 5). The questionnaires were translated by linguists 
in the respective languages, usually native speakers and checked by organisational 
specialists with language knowledge. 
Forty questionnaires were delivered to firms in each country. Completed responses 
received back were as follows: from the Czech Republic 35, from Slovakia 28 and 
from East Germany 14. This level of response was surprising given that 
questionnaires are generally viewed with suspicion in East/Central Europe and that 
the response levels were expected to be higher for East Germany than for the Czech 
and Slovak Republics due to the influence from West Germany and West German 
owners. 
The analysis of the data from questionnaires confirms the overall interview findings 
and thus were incorporated thematically into the respective data in the case study 
chapters and elsewhere in the analysis, rather than discussed independently in detail. 
The design of the questionnaire was perhaps overly ambitious, given the already 
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detailed scope of data produced by the case study interviews. Thus, while it was 
very relevant and useful as a means of triangulation for the case studies, some more 
detailed findings which emerged from it could not be pursued. Thus an interesting 
detail relating to ownership change and control of organisational change emerged 
from the questionnaire survey. Employees reported no improvement in terms of 
management quality (or even the change in the way management operated) with a 
change to private domestic ownership at any level (that is at general or departmental 
levels, etc.), except for an improvement in the quality of supervisors or Meister on 
the shop floor. It is not within the scope of this study to investigate all the detailed 
phenomena which arose from the questionnaires but this could suggest an 
interesting point of departure for other research. 
Observation 
Although this was not a major part of the methodology used, a degree of 
observation was carried out on all occasions with tours around the factories and 
brief encounters between management and employees noted as they arose. 
Inevitably, however, researcher observation plays a subtler role in data collection 
and analysis, as described below with reference to grounded theory. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Methodological Tools Chosen 
Qualitative Techniques and Grounded Theory 
This author takes the view that qualitative research is of greater value in revealing 
what is going on within a certain area of study as opposed to quantitative or 
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hypothesis-testing research which pre-defines the area of study and the issues 
deemed important to it. Furthermore the interview relationship and process are 
conceived of in this research as an interactive process in which the interviewer is a 
'subject- creating interview context' and the interviewee as 'subject- complying with 
or resisting definition of the situation' as opposed to the positivist approach where 
the interviewer is 'object- following research protocol' and interviewee as 'object-
revealing items relevant to the research protocol' 10 • Bryman (1989) also reports on 
the strong emphasis in case study research on context which distinguishes it from 
purely quantitative research (although quantitative research may be one of the 
methods used in case study research)u. 
Thus hypothesis testing or positivist methodology, relying on 'random samples, 
standard questions, tabulations', is only useful as a tool which aids further analysis 
once issues have been established from analysing fieldwork material12• The 
grounded theory approach of producing a map of the context and its dynamics is 
longer, more time consuming, but ultimately more challenging in terms of this 
research project. It also produces more useful and applicable knowledge to the field. 
Stem and Pyles (1986) describe this validity thus: 
'To be credible, the core variables, or theory must be well integrated, easy 
to understand, relevant to the empirical world, and must explain the major 
variation in the process or phenomenon studied.' 13 
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In other words, as Glaser and Strauss (1967) describe it, the theory must 'fit', 
'grab' and 'work'. However it could be argued that while qualitative techniques 
and, in particular grounded theory, allow us 'to discover what is going on', it also 
carries the potential of not generating appropriate information for conclusions14• 
Indeed Glassner and Loughlin (1987), in their study of American adolescents and 
their perception and use of drugs, claim that qualitative research is 'unconcerned 
with standardising interpretation of data', but aims for a rather deeper approach; 
'developing this complex cataloguing and retrieval system has been to retain 
good access to the words of the subjects, without relying upon the memory 
of interviewers or data analysts. ' 15 
(Despite this, Glassner and Loughlin claim that their own research does also fit 
conventional criteria of methodological reliability and validity). This weakness of 
insufficient conclusions does not apply in the case of this research. The use of 
grounded theory here first of all allows for examination of processes and dynamics 
of situations rather than individually expressed experience. This is particularly 
appropriate to the field of study due to the unprecedented nature of change and 
therefore the lack of any immediate comparative event and background literature on 
the transition from a state socialist economy to the market. 
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Problem of Management Bias 
In the interview process, it is necessary to be aware of any discrepancies between 
what managers say and the reality of the situation, or the 'objective truth'. 
However, the author is of the view taken by Glassner and Loughlin (1987) and 
Baruch (1993)16• That is thatinterviews carry factual information and culturally 
defined narratives, or as Baruch defines it, information of Membership Category. It 
is highly important to identify this Membership Category, not only in terms of 
roles, such as management as opposed to employees, shareholders, local 
govermnent and central management, but also in terms of history such as old 
incumbent managers as opposed to newly promoted middle management to top 
management, or administratively appointed management. Lastly the quality of 
Membership Category, needs to be kept in mind, such as the desire purely to own, 
or to restructure, or to asset strip, etc. Ultimately, therefore, management 
pronouncements were viewed as truthful of their individual position and were only 
taken as indicative of the general picture when reinforced by the codification 
process and comparison with other companies. 
Case Study Research 
Case study research may centre on one case study or on numerous ones as with 
studies by Yin (1979) who used nineteen cases and Sutton (1987) who used eight. 
Multiple case studies mitigate the problem of generalising from one case study 
alone, which may only produce anomalies17 • In this study a similar attempt has been 
made researching multiple case studies across three countries. Mitchell (1983) and 
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Yin (1984) both argue that case studies are valuable in terms of the quality of 
theoretical inferences they produce18 • Thus, in Bryman's words: 
'the aim is not to infer the findings from a sample to a population, but to 
engender patterns and linkages of theoretical importance' 19• 
All the findings from the case study interviews carried out in this research raise 
similar questions and the linkages identified by the analysis of the findings display 
the validity of this approach in this situation. Similarly, the longitudinal nature of 
the study over two years could have produced a picture without any unifying 
features due to the rapidly changing nature of the field. In fact, in this research, 
although certain concerns changed over time, the underlying mechanics of the 
situation were the same. Where different concerns were expressed over time, this 
was indicative of the process of change being experienced and it was the job of this 
research to chart this change and unify the different elements into an overall picture 
for the complete period studied. Indeed Bryman also notes that process models of 
organisations, that is: 'models which chart sequences of elements' 20 , almost 
uniquely came from case study research, for example Burgelman (1983) and Sutton 
The Questionnaire Tool 
A third leg of the research (after the two rounds of interviews) was the 
questionnaire survey which was not an attempt at statistical validity but rather a 
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means of triangulation. One of the problems with asking highly structured 
questions, as already outlined under the positivist approach, is that it assumes prior 
knowledge of areas of importance. However impressive the resulting statistics, they 
only prove or disprove the hypotheses with which the researcher initiated the study. 
In other words the field of research does not impose upon the researcher who then 
attempts to make sense out of it but rather it conforms to the researcher's value 
assessment of the field. 
By contrast the questionnaire survey in this research did not form the point of 
departure for exploration but rather acted as a third level of 'interview' after the 
unstructured and semi-structured face-to-face interviews. The questionnaires were 
constructed on the basis ofthe findings of the first two interview rounds and formed 
a highly structured and anonymous data collection system. It provided triangulation, 
both in this sense and in the sense that it was distributed randomly and anonymously 
to management (at all levels) and employees alike in all firms already interviewed 
and the questions were mostly aimed at checking the validity of the data given 
previously. However the questionnaire did also explore to a lesser extent potential 
new areas arising out of the two rounds of interviews, which are in fact outwith the 
scope of this thesis. 
The Comparative Element 
In the study of organisations across countries, no units are completely comparative. 
In a sense, to attempt to form a picture purely from an analysis of comparative 
units, is impossible without reference to the respective contexts. It is this 
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contextualisation which organises the comparative units into meaningful data. It 
does this by highlighting differences and similarities in the environment in addition 
to those at the level of organisational comparisons. Thus each country's data on 
organisational change must initially be assessed within its own country conditions 
and only then compared. Subsequently the appropriateness of certain theories to 
transition can be challenged when seen within the context of different national, 
social, cultural and historical and political and economic paradigms. Hofstede's 
work displays not only the difficulty of assessing comparative data across a number 
of countries but also the richness of individual pictures which result from 
comparisons22 • 
Language 
The interviews were conducted by the author in English or German and 
occasionally with a translator of Czech or Slovak, if and when required. The 
English and German questionnaireswere written initially by the author and the 
German subsequently checked by a native speaker. The Czech and Slovak 
questionnaires were translated by Czech and Slovak translators respectively. 
Conclusion 
Thus the complete process of research carried out in this study, including 
distillation of codes arising from the interviews, the questionnaire survey of 
companies and the study of the findings of related literature, conforms to Stern's 
(1980)23 defmition of grounded theory as being one in which: 
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'developing theory is expanded and densified by reduction [of the data], 
selective sampling of the literature and further selective sampling of the 
data. '24 
Finally no piece of research is ever completed or foolproof. If it appears to fit the 
preconceptions of the researcher completely, questions of an overly positivist 
approach are posed. Equally unsatisfactory is research which raises only more 
unanswered questions without synthesising the data to reveal an analysis of the 
present picture, which provides at the very minimum a working model which can 
later be questioned or used as a comparison of other original research. Ideally the 
choice of methodology and the resulting analysis add important knowledge to a field 
which requires further exploration. 
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Part 11 
Chapter Three 
Czechoslovakia: a brief exploration of political and socio-economic 
inheritance in the 20th Century 
Introduction 
Czechoslovakia, unlike many other East/Central European countries, already had a 
relatively developed industrial sector, as well as a strong tradition of entrepreneurial 
activity, particularly in the Czech Republic, prior to the Second World War. In the 
1930s Czechoslovakia was ranked as one of the fifteen most developed countries and 
by 1948, having escaped most of the wide scale damage of Second World War, had 
recovered the income level of the pre-war decade'. Agnes Zaludova, Life President of 
the Czech Society for Quality, records her amazement on arrival in the Czech part of 
Czechoslovakia in 19462• Mrs Zaludova , after graduating in Physics and Mathematics 
from Glasgow University, began work at the Czechoslovakian Engineering Research 
Institute, which had been a part of Skoda Plseii before this date. She discovered that 
the technical level and expertise rivalled if not exceeded the level in Great Britain at 
that time. Unfortunately this technical advantage did not survive the next forty years, 
as this technical know-how was not fostered and encouraged in industry and 
enterprises under the command economy. 
In many respects the centrally planned economy 'deindustrialised' the Czech region in 
terms of spread of more advanced industrial activity, while ensuring industrialisation 
in Slovakia for the first time in its history. Thus both the pre- and post- war 
inheritance need to be surveyed in order to understand present and diverging 
development in the two, now independent, countries. 
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Chapter Outline 
This chapter will briefly look at the economic inheritance from the first republic, and 
from post- World War Two Czechoslovakia and from state socialism, looking 
especially at the process of normalisation in the 70s and 80s and the resultant 
stagnation as antecedents of the present day situation. In this respect pertinent 
economic critiques of the planned economy during the last two decades of its 
existence are referred to. Subsequently the general socio-economic inheritance will be 
touched upon. 
Socio-Economic Inheritance from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. the First 
Republic and the Post-war Government (unti11947) 
Under the Hapsburg Empire Bohemia and Moravia which nowadays constitute the 
Czech Republic were ruled from Vienna, and Slovakia was ruled from Hungary. 
Okey (1986) describes the German speaking Alpine provinces of Austria and the 
mixed German-Slav lands of the Czech crown as being of the most advanced sectors 
with certain relatively industrialised parts of Poland and Hungary coming third and 
fourth3• Czechs were allowed to be active in business, although for either 
socio-economic reasons or because of conservative institutionalism, business 
remained largely the preserve of German speakers and thus the country developed a 
good level of industrialisation, also benefiting from proximity to Western markets. 
The revival of the Czech language in the early 1800s was encouraged by the 
Bohemian German speaking gentry who were opposed to Viennese centralised 
control. The Slovaks, however, had to wait until the 1840s for recognition of Slovak 
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as a distinct language from Czech. This was due to the completely Magyar speaking 
gentry, in whose interests was the continued centralised Hungarian control. 
Thus the Czech Republic became one of the powerhouses of the empire and Slovaks, 
by contrast, were only allowed to be active professionally in religious life or in 
agriculture. In Slovakia, business activity was reserved for Germans and/or those of 
Jewish extraction. Added to this Slovakia by 1918 still had a predominantly agrarian 
economy in some respects almost feudal. Industry was limited and social integration 
into new economic forms was also barely initiated. 
In addition, the older inheritance of political and socio-economic behaviour and 
practices, which in turn influence the legal, educational and industrial organisation 
norms, stems from both the Austro-Hungarian Empire and inter-war period (the last 
experience of an established market system). The experience of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, as discussed earlier, was one of a powerful state with a good degree of 
independent business activity in the middle classes of the Czech Republic only. The 
Czech Republic was considered the industrial power house of the Empire. In the 
inter-war period, the lack of an omniscient state allowed the independence in the 
economic sphere to flourish into a politically tolerant and democratic inter-war 
government. The strong social welfare concern in society in general has been 
commented on, albeit negatively by Tomas Bata, the Czech shoemaking millionaire in 
terms of interfering with the efficiency of the individual within the economic 
organisation because it blocked the link between personal toil and personal gain. Bata 
saw this tradition in Czechoslovakia as being the result of a residue of the Slavonic 
law or commune (mir) system, whereby all fruits oflabour were shared out by village 
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elders according to conscience and need4• By contrast Polanyi in discussing the 
influence of various institutional, arrangements on economic systems refers to the 
democratic nature of the South Slav zadruga as opposed to the despotism of the 
Romanfamilia5• The development of managerial culture as a result of these different 
traditions has been remarked upon by Rychetnik (1996), as being in pre-war 
Czechoslovakia, a highly influential form of scientific management, 'although there 
has also been a stream of strong paternalistic, culture-focused management (combined 
with Fordism) in Bata's tradition.'' 
This concern for social welfare was also reflected in the first post-war market 
economic programme before Communist Party hegemony was secured after the 
elections in 194 7. Thus strong state bureaucracy, institutional control, a degree of 
independent entrepreneurship combined with social awareness all play important roles 
in the inherited culture of the country. 
The Creation of the Federal Republic and Its Demise 
The Czech and Slovak Republics both emerged from Communist control in late 1989 
still as part of a federal state made up of two republics, known as Czechoslovakia. 
Since its creation in 1918 (the independence of the new Czechoslovakia was 
established on October 28, 1918 and joint coexistence with the Czechs was declared 
two days later in Slovakia at Turciansky Sv. Martin) out of the remnants of the old 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, this marriage of convenience between the two republics 
has experienced numerous tensions. Notable events were the initial disappointment on 
the Slovak part with the arrangement met in 19187 and later the differing Czech and 
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Slovak allegiances during the Second World War. It was during the latter episode that 
on March 14, 1939 that the first independent Slovak state emerged in over 1000 years 
under churchman and nationalist President Jozef Tiso. Tiso became an ally of 
Germany for the duration of the war and until the liberation of Czechoslovakia on 
May 9, 1945. Meanwhile the Czech wartime experience began with the cession of the 
Sudeten Lands to Germany on September 30, 1938 and ultimately of German 
occupation on March 15, 1939 until liberation. 
Moves towards federalisation began during the Prague Spring and in fact the only 
major concession of the post 1968 'normalisation' process, instigated by the new 
pro-Soviet Communist regime, was to allow this one reform of the Prague Spring to 
survive. The concession to Slovak nationalism was made in order to allow the new 
regime to gain some kind oflegitimacy in their enforced control over the country. 
The Czech Lands and Slovakia became two separate sovereign republics on January 
1st 1993. Even so the Czech Republic retained a great deal of the physical and 
institutional infrastructure associated with centralised control of Czechoslovakia, in 
terms of the geographical concentration of the most important and advanced economic 
activity and also as the locus of sovereign bodies of political and economic 
institutions superior to the individual republics institutions. 
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The Economic Inheritance from the First Republic, Post-War Czechoslovakia 
and State Socialism 
First Republic and Post-war Czechoslovakia 
Czechoslovakia was, by the beginning of the Second World War a relatively advanced 
industrialised country with consumer and light industry sectors, a high level of 
technology and skills base. Its economic structure was close to other advanced 
nations. In the 1930s, 30% were active in agriculture, 45% in mining and 
manufacturing, while in Poland and Hungary respectively 67% and 54% were 
employed in agriculture and 18% and 22% in industry8• In 1938 national income per 
head of population was 75% of that of France (but slower growth rates meant that in 
the I 980s it was still at the same level), the absolute national income per head in the 
inter-war period was 60% above Hungary and 70% above Poland9• However, the 
Second World War had caused a loss oflabour and immense damage to the economy. 
The Communist Party victory at the polls in 1946 (38% of the vote) and its dominant 
place in a broad alliance of political parties is often quoted as the heralding in the 
political and economic decline of Czecholovakia, but in fact it was only slowly after 
the establishment of monopoly Communist Party power on February the 25th, 1948, 
and even then only really from the early 1950s onwards that this decline began to take 
effect. From 1945-48, political plurality was revived after the Nazi occupation (in the 
Czech Lands) and control (in Slovakia) of the war years and a limited planning system 
coexisted with private enterprise. The first two year plan, 194 7-48, designed to correct 
the losses and deficiencies caused by the war was actually successful in achieving 
pre-war levels of industrial output. At the same time 61% of industry was 
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nationalised, alongside a still flourishing private sector10• This was the Czechoslovak 
road to socialism agreed by Czechoslovak Communist Party leader, Klement 
Gottwald, and the USSR's Stalin in 1946. Whether this political situation and 
economic freedom would have continued or not is debatable, in any case the seeds of 
the Cold War were being sown and international developments along with the 
influence of Stalin's exclusive interpretation of Marxism-Leninism combined to 
impose the Soviet plarming system on a country far in advance of its neighbours. 
State Socialism 
The Czechoslovakian Communist Party influenced by Marxist ideology and the 
Soviet example began to increase centralisation and plarming. After February 1948, 
95% of industry (in terms of employment) was in the state sector, but international 
contacts and trade were still maintained11 • Myant (1989) refers to the Swedish 
Keynesian influence in Czechoslovakia in the thirties. The Czechoslovakian 
proponents of this approach in the 1940s pointed to the inability of the plarming 
system to solve all of national economic problems and imbalances12 • However the 
Communist Party General Secretary, Rudolf Slansky supported the principle of 
plarming but with the proviso of building on Czechoslovakian advanced economic 
sectors, including the existing heavy industry and electrical engineering sectors and 
thereby not endanger the other lighter sectors of the economyl3• Slansky saw the 
Czechoslovakian economy integrating into East/Central European economic 
development and industrial policy, rather than attempting national economic 
self-sufficiency in all areas with an emphasis on heavy industry, as pursued in and 
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advocated by the Soviet Union for all the states of East/Central Europe. At the first 
meeting of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), Slansky called for 
the regional integration of the economies, allowing Czechoslovakia to find a market 
for its light industry goods and thereby facilitating the importation of much needed 
wheat and raw materials into the country14 • However, the principle that each nation's 
sovereignty would be respected within the CMEA was already being repressed, as 
Stalin began to show his distrust of individual roads to socialism and the central tenet 
of the CMEA of independent national decision-making15• In fact such was the 
mounting pressure exerted by the Soviet Union to follow its prescribed course that it 
became clear that it was purely in the interests of Soviet economic as well as political 
aspirations. Machova (I 962) claimed that this approach was designed in order that the 
authorities profit from: 
' ... the maximum use of what Czechoslovakia's industrial potential could 
contribute to the renewal, development and consolidation of the economy of 
the USSR.' 16 
Slansky had incorporated his initial economic design into the first five year plan 
(1949), but under the Soviet pressure and lack of agreement to anything else by the 
other East/Central European countries this had to be revised. By 1953 socialist 
countries share of foreign trade with Czechoslovakia had reached a peak of 78% as 
compared with 40% in 194817• 
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Ultimately a Soviet style centrally planned economy with an emphasis on heavy 
industry was then introduced, which was quite inappropriate to the advanced state of 
the country. After the Stalin purges of the 1950s which hit Czechoslovakia perhaps 
more severely than any other East European country, one of the more famous victims 
being Slansky himself, came the political and economic reforms leading up to the 
Prague Spring of 1968. The economic discussions centred on the debate as to whether 
the problems with central planning were a result of system or structures". These 
discussions were stopped by the Soviet invasion and only resurfaced again in the 80s. 
Subsequently throughout the period of 'normalisation' under Gustav Husak, (First 
Secretary of the Communist Party after Alexander Dubcek's removal until his own 
resignation on December the I Oth 1989), few major changes were made, and certainly 
no radical structural changes. Consequently the economy continued to produce a 
comparatively high standard of living but with growing inefficiency, stagnation and 
ultimately threatening those very same living standards. 
Normalisation and Stagnation; the 1970s and 1980s 
Komarek, economist and secretary of the Dubcek's government's Economic Council 
in 1968, had criticised since the 1960s the sectoral structure of Czechoslovakia. By 
the 1970s, Komarek had reappeared on the political scene as head of a research 
institute and was later encouraged in his arguments for a readjustment of the sectoral 
structure of the economy by Gorbachev's calls for 'restructuring' in the economy. 
Komarek based some of his analysis on international comparisons to support the 
argument that the sectoral structure of the Czechoslovakian economy at the time was 
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indicative of a less advanced country. He pointed to the fact that in 1984 industry 
accounted for 46% of employment, services for 40% and agriculture for 14%. In the 
Federal Republic of Germany the comparable figures are 41%, 53% and 6%19• The 
FRG was considered a useful comparison as its economic structure was similar in 
composition. 
Komarek was particularly critical of the emphasis on the heavy industrial sector 
manufacturing, such as steel and suggested redirecting investment into modernising 
other sectors of the economy with greater scope for profitability. Indeed the statistical 
yearbooks of CSSR testify to this imbalance in production and investment. As late as 
1988, in millions of Czechoslovak crowns, the mechanical engineering (24 7, 481 ), 
energy (216, 172), fuel (143 754), chemicals (139, 769), and iron smelting (137, 536) 
branches could be ranked the top five out of 18 categories for investment, far 
outstripping other more consumer oriented sectors, except for foodstuffs (94, 832)20 • 
This level of investment had been increasing steadily up to that year. Figures for gross 
industrial production for the year 1988 show the highest levels for four of the above 
sectors (fuel excluded), and foodstuffs coming in fifth21 • Consumption of electricity 
according to selected industrial sectors shows the chemical/ rubber/ asbestos making 
industries as consuming almost 9 thousand million kilowatt hours in 1987, followed 
by the energy industries (over 8 thousand million), iron smelting (8 thousand million), 
fuel industry (over 5.5 thousand million), machine tool industry (almost 5 thousand 
million) and finally the consumer goods industry consuming only just over 3 thousand 
million". Again these figures had been steadily increasing through the 1980s with no 
hint of restructuring. 
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Standard of Living 
The standard of living in Czechoslovakia was, leading up to 1980 and indeed 
throughout the 1980s, relatively good by East European and indeed world standards. 
The statistical yearbook of the CSSR 1987 and 1989 both show a slow rise in 
consumption of basic foodstuffs although a dip occurs around the early 1980s. Myant 
(1989) also notes this temporary dip in 1981, but describes a longer term shortage in 
consumer durables, especially televisions, freezers and furniture23 • The statistical 
yearbooks also depict the national income as continually growing but increasingly 
slowly throughout the 1980s and consumption of most basic foodstuffs as having 
increased steadily since 1936, apart from the temporary downturn again in the early 
l980s24• Naturally the figures may not be completely accurate but compared to UN 
sources and the figures quoted by Janacek above, the same stagnation with 
comparatively good living standards can be observed. 
Productivity 
However, during the 1970s and 1980s a decline in productivity had begun. Janaeek 
notes that average annual growth rates in national income and total factor productivity 
declined from 4.4 in the period 1961-70 to 1.5 in the period 1981-84 (see below Table 
3:1). Myant (1989)25 , using Toms and Hajek (1982) 26 and Klacek and Nesporova 
(1982)27 as sources, assesses individual factor productivity in Czechoslovakia 
1961-1980 as below (Table 3:2), 
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Table 3.1 Average Annual Growth Rates in National Income and Total Factor 
Productivity in CMEA countries, 1961-1984 
Country 1961-70 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1984 
nat. inc. 4.4 5.7 3.6 1.5 
CSSR 
TFP 1.1 1.5 0.6 0.0 
nat. inc. 5.4 6.2 2.8 2.1 
Hungary 
TFP 1.4 1.6 0.4 0.3 
nat. inc. 4.4 5.4 4.1 4.3 
GDR 
TFP 1.1 1.3 0.7 1.0 
European nat. inc. 
-
6.4 4.1 3.1 
CMEA 
Note: ---Not available in source. 
Source: Janacek (1986) and Myant (1989) 28• 
Table 3.2 Individual Factor Productivities in Czechoslovakia 1961-1980 
Period Total Productivity Prod. Prod. of all 
Productivity oflabour of materials 
fixed total non-energy energy 
ass est 
s 
1961-6 0.20 3.30 -1.20 -1.30 -J.IO -0.30 
5 
1966-7 2.00 5.60 2.20 0.10 -0.20 5.40 
0 
1971-7 1.50 5.30 0.00 0.10 -0.10 3.40 
5 
1976-8 0.60 3.20 -2.30 0.20 0.00 1.80 
0 
Source: Myant's (1989) adaptation of data in Toms and Hajek (1982), Klacek and Nesporova 
(1982). 
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These difficulties were reinforced by the hard currency crisis of 1989. Thus, this drop 
in productivity and the slowing of economic growth and of improvement in living 
standards combined with the inability and unwillingness to redirect investments, as 
advised by Komarek, to more profitable, newer sectors resulted in stagnation which 
became a downward spiral and which could have resulted in an eventual depreciation 
ofliving standards had not the transformations of 1989 occurred. 
Notwithstanding this accurate assessment by Komarek, Myant (1989) to the weakness 
in his argument in the 1980s, which was to emphasise the problems of economic 
structure rather than process as highlighted by other Czechoslovak commentators, 
such as Janacek (1986, 1987)29• Indeed, as Myant points out, restructuring under the 
past regime could not be seen as a purely economic issue, due to its overt link firstly 
to the ideological support of central planning and secondly to the elite and sectoral 
interests in preserving the status quo. The difficulty of restructuring is therefore linked 
to the problems of system of management. 
' ... the system has steadily deviated from the abstract model of a 'command' 
economy towards one in which orders are set after bargaining with lower 
levels. Although it is impossible to organise outright opposition to the 
authorities, experience confirms that it is possible for any existing enterprise 
or sector to use every legal organisation- including party, local government, 
trade union and several other bodies- as a means of pressing its sectional 
interests. The system creates no objective criteria for assessing demands for 
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investment of other resources, so that these decisions have to depend on 
political pressure. The consequences for the economic system must be a 
lack of flexibility. Only in the unique atmosphere of the early 1950s, when 
whole sectors were effectively deprived of a political voice, was rapid 
structural change possible. '30 
External Debt 
Czechoslovakia by 1985 had reduced its net indebtedness to 2. 7 billion dollars from 3 
in 198P1• However the hard currency crisis of 1987 revealed the extent of the decline 
in productivity and the potentially serious economic problems which had to be 
addressed32• The plan to reduce the hard currency debt would inevitably have affected 
living standards had there been time for the necessary measures to be taken. In the 
event, however, Czechoslovakia was left with a comparatively low external debt when 
compared with other countries of the region. 
Slovakian Economic Situation within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the First 
Republic of Czechoslovakia 
Slovakia did not have the same industrial and commercial history of the Czech Lands 
leading up to the founding of the state of Czechoslovakia. It had until that point been a 
tightly controlled rural backwater of the Austro-Hungarian Empire ruled from 
Budapest, rather than from Vienna. It lacked entrepreneurial know-how as well as 
domestic capital and adequately educated and skilled workforce for a developed 
economy. One ofthe major success of the planning system in Czechoslovakia was to 
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develop industry in the republic. The increase in industrial production soared from 
about 700% in 1964 to well over 3 150% in 1988, while comparative figures for the 
Czech Republic are just over 350% in 1964 to slightly over 1050 in 198833 • This level 
of growth at last increased the living standards of the Slovaks to the level existent in 
the Czech Lands. Slovakia only achieved equalised living standards to the Czech 
Republic by 1983. Myant (1989) records consumer spending in the Slovak republic as 
standing at 63% of Czech consumer spending in 1953 and at 93% only by 1983. 
However, the cost of such a high investment into the industrial development of the 
area has been the emphasis on the priority heavy industries of the time, such as steel, 
chemicals and most notably armaments. This has returned to haunt Slovakia since 
1989, as these are the sectors which are no longer in demand and cannot compete on 
the international market. With whole communities dependent on any one such 
industry, the implications for the process and speed of economic transition are 
manifold. 
The relationship between the two republics finally came to a close on the first of 
January 1993 only three years after the 1989 revolution but it is with this general and 
specific inheritance in mind that Czechoslovakia emerged from 1989 and started out 
on the path towards privatisation and a market economy. 
Socio-Economic Inheritance from State Socialism 
The immediate inheritance from the socialist regime is one of information and power 
networks of interest groups at firm, locality and central1evels, bargaining for 
influence within an overall system of a highly centralised planned economic structure. 
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This was particularly true for Czechoslovakia as compared with Hungary. The 
situation which gave rise to such bargaining groups and social networks within the 
system have been referred to already. The effect of such inherited networks on 
transition or transformation and on organisational change within this process will be 
elaborated upon in subsequent chapters. However, it is important to note the 
inter-reliance of the social, political and economic spheres. The 'Vhj' (Vyrobni 
hospodafska jednotka in the Czech, or Vyrobnohospodarska jednotka in the Slovak), 
or 'economic productive unit', structure in Czechoslovakia incorporated an unofficial 
but institutionalised bargaining system comparable to the East German unofficial 
'Planerfilllungspakt', except that in Czechoslovakia, locality contacts were more 
important against central state control, particularly in Slovakia as a result of the 
intense post-war industrialisation. 
Most of these arguments are also valid for Slovakia with some reservations and a 
slightly different emphasis. The experience of greater autocratic and severe control by 
Hungary rather than Vienna in the old empire resulted in a mainly agrarian economy, 
with little industrialisation and almost no indigenous entrepreneurial class or culture 
of its own until industrialisation under state socialism. As a result of this local 
economic units and contacts held important political as well as economic sway in 
Slovakia, more so than in the Czech Republic, as they were often the sole centres of 
economic activity outside agriculture in any one area. Paradoxically in regional versus 
central government, Slovakia's localities were more reliant at the same time on the 
centre for co-ordinating directives in economic development and processes34• 
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Conclusion 
All these elements produce an organisational and economic culture which must be 
taken into account when designing a transformation process and related policies. The 
internalised behaviour of the past both at the macro-level of political and 
socio-economic practices and at the micro-level of entrepreneurial and organisational 
activity and development cannot be either cancelled out by the imposition of another, 
culturally alien model onto this inheritance at the macro-level, nor reformed without 
specific policies designed for the micro-level. 
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Chapter Four 
Privatisation, Economic Transition and Economic Embeddedness 
Introduction 
The privatisation process in East/Central Europe has, since 1989, been the main 
focus of political activity in the transition from a command to a market economy. It 
has also received attention from abroad as the most important factor in achieving an 
irrevocable shift to a Western style market economy. Managers also constantly 
referred to the major role preparations for privatisation played in the working life of 
the firm. Consideration of the potential impact of privatisation was also of concern 
to them. Whether the privatisation undertaken has actually achieved a shift to such 
an economic model is highly questionable. Rather it would appear that some 
transient model has been achieved, not only in terms of economic functioning of 
enterprises according to market criteria but also in terms of the 
ownership/management relationship as a central plank (implicit) of corporate 
governance. This chapter aims to discuss the privatisation process, its effect on 
economic functioning and practice, since this is the context within which managers 
and with which managers must operate. The chapter will also begin to explore the 
conditions of the privatisation process in various East/Central European countries 
and its relationship to the newly developing stakeholder model of corporate 
governance. 
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Chapter Outline 
First the privatisation process will be discussed in general in East/Central Europe 
since 1989, in terms of its aims, cultural specificity and success. Secondly the 
relationship between the privatisation process and the Czech and Slovak Republics' 
political agendas will bediscussed. It should be noted here that the main focus for 
this chapter will be the period 1990-111/93, when Czechoslovakia split into two 
sovereign countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. A short space will be 
dedicated to viewing the situation in the year and a half since the split in Slovakia 
in Chapter Five. The time of writing of this chapter is September 1994. 
Aims of Privatisation: Effective Management. Organisational Restructuring 
and Improved Performance 
The aim of the privatisation process in East/Central Europe is initially to divest the 
state of a dangerous over concentration of power and secondly, as elsewhere, to 
improve performance through greater competition, effective management (by means 
of monitoring by the new private owners), and appropriate organisational 
restructuring. In practice the actual rate of privatisation and its successful 
implementation, while varying greatly from country to country in the area, has 
generally been slower than expected in the heady days after 1989. In addition the 
positive effects of privatisation on management and effective reorganisation have yet 
to be appropriately assessed, while the potential and in some cases actual negative 
social effects cause concern. 
The role of private ownership versus state ownership and consequent arguments for 
and against privatisation and nationalisation have raged in Western Europe and 
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other market economies long before the East/Central European revolutions of 1989. 
The argument is seen as being of key importance due to the view that ownership 
patterns affect both managerial effectiveness and firm efficiency. 
It is not the purpose of this research to explore these arguments in Western Europe 
and America in great detail, but an acquaintance with the issues does put into 
context the decisions taken by many newly fledged East/Central European 
governments, often under the influence of the debate continuing in already 
established and mature market economies. 
The Neo-classicist and the Property Rights School 
Some authors, politicians and economists, such as Leipold (1983, 1988) Pejovich 
(1983, 1987, 1989, 1990), Milton Friedman and Margaret Thatcher, appraise 
private ownership as the factor affecting management and organisation efficiency 
most of aW. They assess private ownership as also automatically ensuring efficient 
production and appropriate distribution and preventing abuses of ownership. V an 
Brabant (1992) describes this approach as the neo-Austrian school2• Privatisation is 
also viewed as a means of raising the private capital market which in turn will 
enable future development (Hemming & Mansoor [1988]?. Parker (1993:1) notes 
that this is especially referred to in the case of developing economies4 • However 
Parker (1993:2) questions the power of this one measure to improve firm efficiency 
and commercial success as do among others Helm and Yarrow (1988) and Kay & 
Thompson (1986)5 • According to this latter point of view, ownership change does 
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not automatically produce improvement in firm performance unless accompanied by 
competition and an adequate regulatory environment Thus private as well as public 
ownership may produce inefficiency if operating within a monopoly situation. In 
other words private ownership alone does not produce competitive behaviour or a 
state of competition (Vickers and Yarrow [1988])6• In addition managerial 
behaviour and firm efficiency depends on the type of private ownership and ability 
of any particular type to monitor the situation. 
The Agent-Principal School and a more Organisational Approach 
Estrin and Perotin (1991), Yarrow (1986), Kay and Thompson (1986) have all 
approached organisational change from the point of view of changing the 
agent-principal relationship through privatisation, with an emphasis on contracts 
between ownership and management, linking, for example, payment to the value of 
company stock and the importance of the risk of external takeover to management, 
etc7 • However, Parker (1993:1) cites this agent-principal relationship as only one of 
the three changes required in producing an incentive environment for managers, 
thereby improving performance, the first being the structure of product markets, 
that is the existence or otherwise of monopolies, and thirdly internal structure and 
management8• Parker notes that for a change in management to occur Johnson's 
(1987) organisational paradigm change is necessary9. He cites 'new management, 
new organisational structures, a new market oriented mission and goals, and 
management and staff training programmes', as possibly being required. In other 
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words organisational change is an interactive process rather than the result of a 
change in macro-economic property rights interest, or even a singular reform of the 
agent-principal relationship10 • 
If this is true of organisational change in a relatively stable market economy, how 
much more so in East/Central Europe, where not only the new market and 
ownership structures are in embryonic form but also the very entrepreneurial 
culture and management experience is missing. In this case the very culture which 
predominates across the country or countriesmust be changed by, or at least with 
the aid of those very citizens imbued with that culture. The embeddedness of the 
economic system in a social and cultural context is the starting point of any change 
achieved through political policies, eventually affecting the economy and its 
operation. 
Economic Activity and Economic Embeddedness 
The model of effective business practise (or firm functioning), managerial 
responsibility and legal and regulatory environment must be placed in context. The 
legal framework reflects any society's cultural norms and accepted socio-economic 
practices. It may at times be inadequate or require reform, or even be used as an 
instrument for forcing a shift in accepted legal practices. This has in fact been the 
criticism of 'Thatcherism' in Britain, where 'law' replaced the sphere of 
'community', or accepted socio-economic practices and cultural norms. The vision 
of society and business practise is in accordance with the views of Friedrich Hayek 
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and von Mises who describe strictly minimalist interpretations of liberal 
principles11 • According to this view the state should be completely excluded from 
economic and social practices and limited purely to protecting the individual from 
external unsolicited influences. Thus it was argued under 'Thatcherism' and by 'The 
New Right' in Britain, that the legal system with an emphasis on negative rights or 
'freedom from' (as discussed in Chapter One), should become increasingly the only 
legitimate intrusion of the state into the sphere of civil society12• Thus the legal 
system was used as an instrument of shifting society from 'welfare culture' to the 
minimally regulated 'free market economy'. The sphere of 'market forces' were 
separated from 'business ethics' or the previously acceptedsocio-economic practices. 
Thus Margaret Thatcher was able to proclaim that there was no such thing as 
society, only individuals. Granovetter, developing Polanyi's (1947) thesis of 
economic embeddedness, describes this approach as 'under-socialized', in that it 
perceives individuals as acting purely in accordance with self interest in strictly 
economic terms, regardless of social relations13• The 'over-socialized' account 
perceives individuals as having internalised behavioural patterns to such an extent 
that that ongoing social relations have little impact on their behaviour. Granovetter 
argues the case of embeddedness of economic behaviour, that is that ongoing social 
relations influence behaviour and institutions to such an extent that any exploration 
of the area without taking this into account is extremely deficient. He criticises both 
the over- and under-socialised accounts as being deficient because they do not take 
this latter factor into account. 
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It is from Granovetter's general perspective that the privatisation process and its 
effect economic transition and activity and thus ultimately on corporate governance, 
and firm efficiency, in the Czech and Slovak Republics and Eastern Germany needs 
to be examined (See Chapters Ten and Eleven). If privatisation alone in a mature 
market economy cannot automatically improve firm efficiency for the reasons noted 
in the previous section, then when applied to an East/Central European context and 
socio-economic inheritance it appears substantially insufficient. Parker (1993), 
speaking from a Czecho-Slovak point of view, and van Brabant (1992) in a general 
East/Central European context, support this argument as does the research carried 
out in the Czech and Slovak Republics and eastern Germany by this author in the 
case studies interviewed14• The areas which must be studied in tandem with the 
whole privatisation process are issues of economic activity and economic 
embeddedness andcorporate culture. Thus the role of corporate governance as a 
means of improving both productivity and welfare becomes important, a fact also 
recognised ultimately by Estrin (1991)15 • 
Theories of Ownership. Control and Enterprise Restructuring: application to 
East/Central Europe 
The possibility of organisational restructuring must rest ultimately on the two broad 
schools of thought represented by the neo-classical and the property rights schools 
on the one hand and by the schools of thought which accept a role for the theory of 
the firm (or organisational theory), that is they endorse the separation between 
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ownership and control in a modern market economy. The property rights school is 
represented more generally in applied terms by Lipton (World Institute for 
Development Economic Research), and Sachs (Harvard University professor and 
influential advisor for Poland's shock therapy reform and to the Russian 
government), 1990 (2), and the IMF packages to Czechoslovakia16• Those that 
accept the role of the theory of the firm or for organisational theory, especially in 
an East European context, are represented by writers such as Andreff (1996), Estrin 
(1991), McDermott (1994), Myant (1993), Parker (1993), Pearce (1991), van 
Brabant (1992) etc. Within this group there are differences over the weight given to 
different factors: the role of capital market institutions and availability of foreign 
and domestic private investment capital figure as most important in Estrin (1991); 
the combination of institutional economic factors and organisational arrangements in 
Parker (1993); the importance of these factors in combination with role and 
influence of vested firm interests and networks in Myant (1993), Pearce 
(1991,1992), and McDermott (1994); and lastly the role and relative strength or 
weakness of evolving corporate governance systems in van Brabant (1991) and 
Andreff (1996)17 • 
The Property Rights Application to East/Central Europe 
In the context of East/Central Europe the property rights school initially attracted 
greater interest. The reliance on ownership change as a singular method of 
organisational change was informed by many neo-liberal theorists proclaiming the 
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benefits of privatisation in Western Europe, as referred to previously. This 
approach also required a certain interpretation of the previous regime, as provided 
by the Hungarian economist Janos Kornai. Kornai's early emphasis in his analysis 
of state socialism was that the state-owned enterprise was inefficient purely due to a 
soft budget constraint, that is investment hunger on the part of the firm and a state 
which generally acquiesced in order to ensure the meeting of production targets18 • 
This approach underestimates the role of political control by central government and 
the bargaining nature of the relationship, firm to state organ, as highlighted by 
Myant (1993)19• Kornai's interpretation would suggest that once ownership type has 
changed, so the problems of soft budget constraint and firm inadaptability would be 
resolved, as private entrepreneurship and a free market would step into the breach. 
Thus firm inefficiency would be eliminated. 
Sachs (1993) also assumes that 'markets spring up as soon as central planning 
bureaucrats vacate the field'. 20 Much of this hypothesis of the functioning of a 
market model rests onHajek's interpretation in The Road to Serfdom, which 
inspires Kornai's title, The Road To A Free Economy. 
The shortcomings of Hajek's model, developed in the 1930s have been highlighted 
by many writers including Myant (1993?1• These critiques generally question the 
ability of a free market, unencumbered by state regulation and intervention to adjust 
and temper its own activity and thus ensure its own continued and optimal 
functioning. Schumpeter (1953, 1954) argues that the advantages of a division of 
management and ownership and the role of shares is to provide easy access to credit 
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which frees up entrepreneurial energies22• Myant (1993) points out that in the ideal 
free market and limited institutional structure, only the career manager would have 
the long-term interests of the firm at heart. Therefore in a situation of a newly 
established market, where the quality of management skill is low or even 
non-existent, this type of 'self-interested' or firm-oriented entrepreneurial behaviour 
cannot be expected. Indeed Begg and Partes (1993) list conditions required to be 
met before capital and equity markets can properly act as a disciplining agent on 
management (See Chapter Ten). They doubt the ability of East/Central Europe and 
the former states of the Soviet Union to meet such conditions. 
Privatisation 
With regards to privatisation, in the East/Central European context van Brabant 
(1992) notes the advantages of widespread distribution of shares and ownership but 
also the potential difficulties for effective corporate governance. Widespread 
ownership may result in less effective monitoring especially in the countries of 
East/Central Europe, where managerialability and entrepreneurial experience has 
not been encouraged over the last 40 years and is therefore usually inadequate for 
the operation in a market economy and privatisation policies agreed upon by 
govermnent that will primarily affect ownership patterns. Van Brabant (1992) points 
to the lack of consideration of these issues by writers such as Feige (1990), 
Hemming and Mansoor (1988), Leipold (1983,1988), Pejovich (1990a, b) and 
Schroeder (1988), 'in the zealous advocacy of privatisation' 23 .Van Brabant also 
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points to the possibilities of management abusing its power over important firm 
specific information, as well as the possibility of new owners not necessarily 
allocating 'their services more efficiently than will state appointed officials' .24 
Indeed, at the organisational level, in interviews with this author, managers were 
equally concerned about other areas affecting the efficiency of their firm, in 
addition to the issues of ownership and control. This suggests that at the grassroots 
level managers in these countries perceived the issues of market environment, 
including economic institutions and their behaviour, as being as crucial to enterprise 
efficiency and often survival, as ownership change. 
However, the privatisation process took precedence at that time in terms of 
managerial attention, due to the fact it was the first area to be radically reformed by 
the government with its macro-economic emphasis. Thus, as will be highlighted 
later, managers were encouraged to incorporate ownership change into strategies for 
enterprise restructuring, with various results. 
Indeed East/Central European writers such as Kornai, originally so enthusiastic 
regarding the benefits of ownership change, began to revise this support in the light 
of Hungarian economic experience post 198925• Even the archetyal advisors of the 
neo-classical economic shock therapy, Lipton and Sachs, claim that a transferral of 
property rights alone, is not adequate to provide effective control and corporate 
governance in societies lacking economic institutions26• However, despite this 
admission, the neo-classical solutions of 'macro-economic stabilisation, 
liberalisation of economic activity, and privatisation', are the only options given for 
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economic transformation27• Suggested strategies for achieving effective corporate 
governance are flimsy and ignore completely the inheritance in former state socialist 
societies, especially at local level. The advocated model rests on the principle of 
distribution of free shares combined with a role for intermediary financial 
institutions such as mutual and pension funds to avoid dispersed ownership and for 
appointing representatives to the boards of directors in firms in which they hold 
shares28• In fact, Lipton and Sachs's (1990) model mirrors almost exactly that 
carried out by the Czechoslovakian and later Czech governments. In fact, none of 
these revised views adequately take into account the inheritance of established firm, 
inter-firm, firm-bank and firm-local government-state networks, as does, for 
example, Grabber's (1994) argument29• 
Economic Transition and Privatisation 
Scale 
The sheer scale of privatisation required to make the transition from command to 
market economy in East/Central Europe is reflected in Table 4:1. The size alone 
could be seen asproblematic but it is also coupled with the absence of a stable 
political and economic framework with mature legislative, judicial, institutional and 
civil society elements. In addition a generally accepted business culture and code of 
practice was non-existent and is still developing. Therefore while trying to manage 
an economic transition, representatives of the populace are attempting to secure 
political reforms and to developing support mechanisms required for the efficient 
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and regulated operation of a market economy. The exception to this is eastern 
Germany, which after unification became a fully integrated part of the Federal 
Laender of Germany. Thus, despite a short interim period from 1989, when the 
Berlin Wall collapsed to monetary and economic unification in July 1990 and 
political unification in October 1990, eastern Germany accepted the legislative, 
judicial, and administrative systems of the former Bundesrepublik or Western 
Germany. In other words the political and economic systems were transplanted into 
the new Laender. Adaptations and changes had to be made, but in general the East 
German populace was not left with a tabula rasa. This will be discussed in greater 
detail in the section on privatisation in eastern Germany. · 
The Neo-Classical School and the Role of Privatisation in Economic Transition 
The historical novelty of the transitions has caused numerous theories of how and to 
whom to privatise being proffered by Western experts and academics. Borenzstein 
and Kumar (1990) note six different distributive plans being flagged at that time: 
citizen shares (Feige); vouchers (Romania); financial intermediaries 
(Frydman!Rapaczynski); financial intermediaries (Lipton/Sachs); privatisation 
agencies (Blanchard); and self-management3°. Fischer (1992) points out that in the 
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Table 4.1 East/West Comparison: Share of State Sector in Value Added 
COUNTRY YEAR % 
Czechoslovakia 1989 97.0 
East Germnay 1982 96.5 
USSR 1985 96.0 
Poland 1985 81.5 
China 1984 73.6 
Hungary 1984 65.2 
France 1982 16.5 
Italy 1982 14.0 
West Germany 1982 10.7 
U.K. 1983 10.7 
U.S. 1983 1.3 
Source: Milanowc, B. (1990)31• 
light of the experience leading up to 1992 this list would have to be revised to 
include the programs passed by the Czechoslovak and Polish parliaments, which do 
not fit neatly into any category32 • The reasons for rejecting or accepting any 
particular model reside not only in pure economic criteria but also in political 
considerations. Additionally questions arise concerning the aim of privatisation; to 
increase firm efficiency?; to divest the state of a politically dangerous, 
over-centralized control ofresources?; to distribute shares democratically and thus to 
bolster political support amongst the populace for reforms? 
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It is interesting to note that Walkers, an advocate of privatisation on the Thatcher 
model, also notes the inappropriateness of introducing wholesale any 'foreign' 
package for two reasons; firstly in Britain prior to privatisation, 'the reform of the 
nationalised corporation was carried through while it was still in the public sector' 
and the old Eastern European states intend to allow the new owners to restructure; 
and secondly that it would be too slow33 • Waiters quotes Marton Tardos, leader of 
the Free Democratic Party in Hungary as estimating that at the pace of the 
Thatcherite reforms, Hungary would take 100 years to privatise its economy. 
Waiters quotes legal, political and administrative factors as being the determinants 
of Thatcher reforms in Britain. While noting that only general economic guidance to 
the countries of East/Central Europe may be appropriate rather than specific 
Western privatisation models, Waiters fails to note the necessary requisites of a free 
market economy and private ownership as being the very ingredients that 
constrained Thatcher's privatisation: legal, political and administrative factors. 
Here it is necessary to return to Granovetter's point of social embeddedness of any 
economic activity or system. State socialism, despite its authoritarian and highly 
centralised command system assumed a different form in each country. Thus Poland 
retained a large sector of agriculture under peasant ownership, while 
Czechoslovakia, Russia and the former GDR, for example, experienced 
collectivisation of agriculture. Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia emerged from 
state socialist ownership with a high degree of production in state hands, while 
Poland and Hungary due to the more gradual reforms which had started much 
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earlier ,emerged in 1989 with more private property. The differences are a result of 
amongst other things of social, political, economic and even geographic factors (i.e. 
Romania's pact with China to keep its Russian neighbour at bay). 
Van Brabant looking at privatisation from a East/Central European perspective 
notes the importance of the above two factors of speed and appropriateness of 
Western models. Furthermore van Brabant also questions the wisdom of 
privatisation as a guarantor of firm efficiency even in a Western European context, 
without the fulfilment of certain other criteria as noted earlier in this chapter. It is 
within this context that he quotes Comisso (1989) on the establishment of property 
rights and applies this to divestment of state capital in formerly command economic 
systems. According to this view property rights can only be securely established if 
three conditions are fulfilled. 
Firstly the rights must be in 'the hands of actors with purely economic 
responsibilities'. Secondly these rights must be 'enforced by a neutral party based 
on an effective judicial system and modern civil and commercial codes', and thirdly 
the 'policy-making authority, including the ability to prescribe what kind of 
activities the bearer of property rights can engage in, must be entrusted to 
institutions that themselves neither exercise nor enforce property rights. ' 34 
In other words a fully functioning market structure and an independent democratic 
political and institutional framework must be operational for privatisation, i.e. 
transfer of ownership, to improve firm performance. 
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Table 4.2 Economic Indicators 
Bulgaria CSFR Hungary Poland Romania CEECs USSR OECD (f) 
GDP ($billion) (a) (PPP,1989), 51 124 65 113 103 516 1,858 12,942 
commercial exchange rate(I989) 20 so 29 68 54 221 566 14,459 
GDP per capita (a) ($PPP) 5,710 7,878 6,108 4,565 3,445 5,536 6,500 15,565 
($commercial exchange rate, 1989) 2,261 3,214 2,750 1,807 2,311 2,302 1,981 17,390 
Export share as % of GDP (1989) 31 35 33 19 21 25 7 18 
Investment share (b) as % of GDP (1987} 27 26 25 29 30 28 34 20 
Sectoral shares in total employment(%) (1989) c 17 12 18 27 28 23 19 8 
Agriculturt 
industry 49 46 39 37 45 42 39 30 
Services 34 
" 
43 36 27 35 42 62 
Energy use per unit of output, relative to OECD (1988)(d) 2.2 1.9 1.3 1.9 2,5 2 2.7 1 
Share of private enterprises( e) as a % of NMP/GDP (mid-1980s) 9 3 IS IS 3 9 3 70-80 
(a) CIA estunmesjrom Plml&on, September 14, 1990, for PPP bfJsed GDP figures. World Bahk and OECD esttmatesjor commercwl exclumge rate based GDP figures. For USSR, the Jnlttal value of the commercial rate established in 1990 is used. 
(B) Nationlll Statistics 
c NatioMl statistics tmd OECD estimates 
(d) OECD &onomic Outlook 48, December 1990. 
(E) OECD Economic Outlook 47, luM 1990. 
(F) OECD data are from OECD diUa bases. 
Source: van Brabanl, Table 1.1 Economic Indicators, p.7. in Pozmmski (ed.) (I m) 
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This is clearly lacking, especially in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
but was also lacking in East/Central Europe in the early 1990s and is still not fully 
operational even in 1994. At the beginning of the privatisation process in most 
East/Central European countries the legal and institutional frameworks had only just 
been set up or were being drawn up at the same time as the privatisation scheme. 
David Parker claims that successful privatisation needs a mix of macro-economic 
and micro-economic reforms, as follows: 
+competitive product markets, requiring (a) the removal of preferences for state 
industries, (b) a reduction in tariff levels to fashion a more open and 
competitive economy and (c) competition law to prevent monopoly practices; 
+a free capital market; 
+a macro-economic environment conducive to private investment, including stable 
prices so that inflation does not distort market signals, and low taxes and low 
interest rates to encourage enterprise and investment; 
+the legal and administrative framework for private property rights to flourish, 
including clearly defined property and contract laws; 
+laws to set standards for corporate governance and investor protection; 
+recognised standards of business ethics; 
+agreed accounting systems and conventions so that accounts are meaningful and 
assets can be reliably valued; 
+a stock market and commercial banking sector; 
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+trained accountants, bankers and lawyers; 
+employment and welfare legislation to prevent the introduction of the worst 
excesses of capitalism, which might lead to a political backlash against the market 
economy.35 
As Parker notes although reforms have been introduced since 1990 to bring about 
such a framework, an acceptable and fully operational code of "business behaviour" 
or business culture can only develop over time and cannot be ushered in, in line 
with new legislation. All types of social interaction whether within the personal, 
business or economic or political spheres depend both on resources available and 
the institutional-legal framework ( van Brabant, 1992; Ickes, 1990; Kanel, 1974; 
Moser, 1989)36• Additionally the passing of legislation does not mean that it is then 
effectively implemented. (See discussion regarding bankruptcy and bureaucracy in 
Chapter Five).It is with these aspects in mind that David Stark has produced an 
analysis of the differing privatisation models among the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, eastern Germany, Poland and Hungary based on these factors37• 
Gradual Transition versus Shock Therapy 
Experts divide East/Central Europe into countries which have pursued fast 
economic transition or shock therapy and gradualism. Countries generally classified 
as shock therapy are eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia (1990-92), and the Czech 
Republic post 111193, Estonia, initially Russia (1992-1993), Poland (1990-93). 
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Those pursuing a more gradualist approach are usually classified as Hungary 
(1990-94), Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and various members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as Slovakia since 1/119338• 
However the different dates above display the fluctuations of policy within each 
country. In addition the actual policies pursued can often not be categorised in their 
totality into one section or another. Thus the Czech Republic pursues a so-called 
shock therapy policy and yet cultivates certain economic policies which have a more 
long-term and gradual objective. Similarly, Slovakia is generally described as a 
country of a more gradualist approach. Round two of the privatisation plan since 
independence has been delayed and yet Slovakia cannot be compared to Romania or 
Russia as a gradualist approach country. Rather it belongs to a separate category 
again. 
Slay also points to these discrepancies in the accepted analysis of shock therapy 
versus gradualism while claiming that, with the exception of Russia, all countries 
pursuing a form of shock therapy have fared better than those undergoing 
gradualism. This argument, however, excludes the economic, political and social 
inheritance of each of these countries, which influences the policies which can be 
ventured upon. It would appear that the very failure of shock therapy in Russia 
supports the view that for any particular approach to be successful requires certain 
conditions to be present initially. 
It is perhaps, therefore, also no surprise when looking at shock therapy that the 
country which has been the most successful in this type of transition has been the 
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Czech Republic. This country inherited limited external debts despite a high 
proportion of state ownership, a relatively strong civil society, a high level of 
education and a pre-war inheritance of technological know-how and economic 
power which rivalled the West in the 1930s. However, even in the Czech Republic 
shock therapy has not been applied as undilutedly as claimed, as will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
Thus shock therapy may be a more effective form of transition in narrow economic 
terms but no country in East/Central Europe, apart from perhaps Eastern Germany, 
follows a purely monetarist or shock therapy approach39 • Usually certain monetary 
policies are combined with longer term, more gradual strategy. In addition these 
countries embarking on the shock therapy approach may have done so due to a 
comparably more favourable starting point. This is not to ignore the value of 
individual personalities and skills of politicians and political parties and movements 
in the decision-making process. 
The following comparison of privatisation schemes in the countries of 
Czechoslovakia (1990-93), Poland, eastern Germany and Hungary displays further 
this complex interplay of present transitional economic policies and social, 
economic and political inheritance and present day situations. 
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A Comparative Analysis of Privatisation: Czechoslovakia. Eastern C'.ermany. 
Poland and Hungary 
The above discussion displays the fact that the actual functional process of 
privatisation is socially embedded, as much as entrepreneurial activity, which will 
be discussed in a later chapter. Stark supports the above argument in that he notes 
the influence of the inheritance from the old system of different social stratification 
and political-economic groupings on the method of privatisation of state enterprises. 
Stark argues the point of 'positional property' as important in this process40• He 
acknowledges the problem of the old state bureaucracy and bureaucrats using their 
political power togain economic capital in the privatisation process but rather 
emphasises the potential of economic position in property, e.g. managers and 
salaried employees as against other claimants of property. Jones however, 
emphasises and discusses in greater detail the problem of inheriting an old 
bureaucracy and old personnel with outdated values. Jones argues that the actual 
value systems bred within these institutions run contrary to any successful 
transition41 • As discussed later, Civic Forum found after carrying out a purge of 
Communist Party members within the movement, pulled back from a purge of the 
bureaucracy due to the lack of skilled employees to take their place. This would 
support Jones's view that while political changes have been immense, administrative 
inertia has not helped the process of transition. The problem of bureaucratic inertia 
and potential positional property or positional advantage of managers combined with 
weak corporate governance carry important implications for the success of the 
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privatisation process in producing improved firm performance. This particular 
relationship to the management-control relationship, as a central theme of corporate 
governance, and firm efficiency will be discussed in chapter three with respect to 
the Czech and Slovak Republics. Before tackling this issue however it is necessary 
to understand the context that the privatisation process has created for economic 
activity, how and why this occurred. 
While the problem of outdated administrative value systems and resultant 
bureaucratic inertia appears to be an intractable problem at the moment, 
govermnents do have the ability to model property distribution through the design 
of the privatisation process. If govermnents accept that privatisation is the best way 
of improving the economy andbestowing wealth on new individual owners, who do 
they bestow this wealth upon? Should they attempt to satisfy the new democratic 
aspirations of their populations only recently endowed with full civil rights, or 
should they attempt to effect improved economic performance in the hope of 
attaining middle to long-term support from the population. Alternatively does the 
population need to be convinced of the benefits of a market economy? 
Granovetter points to the importance of a combination of inherited behavioural 
paradigms, independent rational behaviour based on purely economic criteria and 
ongoing social relations in providing the context to ant economic activity. As 
already argued the strong existence of economic embeddedness (in all these aspects 
mentioned above), in East/Central Europe is critical to the understanding of, and 
indeed in the ultimate success of economic transition to a market economy, 
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including improved managerial and firm performance. The introduction to this 
research and chapter one have discussed in greater detail at the 'value' level the 
issues of 'non-economic' criteria, such as culture, political practice and social 
relations influence economic decision-making. Sztompka, a Polish sociologist, also 
outlines the interplay of all these aspects in the concept of social progress in the 
twentieth century42• Stark concentrates on the influence of the political and social 
inheritance of East/Central European countries in choosing their respective 
privatisation processes. 
What are these influences? What do they mean in practice and what are the 
implications for the choice and predicted success of privatisation strategies in 
East/Central Europe? 
Stark admirably assesses the structure and aims of privatisation strategies in four 
countries; Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland and Hungary43 • Although writing at an 
early stage of the privatisation process, in the winter of 1991-92, Stark correctly 
identifies the different emphasis of the strategies in different countries and finally 
searches for and analyses the reasons for these variations in the economic 
embeddedness of privatisation in each country. 
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Table 4:3 
Europe 
Provisional Typologies of Privatisation Strategies in East/Central 
Potential Applicants for Property Rights 
Resources for the Corporate Body Citizens 
Acquisition of Ownership (enterprise) 
Rights 
a a a a m m m m m 
GERMANY a CZECHO-m m m 
financial means 
a a a a SLOVAKIAm m m 
a a a a m m m m m 
n n n n n n n n n n 
position HUNGARYn POLAND n n n 
n n n n n n n n n n 
a= administratively m= through the market n= through negotiation 
Evaluation of the Enterprise 
Source: Stark (1991-92)44 
Stark's diagram attempts to display the different approaches to privatisation of 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Taking Stark's analysis country by 
country, the three elements which have influenced the forms taken are as follows: 
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+ the process and type of liberation from Communist Party control in 1989 
+ the corresponding inherited differences in social structure, political 
organisations 
+ the influences of the above two factors on the present political institutions 
and the way in which interests are shared out between the spheres of state 
and society 
It is interesting to note that Stark identifies the political and social organisation of 
pre- and post- 1989 East/Central Europe as being the most important factors in their 
economic transition. The economic inheritance, i.e. external debt (Poland) versus 
no debt (Czechoslovakia) have also influenced the process but as discussed in 
chapter one these respective economic situations were perhaps more the result of 
political decisions in an attempt to accommodate social pressures without 
challenging the Centrally Planned Economy and one party system, than they were 
of pure economic criteria. Political legitimisation of the system stemmed from 
economic planning and control according primarily to social need (See Chapter 
One), Therefore the political and social criteria were the driving force under the old 
system and thus need to be looked at now. 
The Former German Democratic Republic 
According to Stark's analysis, the former GDR, achieved liberation from state 
socialism through 'unification' into a united Germany, resulting in all political 
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institutions being taken over by the Bundesrepublik (Federal or West Germany). 
Thus the political leadership did nothave to cope with the remains of old personnel 
and completely entrusted the now new federal states or 'neue Bundeslaender' to a 
market economy. 
The old Bundeslaender from its own post-war experience had no reason to distrust 
either the market or the state. The one remnant of the old system where a complete 
change of personnel was impossible and no new all encompassing structure could be 
introduced was in GDR society. After 40 years of Communism certain value 
systems and patterns of behaviour had been built up, as in other East/Central 
European countries, which could not be changed overnight (See Chapter One for a 
discussion of value systems). Stark, in common with East German psychotherapist 
Maaz and East German writer Helga Koenigsdorf, in common with the findings of 
this study lists the inheritance of the last forty years as being personality structures, 
habits, tendencies, expectations and generally the way of thinking45 • Stark observes 
the West German leadership as believing that these attributes must be changed in 
East Germany before they can be entrusted to operate adequately in the new 
structures. Since 1992 to the present day, numerous German television 
programmes, opinion polls (See Chapter Nine), and most famously West German 
disgruntlement at the continuing high level of taxes required to maintain the East 
German recovery would support this view. 
These attitudes have resulted in a privatisation process which is essentially 
administrative in nature, organised through the Treuhandanstalt, set up by the 
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German government as an independent custodian and privatiser of former GDR 
state enterprises, with financial criteria as the 'only' criteria to distinguish buyers. 
The different aspects of this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Nine on 
eastern Germany. 
However the case studies undertaken by the author and discussed in the following 
chapters, indicate that West German potential managers, even before they have 
raised the necessary capital from banks, often prove more successful in acquiring 
companies than either former managers or work collectives or even the original 
owners when East German. The case studies are not statistically valid but do 
provide models for the effect of privatisation on ownership and management which 
are supported by data and other academic arguments. Thus Stark notes that by May 
1991 the Treuhand had privatised 1670 of the total 7000 firms of the former GDR 
and 90% of these were sold West German enterprises, 5% on foreign enterprises 
and 5% to former managers of the enterprises in question. 
Stark predicts (1991-92) that as the privatisation process slows with former East 
German state enterprises becoming less competitive and therefore less valuable the 
only option for the Treuhand organisation will be left with a large number of firms 
that must be either restructured and subsidised or sell to the former managers. The 
final option may involve protracted transactions as to the real value of the 
enterprises. This has in fact happened with the Treuhandanstalt planned for 
dissolution into management units to carry out restructuring of the remaining firms 
by the end of 1994. Therefore, although the privatisation process was the fastest 
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and most successful in narrow economic terms of all the East/Central European 
countries, it did bring about some dire results for the East German population. 
Unemployment at the end of August 1991 reached over one million and short-time 
workers, one and a half million46• Today unemployment stands at 40% of the total 
East German population and local economies have in some areas has collapsed 
completely due to the closure of some key enterprises and the sale and subsequent 
closure of others. The privatisation process has been effective in that it has 
privatised, by 1994, 13 500 firms and sold them to owners within a relatively stable 
and mature economic and political system47 • Management know-how from the West 
has also proved an invaluable resource. However at the same time the unpopularity 
of the Treuhand agency amongst the general populace, also noted in interviews with 
both eastern and western German management carried out by the author on site, 
combined with the 1994 narrow electoral victory for Kohl and an increase in the 
Reformed Communist Party, the PDS (the reformed communist party), such as 
social dislocation and alienation not experienced quite so severely elsewhere in 
East/Central Europe, exception perhaps in the former Soviet Union48• Thus the 
administrative approach to privatisation in eastern Germany resulted from a strong 
trust in the state and market and a distrust of society. 
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Czechoslovakia 
This process contrasts markedly with Czechoslovakia but is similar in one respect: 
belief in the power of the market as adequate means to regulate the process. A (free) 
market was not only the aim of the Czechoslovakian government in 1990-1/1/93 but 
a market was also decided as the main means by which to carry out privatisation 
and thus to build a (free) market. 
Czechoslovakia emerged from 1989 with an alienated and splintered population. 
Gustav Husak became first secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and 
successor to Dubcek at the end of the Prague Spring when he was appointed as a 
loyal servant by the invading Soviet forces. He had kept tight control on the 
political elites and the political opposition so that dissidents existed in often 
uncoordinated groups with weak roots in the alienated society and little innovation 
within the elites could occur. This was called the 'normalisation' process. An 
example of the effect on civil society is the famous Charter 77 which was active on 
human rights issues but was not a large-scale, cohesive political movement enjoying 
vocal support across the social spectrum as Solidarnosc did in Poland. Change had 
not been initiated successfully in Czechoslovakia by a broad based opposition but 
rather change was forced from the government in response 'to the Polish and 
Hungarian liberations as well as Gorbachev's relaxed control. The obvious vacuum 
of support in all areas of Czechoslovak society for Husak's government was the 
primary uniting force in the country. Stark describes the transformation in 1989 in 
Czechoslovakia as coming about through 'capitulation'49 Thus the new government 
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did not have to deal with any substantial grouping of politicians left over from the 
previous regime as Russia, Hungary and Poland did. 
The new government made up of Civic Forum members and instated after 1989, 
enjoyed considerable support but not from any one particular power base. The old 
political elites had collapsed completely leaving a void filled by former dissidents 
with wide ranging views. Some , such as Ramet, consider this to have left a power 
vacuum at the level of civil society and in fact the importance or otherwise of this 
factor is still being discussed in the political arena50• Most recently the same debate 
emerged between President Have!, who sees it as essential in a fully operational 
democracy and Prime Minister Klaus, who from a neo-liberal political standpoint 
sees representative elections as the only necessity in a democratic system51 • Similar 
ideological differences, but on an economic level, are discussed in the next chapter. 
The factors affecting the privatisation process and its design by the govermnent 
were then as follows: 
+ the state was relatively weak and still finding its feet 
+ support for the old political, economic and administrative elites was 
minimal in a country that had been effectively emasculated of its own 
creative, national road to socialism in 1969 
+ the opposition was splintered and not cohesively organised around a set of 
specific aims as in Poland 
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Thus the government needed to privatise, as in all East/Central European countries, 
to divest, in this case, the old administrative personnel any foothold in the power 
process. The government did not have to acknowledge any particular opposition 
group in society that had aided the transition. Thus the process of large scale 
privatisation chosen was coupon privatisation, by which process each citizen over 
the age of 18 had the right to purchase coupons for investment in state enterprise of 
their choice for 1000 Crowns. Stark claims that by charging 1000 Crowns 
(approximately a quarter of the average monthly income for an industrial worker) 
for the coupons, the state was not attempting any egalitarian strategy as in Poland 
where a free distribution of shares was carried out52 • However, given that the price 
was within reach of most people, the cost can only be seen as a token attempt to 
imbue monetary value into the coupon purchase. In fact the price only really 
covered the government's administrative costs of coupon distribution. However, 
government practice of not disclosing important information about firms to 
everyday citizens an yet making the sameinformation available from the ministries 
to journalists for a sum, would suggest that different perceptions existed at both 
government and society level as to who was to benefit from voucher distribution53 • 
What can be said for certain, however, is that the Czechoslovakian government was 
attempting to establish an anglo-american form of investment with, due to the form 
of distribution, a wide distribution of shareholders. Stark, writing at the beginning 
of 1992, notes that this implies a great deal of trust in management ability and 
equally a lack of concern about the effects of widespread ownership. Both these 
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elements are mentioned by van Brabant as being unsupportive in the move towards 
privatisation54 • Ken way and the author of this study have found that despite this 
attempt the corporate governance model has developed a more hybrid form due to 
elements of the intended anglo-american financial model mixing with a spontaneous 
formation of Investment Privatisation Funds (IPFs) and traditional roots in the 
insider or German model 55• This odd structure combined with a lack of management 
and shareholder, especially IPF expertise has caused organisational difficulties. 
This, however, is the subject matter for chapter three but is important to mention 
here due to Stark's neglect of this area. 
Thus due to Czechoslovakia's trust in the market and lack of strong social 
movements, the chosen process was over the market. 
By comparison to the former GDR and Czechoslovakian experience Hungary and 
Poland's choice of privatisation process defines the respective priorities as being 
quite different and peculiar to their own situations and societies. 
Hungary 
Hungary achieved liberation through elections, thus retaining a large number of the 
former political elites. This perhaps accounts for the mistrust of the market which 
Stark mentions56• The legitimacy achieved however by elections does not mean that 
there was a wholesale endorsement of government strategies. The fact that elections 
took place during the 'old regime' has meant that few alternative political options 
other than those of the already established parties had developed by the beginning of 
121 
1992. This created a statist elite. The lack of widespread social support for these 
parties or perhaps the lack of opportunity to measure the extent of any support (few 
intermediary organisations existed), other than the elections meant that the 
government was unaware to what extent society would support its reforms, or in 
other words a lack of social trust in government. Stark describes this as the lack of 
clarity over the extent to which society was willing to trust the government or the 
governmental process57 • 
In addition the liberal political and economic atmosphere was part of a slow 
transitional process leading up to 1989. Significantly elements of a market economy 
had been introduced over a number of years under the centrally planned 'economic 
framework. This meant that managers were in a particularly strong position by 
1989, having secured a limited amount of independence from the state. This in turn 
meant that the government had greater difficulties than other countries in trying to 
control the managers of enterprises. The privatisation process chosen, therefore, 
was not administrative, neither through the market as in the two previous cases. 
Instead 'relational contracting' was used, or a privatisation of the privatisation 
process, as a means of assessing the value of firms58• The State Property Agency 
(SPA),tendered out to the consultancy firms or international investment banks the 
rights to privatise a particular company based upon the proposals put forward the 
above firms. These proposals included an assessment of value, management of 
finances and finding a buyer. This practice of relational contracting between the 
SPA and the consultants elicits more information useful to both parties than could 
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ever be raised through market transactions as in Czechoslovakia. In addition, 
management of state enterprises often form limited companies and joint stock 
companies out of parts of the state enterprises in order to avoid debts, bankruptcy, 
take-overs or state supervision. The actual holders of the shares of these daughter 
companies are in fact held by the state enterprises so ownership of other shares are 
often in leading or middle grade positions of employment or are other joint stock 
companies or alternatively banks. Thus ownership over the period leading up to 
1992 became a complex mixture of types most generally described as 
institutionalised control brought about by a decentralised reorganisation of 
ownership by govermnent with govermnent enacting some control over the 
institutional control of shares and ownership. Thus management has the opportunity 
to use their strong position to acquire the form of a limited or joint stock company 
ownership. 
It is also necessary to point out the role of foreign investment in Hungary which 
Stark neglects to discuss. Hungary has received the highest levels of foreign direct 
investment of all of the East/Central European countries. According to Mr. Hamori, 
Commercial Counsellor at the Hungarian Embassy, London, Hungary contains 2% 
of the region's (East/Central Europe) population and has attracted 50% of the 
foreign direct investment to the area59• Thus the Hungarian choice of relational 
contracting was due to the existence of astatist elite, a lack of trust in the market 
and a lack of social trust in government and resulted in institutional control of 
ownership. This is in direct contrast to Poland, except for the aspect of lack of trust 
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in the market, where society and opposition moulded into one under Solidarnosc 
which was the primary shaper of the new government and political system. 
Poland 
Poland used coupon distribution as the form for large scale privatisation as in 
Czechoslovakia but in a different form and for different reasons. Unlike 
Czechoslovakia, Poland distributed the vouchers free of charge to all its citizens, 
who were then obliged to place these vouchers or shares with an asset managerw. 
The citizen could not cash in her or his shares as in Czechoslovakia, nor could they 
change property administrator. Thus the Polish government was trying to create 
responsible owners of property who could only receive a dividend for their 
investment. In addition workers and salaried employees of the privatised state 
enterprise were entitled to 10% of the shares in their own enterprise free. The asset 
managing holdings of large ex -state enterprises were held separate from pension and 
investment funds, so that no indirect influence could take place. Instead it was 
envisaged that these holdings would take an active role in the politics and strategy 
of the enterprises61 • Contrary to the Czechoslovakian example it would appear that 
the Polish government was 'attempting to design the ownership system along the 
insider type of the German model and was indeed concerned with the effects of 
widespread share ownership. Thus the Czechoslovak approach was to use coupon 
privatisation as a means of creating a market andthe Polish approach appears to be 
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a means of creating social support for the markd2 • What accounts for this 
difference in approach? 
Poland escaped from Communist Party control by compromise63• The growing 
power of Solidarnosc and the unworkability by the Communist Party of government 
over society forced an election which resulted in a disappointment for the 
Communists. Poland was the first East European country to achieve liberation from 
monolithic Communist Party control, with Hungary following a close second. In 
order to govern in the wake of these elections compromises were forced which 
inevitably left intact a part of the old elite. In addition the change had been brought 
about by the struggles and sacrifices of the united and strong social movement, 
Solidamosc, which had deep roots throughout society. Having started of life as a 
workers movement under Walesa's direction, it became a movement representing all 
sectors of society, especially in the wake of the support of the KOR (Committee for 
the Defence of Workers), intellectual activists for the workers during the strikes 
begun in 1976. Thus any incumbent government would have to take its base support 
into account and to satisfy its desires least it lose its support and therefore its power 
base Furthermore the Polish population distrusts foreign capital, especially German 
and therefore, unlike Hungary the government could not rely on this source of 
capital, especially as little foreign capital was forthcoming directly after the first 
elections and Mazowiecki' s call for help from abroad. The 
'nomenklatura-capitalism' of the period directly after the first elections and 
throughout 1989 resulted in calls for a privatisation strategy which would not favour 
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the old but still existent elites64 • Social mistrust of the market can only be 
overcomeby entrusting the population with shares rather than selling off to the 
highest or best placed bidder. 
Implications of the privatisation process for corporate governance and 
organisations in transition 
Privatisation in narrow economic terms does not improve firm performance. 
Various other legal and institutional arrangements need also to be satisfied, i.e. 
adequate competition, effective management, adequate monitoring by owners and 
shareholders, not to mention the ethical consideration of accepted practice in any 
society. In addition to this the aspect of economic embeddedness in any social 
system also affects the operation of the market and ultimately managers and 
organisations in society. Economic embeddedness can be analysed as three factors; 
internalised behavioural pattern, independent economic activity and on-going social 
relations. In a country undergoing change and especially in the countries of 
East/Central Europe undergoing such radical and complete systems and value 
changes the whole argument of social embeddedness illuminates the decisions made 
and the visions adhered to in the chosen privatisation processes. Some privatisation 
processes chosen, for example in eastern Germany and in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, may have been successful in terms of divestment of property from the 
state, but their success as the single most important factor in achieving improved 
firm performance is more questionable. The eastern German economy has benefited 
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from the grafting of stable, mature marketinstitutions and legal framework, as well 
as experienced personnel in the spheres of politics, administration and in business 
from West Germany. Indeed, most old East German fmnshave been sold by the 
Treuhandanstalt to West German owners. However the social costs and the effect on 
local economies in eastern Germany has been immense. Some blame the 
Treuhandanstalt as having created an economic backwater out of the five new 
Bundeslaender from which they can not recover. The rise of support for fascism in 
this area, especially amongst the youth suggests that social dislocation has been 
serious. 
In the Czech and Slovak republics the chosen privatisation process has failed to 
improve firm performance essentially due to it as complete failure in introducing 
effective corporate governance in companies. The strong trust in the market to 
regulate both privatisation and firm performance has been ill founded. The result 
has been a liquidity crisis and ineffective monitoring of management by owners and 
economic institutions, resulting in little organisational change. 
The historical context and inherited practices need to be dealt with in order to retain 
both support from the populace and credibility for government's policies. Equally in 
the design of "capitalism", reliance on market mechanisms alone cannot produce 
automatically an appropriate model for management and organisations in the social, 
economic, cultural and political contexts within which managers and the rest of the 
population must operate. 
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Conclusion on Privatisation 
This chapter has argued that any economic policy must take into consideration 
specifics of economic embeddedness before it can succeed in creating improved firm 
performance in East/Central Europe. The relationship between privatisation 
(ownership transfer from the public to the private sector) and improvement in firm 
performance has been discussed and found wanting when carried out in narrow 
economic terms without due consideration givento legal, institutional arrangements 
and on-going social relations. This is an important area to be considered in the 
study of change in management and organisations in transitional economies as it 
provides the economic and business practice environment for any economic activity. 
Various theories, developed in mature market economies, of the effect of 
privatisation have been explored and the success or failures of the application of 
these or similar theories in the East/Central economies undergoing transition have 
been discussed. A comparative analysis of the privatisation processes in a number 
of East/Central European countries has been carried out giving due regard to 
aspects of social embeddedness of economic behaviour. 
Finally it has been argued that privatisation can effect a change in these economies, 
in terms of firm performance only if it is carried out within a clear, stable 
regulatory environment and with due regard to the inheritance from the past, in this 
case in the spheres of human capital and expertise, economic and social practices. 
The next chapter aims to establish firstly the effectiveness of this new regulatory 
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environment and the privatisation process and secondly their effect on the 
ownership-control relationship in corporate governance within the context of a 
centre-locality dichotomy and thus potential firm efficiency in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics. 
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Chapter Five 
Economic Transition in the Czech and Slovak Republics: 
Neo-classical stabilisation and the lack of micro-economic 
restructuring 
Introduction 
The chapter will argue that the macro-economic policy in Czechoslovakia from the 
beginning of 1990 until 1993 and subsequently in the Czech Republic was primarily 
a mixture of an exaggerated monetarist approach (inspired by neo-classical Western 
economic advisors such as Sachs, Friedman and the International Monetary Fund), 
with some more interventionist policies1• These limited interventionist policies were 
designed to retain political control rather than to consciously influence the market 
system model resulting from macro-economic stabilisation and rapid mass 
privatisation. The limited and patchy industrial policy, enacted by the government 
as a result of pressure from below and from powerful figures in opposing political 
camps, reinforces a divergent firm level model growing organically in response to 
past inheritance, present changing market conditions and on-going socio-economic 
behaviour. The analysis of this firm led economic model will be dealt with here in 
terms of outstanding inter-enterprise and bank debt, two aspects which exert a 
strong influence on the management of organisational change in the transitional 
economies of the Czech and Slovak Republics. An overview of organisational 
change and firm actor behaviour will be developed in subsequent chapters. 
It must be emphasised that this chapter is not designed to give a detailed and 
comprehensive economic analysis of the Czechoslovakian situation and the 
subsequent situation in the Czech Republic. Indeed the economic issues discussed 
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here are too wide ranging to deal with at any length in one chapter. Instead this 
chapter has been designed to provide a political economicbackdrop to the case 
studies in the following two chapters. The period 1990 to mid-1994 covers the most 
important period of economic transition which provided the base to changes at 
enterprise level. However, many subsequent events through 1994, 1995 and 1996 
support the argument made here and will therefore be referred to where 
appropriate. An adjoining short chapter will deal with the Slovak Republic since 
1993. 
Chapter Outline 
The chapter will be divided into two main parts. The first part will deal with a brief 
outline of the political situation of Czechoslovakia from the beginning of the 
transition in 1989/90 and the debate surrounding the economic transition plan of the 
reforming government (post 1989). Thereafter, the second part will contain an 
examination of the effect of those economic policy choices mainly during 1990 to 
mid-1994 relating to: privatisation and achievements of privatisation; competition 
and demonopolisation; price liberalisation, inflation and currency conversion; wages 
and employment; changes in GDP; banking, bankruptcy and inter-firm 
indebtedness; bankruptcy and the lack of an industrial policy. The conclusion relates 
as a whole the discussion of these different areas to the government's lack of an 
integrated industrial policy. The experience of the Czech Republic post-1994 is 
included where it is significant to the argument posed here. 
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Political Evolution and Economic Policy 
Political Evolution 
For reasons of political control, economic decentralisation of state property was an 
imperative which could not be ignored. Control of all economic activity had been 
one of the two central keys to Communist hegemony, the other being authoritarian 
political control. In the heady ,unstable days immediately after 1989, there was 
immense political insistence in turning the tide irreversibly towards a market 
economy and a liberal-democratic political order. 
However there were varying beliefs as to how this was to be achieved. Vaclav 
Have! had been elected into office as President of Czechoslovakia on December 
29th 1989. The anti-communist alliance he represented, Civic Forum2 (in the Czech 
Republic), and Public Against Violence (the Slovak republic's sister organisation), 
were active in a coalition government of Civic Forum (CF) and the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) from mid-December onwards. Very soon Civic 
Forum came to dominate the government after the resignation of a number of CPC 
MPs and ministers. The first parliamentary elections in over forty years took place 
on 27 June 1990, in which CF was elected to govermnent, not as a political party, 
but as a political movement and thus encompassed a wide variety of views and 
beliefs. The movement contained under its umbrella a variety of political 
persuasions including the reformist communist views of those who during the 
Prague Spring had sought for the 'third way' or 'socialism with a human face' as 
proclaimed by Ota Sik in 19683• These reformists had later become dissidents. Also 
included were dissidents opposed to state socialism but with a social concern, such 
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as playwright Vaclav Have!, as well as a later generation of those whose beliefs 
were overtly neo-liberal. This latter, younger generation had often not been actively 
involved in dissident activity under the old regime but had operated within the old 
institutional framework, often carrying Communist Party cards for career reasons, 
while holding opposing beliefs. This was a typical example of 'internal exile' 
exhibited in many former COMECON countries but particularly prevalent in 
Czechoslovakia following the disillusionment of 1968 and the ensuing highly 
authoritarian policy of 'normalisation' under Gustav Husak. 
Four clear political groups began to emerge from March 1991 onwards, the Civic 
Democratic Party (the right or radicals), led by Vaclav Klaus with a larger degree 
of popular support , and the Citizen's Movement (CM), represented most notably 
by the President V aclav Have! which was better represented in the Federal and 
Czech governments. The rest of the MPs supporting Civic Forum, divided 
themselves between the re-established Social Democratic Party (Valtr Komarek), the 
neo-liberal Civic Democratic Alliance (Vladimfr Dlouhy) and other smaller 
groupings. The Civic Democratic Alliance was closer to Klaus, but less 
anti-Communist in tone, although later more minor differences would emerge4• 
Economic Policy 
It appeared to be along the lines of these different experiences and attitudes that 
opposing political views on the economic transition split into 'gradualist' and 
'radical' camps. 
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The old reformists and active dissidents, including President Have! and groupings 
close to him as well as certain research institutes, while supporting a shift to a free 
market economy, queried firstly the speed of, as well as the rationale behind, the 
privatisation plan proposed by Finance Minister, V aclav Klaus and secondly the 
process and sequential order of economic reforms introduced to support this 
transition. Thirdly this group was particularly concerned with the social impact of 
the economic transition. Central to these criticisms was their concern at the Jack of 
a well thought out industrial policy and the supposed ability of the privatisation 
schemes to encourage entrepreneurial behaviour and restructuring and increased 
investment automatically. The group's main proponents in the economic sphere 
were Valtr Komarek, Deputy Prime Minister (and also Member of Parliament, 
member of Civic Forum and director of the Institute of Economic Forecasting), and 
Jan Vrba, the Czech Minister of Industry. The 'reformers/dissidents' then, 
proposed a 'modified Keynesianism' while the new 'radical generation', represented 
by Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Dlouhy, Minister for Planning, argued for a 
monetarist approach5• 
Ultimately, the economic package chosen in 1990 was informed predominantly by 
neo-classical economic theory and resulted in important differences of approach in 
macro- and micro-economic policy decisions. Even Dlouhy, at the time active in the 
State Planning Commission in the reforming Civic Forum coalition government in 
early 1990 and a staunch supporter of Klaus as Minister of Finance, hoped for a 
limited plan to protect a degree of economic functioning, while insisting on the 
importance of radical systematic change. Dlouhy also advocated an eventual 
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development of a more integrated industrial policy which soon became forgotten in 
the enthusiasm for quick, market induced transformation. The fact that there were 
very real differences in the concept of transition, is also shown by the resignation of 
Komarek as Deputy Prime Minister in April 19906• His criticisms will be outlined 
later. 
Klaus pursued the rapid privatisation policy supported by both the International 
Monetary Fund and by western spokespeople, regarded as authorities on the matter. 
Most notably Milton Friedman visited Prague in September 1990 during 
parliamentary debates regarding economic transition and declared support for Klaus 
and his vision of a free market economy as opposed to the alternative social-market 
economy7 • Jeffrey Sachs, Harvard economist and a prominent advisor to the Polish 
government, also argued the case for 'shock therapy' 8• He was greatly involved in 
the summer 1989 debate in Poland on the fast versus slow economic policies for 
transition, setting a precedent for the whole region as it began to emerge from 
Communist control. 
However, as the government's position solidified, two divergent economic models 
became apparent at macro- and micro-economic levels. The different concepts of 
transition held by central government figures were reflected at a local enterprise 
level, where economic actorswere able to adapt policies as they were implemented. 
This was made possible by a number of factors, including the lack of an adequate 
industrial policy, the lack of restructuring and the consequent survival of 
functioning socio-economic networks from the past. Indeed, while entrenched elites 
in the industrial-financial bureaucratic complex were left almost untouched by 
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Klaus, the political sphere was purged under the lustration (lustrace) campaign 
(January 1991), which was deemed particularly necessary to the success of 
economic transition9• 
Those few party members of the industrial-financial bureaucratic elites who were 
removed were those heavily implicated in the excesses of the past regime. Their 
present positions in key posts (such as management) were compromised by past 
highly unpopular and conspicuously inapproprite activities. Thus while in some of 
the case studies interviewed senior management (as opposed to middle management, 
and especially those with purely technical expertise) had been removed prior to 
privatisation, in many of the cases personnel had remained more or less in place. 
Thus removal of key enterprise management figures was by no means a widescale 
phenomenon and no systematic behavioural change in organisational culture was 
encouraged by these individual changes. 
The development of two divergent economic models was evident from the 
micro-economic level from 1993 onwards, the results of which only began to filter 
back through to the macro-economic level in 1996. This will be discussed in the last 
section. 
Economic Plan and Effects January 1990 to mid- 1994 
Opinion as to the nature of the government's economic transition plan and its actual 
effect on the economy vary. The plan as proposed initially by Finance Minister 
V:iclav Klaus (Finance Minister until July 1991, when he became Prime Minister) 
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and Head of the State PlanningCommission, Vladimir Dlouhy (from 1 July, 1991, 
Federal Minister for the Economy) had four essential ingredients: 
1. liberalisation of prices 
2. liberalisation of the economy 
3. privatisation 
4. demonopolisation 
The primary emphasis appeared to be on a restrictive monetary policy by the 
Czechoslovak government, as opposed to institutional change. The restrictive 
monetary approach began on 1 January 1991, when, as already mentioned, 
anti-inflationary measures of price liberalisation and internal convertibility of the 
korunna were introduced. In addition to these policies, direct credit limits and wage 
control were also established. The combination of these policies with the major 
importance given to privatisation by the 'market', (as established in Chapter Four), 
combined to affect the economy in some important and unexpected ways. The lack 
of an integrated industrial policy to deal with issues of enterprise restructuring and 
outstanding debt (inter-enterprise and debt to banks), and the lack of institutional 
change and an adequate regulatory policy to support new ownership control patterns 
reinforced these problems. This in turn had an effect at the micro-economic level. 
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Privatisation and its Achievements 
Auctions, Restitution and Voucher Privatisation 
The actual contents of Klaus' s privatisation plan were criticised by the dissident 
movement, involving the major figures of Have! and Kom:irek as well as groups 
outside the movementsuch as trade unions. The three elements of the plan were 
small scale privatisation, generally through auctions, large-scale privatisation 
through the voucher scheme, and lastly and to a lesser extent privatisation through 
restitution. 
Auctions or small scale privatisation legislation pertaining to the sale of the service 
sector and small enterprises was passed on October 1990 (Law No. 427/90). It was 
criticised as providing money laundering opportunities for the old elites and 
nomenklatura and the illegal street traders who had flourished under the previous 
regime since no consideration was given to the source of finance and employee 
claims. Vaclav Klaus, however, firmly refused to allow any investigation into 
money sources, claiming that the task of distinguishing between clean and dirty 
money might be too complicated. The Privatisation Minister Tomas Jezek was 
quoted as saying: 
'We cannot ask people where they got their money from. Certainly there is 
dirty money here, but the best way to clean it is to put it to work.' 10 
The restitution law passed on 22 February 1991, only allows for the restitution of 
property going back to 1948. In actual fact much property had been nationalised 
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previous to that date. Thus many claimants, particularly Jews and Sudeten 
Germans, were excluded from claiming under this law. This issue is still to be 
resolved. President Vaclav Have! has been pressurising Vaclav Klaus, the Prime 
Minster for some time for the situation to be reconsidered by the Czech parliament, 
as has the German govermnent and Sudeten German groups11 • 
The gradualist or 'modified Keynesian' approach to Voucher or Large-scale 
Privatisation concentrated on two criticisms of Klaus 's plan as enunciated by the 
Institute of Economic Forecasting which submitted its own programme on 
September the lOth, 1990 to Parliament12 • The major criticism was that 
privatisation did not achieve its aim; that of the creation of an entrepreneurial spirit 
amongst owners who would in turn have a positive affect on the economy via the 
enterprises. Instead, it was claimed, privatisation spread ownership over too wide a 
number of shareholders who would have little control over managers and 
enterprises. An immediate criticism at the time in Czechoslovakia was raised by 
Milos Zeman, also of the Institute for Economic Forecasting, who criticised the free 
purchase of shares as reducing an appreciation of their real value and thus, claimed 
the Institute, would encourage further sales of shares soon after privatisation in 
order to buy consumer goods13 • The lack of an entrepreneurial spirit amongst the 
population was also quoted as a contributory factor14• 
However, despite these criticisms, Klaus' s large-scale or voucher privatisation was 
made law on February the 26th, 199115 • Management, employees and other 
interested outsiders were eligible to put forward privatisation plans by 20 January 
199216 • There are some important points to be made here, not only from a political 
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point of view but also with regard to privatisation and its effect on the development 
of entrepreneurial resources and management behaviour seen from the later 
perspective of 1993 and 1994, when the author's case study interviews were carried 
out17 • 
Achievements of Privatisation 
Privatisation, as enacted in Czechoslovakia leading up to the split in January 1993, 
was initially a joint programme. Since partition each country has proceeded down 
similar paths but at very different speeds and with very different political agendas. 
The nature of theprivatisation process in Czechoslovakia, its aims and its critics 
have already been discussed in the previous chapter. The Czechoslovak experiences 
from 1990-94 and beyond support these initial theoretical criticisms. 
What privatisation did achieve, however, was a change in ownership of enterprises. 
The figures regarding the amount of state property privatised vary. During the first 
wave, Mejstik and Burger (1993) summarise, from figures from the Czech Republic 
Ministry for the Administration of State Property and its Privatisation, the number 
as being 943 joint stock companies privatised in the Czech Republic, 487 in the 
Slovak Republic and 62 Federal enterprises, a total of 149218• The total net value of 
property designated for the first wave of voucher privatisation was Kcs 201 billion 
(US$ 7 billion). This accounts for Kcs 902.1 billion in total output across the two 
republics. Takla cites a similar figure of 1,471 companies across Czechoslovakia, 
while Frydman, Rapaczynski and Ear le et. al. quote 1,048 projects in the Czech 
Republic relating to 2, 154 business units19• Myant assesses the numbers as being 
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1,436 Czech and 573 Slovak enterprises accounting for 12% of Czech and 10% of 
Slovak fixed assests listed for the first wave20• Figures for those enterprises fully 
sold again vary with Takla quoting 291 and Myant quoting 4821 • 
Finally, by 1995 after two privatisation waves the EBRD (1995) reports the private 
sector as accounting for 70% of GDP in the Czech Republic22 • This definition of 
private includes anything that is not completely state-owned. This was achieved 
over a first wave in a united Czechoslovakia during 1992 (of which there were a 
number of rounds, that is bidding for shares in enterprises) and in a subsequent 
second wave in the Czech Republic alone, planned for October 1993, but actually 
carried out in 1994. In Slovakia after 1993, the privatisation process faltered and 
this will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter. As a general indication, however, 
the first wave of privatisation in Slovakia sold roughly half the number ofenterprises 
than the same wave in the Czech Republic and accounted for Kcs 196.3 billion in 
total output as opposed to Kcs 592.9 billion in the Czech Republic. The remaining 
Kcs12.9 billion (of the original figure for total output for a unified Czechoslovakia 
of 902.1 given above), represented the total Federal output23 • 
Economic Liberalisation 
Komarek representing the 'gradualist approach' warned of a Polish malaise if 
privatisation was brought in too quickly along with free prices, claiming that 
unemployment and social dislocation would reach unexpected proportions24 • He 
advocated a series of economic reforms alongside a more gradual privatisation 
plan. There was a belief that a contemporaneous development of institutions and 
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practices essential to the effective and regulated operation of a market economy 
could be introduced. Klaus, holding the opposite view, believed that privatisation 
along with price liberalisation, would guarantee successful economic change . He 
was firmly of the opinion that a change to a market system could not be 
orchestrated but would occur naturally with private ownership and reforms brought 
in as quickly as possible with little regard to an overall plrur5• 
Competition and Demonopolisation 
Hrncif (1993) describes the Czechoslovakian economic situation as one of an 
imperfect competitive environment, in which it is unrealistic to suppose that the 
market will act as the unique catalyst to change26 • He quotes three issues which 
were set to constrain recovery of growth in 1993. Firstly, the low level of economic 
activity due to depressed domestic demand and incomes; secondly, the fact that 
large-scale privatisation was proceeding more slowly than expected and was relied 
upon as the 'main driving force for restructuring'; and thirdly, that theopening of 
the economy resulted in limitations being placed on domestic expansionary policies. 
Hrcnif cites the lessons to be learned from the Latin American experience of an 
IMF inspired model being imposed in conditions of imperfect competition as 
described by Dornbusch (1990)27• Hrneif concludes that the 'profitable development 
of individual firms' depends on 'parallel behaviour of other investors', and that 
expectations towards investment and production can only be changed through 
expansionary policies which will increase domestic demand28• However, any 
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expansionary policies are only possible through matching this with a corresponding 
growth in exports29 • 
This critique highlights the inadequacies of the Czechoslovakian economic 
programme post 1989. Czechoslovakian export onto the world market fell 
drastically between 1989 and 1991. Hrncfi quotes Statistical Office data as 
recording a fall in trade flows in 1991 as against 1990 in exports in value terms by 
9% and in imports by 25%30• Where the export level has been maintained is in the 
areas of lower value-added goods. Indeed this was reported by many managers in 
the wood-working industries interviewed by the author, as foreign companies 
demanded value added goods at lower prices and increasingly raw materials in the 
form of unworked wood. Hrncfi summarises: 
'The declining share of Czechoslovak exports on the world markets, 
experienced in the long run, was coupled with increasing substitution of 
higher value-added exports by lower value-added ones, such as raw 
materials, intermediate products and standard consumer goods (while the 
"standard" process of specialisation in the course of development obviously 
implies just the opposite trend). In trade with developed market economies 
the CSFR therefore experienced "regressive" specialisation. '31 
This is supported by findings in the data on 1991, which reveal that surprisingly, 
the industries suffering most from the recession were those where Czechoslovakia 
was presumed to possess a competitive advantage. Thus the manufacturing 
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industries as opposed to the heavy industries experienced substantial reductions, 
while heavy industries in the short-term found markets due to cost and price 
competitiveness and a substantially depreciated exchange rate. 
This situation was completely unexpected by the government, which in accordance 
with IMF conditions had devalued the korunna excessively. The government, in a 
letter to the IMF, had confidently declared it would eliminate inflation after an 
initial rise in prices of 75%, and cancel a fall in national income of 5% by 
economic recovery in mid-199032 • 
As regards demonopolisation, the lack of institutional structures and monitoring 
ability has been described by many commentators. This fact combined with the 
extent of monopoly suppliers, lack of credit flow, inadequate structural changes and 
institutional restructuring, has contributed to a situation of continuing monoplies. 
This carries implications for organisational change. The effect of this imbalance 
became particulary apparent in 1994 when combined with the failure of privatisation 
to restructure and increase productivity. As inflationary pressures mounted for the 
korunna to be revalued upwards, fears increased that this would undermine the 
competitiveness of Czech exports. As little restructuring had taken place, there was 
no scope for competitivenss in higher quality goods33 • By 1996, some claimed the 
opposite problem of a too highly valued korunna and increasing technology imports 
caused the Czech Republic to run a dangerous deficit, with the same lack of 
restructuring impeding a resolution of the problem34 • Whether devaluing the 
korunna alone would help in this situation is questionable, as the low 
competitiveness may have caused the deficit, reflecting the previouslylow level of 
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technology imports35 • Indeed, the case studies in this thesis display the problem of 
enterprises which lack funds for appropriate investment. 
Finally, it is important to note that the opening up of the domestic market did bring 
benefits from tourism, foreign investment and the opportunities for Czechs to work 
abroad, which compensated for some of the negative effects in terms of balance of 
payments. By the end of 1991 the trade deficit was $450 million but the balance of 
payments was in surplus by $360 million. Although the currency was supported by 
loans from the IMF and other international organisations, debt servicing in 1991 
accounted for only 18.4% of hard currency earned through export36• 
Price Liberalisation and Inflation and Currency Conversion 
Komarek criticised the proposed policy of Klaus to free prices in early 1990 before 
demonopolisation of state industry. He claimed that this would lead to racing 
inflation, presumably as inefficient industries increased prices to cover costs without 
restructuring, and to a downturn in consumer spending which would already have 
been affected by rising unemployment37• In place of this Komarek suggested a more 
gradual transition: 
'We anticipated a market motivation in conjunction with a selective 
economic policy of the state that would remove certain areas of the 
economy and support others while utilising and continuously strengthening 
the market mechanism. '38 
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This view primarily involved the restructuring of industry and enterprises while 
continuing with tariffs and subsidies and controlled prices to protect those same 
enterprises from destruction through their inability to compete on the free 
international market. 
The radicals, however, believed that this would involve recourse to the central 
planning administrative machine which was slowly falling apart, and therefore could 
not be relied upon to carry out such a function. More significantly, they believed 
that no administrative machine could predict prices of goods accurately enough for 
the banking system to be able to allocate investment and loans efficiently according 
to successful entrepreneurial activity. Only the market mechanism, the radicals 
argued, based on the principle of supply and demand could be relied upon to gauge 
prices and thereby encourage increased productivity. The continuation of 
administratively set prices would encourage the policy of state subsidies unabated 
thus straining the budget and adding to inflationary pressures. The emphasis on 
eliminating the inflationary overhang (inherited from the old regime when prices 
were kept artificially low, subsidies were high and foreign debt accumulating), 
relied on monetarist measures which in turn, it was hoped, would ensure long-term 
growth from 1990 onwards. 
The radicals also pointed to the fact that in order to carry out any economic 
transition, the country was reliant on help from key international economic 
organisations and Western states, who would only support radical change39• In 
addition, the radicals felt that to continue with administratively set prices would 
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prevent inefficient enterprises being weeded out from increasingly efficient ones. 
With these considerations in mind, Dlouhy countered with the argument. .. 
' .. . the only criterion for the selection (of industries and enterprises to be 
supported) is an appropriate price system that can only be achieved through 
the liberalisation of prices and foreign competition ... The idea to first create 
competition, improve the productivity and competitiveness of our economy, 
and only thenliberalise prices and the exchange rate is a fiction and would 
lead us straight back to centralised planning. '40 
and emphasising the political conditions relating to economic transition, Klaus 
claimed that: 
'When considering whether to liberalise prices first and afterwards to 
demonopolize, we decided in favour of the liberalisation of prices because 
of changing external conditions. At a time when the whole of Europe is 
changing over to a market economy and to payment in hard currency, we 
cannot Jag behind. There is no time for us to demonopolize the economy 
first. '41 
Klaus felt that external competition would increase Czechoslovak industrial 
competitiveness only if exchange rates reflected true, that is market set, pricing 
within the country and demonopolisation would follow automatically. The law on 
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the liberalisation of prices was introduced in January 1990, with the government 
still regulating a selection of prices due to the potential for very large monopolies in 
those areas to abuse their position. Klaus claimed that this would support the 
liberalisation of the market rather than be opposed to it42 • On the 1 January, 1991, 
the government liberalised 85% of all retail prices and internal convertibility for the 
Czechoslovak korunna was set at Kcs28 to $1. It was calculated that after an initial 
upswing in prices (while monopolies raised prices to cover increased costs and to 
compensate for the levelling of the turnover tax rates into four categories as of 1 
January, 1991), new competitors to the market, attracted no doubt by the potential 
profits, would force prices down, after a short period of stockpiling43• Dyba (1991) 
referred to this raising of prices by monopolies as 'naive market behaviour' which 
would create competitive opportunities fornewcomers, and, the director of the Price 
Department in the Federal Ministry of Finance, Emanuel Sip, declared that this 
increased competition would produce adaptation or the creative destruction of 
persistently inefficient enterprises, thus further encouraging 'demonopolisation44• 
Indeed Sfp pronounced in January 1991 the partial achievement of this and forecast 
the elimination of unproductive enterprises through the resultant competition. 45 
It soon became evident, however, as predicted by Komarek, that the limited 
demonopolisation measures were not adequate enough to ensure the competition 
necessary to allow prices to function as a magnet for new market entries. Domestic 
production was protected by the exchange rate and a 20% import surcharge. 
Anti-monopoly agencies and the power of those agencies were inadequate to the 
task46• Neither did they produce a reduction in price rises. Reduction of prices 
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occurred only for perishable goods. Adaptation and creative destruction did not 
occur in the form expected. Instead, as highlighted by Myant in parallel with the 
Polish experience, enterprises stockpiled goods and reduced production thus 
allowing scarcity, once more, to operate as an economic tool. In this case to achieve 
higher prices for those products, without carrying out any restructuring and 
improvement of efficiency. 
Table 5.1 Retail Price Index (month-to-month per cent chan ge). 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
'91 25.8 6.9 5 1.8 2 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 1.5 1.2 
'92 1 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Source: PlanEcon 47• 
Frydman, Rapaczynski and Earle et al. (1993) assess the retail price index as 
stabilising by April 1991, but that the overall percentage rise for the year was as 
high as 58.9%48• Regardless of the fact that different calculations of this figure 
exist, (Myant [1993] quotes the annual increase as being 53.6% based on various 
issues of Statisticke pfehledy)49 and Hrncif [1993] as 57,9% , the overall figure was 
much higher than expected by the govermnent50• 
Ultimately Sip (1992) reflected that the final phase of price reductions had indeed 
only occurred for perishable goods, but not for others resulting in galloping 
inflation as enterprises stockpiled products and raised prices51 • 
However, as the above table indicates, price rises did begin to stabilise by April 
1991 and Hrncif (1993) calculates inflation as increasing by less than 1% on a 
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monthly basis since May 199152• Also currency conversion developed better than 
expected53 • 
Wages and Employment 
Although initial figures for unemployment and inflation in joint Czechoslovakia 
were higher than expected they soon settled back down, never having reached the 
dimensions of the Polish experience. The Federal Ministry of Finance forecast for 
1991 unemployment reaching a maximum of 300, 000 to 400, 000 people (3 to 
4%)54 • Wheaton and Kavan (1992) argue that this was over optimistic given that 
unemployment increased 100% in the first two months55 • By December 1992, the 
Czech Republic's unemployment rate had increased to 5%, although by Western 
standards this was quite low. 
Fogel (1994) quotes estimated over-employment rates in 1990 as being 15% of total 
employment56• Thus although unemployment was rising to a higher level than 
expected, it is significant that it is still relatively low. Slovakia was the exception, 
experiencing at the same time leading up to the separation of the two republics 
(1993, January), an 11% unemployment rate57• Table 5.2 shows the unemployment 
rates in the Federal Republics of Czechoslovakia in 199112 and Table 5.3 breaks 
down these figures by republic. 
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Table 5.2 Unemployment rate (as percent of labour force) in the Federal 
Republic 1991-1992 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
'91 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.2 3.8 4.6 5.1 5.6 6 6.3 6.6 
'92 7.1 6.9 6.5 6 
Source: PlanEcon'8• 
Table 5.3 Breakdown of Recent Unemployment Rates according to Republics 
Year 1992 
akia Czechoslov Czech Republic Slovak Republic 
April30 6.0 3.2 11.8 
May 31 5.6 2.9 11.3 
June 30 5.5 2.7 11.3 
July 31 5.4 2.7 11.1 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade59 
The government's approach to wage and employment policy is perhaps a good 
example of state intervention in the market by a government which depicts itself as 
a proponent of the monetarist 'free market'. The government wage-capping policy 
in the state sector continued through 1994. The wage-capping policy was an attempt 
to keep wage costs low and therefore prevent firstly spiralling wage claims in the 
fight against inflation and secondly bankruptcies. The government has also led an 
active employment policy. Burda (1994) cites the Czech Republic, as following 
active labour market policies to keep unemployment down60• Staffing new 
organisations dealing with the unemployed involved hiring more people than were 
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unemployed and at one stage half the budget was spent on infrastructure and job 
benefits. Burda notes that despite a strict implementation of unemployment benefit, 
resulting in a lower registration than shows in unemployment surveys, the 
government subsidises youth entry into employment (rather than emphasising 
training). 
Slay (1994) has referred to problems of 'creative destruction' and bankruptcy 
reform issues as figuring large in the Polish and Hungarian transition but not in the 
Czech Republic due to the above policy61 • Slay quotes real industrial wages 
increasing in Hungary and Poland from 1990 to 1993 by approximately 25.1% and 
17.4% respectively. Whereas in the Czech Republic during the same period they 
fell by 17.4%62 • Slay's point can hardly be credited given theproblems in banking 
and debt. A more modest claim, perhaps, is tenable: while lack of unemployment in 
the Czech Republic has aided old cadre managers to gain legitimacy in the firm, as 
described by Soulsby and Clark, it has also maintained the social peace63 • 
However, by December 1994, reports of labour unrest began in response to the 
planned reductions of social security benefits64• It is questionable given the 
economic developments emerging over 1996, that the social peace can be 
maintained. 
Changes in GDP 
The fall in domestic demand and its effect on GDP were not calculated by the 
government as noted by both Myant and HrnCil'65 • Hrncff (1993), quoting the 
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Statistical Bulletin, Federal Statistical Office as a source, records a fall in volume of 
economic activity in 1991 as decreasing by -15,9%, and in real wages by -24%66• 
Table: 5.4 Basic indicators of macroeconomic development in 1990 and 1991. 
Year 1990 1991 
% change from previous 
year 
Gross Domestic Product -3.50 -15.90 
Gross Industrial 
-3.70 -21.20 
Production 
Real Wages -5.60 -24.00 
Consumer prices* 10.00 57.90 
*Average for 1991 as against 1990. If compared to the end of December 1990, consumer pnces 
increased in 1991 by 53.6% 
Source: HrnCfr, p.l34. Table 1. 
My ant also sources industrial output as having fallen by 21.2% over 1991, and 
although he records figures for the drop in industrial output over 1992, as 10%, he 
argues that the level was in fact rising after December 199167 • 
Retail turnover, as noted by the chairman of the state bank declined by 23% 68 • In a 
similar way the budget deficit experienced by republic and federal governments by 
the end of 1991, displayed the unexpectedly low level of revenues from enterprises 
due to economic depression and continued government spending despite cuts. In 
fact, as with the the relationship between the job creation schemes and lower wages, 
the government had prevented the budget deficit from leading to higher prices and 
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therefore to inflation, by continuing subsidies on certain basics such as electricity 
and public transport. Myant quotes Kupka (1992) deputy minister in the Czech 
government, as saying that the budget deficit was 'an acceptable price' to pay for 
the maintenance of social peace in the wake of economic transformation and to keep 
Slovakia within the federation69• In the event this last aim was not achieved for 
exactly these reasons which included falling living standards and high 
unemployment. 
This interpretation is supported by figures cited in Dedek (1996), where a 
comparison of the GDP annual growth rate is carried out between East/Central 
European countries over 1990 to 1992. In 1992 Czech GDP fell by -6.4, and 
Slovakian GDP by -6.1, compared to -4.3 forHungary and, surprisingly +2.6 for 
Poland70• Gerloch, at the Charles University, Prague, notes this decline as being 
surprisingly steep and sees the causes rooted in low domestic demand. He interprets 
the reasons for this as being due to a decrease in real wages after price liberalisation 
and the loss of interest in state-owned enterprise managements in making long-term 
investments (linked to the privatisation process). Gerloch calls this a 'unique 
depression of an economy in transition' rather than a 'standard economic 
recession' 71 • 
Slay would appear to agree with the former interpretation72• He reports that during 
1993, GDP in the Czech Republic was unchanged, although it fell by 6% in the first 
half of 1993 and inflation rates were moderate during 1993 at 20% (up 11% on 
1992). He claims that despite this low growth, macro-economic performance was 
more solid than elsewhere in the region. On closer inspection, however, this 
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recovery is described as export led, particularly exports to OECD countries, which 
grew by 13-16% in 1993. Slay points to the fact that the surplus in merchandise 
trade of $268 million by the end of September offset a decline in industrial 
production. He also points to a surge in tourist receipts (an increase of 36% for 
1992). This combined to create a $380 million hard currency current account 
surplus by mid-year. 
On this evidence Slay states that the low growth rates do not reflect the pace of 
economic activity. Although he reports the effect of maintaining high employment 
rates as being a lack of industrial restructuring, Slay does not assess the 
implications of a low growth rate for domestic productivity and ultimately does not 
link this to the lack of industrial (and enterprise organisation) restructuring73 • 
Myant, however, takes the latter view of 'standard recession' when he refers to 
comments made by Bijan Aghevli (head of the IMF mission to Czechoslovakia) in 
Hospodatske noviny (3 May 1991). He argues that the IMF were convinced that the 
recession was evidence of the success of financial monetarist policies carried out, · 
which of themselves would bring abouteconomic transition and recovery74 • To 
compensate for these low growth rates in domestic production, it would appear that 
the Czechoslovakian, and later Czech government, relied upon an export led 
recovery (in turn dependent on a devalued korunna) in basic goods. This resulted in 
little attention being paid to the lack of restructuring at industrial enterprise level. 
More recent changes in Kornai's view as expressed in Highways and Byways 
(1995) would also now appear to support this view75 • Furthermore the evidence of 
the economic situation in 1996 would tend to support this assessment. 
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Inter-firm Indebtedness, Banking and Bankruptcy 
One of the primary problems in the economic transition was that of inter-firm 
indebtedness which was not adequately dealt with within the government's 
economic plan. A prime aspect of the government's anti-inflationary policy was 
direct credit limits. Myant notes that many of the supporters of the anti-inflationary 
approach, such as Vit (1992), were aware that the policy of direct credit limits was 
in conflict with the tenets of free market principles, in that it depressed wages and 
therefore aggregate demand76• However, other effects were less well appreciated by 
the same proponents. In the event the policy of higher interest rates and restriction 
on credit also increased costs and, dangerously, inter-firm indebtedness. 
Inter-firm Indebtedness 
Many enterprises had inherited debts from the past as well as the practice of 
enterprises issuing credits to each other. As discussed in first chapter, by the end of 
the 1980s the former planned economy had begun to run up debts, due in part to 
unpaid exports and credits toformer CMEA and developing countries. In addition, 
Myant points to a change in the early 1980s which reduced the turnover fund from 
enterprises and instead allowed enterprises credits without set repayment dates and 
with very low interest rates in order to fund short-term stock-holding77• As a 
consequence, in the late 1980s, some enterprises were left with stocks of unsaleable 
goods and debts but this did not cause any crisis due to the nature of the economic 
environment. However after January 1991, past debts were suddenly hit by an 
interest rate of 24% as opposed to the previous 8%. The problem of inter-enterprise 
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debt had existed in the 1980s whenever a tighter monetary policy was introduced. 
These debts were then traced back to a small number of large enterprises, but 
threatened other smaller suppliers, whose bills, in turn, were not met'8• 
Vesely (1992), however, notes that by December 1989, inter-enterprise payment 
arrears were at their lowest, standing at 6.6 thousand million Czechoslovak 
korunna.79• After this date there was a steady and sharp rise. Vesely (1992) assesses 
the volume of overall debt as growing to Kcs 47.1 billion in December 1990 and 
Kcs 147.2 billion in September 1991 and possibly surpassing Kcs 300 billion before 
the end of 1992. This affected over 43% of economic units. Vesely estimates Kcs 
36 billion of this was due to primary insolvency, Kcs 29 billion to unpaid debts by 
foreign debtors and the rest due to inter-firm indebtedness80• The reasons for this 
growth in inter-firm indetedness are two and are best presented by in Vesely 's 
analysis of the form and type of payment arrears in Czechoslovakia. 
Forms of payment arrears may be inter-entrprise 'overdue credit vows' (zavazky po 
llu1te splatnosti) and 'outstanding bank credits' (uvery nesplacene ve lhiite). Of the 
first form there are again two types; 'primary payment inability' (prvotni platebni 
neschopnost) and 'secondary payment inability' (druhotna platebni neschopnost). 
Whilst accepting that primary insolvency (bankruptcy) serves as an important exit 
trigger in both natural marketdevelopment and in mature market economies when a 
company does not develop appropriate adaptive strategy, Vesely notes in the 
Czechoslovakian context primary payment arrears can also be a result of a lack of 
liquid capital in the financial environment of a firm, regardless of its actual success 
as a productive unit. Vesely concludes that the macro-economic policy of the 
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Czechoslovakian state was not orientated to solving the problem of primary 
payment inabilitites, which were exclusively a result of behaviour at the level of the 
micro-sphere, where, amongst other causes, firms stock-piled goods in anticipation 
of price liberalisation and did not adapt sufficiently to changing conditions. 
Conditions which exaccerbated the problem of primary payment inability were those 
relating to the existing institutional network; amongst other things under-developed 
connections between banks and an underdeveloped financial market generally. 
However, Vesely accepts primary payment inability generally as a necessary and 
permanent phenomenon in a market economy. By contrast Vesely categorically 
describes secondary payment inabitiy as arising solely out of primary payment 
inabilities and thus are of a temporary, technical and 'manufactured' nature. The 
ultimate cause of the phenomenon of secondary payment inability (arising out of 
primary payment inabilities and inter-frim indebtedness), he describes as follows: 
'Secondary payment inability is a temporary phenomenon which occurs quite 
often and which is caused by underdeveloped institutional market networks 
(or frameworks) in a transforming economic system (inefficient payment 
relations in banks, loan policies do not reflect the real situation, which is 
caused by distortions of their balance sheets, underdeveloped, or 
non-existence of exchange flows). ' 81 
The possible solutions he itemises as follows; 
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'-more flexible credit policy of banks 
-a set of institutional netwok precautions 
-widening of variety of ways to pay credit 
-reciprocal agreements regarding non-payment ability between creditor and 
debtor 
-bankruptcy of companies. '82 
Banking 
A similar situation of inter-enterprise debt inherited from state socialist planning is 
also described by Estrin, Hare and Suranyi (1992) for Hungary in the 1980s and 
especially from 1987 onwards, due to the introduction of a two-tiered banking 
system and large-scale enterprise debts emanating primarily from a few large 
enterprises83 • The new banking system had been designed to allieviate these 
problems by a degree of bank commercialistion. Similarly in Czechoslovakia, in the 
post 1989 period, the reforming government decided to reform firstly the banking 
system along market lines, that is by commercialising state banks and opening up to 
new smaller private banks, and secondly macro-economic policy in order to 
encourage change at the micro-level. 
Unfortunately the problem of debt was unaffected by the new restrictive monetary 
policy in terms of structure. It had been assumed that with the advent of 
liberalisation of the market and these monetary policies, banks would take over 
unhonoured debts, by granting loans to companies and enterprises which were able 
to restructure. Banks, however, acted in their own interests once freed from the 
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constraints of the state, and not in the interests of industry. This initial reluctance 
on the part of the banks to make loans was reported by every companyinterviewed 
by the author in 1993 regardless of its ownership status, that is whether it was a 
former state enterprise or a newly established private firm. Begg and Portes (1992) 
also cite a tightening credit situation, especially for newly established enterprises 
due to over-extension of credit from banks to former state enterprises and due to 
high interest rates84 • Webster (1992), surveying Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, finds similar problems of credit for new firms. In Czechoslovakia 
80% of newly established firms had loans, but 40% of these had been made in 
association with restitution claims or for the purchase of businesses under the Small 
Privatisation Law85 • Again the Hungarian banking system displayed similar 
characteristics after 199086• Thus in terms of enterprise profitability, the above 
policies, unsupported as they were by any strategic state industrial policy of 
selective application to firms, threatened the very survival of the majority of firms. 
The situation became progressively worse. By early 1991 the previous 8% interest 
rate on these inherited loans jumped to 24% 87 • As a result inter-enterprise debt 
began to grow, as firms were unable to secure loans from banks or tried to avoid 
their high interest rates on credits. Begg and Portes (1992) note this growth as being 
a symptom of credit problems rather than a cause and this reinforces Veselfs 
interpretation. Dyba and Svejnar (1992) report that inter-enterprise debt more than 
tripled from Kcs 44.9 billion at the end of 1990 to Kcs 145.5 billion by the end of 
1991 and by the end of the second quarter of 1992 still stood at 123.7 billion. By 
comparison loans from banks to state enterprises increased only from Kcs 529.8 
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bilJion at the end of 1990 to Kcs 575.3 bilJion in 1991 and Kcs 564.9 bilJion by the 
end of the second quarter in 199288• Figures for the rise of overall outstanding 
debt (i.e. both inter-enterprise debt and bank loans), for both republics are quoted 
by Hmcif (1993) as being 250% in 1991 and 100% in 199289• This situation 
threatened a latent 'domino bankruptcy' effect. Indeed Vesely (1992) refers to this 
spreading (rozSifovani) and chain(retezenf) effect on payment inabilities as a whole. 
In the woodworking industries in March 1990 he reports the number of 
organisations involved as being 10 and the amount as being 0.1 bilJion 
Czechoslovak korunna, which rose to 141 affected organisations and 2.8 billion 
Czechoslovak korunna in September 1991. Similalry for the food and drink industry 
numbers of enterprises affected rose from25 in 1990 and 0.1 korunny to 141 
enterprises and 3.6 billion korunny. Across Czechoslovakia as a whole numbers 
increased from 594 affected enterprises in March 1990 and 11 billion korunna to 3 
960 enterprises and 14 7. 2 korunny in September 199190• 
This state of affairs influenced the number of requests for bankruptcy proceedings 
from both creditor firms and banks. Although levels of debt were rising it was not 
necessarily to the advantage of the creditor to push for bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy 
There are three factors which must be borne in mind when attempting an analysis of 
the reasons for the growth of inter-enterprise and bank debts and the reluctance on 
the part of all actors to enforce bankruptcy proceedings. 
166 
Firstly, the enterprises were aware that to take out bankruptcy proceedings against a 
debtor firm was a slow and difficult process due to the nature of the law. This law 
divided bankruptcies into primary and secondary insolvencies, the former being the 
only one which could cause liquidation in order to pay debts91 • Also the process of 
bankruptcy proceedings had to pass through the Ministry of Industry, who could 
delay proceedings for a year. In addition, a further disadvantage for the creditor 
was the fact that to carry out proceedings against a long-term supplier or customer 
could damage production, research and development and sales, because of the 
inter-linked nature of the former economy (close links betweensuppliers and 
customers and the integrated nature of the former Vhjs or combines), and the lack 
of demonopolisation since the change in regime. 
An example of the continuing inter-linked nature of units previously attached to the 
old combine structure can be seen in the brewing industry. The Research and 
Development section for most of the brewing industry throughout the Czech 
Republic and to a lesser extent in the Slovak Republic, was located in Prague. Thus, 
under the new economic conditions, the failure of this institute would effectively 
deprive all breweries, but especially the small breweries, of the research and 
development function which many could not duplicate quickly within their 
individual units92• The existence of this type of dependency, in multiple and various 
forms between suppliers and producers throughout industry, resulted in economic 
units continuing to write credits to other firms and wait for their own creditors to 
eventually honour debts, as this made more practcle sense. 
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A second factor which contributed to the situation was that banks also Jacked the 
incentive to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. McDennott (1994) notes that there 
were 7 main banks across both republics, which accounted for 99.5% of total loans 
in Czechoslovakia in December 1990, and 80.1% in July 199293, despite the fact 
that there were 44 new banks by the end of 199294 • Indeed by July 1992, these 7 
banks held 92.8% of all deposits in Czechoslovakia, 74% of which were household 
savings. Although the setting up of the Consolidation Bank to take over some of the 
long-standing loans, accounts for the difference in total debt held by banks in 1990 
and 1992, by early 1993, 97% of Komercni banka's loans and 55% of Investicni 
banka's loans were to state finns (In June 1993 loans to the private sector stood at 
only 13% of total loans in the system)95 • Thus the uneven structure of the banking 
system and the source of its funding (household savings) had important implications 
for its future development and that of the industrial finn in general. 
As almost all bank capital was invested in industrial firms, the collapse of an entire 
sector, due to the potential domino effect of bankruptcy proceedings against one or 
more finns, meant that the existence of the banks themselves were in question. As 
noted above household savings were the main source of finance for bank credits. 
Indeed, Begg (1991) reports that in Czechoslovakia, two thirds of enterprise debt in 
1990 was effectively owed to householders via deposits in the savings bank, which 
had lent to commercial banks. These commercial banks had in turn made loans to 
enterprises96• The aspect of citizens savings has also been quoted in the argument 
against debt cancellation, along with the fact that any such action would also 
eliminate the assets of the state banking system97 • This fact made the government 
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unwilling to cancel firm debt. In addition banks remained reliant on only two 
sources of income; savings deposits and interest repayments on loans from firms. In 
other words the problem of bank recapitalisation had not been resolved and 
therefore behaviour had not been changed. It was within the banks' interests to 
continue to make out loans at high rates without insisting on restructuring of 
enterprises. Indeed in 1994, the Czech Minister for Trade and Industry, Vladimfr 
Dlouhy berated domestic commercial banks for failing to provide affordable loans 
to firms and thus causing a market sluggishness98 .Thus McDermott (1994) notes: 
'banks enjoy a 7 point spread between credit and debit rates, giving them a 
prime source of financing to strengthen their capital base. As the 
government increasingly stepped in to guarantee short-term bail out loans 
for the most insolvent firms in 1991-92, banks could simply sit on their 
loans and tally expected profits. Given their dependency on the survival of 
industrial firms and their guaranteed high rates of return, banks 
substantially increased short-term loans with only marginal increases in 
medium- and long- term loans. '99 
A less important point, but still a factor until reform in March 1991, was the way 
the banking policy of requiring banks to honour all enterprise debts presented to it. 
This policy acmally stimulated the growth of inter-enterprise debt. Queuing for 
allocation from insufficient funds became the practice, as in Hungary100• 
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A third major contributory factor was the threat of social unrest at large-scale 
closures which caused the government to intervene in a piecemeal fashion to bail 
out individual enterprises. Indeed Myant cites protests from enterprises as being one 
of the main factors in preventing the problem of bankruptcies from becoming 
worse, quoting the examples of the Zetor tractor factory in Bmo in December 1990 
and the events of mid-February 1991 at the CKD engineering combine in Prague In 
these examples the enterprises and workforce outrage persuaded, firstly, the 
Ministry of Finance to intervene and, ultimately, Klaus to establish the new 
Consolidation Bank in 1991. The Bank would offer 8 year loans at 13% interest to 
finance stockholding101 • In addition the Bank was enabled to acquire either equity 
in, or, to cancel outstanding debts in some companies. This latter process was 
supported by the National Property Fund which committed Kcs 10 billion to this 
activity at the bank in February 1993102 • 
By Spring 1992, the bankruptcy law, drafted originally in July 1991 (Act 328), was 
suspended for a year to allow the government time to reform it. It was eventually 
amended on 23 March 1993, and became effective from 22 April 1993 in order to 
relieve the above situation, allowing promising companies to break out of the cycle 
of debt and to prevent new companies from failing as a result of these same 
circumstances. Indeed one of the newly established and highly promising 
companies, interviewed by the author in Western Slovakia, which initially seemed 
to flourish had failed due to bad debts by the second year of interviews (1993). 
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Bankruptcy and the Lack of an Industrial Policy 
It is notable that the government had assumed that the banks, once freed from state 
monopoly would automatically act in a commercial sense, interpreting 'commercial 
sense' as meaning supporting industry. Instead banks operated according to the 
competitive logic of self-interest. The same has been reported for Hungary during 
transition103 • Thus the government, relying on a restrictive monetary 
macro-economic policy and privatisation as the only other approaches to their 
economic transition policy, was reduced to trying to manage crisis situations by 
intervening in Individual cases and trying to prevent industrial collapse by weak 
enforcement of the bankruptcy law and the subsequent amendments and adaptations. 
This process is described by Takla as: 
'govermnent intervention in an ad-hoc manner, in response to financial crisis 
or political pressure, as a result of ex-ante negligence.' 104 
Managers of small- and medium-sized enterprises, interviewed by the author, also 
reported with annoyance the fact that while most joint stock companies had to 
accept the debts from the past, large-scale or important industrial or manufacturing 
sectors were exempt due to fear of adverse employee reaction. Takla (1994) also 
points to the 'piecemeal application of the bankruptcy law' which appears as a series 
of 'concessions which are a function of economic or political pressures', usually in 
the area of very large - scale enterprises in heavy industry, for example Skoda Plzen 
and steelworks etc. Both of these elements testify to the mixed government 
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approach, supposedly neo-Iiberal , but actually mixed with government 
intervention. 
Thus importance of an integrated industrial or micro-economic strategy in 
reforming an economic system and enterprise behaviour would therefore seem 
imperative. 
What other options were open to government regarding debt? Debt cancellation is 
one. There are many arguments for and against this approach105• The main 
disadvantage is the fact that cancellation does not reform the old structure of 
corporate governance within the firm, and thus loss making can continue. In 
Czechoslovakia two further difficulties were the effect of any such action on citizens 
savings and the assets of the state banking system which would be eliminated106• 
The other option in these circumstances is the buying back of debt by the state in 
the form of long-term bonds, as occurred in Chile in 1982. However, as Tanzi 
(1992) points out this causes the government's fiscal position to deteriorate. The 
other alternative, is of course to do the same through the banking system: 
'By being made through the banking system, they do not swell the fiscal 
deficit and, thus, distort the fiscal accounts giving an inaccurate view of the 
tightness of the country's fiscal policy' .107 
The government's decision, however, to set up the Konsolidicnf banka 
(Consolidation Bank) to alleviate the problem of unhonoured debts only fulfils this 
approach partially. As stated above, despite the existence of this system, debt to 
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state enterprises still grew with the other large banks. Begg and Portes (1992) 
suggest further approaches were necessary in their financial restructuring plan for 
economic transformation. Although no reference is made by Begg and Portes to 
problems of cross-ownership in enterprise restructuring (to be discussed in the next 
chapter), an interesting attempt is made to counteract the problems of indebtedness 
which afflicts attempts to restructure. Privatisation on its own, it is argued, cannot 
guaranteethe end of future bailouts for a former state enterprise given the degree 
and structure of indebtedness. In order for privatisation to fully take effect in this 
sense: 
'credibility and transparency are needed, so that the prospect of future 
bailouts does not impede alteration of current behaviour.' 108 
This would involve a constructive policy of selective credit controls rather than 
wider margins, fiscal subsidies, cash limits and the recapitalisation of banks. Begg 
and Portes argue that selective credit controls should only apply to commercial 
banks in the state sector and would specify a minimum share of bank lending to 
private firms. This quota if not used up could be transferred to other private firms 
at cheaper rates. This would encourage entry and exit, rather than wider margins in 
the banking system which would inhibit new firms. This aspect of their proposed 
approach would only survive as long as banks were in the state sector, slowly 
disappearing as more and more banks were privatised. Fiscal subsidies and cash 
limits would allow the government to openly admit to bailing out companies it 
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cannot afford to let close, and yet, impose some sort of restructuring influence over 
them109 • This would involve the government having an explicit policy of fiscal 
subsidy to enterprises it wished to support rather than: 
'conniving in open-ended rescheduling of credit and capitalisation of interest 
arrears. '110 
Thus the lack of credible rules and structures in Czechoslovakia can be directly 
traced back to the lack of a thought-out and integrated micro-economic policy. The 
initial reliance on privatisation alone to restructure enterprises began to founder 
quite soon resulting in thesetting up of the Consolidation Bank, limited banking 
reforms, a piecemeal system of bail-outs and the recall of the bankruptcy law and, 
ultimately, a drop in GNP. 
Indeed within Czechoslovakia the government calls for a more constructive 
industrial policy, rather than a reactive and disorganised protectionism were heard. 
The Czech Ministry of Industry, headed by Jan Vrba wanted a more selective 
approach to bankruptcies and the Union of Industry of the Czech Republic 
supported this m. However, Klaus 's Federal Ministry of Finance and Klaus 
opposed such moves. 
What is interesting is the emphasis placed by the government on a limited form of 
restructuring in the companies where they did intervene. Takla also cites examples 
of the government intervening in m:Uor companies to prevent collapse due to bad 
debt, in particular the example of Skoda Plzeii (the giant heavy engineering combine 
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or Vhj) which received Kcs 915 million in the form of a bond issue from the 
government to cover its debts. This was eventually bought by Komercni banka and 
Investicni banka. However, the Ministry of Finance only allowed the money to be 
transferred once it was sure that restructuring of the unit into 25 separate entities 
had been achieved. Takla notes that the government carried out a similar policy 
with CKD (the giant engineering combine or Vhj), breaking it up along product 
lines and not marketing lines. The problem with this approach, however, was that 
all the new independent units remained tied together firstly, because of their 
dependency on the head office for sales, especially in the areas of exports and 
contracts, and secondly because of the interdependent nature of their product 
progranunes. This, McDermott, refers to as a high degree of synergy. 
Thus while insisting on restructuring in companies where it had intervened, albeit 
inappropriately, the government did not see fit to carry this process out in other 
enterprisesbut rather to rely on the banking system and new ownership patterns to 
carry out the same. Takla (1994) makes the point that: 
'Bankruptcy procedures are not solely about the problem of enterprise debt. 
They also hinge on questions of asset restructuring. The conundrum to be 
solved is whether to reorganise or liquidate. Questions linked with 
liquidation are concerned with determining the point at which one can judge 
enterprise performance sufficiently to justify closure and thus opt for 
definite closure against restructuring. '112 
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Thus Begg and Portes (1992) call for a long-term view to be taken with 
micro-economic changes to support the macro-economic transition. Costs of 
monetary austerity, without a realistic policy on credit control, they suggest, would 
impinge 'severely and asymmetrically' 113 • 
However, international agencies such as the IMF, World Bank and the EBRD, 
impose their own conditions on economic policy in debtor nations. Myant point to 
the fact that the Czechoslovakian government in correspondence with the IMF 
guaranteed tight monetary policy as well as devaluation of the korunna114• Dedek et 
al. (1996) also refers to the Memorandum on the Economic Policy, drafted by the 
Federal government for presentation to the IMF in December 1990, which omited 
completely structural policy as an economic reform tool115 • My ant also refers to the 
IMF's use of the euphemism 'payment arrears'116 , suggesting that no consideration 
was given to the inherited debt situation, a major omission considering the above 
discussion and the resulting effects on corporate governance and restructuring which 
will be reffered to in the subsequent chapters. Begg and Portes (1992) argue that the 
approach they outline for financial restructuring along with privatisation would 
enable international agencies to relax their calls for the achievement of budget 
deficit targets. Thiswould be possible as the micro-economic changes advocated 
would deal with the asset side of the public sector balance sheet, as well as 
encouraging more efficient credit allocation, and therefore also restructuring. 
Ultimately they claim: 
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'Any statement about the sustainability of the public finances is questionable 
given the uncertainty about the value of public sector assets. ' 117 
Finally Abel and Bonin (1993c:4) point out that it is important to separate the 
objectives of financial sector reform from those of enterprise sector reform, that is 
'recapitalising banks, consolidating loans to facilitate workout, and restructuring 
large loss making enterprises. Separate procedures should be designed to deal with 
each problem.' 118 
Conclusion: A Neo-classical Approach or Ad Hoc Interventionism 
This chapter has discussed the economic transition plan of Klaus 's government from 
1990- mid 1994 in Czechoslovakia, and, with briefer reference to important later 
developments in the Czech Republic. Generally it has been argued that there has 
been emphasis on macro-economic stabilisation and liberalisation and a neglect of 
the micro-economic and institutional dimension. Hrncif (1993) describes this 
imbalance as 'asymmetry' .m 
In terms of overall policy detail McDermott (1994), Myant (1993), Takla (1994), 
Begg and Portes (1992) and Czech politicians and economists Jan Vrba and Valtr 
Komarek support this analysis120• In particular many of the above authors highlight 
the lack of a systematically thought out and integrated industrial policy on the part 
of Klaus's economic programme. Therefore, whereas the mass privatisation plan 
and macro-economic policy were strategicattempts to create a certain type of market 
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system, industrial policy as such was an inconsistent and piecemeal affair rather 
than a developed strategic approach. 
It is important to note that although Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic 
relied upon the market to regulate ownership and control relationship through 
voucher privatisation with little government intervention, it did not allow the same 
to occur with employment policy. The point to be made here is that the government 
denied the full implications of the relationship between economics and the political 
and social spheres in supporting the neo-liberal approach on the one hand for 
privatisation, however on the other hand the government accepted this interplay of 
spheres for their employment policy which bound firms firmly to regulations for 
political popularity rather than economic reasons (Myant 1993)121 • 
Myant describes the end result as: 
' ... a kind of compromise in which neo-liberal or monetarist policies were 
adjusted and modified, but no full alternative could be developed. ' 122 
McDermott (September 1994) outlines the continuing problems arising from those 
chosen process of transition as being inter-enterprise debt, inadequate banking and 
investment fund structures, inadequate regulation, and, as a result of all of these 
issues, a lack of restructuring at firm level. Takla's (1994) treatment of the banking 
sector also supports important aspects of McDermott's hypothesis. The confusion 
of financial sector reforms with enterprise restructuring policies have been referred 
to above, and the neglect of micro-economic restructuring reform resulted in 
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inherited practices being adapted by economic actors for survival in the new 
proto-market circumstances. 
What will become increasingly important for the economic future of the Czech 
Republic is long term efficiency of domestic industrial and manufacturing base. 
This is at present compromised by cross-ownership and lack of restructuring, lack 
of long term investment, and the fact that the weak and outdated industrial base 
supplying foreign markets will have to produce this change. In fact on the 6th of 
December 1996 the Financial Times reported on the looming trade deficit in the 
Czech Republic and the lack of efficiency in enterprises. Until mid-1996, low 
production costs and a low korunna had encouraged sales abroad. The issues of firm 
level imbalances arising from the macro-economic emphasis of transition, only 
became highlighted from 1996 onwards. The decrease in competitiveness combined 
with the problem of a complex and sometimes unstable capital market, with cross 
ownership that compromises banks, IPFs and firm behaviour, and continuing firm 
indebtedness have highlighted the micro-level issue; how to restructure with limited 
long-term finance, lack of management skills, especially new and important areas, 
such as marketing, and how to improve productivity and quality. 
It has also been argued by government ministers (as reported in various Financial 
Times issues) and by Myant (in correspondence with the author), however, that the 
increasing trade deficit is in part a result of the importation of technology to 
improve quality. However, a it is too early for this supposition to be proved. What 
the evidence does at present suggest is that for an improvement in the trade deficit 
to occur: 
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'depends on managers and shareholders whipping industry into competitive 
shape. That requires finance experience and nerve by existing management. 
As Richard Salzman, chairman of Komercni Banka, notes: "There are no 
reserves of management available on the market." ' 123 
Some commentators, notably the Financial Times (May 14, 1997), argue that 
although the new owners in the form of IPFs in the Czech Republic have failed to 
restructure, reforming the capital market should allow more foreign investors in, 
which in turn should influence management and performance. Again the assumption 
is that firstly new shareholders will have the long-term interets of the firm at heart 
and thereby influence management of the organisation, and secondly that the new 
owner has the expetise to carry out any such restructuring, that is expertise of 
operation in both a mature market economy and of a transitional economy and of 
the domestic business culture and practise. This is a rather overoptimistic view of 
management and owners' abilities and interests, which has still not been qualified 
by experience to date. In addition development of banks given the plans for bank 
privatisation in both the Czech and Slovak Republics, their potential new owners 
and the roles of these banks in enterprises all combine to influence the evolution of 
enterprise corporate governance and thus posiibilites for restructuring. A rather 
more realistic hope therefore, although still a slow and difficult one to realise, is a 
'silent secondary privatisation', resulting from IPFs beginning to sell their shares in 
1995, not however on the official capital markets but as direct sales at the Securities 
Centre. Although Mertlik notes that many new owners may be foreigners in the 
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Czech Republic, there are also private Czech investors. The difficulties with this 
approach, however, link to the lack of protection for minority shareholders and 
against hostlie takeover bids. Thus there are concerns that this may amount to 
'cheap sale of the national economyot24 • 
At the micro-level, and with the limited example of the firms interviwed by this 
author, the case study of Dfevodelny appeared to have benefited from exactly this 
silent secondary privatisation. Further research on across a wider selection of firms 
would be necessary to explore this point adequately. 
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Chapter Six 
Slovakia: Post independence economic transition and the 
centre-locality dichotomy in micro-economic restructuring 
Introduction 
In the Slovak Republic since the beginning of 1993 the specific socio-economic 
conditions and industrial structure inherited from the command economy have 
forced a more cautious approach to privatisation and economic transition than in the 
Czech Republic. In addition problems of corruption, which exist in both the Czech 
and Slovak Republics, have coalesced in Slovakia into a form of political clientelism 
affecting the political sphere at a highly public level and impeding the progress and 
maintenance of clear policies in economic transformation. As a result privatisation 
has been reduced to a stop-go process all too often obviously linked to political 
favouritism, rather than based on designed macro- or micro-economic criteria. Thus 
Slovakia has, unlike the Czech Republic, undergone a period of political instability 
and change, while at the same time maintaining surprising stability and apparent 
success in the economic sphere. These elements require Slovakia post-1993 to be 
dealt with separately. 
The chapter will attempt to clarify the position of Slovakia as opposed to that of the 
Czech Republic in the field of economic transformation and to highlight the linkages 
to the micro-economic or organisational level in the republic, thus further 
contextualising the information gathered from the Slovak case studies and creating 
an organisational paradigm with which the Czech and to a lesser extent the eastern 
German case studies can be later compared . 
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It is not the intention of this chapter to cover issues of separation from the 
Czechoslovakian Federation and how this was achieved, but rather to plot 
independent Slovakia' s domestic economic progress. 
Chapter Outline 
An outline of Slovakia's economic transition since 1993, including political and 
economic changes will be given. The reasons for the different approach to economic 
transition, including counterarguments will then be examined under the section 
Inherited Industrial Structures. Subsequently the changes in privatisation method 
and in the political sphere will be assessed, followed by an updating of political and 
economic changes 1994-96, including the question of whether economic 
improvement actually occurred. Finally the organisational implications will be 
assessed with reference to privatisation, regional policy, management buyouts, and 
centre-locality networks. 
The potential development of political clientelism and its affect on economic change 
will be updated for the period 1994-96. Finally, the organisational and economic 
implications of this pre 1989 inheritance and of the experience of transformation 
and post- independence will be assessed before the conclusion. 
Economic Transition Since 1993 
Political Independence 1993 
Slovakia became an independent country after the 1st of January 1993, ruled by 
Prime Minister Vladirnir Meciar who with his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
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(MDS or HZDS in Slovak) had won the June elections of 1992. The MDS had 
campaigned at this election for an independent Slovakian economic policy, which 
would protect the countryfrom the worst excesses of economic transformation 
already experienced as part of the federation. 
Leading up to 1993, Slovakia had suffered from substantially higher unemployment 
than the Czech Republic. In addition, enterprise failure and industrial closures had 
affected Slovakia heavily, especially in steel and in the armament producing 
Western Slovakia. Slovakia has a greater share of the armaments industry and the 
loss of markets after the end of the Cold War, combined with President Ravel's 
request to cut production on humanitarian grounds, threatened this industrial 
branch. Jezek (1991) and Outrata (1991) both refer to this imbalance in production 
share in armaments between the two repub!ics1• Dedek et al. (1996) describe the 
production of armaments in the former Czechoslovakia peaking in 1987 when it 
reached 3% of total industrial output and employed 100,000 people. By 1992 this 
amount had been reduced to 15% of the 1987 volume and Slovakia produced 60% 
of the total Czechoslovakian output. Therefore cutbacks in the sector affected 
Slovakia much faster with its share reduced to 40% and 50, 000 employees 
affected2 • 
Thus there was a common perception that Slovakia was in general being affected 
worse than its sister republic by economic transformation. The lack of regional 
policy and policy making bodies within Slovakia, fuelled this perception further. 
This view was shared by The Independent Association of Slovak Economists who 
made these very points in their Declaration on Sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, 
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published in Hospodarske noviny on the 19 March 1991. They called for a revision 
of the reform process to allow for the specific conditions of Slovakia and for 
Slovakian economic sovereignty. 
Thus Meciar managed to attract popular support for his policies in June, although 
support for independence was more qualified. Actual independence was never voted 
upon by the populace and indeed was not generally popular in either republic but 
occurred as a result ofpolitical bargaining. Once Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar 
headed the first independent and democratically elected government in the history of 
Slovakia, he was not, in fact, able to deliver his economic promises. 
Economic Independence 1993 
1993 proved to be a mixed success. The economic disaster predicted by many did 
not occur, although the first year of independence was hardly an unmitigated 
economic success. Slovak gross domestic product fell by 6% in the first six months 
of the year when compared with the same period in 1992 and continued to fall. 3 
Industrial production declined by 14.7% in the first three quarters of 1993 
compared with the previous year over the same time span. However, by August and 
September it began to grow again for the first time in months4• Unfortunately 
unemployment, one of the prime motives in the campaign for economic 
independence, continued to increase. By 31 October 1993 the unemployment rate 
had increased to 13.8% from 10.4% the previous year. In addition, inflation rose 
to 18.2% over the first three quarters of 1993, and an annual rate of 25-30% was 
predicted for December. 
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The reasons for this continued downturn were many but an added complication was 
the effect of separation from the Czech Republic on inter-republic trade. Generally, 
however, the causes were the same as experienced under federal control, as already 
discussed in Chapter Four. The new Slovak government was, perhaps 
unsurprisingly given the depth of problems to be overcome, unable to alter the 
economic situation immediately. 
However, the prime failure of the new government was in the area of privatisation 
and institutional macro-economic change. To this extent it continued to mirror 
disappointments with the same process in the Czech Republic for similar and for 
some very different reasons. 
The absence from the macro-economic reform package of a combined policy for 
institutional economic change (for example, the development of an appropriate 
banking sector or the establishment of empowered and appropriate regulatory 
bodies), and strategic industrial change (for example encouraging competition 
through restructuring of monopolies before privatisation, strategic support for both 
promising state enterprises and newly established firms with appropriate stable 
financing), was characteristic for both republics. The result of the first wave of 
privatisation in both republics (completed in Slovakia in January 1993), and indeed 
of the second wave also in the Czech Republic, has been a predominately 
Privatisation Investment Fund led ownership structure, with a smaller number of 
independent individual domestic owners and a degree of foreign ownership. To this 
extent the organisational implications arising from this type of ownership change are 
the same for both republics. 
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However, the Slovak Republic's disenchantment with the effects of radical 
economic change did slow down the privatisation process after 1993 and heralded in 
a more qualified approach to ownership change. In its initial conception this 
different approach encompassed the criticisms regarding the inability of 
privatisation alone to effect increased enterprise efficiency in terms of improved 
performance and appropriate restructuring. However, political instability and 
opportunism combined with an underestimation of the change in current reforms 
required to combat inherited economic structures, networks and practices, to ensure 
that no coherent alternative was implemented. Instead the new approach only 
increased the opportunity for those with a positional advantage to gain from the 
privatisation process with little benefit to the enterprise as an economic unit. In 
order to understand the reasons for the argument for a different economic 
transformation approach and indeed to comprehend the environment that gave rise 
to the situation of positional advantages, one must first examine the inherited 
economic structure. 
Inherited Industrial Structure and Centre-Locality Networks 
Reasons for a different approach to economic transformation 
The reasons for this search for an alternative approach to economic transition in 
Slovakia can be found in the economic structures inherited from the past. Much of 
this is related to the heavy industrial concentration in Slovakia, especially of steel 
and armaments, whose markets had been severely affected by the economic 
transition from state socialism. In addition regional concentration of such industries 
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occurred to a greater extent in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic, due to the form 
of late industrialisation undergone as part of the federation after 1947. In fact, one 
of the few economic successes of the past regime was in industrialising the basically 
agrarian economy of Slovakia and_ improving living standards to a comparable level 
with the Czechs. In 1956 Slovak household incomes per head were only 68% of the 
Czech level, but by 1980 represented 90% of the Czech level. Similarly, the 
national income (calculated by Myant [1989] from the Net Material Product in 
official Czechoslovak statistics) in Slovakia per head of active population reached 
94.4% of the Czech level by 1989 from 62.2% in 19486• However, the concomitant 
inheritance was a simultaneously highly centralised and patchy industrialisation, 
which relied upon central directives and resource allocations, not only to continue 
enterprise activity but also to support entire communities which had built up around 
the enterprise exclusively. Myant describes the industrial structure of 
Czechoslovakia as being characterised by 'dispersion and equality' which translates 
as greater equality between regions in terms of income and employment, and as 
dispersion of industrial centres according to developmental criteria and not the 
logistical criteria of proximity to markets or raw materials 7 • Reasons for this 
particular drive to heavy industrial development and the negative effects on Czech 
industry have already been dealt with in Chapter One. In Slovakia, by contrast, this 
policy did develop areas previously reliant on agrarian production and thus the 
characteristics of this type of development were particularly pronounced. In the 
Czech Republic heavy engineering remained in the Prague region, Plzeii retained 
the Skoda combine and Ostrava built upon its original base to become the most 
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important centre for coking coal and steel and heavy machinery production. By 
contrast Bratislava became the new base for the petrochemicals industry (the 
resulting pollution being one of the major spurs to Public Against Violence and 
Slovak environmental group activities leading up to 1989), Kosice for steel, and the 
Vah Valley in Western Slovakia for armament production. 
As Myant points out, although many of these new agglomerations called for large 
scale investment, few of the locations were justified by logistical criteria mentioned 
above, with the exception of closeness to the Soviet Russian border, this being the 
other major market after the internal one. Another drawback of the industrialised 
development particularly in Slovakia, was the fact that this dispersion carried on to 
the very small villages and towns, where fragmentation of processes within 
branches of industrial production seemed to occur. In one respect this maintained 
rural communities and indeed helped them grow and Myant (1992) refers to 
Hoffman's 'charity concept' as being the overriding feature of this type of activity, 
which lead to social considerations being put above economic ones8• However, the 
consequences for inefficient production resulting from the lack of integration and 
the isolation from the appropriate infrastructure for many factories in the smaller 
villages and towns are obvious. One justification of such an approach would be 
Fran~tois Perroux' s theory of poles of growth in regional development. Myant, 
however, suggests that the sectoral pressures on the govermnent from already 
established industrial enterprises and agglomerations for investment and 
development hampered the government's attempt to develop fully a regional policy 
based on Perroux' s notion. In fact, these two counter pressures of locational 
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considerations and sectoral development, resulted once again in an inconsistent, 
short-term and reactive regional industrial policy. This situation continued, despite 
debates, into the new democratic system in 1990 and erupted once structural 
changes in the economy began to uncover the hidden inadequacies and umesolved 
imbalances. Myant suggests the real failure of the previous regional policy was the 
resulting inflexible structure and not its economically inefficient location9• This has 
implications for both economic transition in Slovakia and organisational 
restructuring. 
Counterargument to different approach claims 
The interpretation of Slovakian specificities as described by The Independent 
Association of Slovak Economists has been contested by other Czechoslovakian 
economists. It is important to assess this different interpretation as it broadens the 
understanding of the socio-economic inheritance of the Slovak Republic which 
influences both political choices and organisational transformation. The general 
specificities outlined by proponents of a different approach for Slovakia are as 
follows: 
'- higher concentration in Slovakia of production facilities manufacturing 
semi-finished goods or business oriented towards the supply of raw 
materials and semi-finished goods to the Czech Republic; 
-higher dependency on imports, especially from the former CMEA members 
and the USSR; 
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-orientation of most exports to the former CMEA and the USSR; 
-higher share of the armaments industry; 
-lower efficiency of the Slovak economy vis-a-vis the Czech one. ' 10 
Dedek et al. (1996) have also analysed the specificities of the Slovakian economy 
and differ on a number of points while maintaining that important differences do 
actually exist. The important macro-economic indicators of inflation rate, GDP 
annual growth rate, and the unemployment rate are all analysed for the first two 
years of transition showing major differences only in the unemployment rate. The 
annual GDP growth rate for the Czech Republic was -1.2 in 1990 compared with 
-2.5 for Slovakia for the same year. This, however, balances again in 1991 where 
the figures are -14.2 and -14.5 respectively11 • For unemployment the figures quoted 
by DMek et al. show a greater disparity between the two republics. In 1990 the 
unemployment rate stood at 0.8% for the Czech Republic and 1.5% for Slovakia, 
rising to 4.1% and 11.8% respectively for 1991. In 1992, the Czech Republic 
recorded an unemployment rate of 2.6% and Slovakia, 10.4% for 199212 • The 
reasons for the higher growth of unemployment in Slovakia are assessed by DMek 
et al. as being: the greater demographic and social complexity of Slovakia; a more 
easterly geographic position; the structural economic issue of greater dependence on 
heavy industry; and the occurrence of locations reliant on a sole employer. 
However, Dedek et al. (1996) do not incorporate these findings into the specifcities 
of the Slovak economy usually outlined by proponents for a different economic 
approach for Slovakia as outlined above. Indeed, all of these claims are refuted by 
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DMek et al. (1996) as being either unjustified or unproved except for a higher 
dependency on imports from the USSR. (This dependency on the USSR appears to 
have actually increased after the first two years of transformation. In 1992 36% of 
Slovak imports came from the USSR, compared with 18% of Czech imports)13 • An 
equivocal rejection is made with regards to the claim of the major role played by the 
armament industry in the overall economic picture of Slovakia. The fact that 
Slovakia did in fact experience a faster economic decline in this sector due to its 
60% share of production is accepted. However, the fact that the economic and 
social costs of a slump in armaments production to the surrounding area are the 
same for the Czech armaments producing areas of Southern Moravia (producing 
20% of total Czechoslovakian armaments industry output) and the Prague vicinity 
(producing 17%) is used as the main argument against viewing the slump as 
affecting Slovakia more severely. This is hardly rigorous proof, when the 
Slovakia's share of armament production is so large. In addition the structural 
importance of the industry, as well as its share of total production in the 
Czechoslovak economy as a whole is evidence of the large impact of its demise on 
the economy. Between 1978 and 1988 Czechoslovakia was the eighth largest arms 
exporter in the world and the largest in terms of per capita production. Weapon 
sales accounted for between one quarter and one half of Czechoslovakian foreign 
trade income leading up to 1989, Slovakia producing disproportionately more than 
the Czech Republic. Thus the important emphasis in Slovakia's production 
orientation for foreign trade income cannot be denied14 • Despite this imbalance 
between the two countries, the worsening economicsituation in Slovakia cannot be 
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completely blamed on the Czechoslovakian decision to downscale the arms trade. 
Structural and regional issues must also be taken into account. 
Dedek et al. (1996) dispute the claim that the Slovakian economy was structurally 
very different from that of the Czech Republic both in terms of sectoral and product 
emphasis and in terms of organisational structure. While this assertion provides a 
valuable counterpoint to the claims of the Independent Association of Slovak 
Economists, the refutation of most of the claimed important economic differences 
removes the supporting evidence for Dedek's own claim that the lack of a structural 
policy integrated into the economic transformation plan, along with the lack of a 
functioning and appropriate regional policy and uniform social security net across 
the two republics, brought about growing economic differences and political 
disagreements: 
' ... apart from many common features there were also differences between 
the Czech and Slovak economies that deepened after the transformation 
process had been launched. This raises the question of whether the scenario 
of liberal reform had not been too one-sided in not paying enough attention 
to appropriate forms of structural, regional and social policies which caused 
important differences between the two Republics to grow bigger. <~s 
The lack of an integrated structural policy has been dealt with in the previous 
chapter under industrial policy and institutional economic change. With regard to 
regional policy the necessity of its application to Slovakia is supported by the 
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evidence of Myant, Schmoegnerova and other commentators, and ultimately by 
Dedek's analysis: 
'Regional policy is based on a hierarchization of regions following certain 
criteria, such as the unemployment rate, economic growth, income per 
capita or migration of labour forces. At the beginning of the 1990s, based 
on these criteria, most of the depressed regions would be found in Slovakia. 
Except for the towns of Bratislava and Kosice, and several western regions, 
the Slovak unemployment rate was over 7 per cent. On the other hand, the 
number of districts in the Czech Republic exceeding the 7 per cent 
unemployment rate was rather low. Experimental studies conducted at the 
beginning of the 1990s revealed remarkable differences in the performance 
of the regions in the Czech and Slovak Republics (business performance 
indicators, small-scale privatisation and development of the private sector). 
Therefore, the potential regional policy expenditure would have had a very 
differentiated implementation in both Republics. ' 16 
In Slovakia, the case for regional policy becomes more pertinent not only vis-a-vis 
the Czech Republic leading up to 1993, but also since independence due to the 
vastly different economic and socially different regions within Slovakia (e.g. 
Bratislava had an unemployment rate of 4 to 5% in October 1996 as compared to 
20% in some central and eastern Slovak districts17• Dedek et al. quote Myrdale's 
'backwash effects' of the market mechanism, where more developed regions attract 
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economic activity and capital away from weaker economic regions rather than 
supporting them. 
Thus while not denying the political mileage made from claims that Slovakia was 
suffering more than the Czech Republic during transition, it is clear that the 
Association of Independent Slovak Economists, DMek et al. (1996), and Myant 
(1992), all reinforce thepicture of a Slovak economy with an overemphasis on heavy 
industry and agriculture, an inflexibility of markets and economic organisations and 
weak entrepreneurial resources when compared with the Czech Republic. Indeed the 
slow development of small and medium-sized enterprises is shown by the 
registration of only 280 000 private entrepreneurs in the Slovak Republic by the end 
of 1991 (5.3% of total population) as compared with 1.06 million (10.2 % of total 
population) in the Czech Republic. 
Political Changes and Privatisation Method 1993 
Schmoegnerova (1993) notes that while the Czech Republic post 1992 was intent on 
speeding up privatisation through a second wave of voucher privatisation, Slovakia 
began to favour direct sales as a method. 
Prolonged consideration over the viability of a second wave of voucher privatisation 
for Slovakia gave way to the decision to favour the standard privatisation method 
over voucher privatisation as the main method, particularly through foreign 
investment. Schmoegnerova describes the dominant approach in the standard 
method in Slovakia as being direct sale to a predetermined buyer whether foreign or 
domestic18• However, as both Fisher (1994) and Schmoegnerova (1993) point out 
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foreign investment in Slovakia was much lower than in the Czech Republic , Poland 
and Hungary, thus calling into question the viability of this form of privatisation. In 
addition Schmoegnerova (1993) has shown that the government's enthusiasm for the 
revenues from direct sales to foreigners has resulted in sales at a lower book price 
encouraging accusations of the giving away of state assets19• The only other 
substantialopportunity to privatise through standard method is through direct sales 
to domestic buyers, in this case management buyouts and domestic entrepreneurs, 
who are of course thin on the ground especially in Slovakia where small enterprise 
establishment has been particularly slow. 
Under a united Czechoslovakia and by the beginning of 1993, Slovakia had 
managed 353 contracts on direct sales and sales of shares to the value of Kcs 13.8 
billion exceeding the book value by 15%. This did not prevent claims that some 
sales had been made at excessively low prices20• This compared with 503 state 
owned enterprises being privatised in Slovakia over the first wave of voucher 
privatisation21 • In 1993, however, the Slovak government began preparations for the 
second round of privatisation which was aimed at 577 state owned enterprises with 
a total asset value of Kcs 200 billion by methods of public tenders and direct sales 
to predetermined investors22 • Schmoegnerova (1993) claims that this is more in line 
with the new Slovak tendency after 1992 of paying greater attention to branch and 
sector specific aspects. To this end, although the pace of privatisation was generally 
slowed, lower prices for firms and soft credit conditions were set up to foster 
management buyouts and management-employee ownership, as well as to stimulate 
foreign investment. These soft credit conditions involved management being able to 
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repay loans for the purchase of firms over a five to ten year period with a principal 
free period at the beginning and an interest rate that is equivalent to the deposit rate. 
In addition to different and perhaps inappropriate economic choices, the political 
events of 1993 (and indeed since that year), did not aid the process of 
transformation. As pointed out by Fisher (1994), many of the economic problems 
faced by Slovakia during 1993 were a result of 'discontinuity within the 
govermnent' 23 • The Ministry of Economy experienced threedifferent ministers at its 
helm during 1993, while the Ministry of State Property and Privatisation 
experienced the resignation of Dolgos and temporary control by Meciar. 
Thus by September 1993, only 19% of industrial firms were under private 
ownership whereas 50%, 89% and 50% had been in the transport, trade and 
construction sectors respectively. With the exception of the trade sector, these 
figures were only minimally higher than the figures for December 199224• 
Political and Economic Changes 1994-96; Further Complications of Political 
Culture 
Political Change and Privatisation 
From October 1993 Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, leader of the MDS 
(Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) managed to hold on to power only by 
signing a coalition agreement with SNP (Slovak National Party). This gave only a 
very slim majority and by early 1994, Meciar suffered a loss of confidence vote 
which eventually caused him to be replaced as Prime Minister by Jozef Moravcik. 
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The loss of confidence vote, was focused on the government's proposed 
amendments to the large-scale privatisation law. In the parliamentary session of the 
3 February 1994, there was concern that the proposed changes would give too much 
power to MeiSiar, who had already been acting as privatisation minister and 
chairman of the National Property Fund25 • During the session of February 17, the 
Slovak parliament voted in favour of separating the NPF's income and expenditure 
from the state budget, thus also separating the cabinet and the NPF. Current 
members of the NPF' s Presidium and supervisory board were therefore replaced by 
new members elected this time by parliament, which alone retained the right to 
dismiss them. This was described as 'regaining parliamentary supervision over 
privatisation '26• As the furore over democratic practices continued throughout 
February, Meciar rushed through a number of privatisation projects on the night of 
February 15. Twenty-nine privatisation projects were approved, two-thirds the 
number passed in the previous year27• Meciar was later accused of favouring his 
political allies through this process and selling at below market values. 28 
The actual vote of no confidence against Meciar took place on March 11, and due to 
the MDS 's refusal to continue in cabinet without Meciar, they were all replaced on 
March 14. Jozef Moravcik, formerly the last Czechoslovakian foreign minister and 
latterly Slovak foreign minister since March 1993 became Slovak Prime Minister. 
Moravcik had previously been a member of the MDS but had left to join the APR 
(Alternative for Political Realism) which later became the Democratic Union of 
Slovakia (DUS), a centrist party. The opposition coalition supplied 17 ministers 
representing five parties for the cabinet. President Kovac continued in post under 
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the new arrangements. Moravcik immediately set about outlining political pledges 
of returning to a rule of law and accountability and aimed to achieve this by changes 
in the legal system. It was hoped this would revitalise public trust in the state as 
well as reassure ethnic minorities. Moravcik stated that each citizen born in 
Slovakia had the right to protection of their democratic rights, 'including the right 
to criticise the government' .29 In addition a renewed emphasis on the privatisation 
process was announced and Privatisation Minister Milan Janicina began an 
investigation into the mid-February privatisation projects, of which 13 were 
believed to have been illegal. Consequently Finance Minister Filkus was asked to 
freeze temporarily the National Property Fund accounts. Elections were set for 
September 30 and October 1 later that year. 
During Moravcik:'s tenure of office mostly successful attempts were made to 
improve Slovakia's economic position and image abroad. Moravcik relaunched 
coupon privatisation, loan agreements with international financial institutions were 
achieved and the budget deficit was tackled. However the September/October 
elections resulted in a stalemate with neither Meciar nor Moravcik achieving a high 
enough vote to form a government without making coalition alliances with other 
parties. Eventually Meciar formed a voting block with ZRS (the far left Association 
of Slovak Workers), the RSS (Peasant Party), and the SNP (Slovak National Party). 
This block managed to effect far-reaching political changes which shocked much of 
Slovakia, resulting in two major demonstrations in Bratislava on November 17 and 
December 8, 1994. 
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Important institutional changes were also instigated along with the removal of senior 
officials and politicians (some of whom had a mandate to remain in office until a 
new govermnent was formed, i.e. Interior Minister Ladislav Pittuer and 
Privatisation Minister Milan Janicina). Replacement of top officials at the Supreme 
Supervisory Office, of the Attorney General Vojtech Bacho by a MDS member and 
heads of the media as well as replacement of all members of the National Property 
Fund's presidium and supervisory board occurred and a committee investigating the 
crisis of confidence in Meciar's leadership in March was set up. 
As regards privatisation, all direct sale privatisation projects passed by the 
Moravcik cabinet after the 6th of September were cancelled affecting 38 to 55 
projects (valued at 4.5 billion Slovak korunny)30, including foreign purchases 
among them. As Fisher31 points out, although the Moravcik govermnent had 
cancelled some of the direct sale projects approved by Meciar's govermnent in 
February 1994, it had done so on a case by case basis and according to the criteria 
of associated legal difficulties. Instead Meciar encouraged sales to domestic buyers, 
particularly to management and employees. (The results of this approach will be 
dealt with in the section Organisational and Economic Implications). While 
promising to reduce the list of enterprises to be sold in a potential second voucher 
privatisation wave (planned by the previous government under Moravcik), and to 
remove strategic industries such as energy, Meciar also claimed his government 
would start criminal proceedings against some participants, especially privatisation 
investment funds32• The Meciar govermnent' s economic prograrmne did little to 
infuse confidence into the privatisation process and the second wave of voucher 
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privatisation was delayed indefinitely the day before it was due to begin, 
disappointing the 3.5 million Slovak individuals (90% of those eligible) and the 166 
investment funds that had registered to participate. In all a sale of 60 billion 
korunny worth of state property had been planned33 • 
Economic Change 
In part, the new government's economic promises for 1995 were curtailed by the 
necessity of conforming to IMF guidelines to secure loans agreed to by the 
Moravcik government. Moravcik's government had agreed to strict budgetary 
measures (reducing the budget deficit to under 4% of GDP) in order to secure loans 
from the IMF and later from the European Union and G-24 countries, with which it 
was hoped restructuring and stabilisation could be carried out. 34 However, the 
Meciar government, which had made political ground criticising this economic plan, 
themselves introduced an extremely tight budget which was at the same time 
contradictory and over ambitious, suggesting a lack of economic vision as to how 
the problems were to be tackled. The Meciar cabinet forecast for 1995 a growth of 
5% in annual gross domestic product; unemployment and inflation rates at less than 
10% and a budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP, differing little from the slightly 
more modest Moravcik cabinet's forecast. 35 
However, it is in the lack of an overall vision in the new government's economic 
plans that signs of inappropriate action to combat the problems highlighted become 
clear. The Moravcik government had hoped to use the National Property Fund to 
help finance the foreign debt, whereas Meciar cut the budgets for education, health 
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care, local administrations and the President's office drastically36• The new 
government's plans to increase investment (especially from foreign sources once 
again) and financial resources did not consider the impact on inflation. Calls for 
foreign investment were considered to be unreliable given the fact that direct sales 
to domestic buyers had been declared a priority and that three of the direct sales 
arranged by the Moravcik government which were later cancelled by the new 
government, had been to foreign buyers37• Indeed, even the IMF, despite the tight 
budgetary restraints, delayed the third instalment of the standby loan. Kozlik, 
deputy prime minister and finance minister, claimed the IMF were awaiting the 
passing of the final version of the 1995 state budget to be passed by parliament. 
However, as pointed out by Fisher, critics argued that uncertainty over the new 
government's political and economic policy was the real reason for the delay.38 
Economic Growth and Micro-Economic Restructuring 
Economic Improvement? 
Slovakia experienced an upswing in 1994 with GDP growth reaching 4% but many 
analysts, including Zitnansky (1995) claim that this was due more to increased 
exports to the West which was experiencing rising growth rates rather than a result 
of structural economic changes.39 The Financial Times quotes one Western banker 
in Bratislava as saying: 
'There are still serious problems. The infrastructure is backward, other 
countries seem to be doing more: technology is not state of the art; 
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enterprise restructuring is slow; foreign direct investment is unnaturally 
low; there are horror stories ofnon-performing loans at the big Slovak 
banks, and yet the macro-economic story is great. '40 
Indeed by October 1996, the Financial Times began to raise questions concerning 
the sustainability of long-term GDP growth based upon competitively priced exports 
to the European Community, particularly in the heavy industry sector. In 1995 GDP 
grew by 7.5% and was expected to grow between 5 and 6% over 199641 • 
Unemployment had fallen from a peak of 15.2% in early 1994 to around 12.5% and 
inflation had been drastically reduced42• However the current account had shown a 
deficit of $740 million in the first half of 1996, and although ING Barings 
investment bank concluded that this was a good sign at this point in time, it also 
suggested that this could not be allowed to continue for long. Both the current 
account deficit and the trade deficit have their roots in the disparity between 
growing imports and slowing exports. Bank lending to both enterprises and 
domestic clients has grown by approximately 20% a year43 • Although this has 
supported economic expansion, the National Bank of Slovakia has raised interest 
rates as it became more concerned by the high liquidity. 
Technological Imports and Enterprise Restructuring 
Imports have also grown especially in the areas of consumer and investment goods. 
Imports during the first 7 months of 1996 grew by 26.2% to $5.9 billion, including 
industrial technology and cars44 • Exports, however, in the first 7 months rose only 
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by 4% to $4.9 billion45• This is a similar situation to that in the Czech Republic. 
Another similarity with the Czech Republic is the emphasis on raw materials and 
low value-added production which formed the core of exports. In Slovakia iron, 
steel and semi-finished metal goods were the prime areas for export. Indeed the 
East Slovak Iron Works (Vychodoslovenske Zeleziame orVSZ) accounted for 
around 10% of the country's industrial production and between 15 and 18% of 
Slovakia' s total exports46• It is exactly this area of production for export that some 
commentators with reference to the Czech Republic have called 'regressive 
specialisation. '47 While Slovakia had a higher concentration of heavy industries than 
the Czech Republic, and therefore a higher level of export in this area of production 
than would be expected, it is also true that it is the continued export of these heavy 
industrial and lower value-added products that has prevented the restructuring of 
enterprises and has not encouraged the diversification of production generally 
towards higher value-added and quality exports. The Financial Times refers to a 
recent OECD report which suggested that enterprise restructuring was paramount as 
the competitive advantage in certain export goods began to disappear and the 
Financial Times itself concurs with this view: 
'Faster progress in enterprise restructuring is considered crucial if the pace 
of economic growth and the development of exports is to be sustained, not 
least because of the concentration of economic activity in large partly 
state-owned enterprises. '48 
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In spite of this criticism the Deputy Prime Minister and Financial Minister Sergej 
Kozlik claimed that the trade deficit (quoted above) was accounted for purely by the 
rise in technology imports to facilitate modernisation and the imbalance was not an 
indication of the beginning of declining growth as a result of a lack of restructuring 
and, consequently declining competitiveness49• 
However, enterprise restructuring is not simply a question of modern technology 
but also appropriate financing methods, adequate management skills and trained 
labour force andclear corporate governance practices. None of these conditions are 
ensured by the present process of direct sales to domestic buyers (including 
management buyouts), in the form developed in Slovakia. The political intrigues 
and lack of clarity associated with privatisation has drawn attention to the political 
clientelism active in sales to management and other politically connected buyers. 
The OECD and the EBRD have both voiced concerns over these occurrences and 
the practise of not making tenders public (thereby discouraging competition), nor 
informing shareholders of such sales until completed50• Therefore the importation of 
new technology alone cannot compensate for the lack of measures implemented for 
institutional and enterprise reform, just as it cannot be held uniquely responsible for 
the trade and current account deficits. 
Banking 
With reference to the banking sector, which remains predominantly in state 
ownership, the three top banks; Vseobecrui Uverova Banka (VUB), Slovenslci. 
Sporitel a, a savings bank, and Investment & Development Bank all act in unison 
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with the state's industrial privatisation policy and provide highly expensive though 
easy credit to enterprises51 • The inadequacy of the bankruptcy law means that banks 
are faced with losses linked to excessive loans, again reminiscent of the Czech 
situation. 
Thus the economic transformation programme of Slovakia post 1993, has slowed 
down and changed the method of privatisation and kept selected areas in 
govermnent hands (e.g. in 1996 telecommunications, banking and energy were still 
under state control), while maintaining economic stability and indeed growth. 
However, little of the overall process ofeconomic transformation and least of all 
privatisation, has facilitated real restructuring at enterprise level. 
Organisational and Economic Implications 
Organisational Effects of Privatisation 
In the sunnner of 1995 voucher privatisation was cancelled completely. The 
government claimed it disliked the dispersed nature of share ownership which 
results from such a process. A mistrust of Investment Privatisation Funds (IPFs) 
was also stated52• Instead citizens were compensated by a five year state bond which 
could be exchanged for health and pension insurances, to buy apartments as well as 
for shares in state companies. Many failures have been associated with this process 
also. By October 1996 property worth Sk 49 billion was privatised through direct 
sales to management buyouts53 • 
Latest arrangements require MBOs to pay 10% initially and the rest over 10 years 
or through investment in restructuring of the company54 • However, the scope for 
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abusing these arrangements in an environment of opaque insider dealing is 
enormous. The Financial Times refers to the sale of 39% of Slovnaft, a 
petrochemicals group, in 1990 without any other shareholders being informed 
(including the EBRD). In 1996 shares in Nafta Gbely, a gas company, and in SCP 
(a pulp and paper company), were sold to management linked buyers without any 
public tender5• It is notable that these were amongst the largest of Slovak state 
enterprises. 
Thus while Slovakia has developed its own approach to privatisation, it remains 
questionable as to whether this standard or direct sale form of privatisation, given 
the conditions of operation, really is resulting in the best qualified owners for the 
business, who will be able tocarry out appropriate restructuring. The Financial 
Times article suggests that MBOs are fine for small and medium-sized enterprises 
but not so for large ones. 
The findings of the case studies in this thesis tend to question the validity of the 
above assumption of viability for small and medium-sized enterprises, while 
supporting its actual criticism of the direct sale process. This will be argued further 
in the section on MBOs and centre-locality networks but the argument generally 
draws on the lack of regulation and of challenge to old networking patterns as 
causing the failure of direct sale privatisation to change anything but nominal 
ownership. Boland (1996) quotes the OECD expressing concern over accountability 
in the privatisation drive. 
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Organisational Effects of Regional Policy 
The result of the regional policy approach under central planning has been the 
continuing tensions in the relationship between the centre and the localities in both 
the Czech and Slovak republics. However, the crisis in the relationship became 
most apparent in Slovakia where, due to inherited conditions, the effects of past 
unbalanced regional economic policy have been the most undiluted. In the emphasis 
in post-communist Czechoslovakia on macro-economic change without an integrated 
industrial policy and no attention paid to micro-economic considerations or regional 
issues these imbalances were further exacerbated. Myant (1995) regards the 
negative effect of economic transition in some districts in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics as the result of the non-interventionist government approach56 • Indeed 
Bucek (1992) claims that the: 
'reform scenario has failed to accentuate sufficiently the regional aspects of 
the economic policy and had concentrated on a planar understanding of 
macro-economic measures '57• 
The political structure was also highly centralised. In 1992, part of the newly 
adopted constitution required the creation of the upper chamber of parliament and 
the subdivision of the country into regions. (By 1994 neither of these two proposals 
had been carried out. Indeed, Prime Minister V aclav Klaus showed little interest in 
devolving power away from Prague either regionally or in terms of political process 
as evinced by discussions with President Vaclav Have! on civil society58). Although 
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between the Czech and Slovak Republics there was a devolution of certain powers 
from federal to republic level (e.g. the social security system), the imposition of 
macro-economic stabilisation policies were uniformly applied by the federal powers. 
Ultimately the tendency to political centralism and the lack of a regional economic 
and political policy was one of the main factors which prompted the separation of 
the two republics. 
However since separation, the inherited economic structure has not been reformed 
within Slovakia to effect an escape form the problems associated with this 
centre-locality dichotomy. The patchy and unreliable privatisation process has 
prevented the breaking up of monopolies and the beginnings of new entrepreneurial 
activity. At the same time old locational and local-centre networks have stepped into 
the gap left by the collapse of central planning and a lack of an adequate and 
consistent economic transition policy which addresses the institutional and regional 
aspect of change in addition to the implemented macro-economic policies. This 
carries implications for organisational change. 
MBOs and Centre-Locality Networks 
There has been much criticism of this form of privatisation, including claims of 
management abuse. Although direct sale to managers potentially capitalises on 
domestic entrepreneurial skills (of those managers), Schmoegnerova (1993) has 
highlighted the potential problems of excessive facilitation of leveraged buyouts 
where management is concerned: 
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'Excessive facilitation of LBOs might, however, eliminate some positive 
effects of LMBOs, such as increased incentives to managers to run a firm 
efficiently, to reduce costs, and to make less risky decisions. Moreover, a 
low purchasing price weakens the pressure of debt servicing with a 
damaging impact on performance. On the other hand, very hard credit 
conditions could lead to an excessive debt burden and create a 
"hard-budget-constraint trap" (Schmoegnerova 1992). Other negative 
effects of very "hard" LBOs include a preference for short-term earnings 
and a cutback in spending on Rand D. Mass LBOs may also have negative 
macroeconomic implications such as crowding out effects, tax evasion, 
mass business failures, etc .. '59 
Thus where Slovak towns are reliant on a single employer, not only for economic 
support but also as its sole pool of entrepreneurial and management resources, there 
is little competitive scope for the appropriate restructuring to take place. In addition 
inherited centre-locality network patterns reinforce this new development. 
Myant refers to the problem of 'branch factory syndrome' in the previous command 
economy. He notes that the autarkic tendency of enterprises to control as much as 
possible of the production process in order to avoid shortages of material, labour 
and other resourcesresulted, when combined with a compliant and patchy regional 
policy, in companies jealously guarding their prime economic and political positions 
in localities against new contenders in the form of new enterprises. Myant 
highlights the interest of the firm under the previous system of using its: 
217 
'substantial local political influence, once established as the dominant 
economic and hence political force in the area, to prevent further enterprises 
setting up in the area and threatening to poach its valuable labour supply. 
Research in the archives of the former ruling party in Hungary, as yet not 
repeated in Czechoslovakia, confirmed that precisely this had happened. '60 
It is clear that Slovakia's policy of direct sale without adequate regulation and 
institutional control compounded this problem rather than resolved it. 
This analysis is supported by the case study evidence gathered by the author and 
represented in part in the case study chapter dealing with the Slovak firm Kreslo. 
Here the soft credits allowed management to buy out the enterprise but did not 
provide the incentive to restructure and increase efficiency. In fact no new benefits 
were brought to the firm in terms of new and better qualified personnel, or better 
entrepreneurship skills, more finance for investment or organisational restructuring 
in any significant form. The change of ownership in Kreslo was nominal only and 
reinforced inherited centre-locality relations and personnel. In effect old structures 
and practices became more entrenched with a concomitant growth of disaffection in 
the working morale of employees. Any future sincere restructuring attempts within 
this particular organisation will, in the future, have to deal with this double 
inheritance. 
Furthermore for the direct sale process to be successful in facilitating restructuring 
and efficiency, a policy of regulation and control would also have had to take into 
account firstly sectoral appropriateness and secondly the potential for insider 
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manipulation of information. Fox and Marcus (1992) point out that potential LBOs 
in developed market economies are usually those in retail, food processing, 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment production as they are most likely to satisfy 
the criteria for success under such an organisational change, in that they can secure 
substantial and regular cash flows61 • Thus sectoral appropriateness ensures debt 
servicing ability as far as possible. The second point is highlighted by the fact that 
LMBOs encourage managers to reduce firm value in order to secure a cheaper sale. 
There are many examples of this asset stripping happening in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics as referred to already. In addition there exists the option of managers 
using their insider knowledge to distort the value without actually damaging the 
firm. Thus old networks continue to operate to their own benefit without the firm 
increasing efficiency. Schmoegnerova (1993) quotes the example of the Slovak 
government announcing in 1993 that it would support LMBOs where management 
avoided fmancialloss, and as a consequence there was an innnediate increase in the 
statistics for profit-making enterprises. 
Thus the organisational change in Slovakia was affected by the government's failure 
to deal with the issues of inherited regional structure; centre-locality networks; 
positional advantage and political insider dealing in an atmosphere of political 
clientelism and a lack of regulation. The lack of attention paid to the appropriate 
application of MBOs (according to sectoral criteria) and their financing (by state 
banks), contributed to the lack of restructuring. While MBOs hold a potentially 
interesting solution to the creation of a domestic entrepreneurial sector, the lack of 
regulation has resulted in nominal ownership change with little restructuring. 
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Conclusion 
Having experienced the first wave of voucher privatisation as part of 
Czechoslovakia, Slovakia determined to develop its own way. While the Czech 
Republic emphasised the speeding up of the process, especially through a second 
wave of voucher privatisation despite criticisms regarding sector specific aspects of 
privatisation, Slovakia decided to slow down the process, cancelling the second 
wave of voucher privatisation and using standard (or direct sale to pre-determined 
buyers, often managers) privatisation methods. This was done, supposedly to 
re-emphasise the sectoral aspects and to attempt to encourage restructuring of 
enterprises before privatisation. However, this potential of direct sales alone to 
achieve these results was not sufficiently researched and the process was further 
frustrated by political manouvering. 
As already referred in the chapter dealing with privatisation, Slay (1994 ) regards 
the Czech Republic as belonging broadly to the group of countries undergoing 
'shock therapy' and Slovakia now undergoing a form of 'gradualism'62 • Like 
Hungary, however, this gradualism cannot be compared to the experience of 
Yugoslavia, Russia or Romania, as real changes have occurred in the former. 
Privatisation results from the first voucher wave has produced a predominantly IPF 
ownership profile similar to the Czech Republic with dispersed share ownership, 
mixed with the subsequent privatisation process of direct sales, mostly to MBOs, 
which have reinforced inherited network systems. 
In the changed environment of an emerging market economy, again combined with 
a limited notion of regional policy, alternative sources of regional pools of 
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entrepreneurial skills and financing are almost non-existent, thus reinforcing the 
position of the sole local enterprise. In addition the possibilities opened up by 
privatisation and economic transition, especially inthe form engendered in the 
Slovak Republic, allowed old management or local and central government 
personnel to take the opportunity to change 'nominal ownership', that is old control 
stakes inherited from central planning, into new 'legislative' ownership. Thus old 
personnel and network structures are legitimised and rewarded in the new market 
and democratic structures but no new corporate governance structures or 
mechanisms were introduced. The lack of institutional change and an appropriate 
industrial policy, involving a thought out financial market service with selective and 
enforceable bankruptcy powers to support privatisation and restructuring, has 
resulted in ownership change and little else. 
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Part Ill 
Chapter Seven 
A Case Study of Organisational Restructuring Issues in the 
Czech Republic; the role of ownership and control 
Management and Ownership 
Before there was enthusiasm about becoming an entrepreneur, now people are tired, they no 
longer want to be involved. At the first joint-stock company meeting two halls had to be 
prepared. For the second meeting a hall for 500 shareholders was prepared, few turned up. 
The same happened at Plseii Skoda and Ceska Spozitelna ....... The fund managers act like 
19th century capitalists.' 
External Advisor to Company Cl, 118193 
Introduction 
The role of ownership and control in the slowly evolving corporate governance 
models of the Czech and Slovak Republics has been highlighted by the 
Czechoslovakian government, by international institutions (IMF), and by many 
neo-classical economic advisors as the key to understanding the problems of 
organisational restructuring in firms in those two countries. The case study that 
follows shows the complexity of the issues involved in organisational restructuring 
and supports the analysis so far that questions the supposed powerful influence of 
privatisation (and therefore also ownership change) alone to effect organisational 
restructuring. 
The problems associated with organisational restructuring in this firm, as with many 
others interviewed, involve finding investment for restructuring (for changes to the 
production processes and product ranges), changing product processes and product 
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ranges for new markets and finding adequately skilled personnel to lead and facilitate 
in these areas. 
In the absence of any integrated industrial policy on the part of the government to 
support this process, management were reliant on new owners to provide funds, 
leadership and skilled advise. Therefore the issue of ownership and control was 
constantly raised by management during the privatisation process both as a result of 
the functional preoccupation with the process and also in terms of the firm's need for 
investment and leadership. In this particular firm many of the required restructuring 
decisions awaited the new owners endorsement or initiative. Both government and 
management in this regard were reliant on owners to provide these functions. 
However, in many instances the new owners had developed no strategic policy or 
leadership skills. The change of ownership impacted upon the firm only in terms of 
confusion and resentment over control rights and emerging corporate governance 
patterns, which did little to help the firm. It is in this sense that examining the myth of 
the ownership/control change provides the key to understanding organisational 
restructuring, in that none was effected despite government assurances and 
management preoccupation with the change of control rights brought about by 
privatisation. Lastly, the scope for abuse of positional advantage both for manager and 
IPFs (Investment Privatisation Funds) reflect the socio-economic inheritance from the 
previous regime of centre-locality and inter-firm networks. 
The Jack of clear controls on the privatisation process and the lack of regulation of the 
economy generally has resulted in a number of undesirable scenarios: in some cases in 
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managerial intransigence and the pursuit of self-interest with a frustrated Board of 
Directors; or worse, in managerial abuse of the lack of clear controls to devalue the 
firm with the aim of achieving ownership themselves; and lastly as described in the 
case study below in the inability of certain owners (especially IPFs), to aid 
restructuring due to short-term interests and lack of managerial expertise and 
company knowledge. 
The case study rests on interview data from managers (Spring/Summer 1993 and 
Summer/ Autumn 1994). The findings of the other case studies and of the 
questionnaire responses all support the hypothesis discussed in the analysis of 
Dfevodelny. This data cannot be taken as evidence of 'the truth' of the managerial 
position as opposed to that of the owners and shareholders, or indeed of other 
employees. Rather it enables a picture to be drawn which highlights areas of conflict 
and interest. 
The company Dfevodelny was chosen as an example because it displays most clearly 
the problems faced2• Although the vagaries of the management I ownership 
relationship in each firm interviewed in each country has situational specifities, the 
general point of the inability of privatisation to resolve the management I ownership 
dilemma in terms of a clear delineation of control and effective firm restructuring is 
apparene. 
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Chapter Outline 
Due to the rapid changes occurring in the Czech Republic between 1993 and 1994, 
this case study has been divided firstly on a temporal basis, Interview A (1/8/93) 
coming first and Interview B ( 19/7/94), coming second. Within each Interview 
section the case study has been initially divided according to criteria, or general 
themes, developed as a result of the codification process (see Chapter Two on 
Methodology). Some initial conclusions are drawn in each section but a final analysis 
of all the findings relating to this particular case study will be discussed in the third 
part, entitled Conflict of Ownership and Control. 
Case Study from the Czech Republic: Issues In Restructuring 
The Company Dfevodelny 
Dfevodelny is a typical example of a medium sized joint-stock company in the Czech 
Republic, formed out of remnants of the old regional Vyrobnl hospodafska jednotka 
(Vhj) and at present employing 156 people. It is located in a small village in a rural, 
wooded area in northern Bohemia near to both the German and Polish borders, about 
3 hours from Prague. This area has a long tradition of furniture-making and has 
traditional contacts with Germany, being part of the former Sudetenland. The other 
branches and units of the regional furniture-making Vhj had either stopped production 
due to unpaid debts or were very small and fragmented. Dfevodelny had continued to 
exist as a state enterprise, after separation from the Vhj, until the 1st May 1992 when 
it became a joint stock enterprise prior to the first privatisation wave. The table 
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Ownership and Organisational Type of Dfevodelnf Over Time below displays the 
changes in diagrammatic form. The company is now a Czech 'akciova spolecnost ' 
that is a joint stock company, is defined in the Commercial Code as being: 
" a company whose capital stock is divided into a certain munber of shares of a 
certain nominal value ... The company is liable to the extent of all its assets if 
it fails to fulfil its obligations but its shareholders do not bear any such 
liability. "4 
The 'buying' of shares began in January 1993, after a meeting with representatives of 
the National Property Fund, and the last shares in the Company were bought by June 
of that year. The first general meeting with the new shareholders was held on the 30th 
June 1993. 
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Table 7:1 Ownership and Organisational Type ofDfevodelny over time 
Company Type Ownership Type Time Period 
State Enterprise (part ofVhj. State (administered through post-war nationalisation, until 
Formerly narodnl podnik, after command economy). 1989 
1988 statui podnik [i]. 
State Enterprise Undergoing transferral to 1990- May 1992 
National Property Fund. 
Joint Stock Company National Property Fund May 1992- January 1993 
(akciova spolecnost). 
Joint Stock Company Distribution and trading of January 1993 June 1993. 
(akciova spolecnost). shares after frrst privatisation 
wave. 
Joint Stock Company Wide distribution of June 1993- Spring 1994 
(akciova' spoleenost) shareholders. Majority share 
with local IPF 'B'. [ii] 
Joint Stock Company Share ownership: major Spring 1994- June 1994 
(akciova spolecnost) (iii] shareholder individual Czech Shares bought in two stages, 
entrepreneur. from NPF [iv] in Spring and 
from the IPF 'B' in June. 
[1] VhJ, Vyrobni hospodfll'ske Jednotky, or mdustnal assoc1at10ns formed after 1958. For bnef 
explanation of change in name of state enterprise see discussion on page 13. 
[ii] JPF is the abbreviation for Investment Privatisation Fund. 'B' is the abbreviation of the name of the 
local IPF involved in this company. 
[iii] See section entitled interview B. 
[iv] NPF is the abbreviated form of National Property Fund, tbe government holding authority for 
property leading up to privatisation. 
Source: OriginalS. Bygate October 1993. Compiled from interview data. 
Management and Past and Present Organisational Structures 
Senior Management 
As made clear by the organisational chart for the company in August 1993, the 
managing director, Jan D. was also the temporary general manager ofthe Commercial 
Department and temporary deputy manager of the Teclmology and Production 
Department. The Business Consultant, although considered part of the management 
team, was external to the company. The personal and professional histories of these 
three managers are important factors to consider when trying to contextualise their 
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contributions and in order to ascertain their 'inherited' or assumed perception of the 
company and of its activities, their information networks and their interest in the 
company's future. In general the importance of on-going social relations and their 
influence on behaviour and institutions, as described by Granovetter (1985) and as 
discussed in chapter two, underline the necessity of understanding individuals' 
approaches. This is also supported by Sztompka's work as referred as discussed in the 
final chapter5• 
Specifically, managers who are new to the firm or indeed to management are certain 
to display different characteristics from managers continuing in their positions from 
the pre-1989 era. Souls by and Clark (1994) have described the institutional stability of 
management as being in direct relation to the degree of formal and sociallegitimacy6• 
Thus managers surviving the 1989 transformation must secure some type of 
legitimacy in order to be able to function as managers. The personal and career 
histories of the interviewees have therefore to be examined first of all. 
Managing Director, Jan D. 
The former managing director, active during the state socialist period, had died and 
thus the post had been filled by a comparatively new appointee. Jan D., was 
approximately 40 years old and has been the managing director of the firm in the 
village of F. for the one and a half years prior to the interview, that is since January 
1992. He was also, at the time of interview, temporary Deputy Manager to the 
Technology and Production Department and temporary General Manager for the 
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newly established Commercial Department. Both of these appointments were due to 
the fact that no appropriately qualified personnel could be found to fill the posts. This 
aspect will be dealt with in further detail in the section on personnel. 
The history of his experience in Dfevodelny meant that he had experienced a range of 
ownership types, all of which were transitory. Dfevodelny was still in the state sector 
in 1992, as shown in the above diagram, awaiting transferral to the National Property 
Fund and joint stock company status in order to be able to offer its shares initially for 
bidding (and subsequently for distribution) as part of the first privatisation wave in 
1992 ( Large-Scale Privatisation Act 27 February 1991). Therefore, although not 
implicated as part of the management of this company in the previous regime, he had 
experienced a plan style economy of a type at the beginning of the transition of the 
economic system to a market form. Consequently he had experienced all the 
difficulties of operating in a slowly developing market economy, where old markets 
had suddenly collapsed and yet to gain access to new ones was difficult. 
Jan D.'s main occupation had previously been schools' inspector. He had, unusually 
for a Czech, experience of living abroad as a child as his parents had worked in 
Algeria. He thus spoke French well and had a more cosmopolitan outlook than many 
other Czech managers interviewed. 
General Manager of 'Finance and Economics' Department, Jana S. 
Jana S. was in her early thirties and had been continually active in the former state 
enterprise in the village of F. through to its newly established identity as joint stock 
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company, Drevodelny. She had spent almost four years in the finance and economics 
department, two years in accounts and two years in planning. She had held the post of 
Deputy Manager of the Technology and Production Department before 1989. She 
studied and trained for this profession (economics degree) and was experienced in the 
industry. She spoke no foreign languages. 
She too had experienced all the changes since 1989 with the added advantage of 
having been active in the firm previous to the turbulent years following the revolution 
of 1989. She had, therefore, a good grounding in the workings of the furniture-making 
industry and a knowledge of the changing Czech market and environment in general. 
External Advisor, Jaroslav R. 
Jaroslav was external business advisor to Dfevodelny and in this company was 
considered part of the general management team. He had worked abroad in business 
for a number of years after 1968 when he had been part of a management team in a 
state enterprise attempting to bring in reforms as part of the Prague Spring. He thus 
had experience of a command economy, limited experience of a reforming command 
economy, experience of a West European market economy ( he had in particular 
worked in West Germany) and finally an economy undergoing transition from 
planned to market. He spoke excellent English and German and was clearly a valuable 
asset to the firm, which had little knowledge of operating in business outside Czech 
borders. 
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Organisational Structures 
Past Organisational Structure 
Until the 1st of May 1992 Dfevodelny had been a state enterprise (stitnf podnik), 
forming part of the regional furniture-making industrial association or Vhj. The 
enterprise in the village of F. had formed the main workshop of the regional Vhj. 
There had also been other workshops in the villages of 1., 11 and H. However the 
only other significant workshop of the Vhj had been that in the town of L. and this 
was now no longer producing and in fact had made losses, the interest upon which 
was still owing. In order to form the joint stock company, Dfevodelny, the main 
workshop in the village of F. was separated off from the Vhj along with four 
additional workshops, which were in fact mills, and four smaller workshops. 
Subsequently the company had been registered as a joint stock company in 
preparation for the sale of shares in the first privatisation wave. According to 
management past debts were subsidised by the National Property Fund at this time but 
outstanding losses were cancelled. Dfevodelny is now a medium sized Czech joint 
stock company. 
Rychetnik (1992f and Vacha (1978)8 have described the industrial association 
structure (V9robni hospodafske jednotky or Vhj) in the former Socialist Republic of 
Czechoslovakia. Combined with the . information from the first interview, the 
organisational chart of the furniture making V9robni hospodafskejednotky in this part 
of Bohemia can be depicted for the period 1979 to 1988 as below in diagram 
Organisational Structure of Furniture-Making Vyrobni hospodaske jednotky 
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1979-1988. The workforce at this time in the main workshop in the village ofF (later 
to become joint stock company, Dfevodelny), while part of the former Vhj, had stood 
at over 360 employees. 
Vyrobni hospodafske jednotky 
Since the nature of the planned economy changed over time the diagram below, 
Organisational Structure of Furniture-Making Vhj, is designed only to give a general 
idea of the major participants in the command economy system and of general 
divisions of responsibility from 1979 to 1988. Variations in the respective spheres of 
responsibility and control vis a vis state, industrial associations and enterprises over 
the period 1949 until 1989 have not been discussed in detail, although generally three 
stages of reform need to be noted. The package of reforms introduced in 1967/68 as 
part of the reform movement during the Prague Spring attempted to redress the 
excessively centralised planning system inherited from the 1950s. The 1979 reforms 
ensured that long-term strategic management for the industrial branch remained with 
the industrial ministry. Operational and strategic management were to be the 
responsibility of the Vhj. The Vhjs were also required to pay taxes and payments to 
the state budgets as well as bear the central plan targets9• The final variation which is 
pertinent to the present discussion is that described by the 1988 Law of State 
Enterprises which attempted to abolish the Vhjs and to form state enterprises ( statui 
podnik) out of national enterprises (narodni podnik). In four phases between July 
1988 and July 1989 412 state enterprises were created out of the national enterprises10• 
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Organisational Structure of Furniture~ 
Making Vyrobni hospodarske jednotky 
1979-1988 
Annual Plenum of Communist 
Party~Five Year, Two Year and 
Yearly Plans 
Central Committee 
/ 
State Planning Office Industrial Ministry 
Targets and Prices Set longMterm strategy 
FurnitureMMaking Vhj 
headquarters in the town of l. + 
large workshop 
operational and strategic 
management 
Main workshop of Vhj 
I 
Ministries 
in village of F. (later Workshop in village of Workshop in village of 
Drevodelny) L1 H. 
Mill Mill Mill Mill Mill 
Note: The number of mills has not been specified exactly in this diagram. 
Source: OriginalS. Bygate, October 1993. From interview data and using Rychetnik (1978, 1881, 
1992} for Vhj structure and management in relation to government. 
This was aimed at allowing greater autonomy and a degree of self-financing to the 
state enterprise. However, Decree no. 185, passed in 1989, permitted voluntary 
associations between state enterprises and this was often used, as described by 
Rychetnik, to save the old Vhj structures in the absence of competitive pressure. The 
completion of the reform was unsuccessful in making substantial changes to the 
economic mechanism or to the highly concentrated industrial structure and was also 
cut short by the velvet revolution of 1989. 
In addition the managers interviewed in this case study, as in many others, still 
referred to the Vhj structure when talking of the organisation structure prior to 1989. 
The 1989 statistical yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovak (statisticka 
rocenka Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky 1989), the last publication in the 
series which referred to economic data for years 1987, 1988 and 1989, itself makes 
little differentiation between narodni podnik and statui podnik, tending to refer to both 
types under the term narodni podnik. The preface, while acknowledging the existence 
of 1, 448 newly established state enterprises with over 3.1 million workers by the 1st 
of January 1989 claims the above arrangement of referring to both state and national 
enterprises as national was chosen in order not to impair data comparability11• 
Therefore the author has concentrated on providing an outline here of the most 
dominant structure leading up to I 989 (1979-1988), in spite of legal (or paper) 
reforms. 
As the focus of this study is the transition two salient points must be born in mind 
when considering the command economic system in the Czechoslovak Socialist 
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Republic for these purposes. Firstly Myant (1989) has discussed the problematic 
relationships between highly centralised state control and enterprises in 
Czechoslovakia after 194912 • Essentially the system was reduced by the 1950s to an 
imitation of the planning system of the Soviet Union. Myant highlights the difficulty 
of assessing the role of the Communist party within the emerging economic system in 
Czechoslovakia after 1949 but generally points to the 'supreme power' of leadership 
and Central Committee, 'over major decisions and basic organisations ... to ensure that 
those policy decisions were carried out.' 13 
This pure command economy lasted for most of the 1950s but eventually was 
moderated by enterprise management who tried to persuade the centre to set low plan 
targets for the enterprise14• Thus the authoritarian nature of the state vis a vis the 
enterprise was curbed by aspects of the bargaining process. Rychetnik also refers to 
this bargaining process between state and enterprise: 
' .. .industrial associations continued to operate in a highly distorted, 
monopolistic market and manipulated the state plan targets and prices, 
using their virtual informational monopoly and network of 
connections in the political and planning hierarchy ... 'Y 
This second point is important in interpreting the evolving relationship between the 
new, or in some cases not so new, actors in management and ownership roles. The 
problem of actors entrenched in acquired behaviour and networks developed under 
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very different circumstances in order to counteract the difficulties of operating in a 
shortage economy, but which still influence decisions today is highly intractable and 
particularly relevant for the case studies interviewed. 
In Dfevodelny (See diagram Organisational Chart of Dtevodelny 1/8/93, below), the 
inheritance from the old command economy can be seen in the large number of 
detailed activities carried out in the Technology and Production department. 
'Procurement' of raw materials had been an extremely important function under the 
previous system, even more so when choice of suppliers was relegated to the 
enterprise level. Informal contacts were extremely important in this regard, in locating 
and securing adequate resources to cover the production targets. Design was not, of 
course, a necessarily free and creative process responding to customer interest in any 
particular line. Despite the increased degree of control given to enterprises by the 
1988 legislation in the selection of production lines, any such freedom was rather 
limited. The completion of set production targets of a limited range of designs made 
up from a narrow choice of available materials which varied occasionally, but only 
slightly, was generally the rule for most enterprises. Production preparations and 
technology were similarly involved with keeping the production process ticking over 
rather than introducing any innovation. Engineers and mechanics were particularly 
important in the maintenance of, in most cases, old and outdated machinery which 
were often required to fulfil tasks beyond its capacity. 
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Organisational Chart of Drevodelny (1/8/93) 
Annual General Shareholders Meeting 
23 000 Shares. 36 people represent 52% of all shares 
Supervisory Board 
3 people from the Board of Directors on committee 
Department 1 
Managing Director 
MD:JD. 
Functions: 
General Management of 
all depts. and firm. 
Business plans 
(strategy) 
Legal 
Secretarial +admin. 
Job advertising 
Personnel: 
Managing Director 
Business Advisor (JR, 
external) 
Lawyer (external) 
Secretariat 
Work Safety Officer 
Workshop + Mill 1 
Manager, Mistr 
(supervisor) 
Accountant and workers 
Board of Directors 
Managing Director is also Vice President here. 
Others from Investment Privatisation Fund 
5 members in total 
Department 2 
Commercial 
Temporary General 
Manager (J.D.) 
2 other employees 
here. 
Functions: 
New dept. Finding 
customers and 
securing sales. 
Replacing central 
plans and 
directives. 
Personnel: 
No suitably qualified 
manager found. 
Temporary G.M. 
Managers attempt 
to acquire skills 
needed. 4 more 
people required. 
Department 3 
Technology and 
Production 
Temporary Deputy 
Manager (J.D.) 
Functions: 
Design 
Production preparations 
technology 
'Procurement' of raw 
materials 
Transport+ 
maintenance 
Water + Energy 
(include. consummtion , 
environmental damage + 
waste) 
Personnel: 
Not given but large dept. 
covering above 
functions. 
Source: OriginalS. Byagte. October 1993. From interview dafa 
Department 4 
Finance/Economics 
General manager 
(J.S.) 
Functions: 
Accounts 
Taxes 
Sales + Prices 
Wages+ salaries 
Personnel: 
3 in accounts= invoices 
3intaxes 
415 statistics 
To be reduced 
4 small workshops 
As replacement parts were difficult to come by, if at all, engineers and mechanics 
performed the important task of scavenging and/or making ad hoc replacements from 
old pieces, and stockpiling, where necessary, for potential future needs. The enterprise 
was also responsible for its own transport requirements and its maintenance. Indeed at 
the time of the first interview, Di'evodelny had its own full-time chauffeur and car, 
although the size of the firm and the requirements of its personnel did not justify this. 
The location of water and energy consumption and envirorunental control in the same 
office and in the same department suggests there may have been at times some 
conflict of loyalties16• Increasing envirorunental degradation, particularly in this part 
of the Czech Republic, Poland and eastern Germany (the Dirty Triangle) had proved a 
catalyst for political activity leading up to the transformation of 1989. Since the 
production target aspects of the plan predominated it is unlikely that any real 
monitoring of envirorunental pollution and its control were ever really affected by this 
structural arrangement17• Thus the former networks between localities, enterprise 
managers, key employees and suppliers and sometimes Vhjs formed information 
pools and co-operative alliances which could be used to wrest some control from 
central government McDermott has referred to these inter-enterprise, firm and local 
actor alliances and the problem of bridging the 'social distance' and 'information 
asymrnetries' between them and higher level institutions such as government and 
outside investors. 18 
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Present Organisational Structure 
The present organisational chart of Dfevodelny, as of the 1/8/93, is drawn below. A 
major change had taken place in terms of the creation of an Annual General 
Shareholders Meeting, a Supervisory Board (dozorci rada) and a Board of Directors, 
the latter being elected for a maximum period of five years at the AGM. Managers 
reported that one third of the Supervisory Board must be made up of persons elected 
by all employees in the company. Candidates are also proposed by employees19• The 
Board of Directors must include a minimum of three members, one of whom (if the 
company has over fifty employees) must be a company employee, elected by 
employees. In this case the elected employee is the Managing Director. These 
structures are also outlined in the Commercial Code, as designed by the Czechoslovak 
government, for all akciova spolecnost or joint stock companies20• Thus new 
ownership and control structures were now formally established at the upper levels of 
the firm hierarchy. The previous relationship between 'locality' and 'outsider', that of 
centralised state and local networks based round the enterprise, has now been replaced 
by the same or similar locality networks and the shareholder, the major shareholder 
usually being a Privatisation Investment Fund. In DfevodiHny the major shareholder 
until shortly before the second interview was, in fact, a privatisation investment fund 
owned by a regionally based bank. 
Prior to full privatisation, as the transition gained impetus and a competitive market 
began to open, a Commercial department had been founded by management in the 
autumn of 1992 but due to its short history and lack of experience in this field, it is 
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still rather lightweight by comparison with the Production and Technology 
Department (See diagram Organisational Chart 1/8193 above), which at the time of 
interview still showed traces of its former importance. Clark and Soulsby have 
highlighted the existence of some so-called commercial ( obchodi ) departments in 
former state enterprises21 • These departments may well have been encouraged as part 
of the 1988 State Enterprise legislation aimed at devolving a degree of control in 
selecting production programmes and choosing outlets and suppliers to the state 
enterprise and away from the ministries and central plarming but still within the limits 
of the state plan22• However, as already discussed, the 1987-89 reform was flawed and 
never entirely implemented and therefore Dfevodelny was still described as having 
only constituted the main workshop of the former Vhj in the town of L. Thus there 
was no 'obchodni' or commercial department in the enterprise prior to its 
establishment in the autumn of 1992 by the new management team. The new 
department required, at the time of interview, staffing with appropriately skilled 
personnel with the requisite skills. This was proving difficult to carry out. 
The services of an external business consultant had also been contracted to aid the 
management in its reorganisation of the company and approaches to the marketing of 
its products. They had deliberately looked for someone with Western management 
experience but with a Czech perspective, as many consultants had flooded into this 
area from the West, particularly from Germany, offering advice without truly 
understanding Czech conditions. 
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The diagram below also shows Department 1, under the control of the managing 
director, to be rather over-centralised in its activities and personnel. In 1993 
Department 1 comprised the general management of all departments, strategy, legal 
matters, clerical duties and administration, monitoring of work safety and personnel 
(job advertising). Staff includes the managing director, the lawyer, the business 
advisor, the secretariat (clerical and administration) and finally the work safety 
officer. Middle management is spread across the departments in different activities. 
Overcentralisation of activities and staff in Department 1 is partly due to the 
inheritance from the past, where, for political reasons the managing director had a 
great degree of control over information and activity. For example, the managing 
director had access, along with party officials, to the details of employees' personal 
and political allegiances collected in the Personnel section. This information was 
viewed as highly sensitive and therefore, was often located under the managing 
director's control, if not always in the same department. Individuals were distrustful 
of the role of Personnel in this context. 
The Finance Department (Department 4) and the Technology and Production 
Department (Department 3) were felt to be over-staffed and senior management felt 
that numbers in middle management generally were too high. Although numbers had 
already been cut on the dissolution of the Vhj from 360 to 156, it was felt that these 
further specific further reductions still had to take place. 
By the first interview, in contrast to the formal structural alterations, few real changes 
had occurred. Organisational restructuring, the functioning of the firm both at the 
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level of strategy (i.e. investment in new machinery for. new production ranges 
appropriate to the changed market situation) and at the level of internal adaptations to 
the new situation (i.e. division and allocation of labour and skills, the tailoring of 
departments to these needs and ultimately the quality of work effected) had changed 
only marginally, by dint of the limited alterations already carried out by management. 
According to managers this lack of change had three causes. The unstable period of 
joint stock company status under the National Property Fund control before 
privatisation occurred had left the company in limbo. Government, legal provisions, 
economic conditions and ownership were all in a state of flux. Managers were feeling 
their way in a new market environment with little knowledge of what was entailed. 
There was a lack of clarity as to what managers could change while ownership was in 
flux and what was immutable. Naturally, many cadre managers, that is those with a 
vested interest usually continuing from the past regime, used this to their own 
advantage. 
The future changes planned by management in Dfevodelny to redress the lack of 
concomitant internal organisational change had been drawn up in the form of a 
business plan and the few organisational changes already carried out were included in 
this for ratification by the new owners. Notes on planned changes are present in the 
diagram organisational chart of Dfevode!ny (118/93) and are discussed in the next 
section, Restructuring Issues and the Business Plan. 
The three major structural adjustments at the upper levels of the organisational 
hierarchy would suggest that future parallel internal and detailed restructuring at 
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management, departmental and employee levels was required. The new market 
arrangements were already influencing the firm in terms of competitive prices, quality 
and choice described in the section below, Markets and Production. The market had 
also drawn attention to the need for reformed product orientation, product range and 
therefore ultimately production process. The necessary future changes do not only 
apply to formal reorganisation, reduced and improved personnel, new markets and 
improved production processes and products, but also to intangible aspects such as 
motivation and dedication to quality. It is the final two aspects which presented West 
German management with difficulties in eastern Germany at this time.( Chapter Nine 
contains a more detailed discussion of this). However, in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics the necessary changes are also influenced by the centre-locality dynamic 
inherited from the past as described above. 
It had been assumed by the government architects of the privatisation process that the 
structural changes introduced by institutions to the ownership-control hierarchy would 
suffice to encourage the necessary changes for effective restructuring. The next 
section describes the limitations of these structural changes and the mistaken 
assumptions. 
Areas for Restructuring, Changing Markets and the Business Plan 
The main problem as identified by management, and indeed a major problem across 
both the Czech and Slovak Republics and for eastern German managers, was 
restructuring in order to compete in a market environment and the search for 
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investment money to aid this process. To be able to adapt to changes in the market for 
furniture, management had to consider means of raising revenue in order to update 
machinery, buildings and ultimately production processes, as well as investing in 
appropriate advertising. Loans from banks were not always easy to come by at this 
stage, perhaps as a result of past bad experiences and a lack of understanding of 
market economies. In addition the government made it increasingly difficult and 
expensive to acquire bank credit and government support (see Chapter Five). In fact, 
by 1994 some commentators were of the opinion that it was this lack of enthusiasm to 
make out loans by banks and the high interest rate for those loans granted that 
prevented the Czech economy from growing during 1993.23 This was especially the 
case for small, newly established enterprises24• A secondary aspect, in this particular 
firm, was to improve the quality persounel in line with the new requirements and 
responsibilities involved in altered production process. 
Interim Changes 
The managing director and finance manager had already made some important, 
although limited, changes before full privatisation had occurred in the areas of 
workforce reduction and the creation of a new department and the taking on of an 
external business advisor. With the virtual completion of the privatisation process in 
Dfevodelny, management now had to allow the new ownership structure to ratify the 
two changes made so far via the Board of Directors and the Annual General Meeting. 
Further large-scale changes would in future have to court the same endorsement. 
248 
~~------------ -· -
Therefore the Business Plan submitted to the first shareholders' meeting included not 
only the organisational changes already carried out but also those necessary for the 
proposed long-term strategy, including the sale of some fixed assets, as described 
below. 
Markets and Production 
Under the state socialist system, production had occurred according to the requisites 
of the plan passed at government level, which was, in a sense, an officially endorsed 
planned and allocated market. In this particular company, production had been geared 
to manufacturing wood, laminated plates and bookcases, etc. and general furnishings 
for offices and hotels. The company was able to plan ahead for substantial periods 
because there was no, or at least very little change made to production plans. In 
addition production was done according to huge quotas and consequently primarily 
aimed at (state) wholesale dealers who then allocated products to shop outlets. 
However, since the change in the political system took hold, the complete network of 
wholesale dealers had collapsed and the markets for office furniture had become 
overcrowded. The area around the town of L. has a long tradition of furniture-making 
and since 1989 many new, independent companies had been established. Management 
hoped to increase advertising and to also offer products and services through 
catalogues in order to compete. 
They also realised that production of large quotas of any particular product had also 
become inappropriate. 
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Consequently the factory now made furniture to order, depending on demand from 
shops, dealers, large organisations and companies who were equipping new buildings 
and offices. One manager described this as the discovery of the 'single' or individual 
customer. 
The change in the market for the Dfevodelnfs products resulted in 30% to 40% of 
production now being tailored to the private home market, which is sold through 
furniture shops and the remaining 60% or so for the hotel and restaurant market, 
which tended to require complete interiors, e.g. entrance halls, dining rooms etc. and 
were made to order. 
Indeed the firm had received numerous visits from abroad, especially Germany and 
Austria and also eastern Germany, interested in buying products but at a price which 
managers knew would not cover their overheads. In addition these visitors had 
complained about inadequate quality of products and expressed interest in exporting 
unfinished products for finishing in Germany and Austria. Managers were aware that 
products from abroad were· also starting to compete in the Czech market with 
domestic products. The managers complained that western European visitors viewed 
the Czech Republic as an underdeveloped country and consequently tried to force 
down the price of products to a level which would not even cover the purchase of raw 
materials. Of the fifty-four visiting company representatives, only two offers had been 
acceptable. 
All these market changes and proposed related changes to both organisational 
structure and finance were recognised in the newly drawn up Business Plan 
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recognised these changes and proposed related changes to both the organisational 
structure and future strategy to accommodate and develop these new possibilities. In 
detail the Business Plan highlighted renewal of production machinery and buildings. 
both because of age and new production requirements, and pointed to the main 
problem as being locating investment to enable these changes to take place. The 
acceptance or otherwise of management's proposals to this effect depended on the 
agreement of the Board of Directors and ultimately the shareholders. This issue is 
dealt with further in the section on Restructuring and the Ownership/Control Conflict 
section. 
Investment and the Sale of Basic Capital 
Management had made a Spring proposal to sell off part of the basic capital of the 
company in form of a property in the local village of H. This was also seen as a means 
of rationalising operations and generating desperately needed cash for reinvestment, 
especially in new machinery for the change in production as a result of market 
changes. The raising of revenue was particularly important as the new owners' shares 
were in the form of vouchers, issued by the government, which secured ownership but 
were not a source of finance and investment. Management had located a potential 
buyer for the property in H. However, since the Commercial Code states that any 
increase or reduction in capital stock has to be authorised by the general meeting of 
shareholders this proposal was made part of the business plan and submitted for 
ratification25.1t was prepared by the Managing Director, the Finance Manager and the 
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External Advisor in March 1993 for shareholders comments in April, prior to the first 
Annual General Meeting in June 1993. 
According to management, the endorsement of the shareholders and the Board of 
Directors proved to be rather more difficult to achieve than expected. The Business 
Plan was rejected by the Board at the first meeting of the joint stock company with its 
new shareholders in June 1993. Management reported that no reason was given for the 
decision and in addition the meeting suggested no alternative long-term plan or 
investment raising suggestions. The decision against the sale of property meant that 
the potential buyer was lost as well as the opportunity to raise essential revenue, and 
the organisational changes were put in jeopardy. Management reported that the Board 
of Directors made regular monthly visits to the company but without making any 
comments or suggestions as to advisable courses of action, particularly in the field of 
finding investment sources for the renewing old machinery. Thus while management 
recognised that markets had changed and production processes had to change 
similarly, and indeed struggled to do this in order to survive, they were not provided 
with any future strategy options as to how the necessary changes were to be financed. 
Personnel 
Management believed that a reduction in the number of managers across departments 
(not workshops) from 23 to 15 could be achieved by June 1994. One of the few areas 
of agreement was in fact employee reductions and the Board of Directors agreed to 
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the above and further proposed that only I 0% of the original workforce eventually be 
retained. 
Managers expressed regret at the decision taken after separation from the Vhj to 
reduce the workforce, especially as they felt there were few alternative employment 
opportunities in the immediate locality. In spite of this it was still felt necessary to 
reduce middle management from twenty-three to fifteen individuals, as well as make 
further reductions in the finance department). The Board of Directors proposal for a 
reduction of the work-force to 10% seemed a rather drastic measure which would 
reduce employees to fifteen people. This would only be possible with the introduction 
of a highly mechanised production process on a large scale. The rationale, and more 
crucially, the funding for such a proposal was not present at that time, due to the 
reported lack of support on the part of the Board of Directors for changes. 
Management also expressed concern over how the further reductions were to be 
achieved and were proposing two methods at the time of interview. The first method 
relied on natural wastage primarily through retirement. For the remaining employees 
they accepted that an increased work load and greater flexibility were inevitable, 
although management were uncertain as to the employee response to the change in job 
roles. The second method cited the increased use of technology, in particular of 
computers. Computerisation was to take place firstly through computerisation of the 
headquarters and subsequently the workshops. The final step was to be the connecting 
of the two networks. 
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It was estimated that this would reduce overstaffing in the finance department 
especially, where the laborious manual processing of accounts, invoices, taxes and 
statistics, employed around ten women (see diagram, Organisational Chart of 
Dfevodelny 118/93). There was one personal computer already in use in the firm and 
management was aware it was not being deployed effectively. Its scope was at that 
time limited to the drawing up of tables and schedules and as a typewriter. 
Generally, the number of managers employed would suggest pre-1989 attempts to 
compensate for a lack of quality personnel (especially those able to take responsibility 
for decisions) and lack of adequate and properly used technology by increasing 
numbers. Senior management, were aware that a similar company in Western Europe 
would have fewer managers than Dfevodelny at present. They felt that a maximum of 
only 6 managers would really be necessary, although at the moment Dfevodelny 
employed 23 managers across all departments. (as discussed above a reduction to 15 
was planned by June 1994). 
New Personnel 
Now management were engaged in searching for new personnel to fill the post of 
Commercial Department general manager and a deputy manager for the Technology 
and Production department. However, the finding of such personnel, especially 
someone with marketing skills for the Commercial Department and someone with 
adequate expertise for the Technology and Production Department was proving rather 
difficult. The post for Deputy Manager in Technology and Production department had 
254 
- ----------------------------------
been advertised for 3 months but no applicant had any experience in the furniture 
trade. The Commercial Department had been established the previous year and was 
still temporarily managed by the managing director with help from other managers 
across departments. 
Remuneration 
Part of the problem appeared to be a loss of skilled employees across the border to 
Germany but more importantly to newly established private companies which were 
not bound by government wage bands as were former state enterprises. The wage 
capping policy of the Czech Republic was an attempt to control inflation, necessary 
for the arranged International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. Wage capping restrictions 
in 1992 did not apply to enterprises with more than 30% foreign ownership, 
enterprises with less than 50% state ownership and any enterprise established since 
the 1st January 1992. Since the 1st January 1993 wage capping restrictions have been 
abolished but an amendment to the social and employment insurance legislation 
effectively continues to limit increases, in this case, to below 5%. Companies who fail 
to comply will be required to pay substantially increased social insurance 
contributions26• Indeed fines for excessive pay increases were in effect unti1199527• 
Management described 1990/91 as a particularly difficult year due to the government 
policy of wage capping. Consequently, many well qualified people left to join the 
newly established private sector. The top wage in a state-owned enterprise was 
5000-6000 Czech crowns, that is wage band 8 (see Appendix 2), applicable to 
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managers of workshops employing SO staff. While in newly established enterprises 
this restriction did not exist. A wage of approximately 8000 Czech korunny (or 
Crowns) were cited as the top reward for employees in newly established enterprises 
not employed on a salary, while in former state enterprises this top wage was 
restricted by the wage bands to 5-6000 Czech korunny. This situation was to change 
by the time of the second interview. 
In addition government policy made it very difficult for companies to make employee 
reductions without continuing to pay wages for those laid off for another 3 months. 
The managing director felt that the only way to fill the posts now was to compete with 
a private company and unofficially 'overpay' the appointee, an illegal activity which 
risked the company incurring a fine. 
Motivation 
Despite the limitations of wage constraints there was still an awareness of the need for 
a better quality of employees which was felt to be in short supply. Management had 
identified the profile of a higher quality work-force as being one which could work 
with less supervision than currently necessary. They cited lack of motivation as the 
major inheritance from the past which was braking present progress. They knew that 
employee behaviour in this respect had to be changed. This is a common point raised 
by all managers across all three countries and amongst foreign (west European) and 
indigenous managers. There also appeared to be a growing awareness of the changing 
nature of management practice in terms of a move away from a bureaucratic and 
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closely supervisory role to one of creative and independent thinking; decision-making 
unencumbered by inefficient levels of supervision. The remuneration of managing 
directors and departmental directors was not included on the wage band scales, these 
were rather subject to contract and paid on a salary basis. This, it was claimed, had 
raised incentive and motivation for managers. 
All managers reported increased overlapping of departmental activities which 
previously did not occur due to stable nature of the market and production and to 
delineation drawn by the central authorities. As already discussed, in the past 
commands were passed down to companies who then bargained for reduced plan 
quotas and other benefits.28 These plans were then carried out by departments rather 
than developed in departments according to priorities identified by the companies29• 
Impediment 
While expressing frustration at the impediment caused by the Board of Directors' 
imperviousness to the proposed restructuring ideas, all three managers were initially 
confident that changes already made could be sustained and others introduced. 
Management decided to continue informally with the changes to the organisational 
structure already implemented. Changes in production and managerial activity and a 
reduction and improvement in the work-force were felt to be necessary in order to 
survive in a transitional and market-type economy. They now plarmed to achieve 
these other goals by circumventing the Board of Directors and again proceeding 
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informally with their plans, although how this was to be done without risking 
dismissal by the Board was not raised. 
Issues Constraining Restructuring 
From the description above there are a number of issues affecting restructuring in this 
particular company: changes in the market, government policy ( in particular 
employment policy and credit control), the absence of an established domestic 
financial sector, the countrywide lack of appropriately trained personnel for the new 
market system and the nascent relationship between new owners and managers of 
enterprises. Of all these areas the most immediately imortant ones are finance and the 
ownership/control relationship. This issue of finance has already been dealt with in 
Chapter Five, under Indebtedness, Banking and Bankruptcy. As regards the 
ownership-control (or management) relationship, the chosen process of economic 
transformation devolved the unresolved problems of enterprise and industrial 
restructuring to this level. This was the one issue in the managers' environment, where 
managers felt they could legitimately exert influence and take responsibility for the 
development of the situation in the locality. The change to a market system and the 
concomitant macro-level adjustments taking place were felt to be outside the 
managers' control. These findings are mirrored by those of other firms interviewed. 
Other areas for managerial activity involved circumventing credit controls through 
writing credit notes between suppliers. This type of activity was not envisaged by the 
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government's macro-economic policy and the official vision of corporate governance 
as projected by the privatisation process. 
Privatisation and Ownership in DfevodeJny 
In order to understand the interaction between management and owners a dissection of 
the owners and share distribution in Dfevodelny is necessary. Subsequently it is 
necessary to examine possible reasons for the Board of Directors blocking 
management proposals and how this lack of symmetry in management and ownership 
outlooks was dealt with. 
Generally in the Czech Republic, the wide dissemination of actual share ownership 
and the limited knowledge and experience of individual shareholders led to an overt 
concentration of power and influence in the hands of the privatisation funds. While 
IPFs usually effected little restructuring with this power, they were able to block other 
shareholders and management input. Central government's inspiration for voucher 
privatisation was to create citizen owners who would have a stake in the future of the 
firm in question. This rarely occurred in a real sense, although it ensured nominal 
citizen ownership. Instead the Investment Privatisation Funds (IPFs), which sprang 
up spontaneously, lobbied citizens for their vouchers, promising large or speedy 
returns. Due to the fact that any IPF can own up to 20% of shares30 and that 
government encouraged firms to become involved in management of enterprises even 
before shares were issued to them, there exists 'a fragile alliance, which may be 
threatened in the future because there is no protection for minority shareholders from 
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a hostile takeover.m There rs one other aspect regarding lack of management 
know-how on the part of the IPF which is highlighted by this case study. 
Table 7:2 Ownership Distribution in DrAevodeAlny'- 118/93 
After first wave of privatisation 
Shareholder 
Regional Privatisation Fund "B" 
(which is also the regional 
bank) 
Individuals (see x below) 
Various Newspapers (y) 
National Property Fund (z) 
For Investor (s) 
For Small Privatisation 
Investment Funds 
For Restitution Fund 
(original owners). 
Share% 
20% 
20% 
45% 
Shares still held for following 
~--~ 
7% 
5% 
3% 
(x) This group may include itiformal groupings of shareholders acting together, although they may not 
always be co-ordinated in their activity and therefore do not form an effective block vote. 
(y) The shares held by the newspapers do not represent a single cohesive grouping. 
(z) Shares remaining with the National Property Fund awaited sale in the second privatisation wave, to 
be dealt with later in this chapter. 
Source: Interview carried out by S. Bygate with Managing Director, External Advisor and 
Finance Director, 118/93 
The prime role of the Privatisation Investment Fund in the ownership configuration is 
also true for D.i'evodelny. There was a total of 1500 shareholders in this company. 
Representatives were chosen by dint of the portion of shares owned. These 
representatives numbered 36 and controlled 52% of all shares. They therefore formed 
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the basic invested capital. The breakdown of investors can be seen above in diagram 
Ownership Distribution in Dfevodelny-1/8193. 
Managers reported that the individual shareholder had little influence and in fact the 
regional privatisation fund, which was owned by the regional bank was the single 
biggest shareholder and dominated the Board of Directors. The managing director and 
finance manager continually highlighted the lack of knowledge and the old style 
thinking of the shareholders. The external advisor experienced the dealings with the 
shareholders with great disillusionment and believed that they had lost interest after 
the initial euphoria of belonging to a propertied class (see quotation at the beginning 
of this chapter). As an example of this he cited the first joint stock company meeting 
with the new shareholders when two halls had to be prepared. For the second meeting 
room for 500 shareholders was prepared but few turned up. The 3 interviewees cited 
similar more widely known examples of this in bigger companies such as Skoda Plseli 
where a hall was prepared with a capacity of 20 000 for a meeting of shareholders and 
only 300 appeared and Ceska spozitelna, a major savings bank, where only 120-200 
shareholders attended, as evidence of a general lack of interest amongst shareholders. 
It can be summarised, therefore, that due to superior nnmbers a lack of cohesive 
groupings and active interest amongst other shareholders, the IPF holds the most 
dominant position in Dfevodelnf s ownership profile. The impact of this ownership 
configuration on management decision-making and hence restructuring plans was 
therefore of central significance. 
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Management and Owners and the Board of Directors 
In Dfevodelny, as management attempted to initiate organisational restructuring 
considered necessary to ensure the survival of the firm, owners, the Board of Directors 
blocked these moves, while remaining unwilling to suggest alternative plans or to 
comment on reasons for the rejection of the business plan put forward. Consequently 
management felt very frustrated in their activities. 
The shareholders and board of directors had only recently adopted the ownership role 
in relation to this company. The Board of Directors were removed from the detailed 
running of the company and unlike management it had not experienced at first hand 
the changing market and demand structure. From the description of the issues where 
management decision-making was affected by the Board of Directors it would appear 
that there was a direct effect on the long-term strategic planning. 
In practice the Board of Directors had been involved only negatively in strategic 
decision-making, e.g. their rejection of the Business Plan. Their only positive 
contribution was limited to a few individual operational issues, e.g. possible labour 
force reductions and regular monthly trips to the firm. No recommendations were 
made on these visits, much to the disappointment of the senior on-site management. It 
is possible that, although the managers were new to the firm that they had residual 
expectations of active ownership input as under the old central planning system, 
where the owner, the state, sent down the plan quotas and controlled resources and 
outlets. However, the fact that the Board of Directors would offer no alternative plan 
which could be acted upon and that management were thinking 'creatively' as to how 
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to circumvent the opposition to change belies any such passive stance at enterprise 
level. Although it is interesting to note that this very 'creativity' when dealing with 
seemingly intransigent authorities may be interpreted as a parallel to the past dynamic 
of locality-centre relationship. 
With regards to the relationship between ownership and management in Dfevodelny, 
the latter realised that a prerequisite for the acceptance of the Business Plan by the 
Board of Directors was a greater awareness of the issues in the running of the 
company. The possibility of re-educating the Board of Directors was discussed, but 
strategies for this had not yet been developed. However management believed that it 
was necessary to foster a co-operative spirit rather than allowing the situation to grow 
into an 'us against them' scenario thereby achieving a greater change in attitude. 
They were convinced that the Board of Directors and the General Meeting would 
eventually have to accept the Business Plan as no other workable alternative had been 
proposed. Meanwhile management recognised the value of implementing aspects of 
the Business Plan piecemeal, with or without seeking Board approval. 
However, by Interview B, two of the senior management team had resigned and the 
company sold to a private Czech owner, who had immediately endorsed the Business 
Plan as laid out in 1993. In the event, therefore, the Business Plan was never accepted 
by the Board of Directors and stalemate ensued until the take-over by the new owners 
occurred. 
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Ownership Change 
Ownership had also changed drastically. The majority owner was no longer the 
regional IPF 'B', but an individual Czech owner, who had bought a 30% share in the 
company. 15% of the shares available in the firm had remained with the NPF for the 
second privatisation wave. The new owner had bought these shares directly from the 
NPF and had then approached the regional IPF for another 15% of the shares. Thus by 
the time the new Board meeting occurred on the 14th of June, the majority owner had 
changed and thus new management changes were set in motion. 
The new owner was the son of a previous employee of the firm who had left the 
company three years previously and had moved to Prague. This employee had been 
active as a technical assistant and therefore had detailed knowledge of the 
furniture-making sector and the company 
Interview B (19/7 /94) 
By the second interview in 1994 many changes had taken place. Both the 
constellation of management and ownership had radically altered reflecting, perhaps, 
the very problems that have been described in the relationship in this firm in the 
section dealing with the first interview. 
Management Change 
As already mentioned there had already been certain management changes with the 
resignation of Jan D. in December 1993 and Jaroslav R. in February 1994. Jan D. had 
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returned to his original profession of schools' inspector due to his frustration with the 
Board of Directors' intransigence and because he also earned more in his previous 
profession. The external business advisor, Jaroslav R., had begun to work for a 
foreign company, now operating in the Czech Republic. Between Jan D.'s resignation 
and the new ownership take-over the company had been without a director. The Board 
of Directors, with a majority representation of the IPF, had continued to reject the 
Business Plan and ceased to function properly, in that no competition took place to 
find a new director. Jana S. reflected on the reasoning for this as being that the IPF did 
not they did not feel responsible for the survival and future strategy of Dfevodelny, as 
their interests were only in trading shares and investing for short-term profit. In this 
respect Jana S. saw privatisation as no particular advance for Dfevodelny, rather a 
change of ownership form. Nobody took the necessary responsibility for debts and 
investment. 
Organisational and Personnel Changes 
The new owners and management had only been in position for less than a month. 
The Board meeting had occurred on the 14th of June and the interview took place on 
the 19th of July. Therefore, only a limited number of changes could be reported. 
Despite the style of the new owners, their insider knowledge and the changes already 
made suggested a break from the past stalemate for the company. As for the new 
owners, Jana S. reported that neither had they brought with them investment sources, 
however she tentatively saw a change in the level of responsibility being taken for the 
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direction of the firm and a bank loan had been secured for restructuring purposes. The 
new owner had made his father managing director and already more orders were 
flowing in for products. The production emphasis had been changed to the making of 
interiors for buildings. Management had fully endorsed the business plan proposed by 
the previous management team with few changes. 
Additionally the new director had brought with him one man as assistant and the 
manager of one department had been replaced because of insufficient functioning. 
One of the workshops had also not been functioning properly and the Mistr or 
supervisor here had also been changed. J ana S. reported that there was now 
recognition of the need to increase the quality of supervision and middle management 
as the prime concern. 
Conflict of Ownership and Control 
With the above narrative in mind it is consequently of importance to examine the 
legal delineation of responsibilities of owners and management at this time, while 
accepting that legal delineation does not guarantee that the actual behaviour of parties 
conforms to the prescribed pattern. The privatisation process envisages the right of the 
shareholders through their shares to 'participate in the company's management, profits 
and liquidation balance, should the company be wound up. m According to the 
managers and supported by the Commercial Code, no independent management 
decisions can take place on issues such as the increase or reduction of capital stock, 
the issue debentures or higher investment levels without the Board of Directors 
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approval or the AGM (Annual General Meeting) endorsement33• All proposals 
concerning decisions in these areas must be formally accepted by the Board of 
Directors. Finally the AGM alone can approve the annual financial statement. It is 
also stated that the scope of this participation in management is limited to the business 
of the general meeting convened annually34• This has important implications for the 
management-shareholder relationship in practical terms. 
Senior management in this company, i.e. the general manager, the finance department 
manager and the external advisor also mentioned the division of legal responsibilities 
described above and emphasised the responsibility of shareholders to contribute to the 
management of the firm. Management, however, also stressed that ultimately the 
Board of Directors were only interested in profit and could play no role with regards 
to the production process. In the minds of managers at least, the delineation of control 
and responsibilities with respect to management and ownership remits is rather 
unclear. The reasons why relate to the above issues. In this particular company the 
shareholders and elected board of directors appeared to be acting according to a very 
different behavioural pattern than managers. The fact that the Board of Directors and 
the shareholders, both bodies being effectively controlled by the IPF, blocked 
restructuring measures and basic capital rationalisation suggests a fear of loss of 
immediate liquid value. There is a possibility that the new owners were unenthusiastic 
about making any major changes before having time to assess the situation properly. 
However, the IPF had been involved in the firm since January 1993, and had seen a 
copy of the proposed business plan in March/ April, well before the first joint-stock 
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meeting. They had had, therefore, time to accustom themselves to the new property 
and its problems. Management believed IPF intransigence with regards to the 
restructuring proposals to be due to an old style of thinking which encouraged 
hoarding in case of shortage and where the larger the enterprise physically, the more 
power it could wield. This locality-centre dichotomy may also account for 
management expectations of active ownership involvement. Memories of directives 
sent from the central administration to the firm as to production, perhaps encouraged 
higher expectation of ownership involvement. However, this does not adequately 
account for the reaction of the IPF involved in Dfevode!ny in a new market 
environment. Certainly behaviour may be influenced by past scenarios but there must 
also be a reaction to stimuli in the present. 
Therefore, a possible further explanation is the desire of these IPFs to trade their 
shares later on the nascent stock markets in order to secure the funds both for their 
own survival and in order to repay investors. Indeed, in this firm the IPF sold all its 
shares to a private Czech investor a year later, having made no organisational changes 
whatsoever. The new owner immediately endorsed previous management's 
restructuring plan. 
For the moment it is important to note the generally benign approach of management 
in Dfevode!ny. In this particular company, there appears to be a 'disinterested' (see 
Cannon's definition of corporate governance below) awareness, that is one based upon 
firm interests rather than management self-interest, on the part of management of the 
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required changes in company strategy. These changes are needed to accommodate 
new production requirements and new organisational arrangements, as a result of and 
appropriate to emerging market relations, as has been discussed under the section 
entitled Market and Production .. 
This awareness amongst senior management has been built up within and in relation 
to the company since the 1989 transformation. 
However, it is also important to note that no generalisation can be drawn from this 
case study with regards to management acting in the interests of the firm as opposed 
to self-interested owners. There are numerous cases of the opposite happening where 
management was entirely corrupt or, as will be described in chapter five, cases of 
former management legally taking over ownership of a firm while not adequately 
addressing the legitimacy crisis that this provokes, nor carrying out any changes 
towards restructuring the firm. What the situation in Dfevodelny does show is the 
realm available for misuse in the power-control dichotomy due to the lack of 
regulation and accepted practice. 
The comments, however, by management do show an awareness of the potential for 
abuse of the managerial position of(feasible) covert power and insider knowledge. 
In terms of knowledge asymmetries, it is important to note here the difference 
between overt and covert power. Managers may be either active or passive with 
self-interest or the interest of the firm at heart. Since the Czech Republic, as indeed 
the Slovak Republic, lacked closer guidelines at this time, as to remit of managerial 
versus share-holding responsibility, this opened up spheres of activity for either covert 
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power (former cadre managers exploiting their insider knowledge, lack of regulation 
and lack of ownership knowledge to asset stripped the firm) or for overt power being 
used with little understanding or consultation and often with short-term interests at 
heart (shareholders, specifically, privatisation funds, interested in making a short-term 
profit through eventual trading on the nascent stock market). Both possible outcomes 
reflect a lack of regulation by government, its mixed approach to the economic 
situation and an ineffective, bureaucracy, largely remaining from the past era and also 
to the absence of an established business culture of acceptable practice. The fact that 
the government chose large-scale privatisation as the sole tool to restructure firms 
suggests a laissez-faire economic approach on the part of the government but also 
assumes an important role envisaged for owners in the management of firms. 
However, the major role allotted intrinsically to the Investment Privatisation Funds, 
due to their monopoly of shares and the process itself had not been referred to either 
legally or institutionally. Furthermore the fact that the IPFs were encouraged by 
government both in this company as in many others, to become involved in the 
management process even before privatisation had been completed reinforces the 
more institutional approach to ownership and management. 
However, many IPFs had no experience of management, and even fewer of 
management in a market economy. Some were set up by independent entrepreneurs, 
but most belonged to banks. Bank ownership ofiPFs potentially leads to a conflict of 
interest in this environment. In the first instance financial criteria are the gauges of 
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success for the investment funds and short-term liquid assets are of most benefit to 
them. In the instance of bankruptcy, however, banks are unlikely to put into practice 
the new legislation, if it results in losses to themselves. They are more likely to shore 
up the company in the hope that eventually the firm will break even and make some 
returns on loans and invested shares. 
The unresolved nature of the relationship of ownership to control in this process 
reflects a complex set of inherited circumstances and relationships (centre-locality 
relationship, inter-firm networks, etc), and inadequate industrial policy, provision and 
design on the part of the reform government. In this last respect it is clear that 
privatisation has not bridged the knowledge asymmetries between ownership and 
management networks. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the discussion on restructuring two problems for this particular 
company were highlighted. Firstly the difficulty of making organisational changes and 
secondly the problem of rationalising the work-force and finding the appropriate 
personnel. 
However the underlying operational problem, became, as a result of privatisation, the 
relationship between owners and management, reinforced by the lack of government 
regulation in this area and the Jack of a strong and clearly thought out industrial 
policy. 
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Paradoxically the problem of finding adequately skilled personnel was in part a result 
of the govermnent's limited industrial policy intervention, which worsened the 
position of the company regarding personnel in 1993. The structural change of 
ownership, which was involved in the large-scale privatisation, cannot transfer 
company and production sector knowledge to an essentially stock market oriented 
ownership. Neither can profit seeking and potential efficiency criteria be transferred 
automatically through ownership change to a self-interested management, motivated 
only to maintain the status quo. 
Therefore, put into its situational context of the Czech Republic 1990 to 1994, the 
industrial restructuring has yet to be solved by the new ownership/control relationship 
brought about by privatisation. Within a slowly emerging free market the situation of 
unequal and unregulated distribution of power and knowledge between ownership and 
control has not been dealt with. In Dfevodelny the requirements of restructuring to 
ensure firm survival were not effected by privatisation, but had to wait for an owner 
with sectoral and firm specific knowledge and interest as well as finance. 
How this relationship will be developed further between the two parties in an 
atmosphere of limited regulation and an unstable, still embryonic business culture 
within an evolving political and economic culture, is a subject which needs to be 
understood if the machinations of management and firm in transition are to be 
properly grasped. 
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Chapter Eight 
A Case Study of Organisational Restructuring Issues in the 
Slovak Republic: the role of ownership and control 
Olievacka 
"There is an old tradition in Slovakia ofOlievacka, the throwing into the river of the women 
of the village on Easter Monday. It is a symbol of purification with religious connotations of 
the rebirth of Christ... The water is still cold at this time of the year. The women must learn to 
swim or sink. This is the way we live now. The Transition has been a cold shower." 
Economics Manager, Central Slovakia, Apri/1993. 
Introduction 
This chapter analysis the ownership-control relationship in a case study where 
restructuring is paramount to its survival. This case study displays a management 
team using their superior locality knowledge and networks to wrest control from the 
state and to a certain extent from employees. This process is legitimised by 
privatisation legislation and the muddled progress of privatisation in the Slovak 
Republic. The previous chapter has discussed the issue of information networks and 
knowledge asymmetries as raised by McDermott with reference to the former 
Czechoslovakia during transition. The case study in Chapter Seven displayed the 
inability of privatisation alone to resolve either the centre-locality dichotomy, now 
expressed in terms of ownership and management, or to provoke restructuring. 
The Slovak case study, chosen for this chapter, highlights the same basic issues but 
with the added dimension of the question of legitimacy and with more emphasis on 
the centre-locality networks. Influencing these two issues is the underlying context of 
a rather different evolution of political culture in Slovakia, which ultimately 
influences choices in economic policy, and the industrial structure inherited from state 
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socialism and characteristic of this region.(see Chapter Five). Lastly the chosen 
company, Kreslo, displayed most clearly the centre-periphery tensions present in 
differing degrees and forms in all the Slovak case studies, now 'devolved' to the 
owner-management dichotomy, and the problems arising out of the privatisation 
process'. These aspects are of prime importance in understanding management in 
transition in the Slovak Republic and similarly in the Czech Republic, in the two year 
period 1993-94. 
As in the last chapter, it will be argued that privatisation (effecting ownership 
change), has been inadequate as the sole guarantor of restructuring in enterprises, 
which was hoped would ultimately lead to greater efficiency and profitability. Chapter 
Four discusses the general theoretical aspects of this in the Czech and Slovak 
contexts. 
The general issues were elicited from the data generated from six companies which 
were interviewed from the furniture making sector as well as brewing over two years, 
April1993 and July 1994.A Slovak questionnaire was also distributed in early 1995 to 
managers and employees randomly across all the former state furniture manufacturers 
and the brewery previously interviewed. As in the previous chapter, the general 
findings will be incorporated in the analysis given in this and subsequent chapters as 
the questionnaire data supports the main findings arising from the interviews. 
Chapter Outline 
The chapter will first of all describe the chosen company and setting for the case study 
in terms of its inheritance from the previous (the period ending 1989) Vhj 
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(Vyrobnohospodarska jednotka or Economic Production Unit) structure and the 
reasons why this particular case study company was chosen over others interviewed. 
The issues relating to restructuring will then be examined in chronological order over 
the two interviews carried out in consecutive years. Finally the analysis of the 
highlighted issues relating to restructuring will be carried out in the penultimate 
section and will emphasise the underlying aspect connecting all the issues, namely 
that of the legitimacy of ownership and control arising from the privatisation process. 
Case Study from the Slovak Republic: The Centre-Locality Dichotomy: the Issue 
of Ownership and Control and Legitimacy 
Why Kreslo? 
Kreslo was chosen out of a total of six companies interviewed in the Slovak Republic. 
Of these six firms, four had been part of the Woodworking and Furniture Vhj, one 
was a newly established furniture company in Kosice and one was a brewery, again in 
the region of Kosice. Of the four with direct links to the above mentioned Vhj, one 
was Drevounia, the export wing, the other three being associated factories, sometimes 
also with functions at the level of management of the trust and/or Vhj as a whole. 
Kreslo had constituted one of the affiliated factories of the 'trust' headed by Novy 
Domov in Spisska Nova Ves, prior to the establishment of state enterprises in July 
1989. Kreslo had no overall trust management function outside its own 
administration. It was felt that both in terms of its production and its position within 
the trust it represented a typical example of a furniture making factory within this 
particular Vhj and indeed within the Slovak Republic. Although originally slightly 
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larger than the Czech case study company described in Chapter Seven and with a 
greater emphasis on upholstered products, its essentially productive role within the 
Vhj, product orientation and relative size made it excellent comparative material. 
Lastly, as explained in the introduction, Kreslo displayed most clearly the 
centre-periphery tensions present in all the Slovak case studies, now 'devolved' to the 
owner-management dichotomy. 
The Interviews 
The two stages of interview with Kreslo took place on 9/4/93 and 28/7/94. 
The first interview took place in the conference room adjoining the managing 
director's office with almost all senior managers. Jozef, general manager of Kreslo, 
Emil K., senior manager of the technical department, Ing. (Engineer) Vladimir K., 
senior manager of the economics department, Jan, senior manager of the production 
and marketing department and Miroslav T., deputy manager, of the marketing 
department, Yvette K., senior manager of the Accounts and the Personnel departments 
and lastly the legal advisor. A second interview was conducted with the managing 
director, Jozef on 28th of July 1994, in a newly revamped office. All other managers 
refused to be interviewed, some (those not involved in the Management Buy Out) 
having already left. The possible reasons for the refusal to be interviewed will be 
discussed below, as will the developments which had given rise to this situation. 
A degree of observation was carried out on both occasions with tours aronnd the 
factories and encounters between management and employees noted as they arose. 
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The Company 
The company Kreslo is situated in a small town in Central Slovakia on a wide plain 
between the mountainous regions of the Vysoke Tatry (the High Tatras) and the Niske 
Tatry (the Low Tatras), closer to the major urban and industrial centre of Kosice in 
Eastern Slovakia, than to the capital Bratislava in the West. The company had been 
part of the former furniture-making Vhj (Vyrobnohospodarska jednotka) in Slovakia. 
The formation of these industrial associations in 1958 has been discussed in the 
former chapter, Chapter Four, as part of the background to the Czech case study. 
Despite the slightly different Slovakian name, these units were introduced throughout 
the former Czechoslovakia with little variation in function and management 
hierarchy2• Although the senior management of the Vhj did change over time as a 
result of political decisions, the basic structure of the hierarchy remained the same. In 
this firm further changes occurred with certain satellite firms being amalgamated with 
the main firm in Spisska Nova Ves or separated from it. 
From the 18th of March 1958 the firm in Spisska Nova Ves, of which Kreslo was a 
satellite part, had belonged to the Vhj of woodworking enterprises with its direction in 
Zilina. Subsequently, from the 1st of January 1961 the firm in Spisska Nova Ves, was 
subordinated to the Vhj 'ZdruZenie' for furniture-making industries with its seat in 
Bmo, Moravia. Bmo was the control centre for the industry across the former state of 
Czechoslovakia. From 1st of January 1969 there was once again an organisational 
reshuffle and the firm became part of the Vhj 'Drevarsky a Nabytarsky Priemysel 
(Woodworking and Furniture Industry) with its general management in Zilina. The 
design of the Vhjs in this final reorganisation has been discussed in Chapter Four. In 
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this reorganisation of Vhjs there were generally three types, 'branch national 
enterprises', 'concerns' and 'trusts'. Rychetnik (1992), offers a basic description of each 
type and describes the trust particularly, as: 
'consisting of national enterprises and other service organisations, co-ordinated 
by a trust's "general directorate" ' 3, 
~~b~~~b~~~b~~~~b~ 
of a legal person. Rather, as outlined in decree No. 9111974, they represented a middle 
layer of three stage management hierarchy coming between ministry and national 
enterprise levels4• As noted in Chapter Seven, although the Law of State Enterprise 
legislation 1988, theoretically removed this structure, the lack of competition 
preserved the old Vhj structure5• Therefore the old networks arise predominately out 
of this type of organisational structure, especially as final conversions from the old 
Vhj to the new state enterprise structure only took place on 1st of July 1989 and the 
revolution began in November 19896• The state enterprise structure and function had 
little time to establish itself. It is therefore this structure on which the chapter will 
concentrate when looking at past inheritances. However, in Chapter Seven the 
amendments which took place in 1990 to the Law of State Enterprises 1988 and the 
implications for enterprise management structure is discussed. 
The firm in Spisska Nova Ves was of the 'Trust' type. The structure of the former Vhj 
and the firm in Spisska Nova Ves with its amalgamated factories from the 1st of 
January 1969 to the 1st ofJuly 1989 is depicted below. 
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Organisational Structure of the Slovakian Furniture-Making 
Vyrobnohospodarska jednotka 1/1/69-1/7/89 (including 
Kreslol 
Vhj Drevarsky a Nabytarsky Priemysel 
(Vhj Woodworking + furniture Industry) 
Orevounia General Management 
State foreign trading ~ Zilina 
company Trust Enterprise 
.... Novy Oomov 
~ - in Spisska Nova Ves + factory and showroom 
Kyscko factory 
/ separated from firm in 
/ -. 1981 Liptovsky Mikulas 
Spisska Nova Ves factory linked to the above location K ~'=·"_,_, __ factory: from 1950 onwards. Producing display 
producing bedrooms, cabinets for sitting rooms and amalgamated in 1974. New 
collection of bookcases bedrooms and upholstered suites. factory producing display 
for sitting~rooms Servicing (maintenance) also dealt cabinets + writing desks for 
with. living rooms, upholstered 
suites & other elements 
Sabinov factory 
Maluzina factory new factory producing display 
producing small cabinets+ collection of bookcases, 
bookcases and restaurant tables and desks. Older 
restaurant tables servicing centre. 
Source: OriginalS. Byagte. compiled from four sets of interview data and from Navy Domov, statny podnik, 
Spisska Nova Ves. Kukol, Ladislav lng. Vychodoslovenske vydavatelstvo v Kosiciach pre N. D. v roku 1990. 
As with the Czech case study the 1988 Law of State Enterprises made the firm in 
Spisska Nova Ves a state enterprise from the 1st of July 1989 subordinated to the 
Ministry of Wood and Water Production and Woodworking Industries in Bratislava, 
Slovakia. 
A picture appears from this history of both great stability of structure, function and 
personnel, and of minor reorganisation between a number of loci of senior 
management of the Vhj in the industry and, in this particular 'trust' organisation, with 
its seat in Spisska Nova Ves, of the changing number of factories affiliated to and 
separated from it. The potential for secure networks of personal and organisational 
contacts to become the bedrock of 'post-socialist' or transitional management becomes 
clear. 
Chapter Seven has raised the issue of network capital and its implications for the 
Czech case study, as McDermott (1994) has done generally'. This will be developed 
further later. 
Restructuring Issues-1st interview 9/4/93 
Management, Enterprise Culture and Old Networks 
The management personnel were essentially from middle or lower management from 
within Kreslo. Many had been held back for political reasons. The general manager, 
Jozef, had been active in the reforms of 1968 and was expelled from the party during 
the 'normalisation' process after Dubcek's well documented visit to Moscow. Jozef 
was thus well known and well liked and respected both within the enterprise and the 
small town for his stance during the time of the Prague Spring and since. In 1991 all 
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interviewees were working in Kreslo but not in senior positions and expressed the 
difficulty they had experienced in acquiring the necessary skills in accordance with 
their new status. In addition these promotions had occurred during a time of rapid 
change and instability. The previous senior managers of the various departments as 
well as the former general manager had either already left or been 'demoted'. The 
previous general manager of the technical department of Kreslo had been a rising star 
of the old regime. 
"At 25 he had his picture on the wall and now he owns his own company", 
reported one manager resentfully. 
In an authoritarian and procedural structure most had to wait for the appropriate age 
profile as well as satisfYing work and political requirements before securing 
promotion. It was felt by the new breed of managers that the former general manager 
of the technical department had manipulated the old system to personnel advantage, 
just as he was the new. It was believed that he had used old contacts in the political 
and economic fields in order to be able to set up his new business. Generally it was 
noted that former Communist Party officials or members and those with important 
positions within the past state hierarchies had the experience, capital and contacts to 
set up their own companies under the new system. 
This was a common occurrence after 1989 and indeed the logistical and bureaucratic 
problems of setting up a business encouraged the use of old contacts. The interview 
with the newly established furniture company K. in Kosice in Spring 1993, as 
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described by the author in Bygate, Edwards, Mills and Polonsky (1994), refers to 
these aspects and the subsequent problems9• The difficulty of the slow processing of 
necessary forms by the Slovak bureaucracy and the problems of implementing the 
large amount of new legislation being passed by government caused one young 
partner of this private firm to use contacts in the legal profession and favours in order 
to speed up certain applications necessary for the survival of the firm. The scope, 
therefore, for old cadre managers to use contacts from old networks within the former 
Vhj structure, party organisations and bureaucracy, many of whom were still in a 
position of authority, or had reinvented themselves, is therefore enormous. 
However, Kreslo's managers claimed that this new furniture company threatened little 
competition with their already well established firm, primarily for reasons of product 
design and range and also because the new company had the problem of financing 
premises and equipment which did not face the former state enterprise. The show 
room of this new company in the town was visited by the author independently and its 
size, product range and quality of products did indeed suggest little rival competition 
to Kreslo. 
Managers of Kreslo were at pains to point out that by contrast to the above example, 
one former manager, functionary and Communist Party member still worked within 
Kreslo but now in storage. It was emphasised that former political loyalties did not 
prejudice continued employment in the firm as long as the individual worked well. 
Unlike some other firms interviewed, however, high office in this firm did not appear 
to be open to former incumbents as the above two examples show. In two other 
former state furniture companies interviewed some members of former senior 
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management were still in place, although they fully endorsed the new political and 
economic freedoms and were critical of the past. 
Thus the combination of a popular new general manager and a new crop of senior 
managers recruited from former middle and lower management, who were not 
implicated either in a formal or high profile way with the former regime, lent the 
organisation as a whole a renewed enthusiasm for the future of the company and gave 
management a sense of legitimacy sometimes found lacking elsewhere. This perhaps 
explains the atmosphere encountered in observations of the interaction between 
employees and management both within the offices visited and on factories rounds 
which appeared genuinely friendly, interactive and relaxed, if slightly 
patriarchal/avuncular. 
There was also added optimism in the country generally as a consequence both of the 
'89 revolution but also, and in particular, as a result of the first experience of 
independence from any external power in Slovakian history since the Great Moravian 
Empire one thousand years before. Independence was of great emotional and cultural 
importance at the time of the first interview. The Economics Manager seemed to 
express a commonly held concern amongst all the managers at the way economic 
reforms passed in the former state of Czechoslovakia had hit Slovakia hardest. Most 
heavy industry or early part of production processes (later finished off in the Czech 
Republic), in the old Czechoslovakia had been located within Slovakia's borders. 
Slovakia's main markets then had been to the former Soviet Union. Thus in the 
process of closing outdated heavy industries whose products were no longer 
marketable, the Slovak Republic had been affected more dramatically. Whilst 
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maintaining hopes and expectations that separation from the Czech republic would 
bring about change and open up opportunities, the managers, however, generally 
commented that the separation had been a move supported by political forces rather 
than the populace as a whole. 
Organisational Structure at First Interview 
The organisational structure at the time of the first interview was still in a state of 
flux. Initial changes had been made but it was recognised that further organisational 
structure changes would have to be carried out once privatisation had been completed. 
It was felt that until now only the names of departments had been altered but little 
else. Indeed the Economics Department had formerly been Planning and Statistics and 
the Finance department had only been founded relatively recently by the Senior 
Manager of the Economics Department, Ing. Vladimir. Previously the Finance 
Department had been located at the centre of the former 'trust' Vhj in Spisska Nova 
Ves. Finance was now run by Yvette, as was Personnel. 
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Technology Dept. 
Senior Mana_ger: 
EmiiK. 
Production Dept. 
Senior Manager: 
JanV. 
Construction Dept. 
Upholstery Dept. 
Organisational Structure of Kreslo (9/4/93) 
General Management Department 
General Manager: JozefT. 
Sales and Marketing Dept. 
Senior Manager: 
JanV. 
Deputy Manager: 
MiroslavT. 
Economics Dept. 
Senior Mana_ger: 
lng. Vladimir K. 
Finance Dept. 
Senior Manager: 
Yvette K. 
Personnel Dept. 
Senior Manager: 
Yvette K. 
Legal Advisor 
Approximately 760 employees in the rest of factory 
Source: OriginalS. Bygate basd on interview data 1993 
Personnel was described as formerly being controlled by the Communist Party and at 
the time of interview had not yet been subsumed into another department as was 
sometimes the case after 1989, as new incumbents attempted to sweep away old and 
unpopular political control mechanisms. 
The Sales and Marketing department had also previously existed but presumably in 
the form of the Commercial or 'obchodni' department. However, its function differed 
considerably from this time and was now much larger and more important. This was 
explained by two factors. Firstly Kreslo had previously received more or less fixed 
orders at fixed prices for five permanent clients for its furniture production, three 
domestic clients, and two export clients, the former Soviet Union and abroad via the 
export wing of the Vhj, Drevounia in Bratislava. 
Secondly, it had not as a company ever had direct contact with its customers as the 
'trust' headquarters in Novy Domov, Spisska Nova Ves, had dealt with this. The 
situation post-1989 had of course involved almost complete market collapse. One 
manager summed up the changes thus: 
" Before to be successful as a director it was necessary to fulfil three 
conditions. Firstly to be a good friend of the local Communist Party chief, 
secondly, to have as many friends in the state apparatus and party as possible, 
and thirdly to have lots of container wagons in the railway station. Now we 
have all the wagons we need in the station and no markets."10 
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The friends and contacts were required to aid the factory in the frequent event of Jack 
of adequate materials, investments and machinery which could potentially curtail the 
production process and in order to bargain for and secure lower enterprise production 
plan targets. 
The situation had now changed dramatically. Customer orders were now separate and 
the customers had to be found, particularly customers from Western Europe. 
"Before to get furniture it was necessary to bring along a bottle ofBorovicka, 
now to sell you have to bring along a bottle of Borovicka" .11 
However, it was hoped that the necessary changes in organisational structure, working 
rationale, production and market sector establishment would be primarily enabled by 
the success of the management privatisation plan, if and when it was accepted by the 
Slovakian government. 
Production for a Changing Market 
Until two or three years prior to the interview in 1993, exports to the former Soviet 
Union had accounted for approximately 40%-80% of production, the rest going onto 
Czechoslovak markets, and only 10% to the Western European (exclusive of West 
Germany) market and 5% to West Germany. The market in Slovakia was now 
extremely poor, with little fluidity of capital amongst customers. The problem of 
payment arrears has been dealt with in Chapter Five and with reference to Begg and 
Portes (1992), McDermott (1994), and Vesely (1992). Indeed as with many 
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companies interviewed in the Czech and the Slovak Republics, payments to Kreslo for 
its products not yet honoured by purchasing Slovakian firms were a serious problem. 
The demand for furniture in Russia was still potentially big, but no-one had the 
necessary finance to be able to purchase such items. At the time of interview, over 
50% of actual sales were going to western Germany, France, Holland and 
Switzerland. The management team wanted to open up British markets but had found 
access very difficult. Many products were being stockpiled due to lack of customers. 
The company was still pursuing Russian markets, in the hope that finance would 
eventually back demand. They noted that they would also now try to approach the 
Eastern supply market with regards to supplies of raw materials and partly finished 
goods in a similar vein to the West European approach to their own market. It was felt 
that West Europeans were only interested in raw materials and since it was made 
illegal by the Slovak government to export raw timber abroad (in order to prevent the 
export of wood supplanting the wood-working industry in foreign trade terms and 
thus providing lower revenue), western companies subverted this by arranging to buy 
minimally worked timber and exporting this to their own factories for re-working. In 
addition there was much resentment against the European Community at firm level 
due to what were felt to be unhonoured promises as regards open markets. Instead, 
furniture companies and clients from abroad, required a higher quality of product, 
which Kreslo was unable to supply at that time, but at extremely low prices. This was 
cited especially in dealings with countries such as Switzerland, Germany and Austria. 
The resentment was particularly felt as the Swedish firm IKEA had been buying the 
products from Czechoslovakian companies under the former regime for a number of 
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years, in this particular case through Drevounia, the Vhj's export wing in Bratislava. 
The same products were now demanded but at lower prices. 
The product range was primarily furniture and upholstered furniture and although 
management planned to change models they essentially wanted to remain in this area. 
They were interested in diversifying into saunas and sports production, as there 
seemed to be demand from abroad for these specific products and indeed there were 
offers from abroad for collaboration on such products. Kreslo was still considering 
these offers. 
Motivation, Training and Personnel 
Management felt aware of the changes needed in order to ensure a better working 
rationale and therefore to fulfil one of the requirements of better product quality. The 
rationale of the past had been one of completing time cards. Employees would clock 
on and off at the appropriate times but with little application to the work in hand and 
little attention paid to the actual quality of work. Employees were aware of the 
required changes now that the market rationale had changed and the company had to 
engage in the actual selling of products to ensure the future of the firm. Management 
wanted to improve supervision and to encouraged a heightened awareness of these 
issues, firstly through improving management skills commensurate with the new 
burgeoning market system requirements, later offering appropriate training also to the 
factory employees, and lastly improving health and safety standards, and 
environmental conditions. 
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Management and the Improvement of Skills 
The growing importance of searching out markets for products, especially in Western 
Europe, meant that language and marketing skills were now deemed to be of 
importance, as well as what was termed as 'foreign economics generally'. However 
only the Deputy Manager in the Sales Department had the training and experience in 
both these fields leading to a strain in the relationship between the senior and deputy 
managers of this department that was quite apparent during the interview and indeed 
was commented on independently by individuals after the official interview. The 
Scandinavian company interested in buying the other half of the factory in the 
forthcoming privatisation plan (see below), had attempted to employ the Deputy Sales 
Manager, Miroslav. However, he felt first of all a loyalty to the Slovak firm and to his 
home town and secondly he felt the package offered to him was exploitative. 
It was generally felt that the skills and experience required to steer a course through 
the present changes were lacking and managers were attempting to acquire the 
appropriate skills as they worked. None of the former middle managers had really had 
any formal management training at all and realised the importance of improving their 
skills base to ensure firm survival and success. As part of this aim the Deputy Sales 
and Marketing manager had gained access to an human resource management course 
in the near future in Japan, to be conducted in English. 
On the positive side managers had successfully installed and acquired the requisite 
skills for the new computers used in the Finance Department. This was greeted as a 
very substantial technological revolution by the department, as in the other case study 
company, Dfevodelny, in the Czech Republic, which is analysed in the previous 
293 
chapter. Until 1989 there had been no computers and no fax machine either. Now 
Kreslo had 14 computers and management had learnt to use them without formal 
training by trial and error. 
Motivation and Worliforce 
There was continuing confusion as to what approach to take with the workforce 
regarding discipline. Management preferred an informal and common spirited 
approach rather than a harsh one. However, it had been noted that until now this had 
not really been successful, as employees listened avidly and then did not follow 
instructions. The question this experience appeared to pose for managers was how 
was this way of thinking to be changed? Part of the problem was perhaps also what 
was described as "transitionally low morale", due to the looming privatisation which 
envisaged the Scandinavian company hiving off some workers and some of the 
factory and machinery. It was clear that some dismissals would occur as a result of 
this and employees felt wary of the future. Two immediate consequences of this were 
firstly a rise in the number of thefts of company property and secondly the present 
enthusiasm by workers to take on a second shift due to a fear of unemployment, where 
prior to this point managers had problems recruiting for extra work requirements. 
This was recognised at this time as motivation for 'negative' reasons and was not 
viewed as a long-term solution. Management had outlined three areas which needed to 
be tackled in order to improve motivation for more positive reasons. Firstly, health 
and safety issues, secondly the employee training and skills base and thirdly closer 
supervision. 
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Health, Safety and Environmental Issues 
The team felt it to be important to improve health and safety standards, as much of the 
machinery on the shopfloor did not have covers and there was a lack of hygiene 
throughout the factory. In addition the factory had to face particular environmental 
concerns due to its position in the centre of town and near a residential area. A 
number of other Slovakian furniture companies commented on the new environmental 
laws and were concerned how they were to meet such strict legislation with such little 
money at their disposal and no promise of future customers. All of these firms were 
situated either on the outskirts of towns or far from private dwellings which 
consequently made the issue less pressing. Due to Kreslo's geographical location, 
however, it was felt in 1993 that the environmental legislation was of great 
importance. It was also believed that improvement of standards within the factory 
would also stimulate motivation. The general manager had been impressed by this 
approach on a recent visit to furniture-making factories in Britain. However, there was 
also an awareness that financing such an undertaking could be a problem, especially if 
the management privatisation plan were endorsed by government, who would then 
have to be paid for the existing machinery and buildings. 
The third arm of the strategy to improve motivation and approach to work was the 
increased quality and attention of supervision. At this point no plans had been made as 
to how this improvement was to be made, but it is interesting to note that responses to 
the questionnaire circulated to employees and managers by Spring 1995 to all firms 
generally cited supervision (expressed as confidence in the supervisor or Majstr and 
increased discipline) as generally the one area of enterprise functioning to have 
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improved and increased with privatisation. There was also a correspondence between 
improved supervision and perceived management improvement. This will be 
highlighted in the final chapter. 
Legislation 
The general legislative situation of 1993 was commented on by many companies 
interviewed. The legal advisor in Kreslo reported similar concerns. She noted that for 
two to three years after the Velvet revolution of 1989 the government did not make 
any large scale changes to the legal system which resulted in a "wild west 
atmosphere". Kreslo had to adapt to the changes in the situation quickly as they 
appeared: 
'We felt like firemen constantly putting out the fire wherever it arosem 
When new laws did eventually come into being, they came in a flood of legislation 
and the company noted that many of them contradicted old legislation. The legal 
advisor also noted that this was an ideal situation for former Communist Party 
members who were adept at working the system. She also observed, however, that the 
legislation was not very "strong", and that Kreslo was finding ways around it in order 
to survive. This observation was not exclusive to Kreslo amongst the case studies. 
Yvette F. noted in the Finance Department that while new tax laws had been drawn up 
with January 1st 1993 in mind, they had since changed again and the situation had not 
been clarified. This affected Kreslo's functioning directly. 
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As regards environmental legislation, despite the Slovakian government processing 
much legislation, one manager reported 73 pieces of separate legislation pertaining to 
business operations being sent to his company between January 1st and April 1993, 
the authorities were not as effective in monitoring and implementing those same 
legislative codes 13• Thus the initial concerns over environmental legislation were not 
met by strict implementation and fines. This is reminiscent of the past regime's 
approach to environmental legislation which on paper was extremely advanced but 
was never properly implemented if at al114• 
Management and Foreign Privatisation Plans 
The privatisation of Kreslo was to be decided by the competing of various 
privatisation plans put forward, in this case, by five separate parties during the first 
wave of privatisation in 1991. These plans were assessed at ministerial level and two 
of the plans were accepted. The managerial buy out plan and that of a foreign Swedish 
company. It was hoped that privatisation would occur by the 1st of May or June 1993, 
although it was envisaged that it may take longer due to the usual slow processing of 
documents by government and state institution bureaucracy. 
The management buy out team consisted of seven people from the Kreslo 
management team: the General Manager of Kreslo, and the Senior Manager of the 
Finance and Personnel Departments' manager, the Technology Department, the Sales 
and Production Departments', manager, the Upholstery Department and Construction 
and one further senior manager who would be the major investors. A further twelve 
who worked in the company but not in management were also to invest in the new 
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company but at a less prominent level. It was hoped that the remaining part of Kreslo, 
after the Swedish purchase, would then become a limited company under the above 
owners. The privatisation plan submitted to government included not only the price 
offered by potential buyers, but also the number of employees to be retained and plans 
for the future of the firm, including investment and sources. Management claimed that 
the main capital for buying the company was to come from personal savings, the rest 
from bank credits. The arrangement would be that repayments would take place over 
five years. 
This was an unusual source of funding at the time as few citizens possessed very 
many savings, particularly not former middle and lower management, who were less 
able than top management and party functionaries to capitalise on their positions. 
Personal saving had not been encouraged by the previous regime and was not a useful 
option in a state where money was unlikely to be as powerful in securing goods in 
short supply as contacts. 
Management realised that the venture would involve a great personal risk but they 
felt they possessed the self-confidence and professional skills required to make the 
investment work. It was also hoped that government would support those who wished 
to invest. 
It had been provisionally agreed that on privatisation the foreign company would take 
over approximately 300 employees and Kreslo under the management buy out team 
would retain 400, but that of the 760 employees who worked in both companies, 25% 
would lose their jobs. The management team had already identified the changes 
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needed to be made in organisational structure, production and marketing, motivation 
and personnel, working conditions and morale. 
Enterprise Culture 
Management was concerned about the popular perception amongst employees of 
working for a foreign owned company. The assumption was that not only would the 
company assure jobs, but that it would also pay a higher salary and indeed a higher 
price to the state for the firm. In effect, reported management, foreign firms generally 
employed fewer people than domestic firms and also often made people unemployed 
only to re-employ them again in order to claim a Slovak government subsidy open 
only to foreign firm to encourage location within its borders. Whether this is an 
accurate picture of every foreign firm or not, it does confirm management's appraisal 
of the situation as being fuelled initially by social concern. This concern was 
indicative of a degree of social responsibility observed in almost all firms interviewed 
especially in the first round of interviews. Many managers expressed the hope that 
dismissals of employees for restructuring reasons could be avoided. Indeed, although 
part of the proposed two privatisation plans involved a certain degree of dismissals, it 
was hoped that if the new management limited company was successful thirty more 
people could be needed, depending on production and sales. Any question of making 
lay offs in order to increase savings and promote higher productivity amongst those 
remaining employees was dismissed as being "too capitalistic". The social function of 
the former m\rodni podnik (national enterprise) obviously still influenced the culture 
of the new management echelons at this time (see Chapter One). 
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Restructuring Issues-2nd Interview 2817/94 
By the time of the second interview the two privatisation plans, foreign and domestic 
had been endorsed by government and processed. The company was now a limited 
entity formed on the basis of the management buy out described above. The four 
senior managers of the new departments were now also the directors of this company. 
Although the second interview was open to senior managers and directors, all of 
whom had attended the previous interview and therefore had already met the author 
and been aware of the nature of the work, only one agreed to attend. A second had 
already left the company, for reasons which will be discussed and was working 
abroad. Thus the second interview data rests on the evidence of one witness, that of 
the General Manager, Jozef. However the context of the case study, the nature and 
stature of that particular interviewee, as well as the fact that the descriptions given are 
consistent with the author's analysis of the situation in Kreslo and are supported by the 
general findings of other company situations reinforce the reliability of the data. In 
addition numerous other examples in the press and exposed at a political level of 
problems surrounding direct sale to managers and the questions of corruption and 
legitimacy involved, testify to the widespread nature of the problem illustrated below. 
Privatisation and the Management Buy Out 
The cost of the management buy out had been estimated at approximately 120 000 
Slovak Crowns, and was acquired in the form of credits from the government which 
the new owners were required to pay back to government over the coming five years. 
Investment for new machinery had been provided in part by banks (with interest rates 
300 
of20%) and in part by the profits made by the company. Management itself had very 
little money. The personal savings mentioned in the first interview as forming the 
basic capital had not materialised. 
The general manager declared that privatisation in this company had been very 
specific. The form and timing for the privatisation of companies across the country 
had to be decided by both the Ministry for Privatisation and the Slovakian government 
in Bratislava. The first step in this process, however, is applying to the regional 
council, or local government with a privatisation plan. According to the interviewee, 
who had been part of the process, the management team had especially good relations 
with the local council, which enabled them to lobby the higher echelons of 
government effectively. This was possible due to the old political networks still 
operating between local firm and local government, between local government and 
central government and indeed between local firm and central government. The 
inherited structure of the Slovak economy with regards to centre-locality networks 
(see Chapter Five), strengthens the local firm as sole employer and reinforced by the 
political culture developing since 1993. The process of direct sale privatisation 
became entangled at all levels, but most spectacularly at government level (see 
Chapter Six), with a degree of political clientelism or favouritism. Jozef was of the 
opinion that coupon privatisation, used in both the Czech and Slovak Republics at 
different times as a means of privatisation, was morally a better proposition. He felt 
that until the previous year no-one had really understood the nature and implications 
of privatisation. Government had claimed that where direct sales of enterprises were 
concerned all Slovaks would potentially be able to buy. In actual fact management 
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and directors have far more opportunities to profit from direct enterprise sales than 
employees or citizens without a connection to the firm. 
Organisational Changes 
Thus Kreslo's management team, now also the new owners, were able to make and 
. endorse the organisational changes thought necessary to improve company success. 
Actual organisational structure had, indeed, become more streamlined with fewer 
departments, mostly achieved through the amalgamation of some functions under 
main departments, as shown below. The four main departments were now Economics, 
Technology, Production and the Commerce department, which included marketing 
and sales. The senior managers of the four streamlined departments were also the 
directors of the new limited company, which was likened to the German GmbH 
(Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung or limited company.). 
As in many other former state run enterprises, the personnel function was reduced in 
importance and subordinated within another department. This was due to the powerful 
role of the personnel department under the previous regime, when it had busied itself 
with information gathering and cadre nominations. It was therefore stressed that the 
present four senior managers of each department dealt with the personnel matters of 
their respective departments individually. The secretaries of each department recorded 
illnesses, absences and holidays for each employee in that particular department. 
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Production, Markets and Investments 
Production, that is method, equipment and products had remained more or less the 
same, with a change only in the upholstered furniture. Foreign export was aimed at 
Germany, France and Switzerland and had reached about 50% of all production. This 
is similar to the level achieved at the first interview with the exception of Holland as 
an export destination. The other 50% went to the domestic Slovak market. Many 
foreign firms were interested in Kreslo's products but were always pushing the price 
lower. Occasionally Kreslo still managed to export to the former Soviet Union 
through old contacts which they had maintained along with contacts to the former 
enterprises of the Vhj. In fact, with respect to old contacts and networks, it was noted 
nothing had really changed. 
The Scandinavian firm had bought new production rooms since 1993 and had 
imported 400 million Slovakcrowns (approximately £100, 000) worth of machinery 
from Italy and indeed were attracting some of the employees from Kreslo. With 
increased competition, it was felt possible that wages and working conditions within 
Kreslo would be improved in the near future to cope with this competition. 
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Organisational Chart of Kreslo Ltd.- 2nd Interview 
28/7/94 
Management Buy-Out- 4 Managing Directors 
represent management ownership interest in firm and are also senior managers of each department 
described below. 
Production 
Senior Manager 
Branch Production + 
distribution 
Centre- computation + 
assembly 
Centre- upholstered 
production 
Centre- construction of 
worked pieces 
Branch· PP. PO-CO 
Branch- legal + 
personnel 
Technology 
Senior Manager 
General Manager 
Economics 
Senior Manager 
Branch- finance, taxation 
and accounts 
Branch- wages + book-
keeping 
Branch- formulation prices, 
calculation, rationalisation, 
consumption of materials + 
work 
Branch- (ASR) regulation 
of statistics of provisions 
Branch- technology, development+ construction of furniture 
Branch~ realisation of custom made production 
Branch- management+ control (inspection) activity 
Branch~ investment, technical services + maintenance 
Branch~ care of surroundings +environment 
Source: OriginalS. Byagte from inteNiew data 2Bn/94 
Commerce 
Senior Manager 
Branch- Sales +marketing 
for export 
Branch- sales + marketing 
(DT) advertising 
Branch- (MTZ) construction 
cooperation 
Bran'ch- small commercial 
sales 
This differs from the Czech example given previously where due to a lack of 
unemployment, poor skills, wage controls and competition from new companies, the 
company had problems finding employees of good calibre in certain areas. In 
Slovakia, by contrast, it would appear that despite greater unemployment, the problem 
of a lack of an appropriately skilled or motivated workforce had not been solved. 
However, Kreslo now had no more money for machines and had to spend what 
remained on materials. In addition they had the problem of outstanding debts still to 
be honoured by Slovak firms. The general manager saw some firms as simply 
functioning with no intention of paying for goods but usually the problem was one of 
bankruptcy. 
Generally it was hoped that if management continued to make good in sales they 
would be able to invest in new machinery and would be able to pay off loans. It was 
also noted that competition was increasing rapidly in this sector. 
Personnel 
The foreign buy out of half of the old state owned Kreslo enterprise had indeed gone 
ahead but the firm had not taken on 300 employees from the available labour pool. 
Only 80 had gone over to the new company and another 40 from outwith the former 
complex had been taken on. Kreslo in turn had cut down drastically on staff and by 
July/ August of 1993 employed only approximately half of the original number, that is 
350 people out of the original 760, minus the 80 employees who had gone over to the 
foreign company. The technology department had been especially reduced with about 
50% of its staff being released from employment. The main criteria for dismissal had 
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been inadequate motivation and attention to work or lack of skills. It was stressed that 
it had been a difficult decision and in the main good Majstr, (the Slovak and indeed 
Czech Republics follow the German tradition of having master craftsmen as 
supervisors, the Slovak name itself comes from the German Meister or master), 
'technologists', and managers had been favoured over other groups. Generally greater 
numbers of people working in administration and production had been released from 
employment. All former managers, however, had remained. This was reported as 
having resulted in very low morale, and indeed observation at the factory in general 
and interactions gave evidence to feelings of strong suspicion and resentment on the 
part of employees with regards to management and new owners. The general manager 
reported the disappearance of all of the former community feeling in the factory and 
described the differentiation between managers and employees had increased with 
management, now proud new owners, generally behaving rather autocratically. 
No new skills had been acquired by management since the last interview although it 
had, at the time of the first interview, been expressed as one of the prime areas of 
concern. The deputy sales manager, Miroslav, had completed the training course in 
human resource management in Japan as planned the year before. After his return to 
the firm, personnel problems caused him to leave and he was now working in abroad. 
The personnel problems were reported as being jealousy from the senior managers 
and owners, to the degree that his functioning within the firm was made impossible. 
Thus the one area where the skills base had been improved had not been capitalised 
on. 
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Motivation and Enterprise Culture 
Wages had increased and working conditions had improved, but only marginally and 
the planned improvements in health and environmental conditions of employees had 
also improved much less than planned. Motivation was not being raised as 
management as a whole had previously hoped, as a result of better wages and working 
conditions and a desire for the company to succeed, but rather out of fear. 
Unemployment in the small town stood at 1 0-15% and there was little else around the 
town, in terms of industries, services and urban settlements which could provide 
alternative work. In fact the only other option was agriculture and as a result 
employees were working relatively well despite low morale. 
In fact the General Manager noted that the workforce was indeed secretly very angry 
with management over dishonoured promises and the way the firm had been acquired 
over their heads. The enterprise culture had changed remarkably with suppressed 
hostility and sombre mood amongst employees, especially in dealings with 
management, being quite obvious on visiting the factory. 
Indeed the General Manager, one of the management buy out team, was quoted as 
saying: 
" Die Arbeiter hier arbeiten wie Sklaven und Management benimmt sich wie 
Konigen" 15• 
("Workers here work like slaves and the management behave like kings.") 
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He predicted the firm could be worth almost 1000 million Slovak Crowns (almost £2 
500 000) in five years time, and would belong to seven people, himself included, who 
had never really paid for the firm out of their personnel wealth, but rather had used the 
sales produced by employees to service and pay back government loans on a buy out 
capital of 120 000 Slovak Crowns. This arrangement had been the sole means of 
differentiation between management and employees and the formally legitimised 
process by which management had achieved ownership status. 
Future Problems 
The main condition of the survival of the firm was continued sales which would allow 
the settling of loans and the investment in new machinery. The environmental 
problems were also still of concern due to the emissions of gas and sound, however, 
given the concern of the first interview and the lack of change by the second, it would 
suggest that this was deemed less pressing by the rest of the management team given 
the machinery and debt repayment needs, in order to secure their ownership. One area, 
however, where an overlap of interests would seem to occur was in the replacement of 
the heating system which was deemed uneconomical. The issue of energy generally 
would have to be tackled. Lastly there was a concern over attracting the best personnel 
given the growing competition in the town. There was an awareness that in some 
respects and for some employees, wages and conditions would have to improve. 
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Analysis; Centre-Locality Issues and the Question of Legitimacy in Ownership 
and Control 
Jozef was still managmg director and had been part of the initial management 
reorganisation plan and buy out project, and was thus still set to benefit ultimately 
from the process. However, his misgivings and concern over new management (and 
enterprise) culture and practice were serious enough to override his own potential 
personnel gain. Indeed, he felt so strongly about the experience of the two years that 
he was convinced that voucher privatisation was 'morally' superior to direct sales for 
reasons already outlined above. This attitude, of course, raises the issue of legitimacy, 
but initially it is necessary to examine the evidence in order to cross-reference this 
interpretation. 
Included in the analysis must be both firm specific factors and evidence from the 
examination of other cases in this study and the evidence from studies of the 
macro-level situation. The firm specific factors relate to personnel, motivation, capital 
and investment funding, sources and acquisition, training and health and 
environmental improvement plans, organisational restructuring and product and 
market strategy, the lack of willingness of management to be interviewed and lastly 
the author's independent observations. On the wider level the author's analysis of other 
case studies in the same sector across both the Czech and Slovak Republics as well as 
general findings on the effect of privatisation on management behaviour across the 
two countries would suggest that the criticisms of the general manager of Kreslo were 
of some validity. These factors need to be looked at individually. 
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Relating to personnel and the skills profile, the only member of the management team 
with a high degree of fluency in English, experience of working practice in both 
American and Japanese firms and market economy enviromnents, and the only 
member to increase his knowledge of new appropriate skills since the first interview 
had met with hostility and a lack of co-operation on his return to the company. This, 
in turn, encouraged him to leave the firm and subsequently to return to employment 
abroad. No other changes had occurred at management level in terms of a change in 
personnel or the improvement of the skills portfolio offered by senior management to 
the advantage of the firm. 
As far as concerns the capital and investment funding and sources, there was an 
overlap with the personnel considerations. Neither entrepreneurial skills nor adequate 
capital had justified this take-over of ownership. In effect the privatisation process of 
direct sale had enabled legitimisation of a partial resolution of a centre-locality 
relationship without truly benefiting either the locality itself (given the lack of 
employee participation in the ownership and control process and the degree of 
resulting unemployment), nor the entity of the firm itself (no superior knowledge or 
funding had accrued to the firm as a result). By the time of the second interview there 
were 350 employees in the firm who produced the profit with which the loan for the 
purchase of the firm by management was serviced and paid off, as well as loans for 
investment. Management had limited personnel money for investment and limited 
skills and yet by their superior position and contacts had been able to secure 
ownership from the central state for a narrow elite within the locality. The main 
advantage of their superior position was the ability to capitalise on opportunities open 
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to them alone to use contacts from the old extended networks within the former Vhj, 
ministries and central and local state apparatus and also to use new institutional 
networks which still function upon old lines. Ultimately, once the government loan 
was paid in five years time, the firm, given its continuing rate of reported sales and 
profit, would have appreciated significantly in value and would effectively belong to 
only seven owners with a major stake out of the original 760 employees. The initial 
management privatisation plan had also involved another twelve minor investors 
working in the company but not in management, however, the consolidated dual 
control of seven major investors who also shared senior management positions and 
four of whom were also managing directors created a situation of a controlling 
majority by seven individuals in both ownership and control terms. 
The number of employees had been reduced more drastically than originally forecast 
and indeed any previous commitment to 'social' obligations, the eventual 
re-employment of some employees and an improvement in workforce training the 
development of positive and more effective motivational factors (for example 
improvements in health and safety conditions, environmental upgrading and indeed 
regarding stricter supervision and guidance by supervisors and lower management) 
were now completely absent, and no attempt in the past year had been made to enact 
them. The organisational structure had indeed been reformed and streamlined but was 
also used as a means, along with the personnel overlap, by which ultimate control of 
the management structure by new owners was reinforced. The share of production 
being exported had not significantly increased, although the domestic market demand 
had improved. No clear market strategy had been developed to cope with the rising 
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competition. Lastly no explanation had been given to the finn generally, and there 
appeared to be no necessity to inform central authority of the changes in the originally 
stated privatisation plan. In addition none of the other members of the management 
team would communicate in any fonn with the author on this or other issues, in 
marked contrast to the initial survey of opinion. 
The author's analysis of the finn is a result of the author's direct observations in this 
particular firm and the differences in facts and descriptions of intentions between the 
first interview and the actual occurrences by the second. By the second interview the 
atmosphere and interaction between managers and employees had visibly changed due 
to the experience under the new management buy out scheme. 
Culture Change and the Inheritance of Past Value Systems 
It is also interesting to note the change in Kreslo's management approach to the feared 
exploitation of the workforce by the foreign firm stated in the first interview. By the 
second interview, this concern had been abandoned and instead Kreslo was 
considering potential ways to prevent the loss of scarce highly skilled employees to 
the foreign firm. The culture had changed from one of the guardian of social concern 
to one of a competing firm concerned over the poaching of its employees by a rival. 
The observation of the changing management forecast for employment of the firm 
cannot be judged as intrinsically correct or incorrect given the lack of figures and data 
available and the completely unprecedented situation. What it does suggest is that the 
value systems of the managers on purchase with regards to certain aspects of past 
inheritance where no self-interest was attached were swept away. Where past 
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inheritance served self-interest, be it local government, ministerial or inter-enterprise 
contacts and the self-protectionist approach to management personnel, their skills 
profile and approaches to finance, the values were maintained. Indeed the approach to 
the financial sources were similar to the bargaining entered into by enterprises with 
the central state under the old system. Previously firms bartered, unofficially of 
course, for increased investments and lower production targets. Here management's 
original privatisation plan was made attractive to central government in the terms 
outlined above of personnel and strategy and in terms of personal and bank funding. 
None of this materialised in the end, and indeed government was relied upon for the 
capital loan for purchase. 
Privatisation, Centre-Locality and Legitimacy of Ownership and Control 
Although one of the advantages of direct sales to management is the opportunity for 
domestic entrepreneurial investors to develop their skills and for the country to 
capitalise on the skills and knowledge already available in firms, their are problems. 
Both the advantages and disadvantages have been discussed by Schmoegnerova 
(1992) and (1993)16• 
In general, the experience of privatisation in the Czech and Slovak Republics suggest 
that direct sale has given rise to opportunities for management to use their superior 
knowledge position to their own financial advantage. Management in some cases have 
either asset stripped the firm to their own short term financial advantage, or have used 
this technique prior to the beginning of the privatisation process in order to be able to 
buy the firm at a lower value at privatisation. In other cases lower firm evaluations 
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have been secured by specific proposed privatisation plans on the basis of contacts 
alone. 
In Kres!o there was a need for management to establish their identity as owners and 
authority as managers over employees. As shown above this was not justified by 
improved skills on the part of the managers, or indeed by any market management 
skills, nor by sources of funding. The centre-locality tensions, expressed in the past as 
state versus enterprise/locality tensions, were now dissolved by direct sale into a crisis 
of legitimacy in ownership and control. In some ways control had still not been 
wrested from the centre as they were the prime source of loan funding. How this 
relationship would develop further and how it would affect firm functioning is still 
unclear at this point in time due to the early stages of the relationship. 
By contrast in Dfevodelny the centre-locality conflict had been converted into a 
devolved the control crises between ownership and management. However, there are 
important similarities. Firstly it is the centre-locality conflict in both and the need for 
restructuring in order to survive in a new market environment that has provoked 
privatisation. Secondly, the failure of either approach to properly ensure an 
appropriate and efficient restructuring can be observed. This failure is not only at 
management and firm level, but also reflected in macro-economic planning and local 
and central state functioning. Lastly the influence of past value systems and cultures 
inform present behaviour regardless of significant political and economic changes. 
In Dfevode!uy managers referred to the 19th century capitalist mentality of owners. 
In Kreslo, the general manager referred to a management acting in a similarly 
authoritarian vein. The perception of ownership in both firms seems to have been 
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informed by the previous regime's often rather simplistic interpretation of Marxist 
analysis of capitalism in the last century and applied to the present day capitalist 
system without adjustment. In addition the authoritarian/paternalistic nature of 
management in the past has informed a behaviour of control according to rank 
differentiation, rather than leadership by virtue of leadership by confidence, superior 
and appropriate skills or entrepreneurial experience and source of funding. It appears 
in both examples that at the end of the privatisation process, it is the state of owning 
that is considered to be the real sign of success, rather than what is done with that 
ownership, even in the case of a management buy out. Ultimately his limits the 
enthusiasm for restructuring. In the Slovakian case study, the fact that the government 
is the main creditor, would suggest the reinvention of the 'soft budget constraint' as 
referred to by Komai, and the possibly tentative approach to any potential bankruptcy 
proceedings. Similar effects have been observed elsewhere17• 
What it also significant in this particular case study, is the fact that it is not former 
senior management (i.e. from the previous regime) which is availing itself of the 
techniques described above but the former regime's middle and lower management, 
who had become senior management after the revolution of 1989. The new senior 
management has taken on and perpetuated the inherited socio-economic culture of 
former enterprise management behaviour, as discussed in Chapter Five. There is a 
parallel here with the political developments in Slovakia and its interaction with 
macro- and micro-economic policy. 
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Conclusion 
The fact that management are in a better position to gain potentially from direct sale 
privatisation (for example, by reducing company value before privatisation and 
thereby securing a cheaper buy-out, or indeed to reduce value in book terms alone to 
the same ends or to use their old firm-locality-centre networks, to bargain for 
privatisation projects to their own advantage), or to asset strip before voucher 
privatisation or direct sale to an investor outside the management, reoccurs not only in 
the case studies looked at by this author but also in numerous other reported examples 
and has been commented on by other authors (McDermott [1994], Myant [1993], 
Schmoegnerova [1992], [1993]). Indeed Myant has suggested that if employees had 
been given a greater role to play in privatisation some of excesses of managerial 
profiteering could have been avoided18• A consequence of this could have been greater 
legitimacy not only of management and the process of restructuring and privatisation 
within the firm but also outwith. Perhaps ultimately such legitimisation would also 
have informed the debate regarding civil society, decentralisation of state institutions 
and political control, as discussed between President Have! and Prime Minister 
Vaclav Klaus during 199419• These two separate positions have resulted in political 
divisions between advocates of civil society (Have!) and advocates of a more narrow 
interpretation of liberal democracy (Klaus) in the Czech Republic. This carries 
implications for the evolution of an appropriate model of market economy in the two 
republics. 
In Slovakia specifically, the optimism over independence at the time of the first 
interview was to disappear rapidly on the political level, as the initial euphoria of 
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independence from the Czech Republic paled and political instability and renewed 
economic problems began. On the social level, the economic hardship resulting from 
the many closures of firms, affected the trust of many employees in firm management 
and the promises of various political factions also affected the mood of the country. 
The numerous problems at the political level with the privatisation process in 
Slovakia and the macro-economic policy, resulting in a damaging stop-go process of 
privatisation and the identification of certain privatisation forms with certain 
politicians, has already been discussed (see Chapter Six). This emerging clientelism 
also carries implications both for both the privatisation process itself and the 
emerging political order. The final chapter will raise certain interesting points from 
the questionnaire data pertinent to the question of the ability of privatisation to 
engender restructuring, it will also link the general findings to the question of 
corporate governance. 
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Kreslo is a pseudonym for the company as anonymity was promised all interviewees and is 
the Slovak for armchair, appropriate for this company as it produced upholstered furniture as well as 
exclusively wooden products. 
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Chapter Nine 
Comparative Issues in Organisational Change (and Economic 
Transition) in Eastern Germany; a general resume of the case 
studies 
Introduction 
Despite the initial obvious differences between the east German and Czechoslovakian 
(latterly the Czech and Slovak Republics') transformation, both economic and 
political, a comparative study of these areas highlights similarities as well as 
differences. It is interesting that a study of organisational change in former state 
enterprises undergoing privatisation or having been privatised in all three countries 
highlights a first level of functional similarities, such as the obvious lack of 
knowledge of the market economy environment, sales and marketing, and so on, but 
there is also a second level of similarities in the form of inherited and adaptive 
networks in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and deleted and transferred networks in 
east Germany. 
Chapter Outline 
The chapter will first of all discuss issues linked to organisational change and the 
external environment. Subsequently the chapter will look at the details of the 
operation of the Treuhandanstalt (THA), the aims of privatisation in East Germany 
and its outcomes, the political and social unrest resulting from this strategy and the 
attempts to temper these effects. The difficulties and implications for East German 
firms (state-owned or privately owned, usually through MBOs) are discussed 
generally and by means of the chosen case studies, both of which reveal the influence 
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of old networks on firms attempting to adapt to the new market situation and the 
constraining influence of new transferred networks on that attempted adaptation. 
Organisational Change Issues and the External Environment 
The type and success of organisational changes carried out in former state enterprises 
depend as much on the external environment and the chosen (or aimed for) corporate 
governance model as they do on the individual characters within the firm. For eastern 
Germany, unlike other countries, there was a ready-made system for transplantation 
waiting in the wings. The West German corporate governance, economic and political 
models were deemed an end-state from the beginning and as the process of 
transformation. This, one may call, the ultimate teleological approach. Within this it is 
important to note that political choices influenced economic transformation policies in 
spite of economic rationale: political pressure for reunification, political and social 
pressure for currency reunification; promises of West German consumption and 
wealth levels and political prestige for West Germany. Initially it was believed that 
privatisation of East Germany alone would compensate for costs of transformation to 
West Germany. An East German group, Neues Forum, represented by, among other 
writers and notables, Christa Wolf, did call for the maintenance of East Germany as a 
distinct area to protect its heritage and economy, but events overtook this movement 
and no such attempt was made. Thus predominantly political choices, as opposed to 
economic rationale, influenced the style and pace of transformation. Many prominent 
persons, however, both East and West, such as the West German writer, Gilnter Grass, 
have continued to criticise the purely political rationale for early reunification as the 
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root cause of the increasing malaise which tolerates the numerous Treuhand scandals 
'like petty offences', and which reduces the 'expropriation' of the East to the West into 
social estrangement and massive unemployment1• Scandals were not only limited to 
the THA but also surrounded such issues as the diverting of investment money bound 
for the East into western developers' hands2• In addition by 1993 hidden 
unemployment was already estimated to be as high as 30% of the workforce and was 
set to increase3• 
Pickel (1993) cites East Germany as a special example of the consequences of shock 
therapy with external actors dominating all the processes4• Therefore, the domestic 
process of institutional building from the ground up, the construction of market 
mechanisms and choice of form of regulation and its implementation was 
unnecessary, as it was all imported wholesale. The cost to East Germany of not 
having to make these decisions was the literal deletion of GDR heritage and history. 
This included the deletion of independent and indigenous local economic base (Koch 
and Thomas 1997) and the destruction of endogenous potential (Hoffman 1993; 
Matzner et al. 1992) caused by a number of measures including; price rises, currency 
conversion, collapse of eastern markets, liberalisation (flooding of East Germany with 
western goods of better quality, initially greater cachet and more readily available), 
and trade union pressure for equal wage levels, despite low productivity5• All this 
meant that East German firms could not compete with the West. In addition, whereas, 
in the Czech Republic industry experienced restructuring towards Western industrial 
structure, the East German industrial structure, notwithstanding differences in basic 
ideology and economic systems, was already similar to the West German one at the 
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beginning of 1989. Economic transformation actually caused the structure to differ. 
Thus the construction sector increased under transformation to a greater role in the 
East than in the West. In 1990 construction accounted for 18.1% of gross output from 
productive industry in East Germany. By 1994, due to infrastructure reconstruction, it 
had risen to 34.5%, while in West Germany the comparative figure was 7.3% for 
19946• Similarly, chemicals, once a significant sector in East Germany has been 
reduced to an extremely low level. The gross output of chemicals compared with the 
total for all sectors was 4% in 1990, declining to 2.7% in 1994, compared to 10.8% in 
West Germany for 1994. Two consequences of this which raised concern were issues 
of social fall out from such drastic measures and the concern to retain political control 
and stability. Thus political priorities changed industrial sector structure and the 
economic climate which in turn affected the choice of privatisation strategy and 
design of the structure appropriate to carrying this out. 
In this context it is interesting that although the Treuhandanstalt aimed to privatise, 
preferably to West German managers and entrepreneurs, it became involved with 
Sanierung or restructuring to a greater extent than the National Property Fund in 
Czechoslovakia (and subsequently in the two republics), with the government playing 
little role. On the other hand these policies were not part of an overall prograrurne to 
build an eastern German economic base but to prevent social unrest. This is both 
different and similar to the Czechoslovakian situation. In both Czechoslovakia and 
Germany the government were less involved in privatisation then their respective 
privatisation organisations, the NPF (National Property Fund) and the THA. 
However, the THA strategy was administrative in nature as compared with the more 
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minimal form of involvement of the NPF which devolved the responsibility to the 
market. Therefore the role and nature of Treuhandanstalt as an organisation of 
economic transformation was more important in East Germany than the nature and 
role ofNPF in Czechoslovakia. 
Treuhandanstalt- administrative privatisation 
The THA was created by the last GDR government prior to the first free elections in 
March 1990. Its portfolio was to transfer legally state enterprises into a form 
comparable with West German corporate law. The Treuhand organisation reflected 
the structure of the state-owned economy. The THA headquarters were located in East 
Berlin for large Kombinate (or industrial conglomerates, the equivalent of the 
Czechoslovakian Vhjs) and then distributed across the 14 district branches for the 
Volkseigene Betriebe7• Another remarkable difference between most other 
East/Central European countries and East Germany which bears witness to the 
influence of external actors on the process is the rapid growth of investment levels in 
East Germany during the early 1990s, whereas elsewhere investment especially in the 
public sector initially collapsed8• This was a result of West German investment in 
rebuilding the East German infrastructure. 
Actual reunification occurred on 3rd October 1990, with the German Democratic 
Republic's accession to the Federal Republic of Germany, and currency reunification 
had taken place on I July 1990. The legal basis of the THA was revised on 17 June 
1990 to enable it to sell state-owned property as its main task and it became 
responsible to the Finance Ministry. The organisational structure of the THA was 
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discussed in Autumn 1990 and revealed the great confusion as to how to proceed and 
indeed as to how many firms the THA actually possessed. The criteria for sales was 
set in order to check that West German buyers were actually interested in the firm, 
and not motivated by the desire to erase a potential competitor from the field or 
acquiring highly valuable real estate. The criteria therefore covered four areas; the 
investor's product development, marketing and finance plans; the amount of planned 
investment; the number of future jobs; and purchase price. A board, called a 
Leitungauschuss, was appointed to assess each application and included 4 top West 
German managers and 80 analysts. 
Structure of the Treuhandanstalt. 
The THA was organised into departments around industrial sectors. Later in August 
1990 it was reorganised into either Privatisation or Sanierung departments. There was 
a fear that under the old structure departments might identify with industrial sectors 
and attempt to preserve them, (especially as they ran along the lines of the old 
Kombinate ). However, this new structure proved untenable as each department had to 
deal with about 2000 firms. Restructuring especially proved too complicated to carry 
out without sectoral knowledge. Therefore a new divisional structure was 
reintroduced according to industrial sectors. This, in effect, was a revision to the 
former model9• 
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Aims of Privatisation- Ownership, Control and Restructuring 
Aims 
There were two basic aims initially. Firstly privatisation was used not only for 
transferral of property to private ownership as an aim in itself and to encourage 
restructuring and to improve efficiency (as in Czechoslovakia), coined by Kern and 
Sabel (1992) as the 'concept of restructuring through competition and market' or 
'auction market privatisation' ('Auktionsmarkt-Privatisierung'), but also to ensure sale 
to West German managers/proprietors in order for firms to benefit further from 
management skills such as marketing know-how, finance, investment, technological 
know-how, product knowledge etc., coined as the 'concept of reorganisation through 
powerful company groupings' or the 'big groupings model' ('Grossgmppenmodell')10• 
It was believed that this would reinforce restructuring attempts. Indeed Birgit Breuel, 
head of the THA from 1990 to 1994, claimed: 
'We always say we are not just selling firms, we are also buying something for 
them. We are buying management, we are buying technology, we are buying 
capital, and probably more important, we are buying a market share' .11 
Secondly, the authorities assumed they would be able to finance the costs of 
transformation to the West German state by using the estimated profit of DM 500 
billion from privatisation. However, the harsh economic conditions after currency 
reunification caused a massive drop in value of East German firms. It became obvious 
326 
----------------~------------------ ~---·-
by Autumn 1990 that most firms could not be sold profitably. Ultimately a debt of 
DM 260 or 270 billion arose from THA privatisation activities12• 
Outcomes 
The types of ownership actually achieved remained in line with the original aims of 
theTHA. 
On 1st July 1990 the Treuhandanstalt possessed 12,132 firms and 4 million 
employees but by 31st December 1994, 97% of its portfolio had been sold to private 
owners or reprivatised and transferred to municipalities or liquidated13• It is 
interesting to note the types of ownership in broad percentages given the above aims. 
By 1993, 80% had been sold to West German managers and 20% to indigenous (i.e. 
East German) MB0s14• 
Most importantly for the following discussion about endogenous entrepreneurs and 
economic potential, Kombinate had been broken up and Research and Development 
departments hived off and privatised separately. The main aim was to improve 
individual firm micro-efficiency, by hiving off unproductive units, in order to attract 
West German investment. This overriding aim proved a greater priority than the 
health of the regional economies of the former GDR. As a consequence of this 
approach, and because many firms within the Kombinat were involved in incomplete 
production processes, surviving East German found enourmous difficulties, in finding 
and producing for appropriate alternative markets for goods. 
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Political and Social Unrest- temporary adaptation of governance 
Due to the political need to control social unrest, Sanierung initiatives began to figure 
as part of THA activity. Birgit Breuel , president of the THA made a speech in 
November 1991, where she acknowledged the real possibility of deindustrialisation15• 
There was real fear that the trade unions and Laender governments may form a united 
political opposition to economic reform. However, the concept of how to maintain the 
industrial core regions (as referred to by Breuel), remained unclear and resulted in 
only limited policy measures. Indeed the external economic and political environment 
left little option for adapting the THA role and privatisation process. Although a 
policy change was formalised in June 1993 with regard to THA tasks and strategy, the 
main strength of the THA, as Seibel points out, was to voice concerns in order to 
prevent a political backlash: 
'This achievement was made possible by the Treuhandanstalt's institutional 
status as an independent federal agency and its step-by-step differentiation in 
a rigid centre with a flexible periphery, a process that gradually developed 
after crisis-like phases. In this way, the Treuhandanstalt balanced out not only 
the political dilemmas of the drastically accelerated privatization process but 
also the tension between the short-term task of privatization and the long-term 
process of economic structural transformation."6 
The limited policy measures taken were as follows. Firstly better information 
explaining the reasons for closures was made available and meetings with economic 
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players in the localities were undertaken. This was in response to incidents such as 
those around Schwerin, where workers and trade unions briefly began opposing 
closures, and in the East German potassium mining sector in 1993 where employees 
organised sit-ins and hunger strikes lasting into 199417• Two further policy measures 
were THA led; the MBOs (Management Buy Outs) and the MKGs (Managment 
Kommanditgesellschaften). The innovation of the Land of Saxony ATLAS 
(Ausgewiihlte Treuhandbetriebe von der Landesregierung angemeldet zur Sanierung) 
model was, however, the result of regional pressure which the THA, under political 
pressure, had to cede to. Indeed Geppert and Kachel (1995) describe these attempts as 
'(passive) Sanierung' and divide the development of the THA policy into 3 phases; 
quick privatisation through sale (until the beginning of 1991; privatisation and 
complementary restructuring (until the beginning of 1992); and the phase of 
'restructuring accompaniment and restructuring co-operation with the federal (Land) 
governments' 18• 
MBOs, MKGs and Saxon Atlas Model Initiative 
The MKG - Management Kommanditgesellschaften 
The MKG were formed from the Spring 1992 onwards to restructure and ensure 
eventual sale of individual firms rather than the industry of a particular region or 
industrial sector. An experienced West German manager directed each holding and 
received an additional premium if privatisation was a success while the THA owned 
and supplied capital resources19• This initiative was exceptional in that it was the one 
of the few instances where the THA became involved in restructuring before sale. The 
329 
---------------------------- - -
fact that in I 992, only I 0% of the Treuhand firms were destined for the MKG status 
also emphasises the limited nature of the initiative20• 
ATLAS model 
The ATLAS (Ausgewiihlte Treuhandbetriebe von der Landesregienmg angemeldet 
zur Sanierung or 'selected THA businesses registered by the Land government for 
reconstruction'), model was not an initiative of the THA but rather of the Land 
government of Saxony. Here a district attempted to control THA activity by 
influencing the process and form of privatisation (and restructuring). The THA only 
accepted this local initiative under political pressure in April I 992. Under this 
agreement the Land government earmarked THA enterprises which it deemed 
important for the region. The Land government then subsidised these firms (with 
federal funds given for improvement of regional economic stmcture ), and the THA 
closely supervised them. The co-ordinating mechanism consisted of a non-profit 
organisation with two managing directors; one nominated by the trade unions and the 
other by the employers' association21 • Seibel calls this an 'attempt to make firms 
competitive in a corporatist style' 22• 
The advantages and disadvantages of both models are interesting when one regards 
the concept of deleted, imposed and adaptive networks. The MKGs model ignored 
existing networks of suppliers and customers as the THA was fearful of the 
propagation of networks from the old Kombinats. However, firms found it difficult to 
become competitive without capable and appropriate networks of suppliers, 
customers and services. This will be discussed in greater detail for East German firms 
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generally in a moment. This weakness of the MKG mirrored exactly the very strength 
of the ATLAS model, which concentrated on a regional inter-related industry 
approach. However, the drawback, as outlined by Seibel (1997) was that: 
MBOs 
'the interests of existing production sites and existing jobs were dominant, 
thereby limiting the innovation of products and industrial organization.'23 
The fact that the THA believed only Western management experience could 
restructure East German enterprises and make a success of them meant that this 
strategy effectively excluded East Germany from the whole privatisation process. The 
MBOs which did occur were almost the only example of privatisation from below in 
East Germany and were concentrated in small and medium-sized enterprises and parts 
of enterprises. These were not the result of a centrally initiated strategy by the THA 
but a strategy which evolved out of the regional subsidiaries of the THA in response 
to concerns about unemployment and deindustrialisation. Car !in (1994) points out that 
not only did the THA not encourage MBOs, as they were not expected to survive for 
long , but in addition banks and funds were unwilling to provide external finance to 
MBOs24• This is confirmed by interviews carried out by the author of this thesis. As 
with the other initiatives, MBOs only formed a fraction of privatisation initiatives, by 
!993, 20% of all privatisations25• By 1994, 2,400 MBOs had been successful, which 
constituted just under one fifth of the total number of sales of enterprises or parts of 
enterprises26• Two thirds of MBOs were small firms of less than 50 employees, 6 
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MBOs were between 500 and 1000 employees and 45% were concentrated in 
manufacturing27• 
Difficulties of East German Initiatives 
It is in the context of East German initiatives that the problems of old networks 
between suppliers and producers became obvious. These problems were reinforced by 
the difficulty of breaking into Western associations. Fleischer (1996) points out that a 
number of environmental conditions caused significant problems for small- and 
medium-sized East German firms in establishing new markets28• Many of these 
problems relate to changes in business organisations in West Germany which, after 
unification automatically became part of the business environment in East Germany. 
The rest of the problems were part of the transformation process carried out in East 
Germany and a result of its inheritance. 
The main elements in the changing West German business environment are as 
follows: Firstly, internationalisation favours large-scale enterprises. Secondly 
German research and development facilities in large firms tend to be located 
increasingly outside Germany (in order to make the most of technological innovations 
as quickly as possible) and tend to be founded between large competitors in 'strategic 
alliances'. Fleischer (1996) cites the example of Siemens in this context29• These 
external conditions make it very difficult for small firms to compete, especially as 
Research and Development can be a very costly undertaking. Thirdly, a further 
development is the trend of the passing on of costs by final producers to suppliers, 
causing rationalisation and further cost cutting among suppliers. Thus the nature of 
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the networks between supplier and producer are changing in a mature market 
economy. Thus within such a competitive and tightly integrated market environment 
the only chance for a newcomer is to produce innovations in order to corner at least a 
section of the market30• Fourthly, under the German system there are certain special 
taxes incumbent on the newcomer, such as auditing costs, stock control costs, and 
'shelfmoney'31 • Thus not only the legal system of West Germany relating to business 
fell upon East Germany, but also the West German business networks and the 
evolving nature of those networks. 
Therefore, in many cases, the the changing business environment of West Germany, 
rather than alleviate the situation, compounded further the problems already 
experienced by East German firms as a result of their domestic economic inheritance 
and as a result of the transformation process 
Implications for East German Small- and Medium-Sized Firms 
As large-scale East German enterprises began to decline after 1989, so too did the 
opportunities, particularly for medium-sized firms to maintain supply links with 
customers. In addition West German enterprises could satisfy almost every East 
German demand and therefore medium-sized indigenous enterprises had little 
possibility of finding replacement customers. Furthermore West German firms 
brought with them their own settled supply networks, as noted above, and also 
established distribution systems. Fleischer (1996) points out that as wholesale chains 
dominate the modem retail business and much of this was organised across regions, 
this meant that there were even fewer openings for East German enterprises both for 
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entry into the supply chain or as regional players in either supply or production of 
finished retail goods. The only option was to be able to offer innovative products or 
services and/or low prices. 
However, there were two major problems with this option. Firstly, cost competition 
came from the other East/Central European countries and, secondly, the lack of access 
to maintenance and development of research and development facilities during 
privatisation meant that even offering innovative products and services was difficult. 
The lack of maintenance and development of research and development facilities in 
East Germany were the result of inherited phenomena and the on-going privatisation 
policy. Most Kombinats included a number of enterprises and services under their 
umbrella, often with the Research and Development facilities serving all component 
parts. Thus the breaking up of the Kombinats under privatisation and separate sale of 
all parts meant that most enterprises were deprived of access to Research and 
Development facilities, unless they were prepared to contract them in separately at 
high cost. This was the very function required in order to reform product lines in old 
enterprises and aid new regional entrepreneurs to generate new products saleable in 
Western markets. Between the end of 1989 and the autumn of 1992, the number of 
researchers in East German industry dropped from 75,000 to 15,000 and this fall 
especially affected the industrial core sectors of the former GDR industry, such as 
electrical engineering (a loss of 90.8% of R and D capacity), the chemical industry 
(83.3%) and the machine-building industry (77.7%)32• Indeed, Grabber states: 
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'To what extent future economic potential was sacrificed for the sake of rapid 
privatization may be seen from the wanton destruction of the research and 
development faci!ities.'33 
The question is therefore how remaining East Gem1an firms coped with this situation. 
It would appear that as the difficulty of breaking into Western associations increased 
firms fell back on the old remnants of old networks of suppliers and producers, and 
outlets. 
Case Studies 
The two case studies chosen for this chapter are typical examples of East German 
firms undergoing restructuring since the Wende (the transformation or change of 
1989). They do not each display every single characteristic outlined above but in the 
main are representative of the general problems reported both to this author in the 
conduct of interviews and by many other writers as already outlined in their research, 
and noted throughout the chapter. 
Firm Dunkles was a small brewery with strong and well-known roots in the local area 
(established in 1887 by the grandfather of the present owner), and also recognised 
across the Land of Saxony as a quality producer of a traditional and well loved beer. 
The THA had allowed it to be partly privatised and partly restituted to the 
descendants of the original owners (from the I June 1990 onwards), who still lived in 
East Germany and had continued to be active in the brewing industry. These owners 
had initially had to buy a proportion of the firm (51%, covered by a loan of over 
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DM 1 million), not included in the restitution plan (49%), although since then they 
had successfully carried through a long term legal case to be recompensed by the state 
for this amount, which was finally achieved in December 1992. The brewery had 
previously held the status of 'Nebenbetrieb' ( or supporting or branch enterprise) in the 
previous Kombinat and had then employed approximately 40 people, compared with 
the present ll. Production had been tied to beer and soft drinks at a level of 25,000 
hectolitres, which was now limited to beer alone and had dropped significantly. Thus 
Firm Dunkles was a very small enterprise, which held problems and advantages for 
the new owners. 
Firm Sessel was a furniture producer, again in the Land of Saxony, and was still in the 
possession of the THA, although management had put in an as yet unsuccessful bid 
for a Management Buy-Out proposal. This firm had formed an important part of the 
former Kombinat, being a leading firm out of nine other smaller firms within a radius 
of 50-60km. It had originally engaged 410 employees and was thus a medium-sized 
enterprise for the time. However, after restructuring and the closure or breaking off of 
the smaller surrounding firms, it now employed approximately 85 people. 
Thus the problems and challenges for both these firms were typical of the small- and 
medium-sized new firms emerging from the old enterprises in East Germany. They 
shall be divided here along the lines of old and new network issues which have 
already been defined above as being of particular significance in the survival of such 
firms. 
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Old Networks 
Both firms experienced problems associated with the breaking up of the old Kombinat 
structure and the replacement of functions previously carried out elsewhere. In 
addition there were problems inherited from the firms' previous status within the old 
structure. Thus both firms had to reproduce supply and distribution networks to 
replace the now defunct ones. In addition firm management had to begin new 
functions which had previously not existed, as with accountancy in Firm Dunkles. 
Over and above these individual functions overall management strategy and direction 
had to be learnt and out effectively by incumbent and/or new management, where no 
previous experience had been acquired due to the Ministry and Kombinat exercising 
these functions. For Firm Sessel, the former Kombinat's main enterprises had 
produced parts, which were then assembled in the smaller enterprises. Thus firm 
Sessel had had to learn and take over the complete production process. It had 
previously supplied foreign firms, especially in the West ( such as IKEA), organised 
through the Ministry, but also firms in the Soviet Union. However, the market in the 
former Soviet Union had collapsed a year after the Wende, and aJI Western contacts 
had disappeared with the destruction of the former GDR authorities and structures. 
One advantageous inheritance of Firm Sessel was the relatively high quality of 
products and therefore the good operation of its research and development function, in 
comparison to other East German products. This was due to the nature of its previous 
production in the area of children's and youth products which had to reach certain 
safety standards for internal sale and export. Thus the firm was beller able to produce 
new quality products compared to other East German firms. Firm Dunkles had the 
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advantage of inheriting a traditional name and product well appreciated in the area. 
However, its existence as a 'Nebenbetrieb' had meant a lack of investment in 
comparison to other branches of the Kombinat (in fact of all profits made under the 
previous regime 96% were returned to the Kombinat headquarters and only the 
remaining 4% was left to the firm for its own use). Thus the firm required substantial 
investment in machinery and infrastructure which had depreciated significantly under 
the previous regime. Although ultimately provided, the sourcing of a loan to these 
ends had been a major concern for the survival of the brewery, especially as the THA 
and most banks were not forthcoming in making loans to East German owners, due to 
lack of confidence in their management ability and lack of personal savings or 
possessions which could act as security. 
New Networks 
Both firms had to build up new contacts and outlets for supply and distribution, in 
different fashions according to size and type of products. The brewery found that 
West German breweries with a greater disposable income and with, for East German 
consumers initially at least, novel products, managed to secure tied houses amongst 
local inns by supplying them with funds for refurbishing in return for the exclusive 
sale of that beer. By contrast Firm Dunkles did not have the funds to set up similar 
outlet networks. However, once the initial novelty of 'West' beers had worn off, the 
local populace had returned in favourable numbers to the local beer, to the firm's 
advantage. To increase this potential the general management, in this case the 
owner-manager Herr Hahnemann and his wife, had employed a West German 
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marketing and company consultant to aid them in restructuring both the firm's 
departments, but also and more importantly, in improving the look, quality, and 
marketing of the product in line with European Union norms. To this end, the general 
manager, who also worked as one of the two head brewers, had begun investment in 
and improvement of machinery, buildings and production processes. 
Firm Sessel, by contrast had to compete both with Polish and Czech wooden furniture 
and furnishing products at the lower end of the market and high quality products from 
the West, especially West Germany. It possessed no unique niche market as Firm 
Dunkles did. In addition 80% of all the distribution and sale of products in Germany 
is carried out mostly by established wholesalers and their networks. As Firm Sessel's 
outlets collapsed, they were forced to consider agreements with West German firms in 
order to secure sales. Thus Firm Sessel, had made an agreement to produce a well 
known West German fmn's furniture model which was then distributed and sold by 
that firm. Indeed 75% of Firm Sessel's production was oriented to this activity and the 
remaining 25% of production was concerned with office and house and hotel interiors 
for the local market, for which the firm was building up its own distribution and sales 
network. 
It is interesting to note that both firms described the problem of low 'Arbeitsmoral', 
while registering their sadness at having to carry out redundancies. Both firms 
recorded low attention spans and lack of exactness among their employees in carrying 
out important pieces of work, which often resulted in sizeable losses. Management 
felt that this was due to an inherited culture on the part of the employees who 
disassociated the fmn's continuing success and survival from their own individual 
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working practices, and thus ultimately their future continued employment. It was 
reported, however, that this was gradually improving with redundancies and market 
competition, although for management, this was still not quick enough. 
Deleted and Transferred Networks 
Thus the evidence of the case studies reinforces other research indicating deleted East 
German networks and the transference of established networks (loose and unofficial) 
from the West. 
Deleted 
The final chapter discusses the impossibility of separating organisational change from 
the external environment of economic transformation. Ultimately, neither 
macro-economic transformation, nor individual organisational · restructuring and 
change can be relied upon in isolation to effect successful reform. Geppert (1996) has 
also discussed the importance of comprehending the social embeddedness of 
organisational change in the East German context as opposed to viewing 
organisational learning as a 'purely self-centred process'34 • Fleischer ( 1996) highlights 
the fact that little attention was paid to the need for a regional industrial environment, 
that is the need for a regional industrial policy, if not to protect the remnants of East 
German economic inheritance, to provide the conditions for new local entrepreneurial 
activity35• Grabber (1997) more pointedly states that the cost reduction policy pursued 
by the THA in respect of separating off unproductive units from other units for 
privatisation, was: 
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'part and parcel of a strategy to isolate individual production plants by 
paralysing economic and social linkages with pre-existing production system. 
This strategy was expected to facilitate the privatisation of the GDR economy 
by enhancing the attractiveness of the plants for Western investors.'36 
Transferred 
On a number of levels, however, West German investment also curtailed endogenous 
entrepreneurial potential growing out of former state enterprises or indeed newly 
founded ones. West German owners did indeed secure much needed investment in 
East Germany but in ways which do not portend well for the region's long-term 
economic development. Firstly, investment was concentrated in two regions, 
Berlin-Brandenburg (due to proximity to the new capital), and in Saxony (due to its 
strong industrial origins and industrial concentration). Secondly, initial investment 
reflected Western firms' market motivations- access to Eastern European markets, 
access to the European Union (for example for Austria and Switzerland) or widening 
of product markets (for example for American firms). Thus cost difTerentials (unlike 
other East/Central European countries), did not play a role. As a result corporations 
tended to establish new firms in East Germany but only 7.3% were for production 
purposes, and 78.7% were branch plants for distribution or representative functions37• 
Furthermore, after this first stage of investment, economic changes across Europe 
challenged the THA and the German government's optimistic predictions of the 
second stage investment. Measures which had caused the deletion of old networks 
meant that the old GDR industry collapsed and thus there was no indigenous 
341 
established industry for capital-goods projects to supply in East Germany. Then again 
the collapse of trade with East/Central Europe after the 1 January 1991 meant that 
there was no entry point into Eastern Europe through the eastern part of Germany. In 
addition labour costs soared. Thus THA predictions of a second wave of investment 
commitments from the private sector in 1994 were confronted with West German 
investment stagnation and the stretching of investment projects over a much longer 
time span as investors began to withdraw from the region38• Grabber estimates that 
taken together this reflected a drop in investment in 1993 by DM5 billion39• Lastly, a 
transferred network phenomenon related to the factor of investment withdrawal was 
the collapse of burgeoning supply chains around these withdrawing firms, as the 
example of Mercedes-Benz proves, where around 60 supply firms were left isolated 
after Mercedes-Benz's withdrawal40 • 
This latter phenomenon also spans the issue of transferred networks at another level. 
As described above, many West German firms brought with them their own networks 
but also used 'aggressive' tactics to target competitors. By Autumn 1993, even 
industrialists and Western managers of East German subsidiaries and foreign 
investors were claiming that big Western manufacturing firms were operating 
'effective cartels' to prevent other entrants, the dumping of stocks of goods 
accumulated due to the recession in the West, and price slashing from the West (as 
well as the East)41 • This resulted in serious barriers to production and sale of, for 
example, the first CFC-free fridge made by an east German firm. West German 
competitors mounted 'major trade barriers' including 'negative image', 'cartel 
agreements, price dumping, head hunting of staff and connections between 
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administration and industry', in order to prevent East German companies entering the 
market42• When all of these measures failed to stop the CFC-free fi"idge production, 
they included similar fridges in their own production lines. 
Similarly, Fleischer (1996) notes the example of Jenoptik as suffering difficulties 
breaking into markets even with innovative products for the same reasons of a 'high 
degree of stability of established delivery and supply networks' among West German 
firms'43 • Loose networks exist naturally also exist in mature Western economies, into 
which other Western firms must break. However, for East German managers and 
firms the implications of the wholesale importation of such established networks into 
a region of deleted or reduced networks are notable for the severely destructive effect 
on the whole regional economy. Jenoptik, a descendent of the Karl Zeiss combine in 
Jena, developed innovative products and regional services but could not break 
through until it resorted to distribution partnerships with international groups. 
It is important, however, to view the experience of West German investment also 
from the West German perspective. Two firms bought by Western investors in East 
Germany reported similar phenomena, both problems and opportunities of operating 
in the area. The furniture making company Firm Lichtbraun. in Dresden, and the 
brewery, Firm Flasche, in a small town in Saxony, both reported the opportunities 
arising from the lack of any challenging local competition, finance opportunities more 
readily open to them as Western manager/owners as well as problems with the THA, 
issues associated with the organisational and network inheritance from the past and 
the continuing linked problem of low 'Arbeitsmoral' (working morale). Brewery 
Flasche had been deprived of vital information regarding the viability of the firm prior 
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to purchase. It was actually classed as a category 6 firm, that is as economically 
unviable, but according to management the THA was politically motivated to ensure 
sale and so had suppressed certain documents testifying to this state of affairs. A legal 
process had been threatened by the new owners/managers who had thereby managed 
to free up an investment ofDM 600,000, initially promised by the THA at purchase. 
One of the general manager/owners complained that these practices in West Germany 
were unthinkable, but that West Germans were not averse to using these practices 
abroad, that is in East Germany, where they were politically expedient. 
Both sets of buyers at Lichtbraun and Flasche were either general managers and/or 
enterprise owners in West Germany, and involved in the same sectors as their new 
firms, as well as various different manufacturing sectors. Thus both groups brought 
with them knowledge of market systems, knowledge of the specific product market 
and a series of ready made contacts and networks necessary to the efficient 
functioning of the enterprise. External sourcing of finance was highly significant for 
both firms, as they sourced this partly from the THA and partly from West German 
banks. Personal investment appeared to be less important, especially as the new 
owners/managers in firm Lichtbraun claimed that they would never have found the 
opportunity to buy their own firm in West Germany. 
Management at both Lichtbraun and Flasche expressed problems with 'Arbeitsmoral'. 
Firm Lichtbraun felt that the technical ability of employees was as high in East as in 
West Germany, but that less attention and dedication was paid to work in hand in East 
Germany. Brewery Flasche felt this issue posed a greater problem, perhaps because of 
the nature of its production process. One small mistake on a machine, in one instance, 
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had caused the writing off of a large consignment of beer which fell below 
presentation quality, the quantity recorded on the label was incorrect. Management 
found the workforce was uncomprehending as to why perfectly good beer had 
therefore to be thrown away. Indeed the workforce had suggested washing the beer 
bottles in warm water to remove the labels without giving consideration to the effect 
on the beer. 
It is worth noting that while firm Lichtbraun displayed appreciation of the East 
German workforce, half the ownership/management of the brewery Flasche 
maintained a highly critical and indeed at times aggressive attitude to its East German 
employees. This perhaps was also the result of the brewery having been the centre of 
the old Kombinat in the past and consequently having inherited many old personnel 
networks strongly identified with the Ministry and indeed evidence of a strong Stasi 
(Staatssicherheit or state security police) presence in the town. Old networks were felt 
to be preventing the effective operation of the market. By contrast, firm Lichtbraun 
having purchased the main part of the old Kombinat, used former contacts within the 
old Kombinat (many of which were now MBOs) in order to capitalise on those 
personnel networks that worked efficiently and to Firm Lichtbraun's advantage in 
terms of supply of materials and parts. 
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Conclusion: Comparative Findings of Case Studies 
The issues explored above broadly relate to two points: market networks and the role 
of institutional economics in Western market systems 
Networks 
What is notable in the comparison of East Germany and the Czech and Slovak 
Republics is the important role of informal networks as an unofficial infrastructure for 
barter, necessary because of the particularly highly centralised nature of both plarmed 
economies44• 
Deleted indigenous networks in East Germany compare with reinvented or on-going 
adaptive networks (which may or may not be prone to stagnation) in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. Stark claims the latter transformations resemble 'innovative 
adaptations that combine seemingly discrepant elements, or bricolage, more than 
architectural design', whereas the aim of privatisation in East Germany was the 
exclusion and thus deletion of such networks45 • 
Indeed Kern and Sabel (1992) note that the 'Grossgruppen-Perspektive' (big grouping 
perspective) within the Treuhand believed: 
'one could build up firms without taking into account any practical 
consideration of the industries or sectors concerned. In this view markets 
were structured by means of economic unions, standardisation agreements, 
agreements with authorities and above all through the activities of big 
economic groups- most private but some also public- the latter being most 
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associated with this by advocates of the 'big groupings' idea.'46 
However, in East Germany privatisation became an inadequate bolster between the 
political aims of West Germany and the social discontent in East Germany. Although 
certain remedial measures were taken, no concerted attempt was made to foster East 
German economic identity or inheritance, or indeed to encourage endogenous 
regional growth. Instead deleted networks were replaced by loose but sustained and 
established West German ones (Granovetter 1992). However, despite these criticisms 
of the West German strategy in East Germany it is important to remember that the 
political priorities of reunification were also real and pressing. Hornschild (1996) 
notes the impossibility of maintaining difference in payment levels between East and 
West due to potential problems of migration, and that therefore strict economic logic 
was inapplicable. 
'Political expediency meant that longer-term isolation of east Germany 
through flexible exchange rates was not feasible. The whole adjustment 
process followed a path of political necessity while the economy had to find 
the best possible solutions under these circumstances.'47 
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Economic Institutional Building 
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, the complete legal, institutional, political and 
economic system had to be built from the base with no guidelines. The choice of 
privatisation policy as a restructuring tool was a major part of this institutional 
building. This privatisation policy was devolved through the political process down 
to the population in the belief of the automatic regulatory nature of the market (Hayek 
1944) and a belief in neo-classical economic theory48• 
In the final chapter of this thesis the author refers to the importa11ce of understanding 
the loose network capital (Bourdieu [1986] and Granovetter [1992]) at work in 
established market economies when considering the aims of economic transformation 
in East/Central Europe. The experience of West German versus East German 
entrepreneurs and enterprises in East Germany offers a good context for this type of 
research, given the similarity in all other fields; that is the economic and political 
institutional and legal system transplantation to the east. 
However, the viability and success of the privatisation process, the economic 
institutional and loose network transplantation still need to be ascertained by the 
political process across Germany. By the end of 1994, THA was abandoned and the 
Bundesanstalt fuer vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben (Federal Office for Special 
Tasks Related to Reunification or BVS) was set up to control contracts taken out by 
THA and the final stages of privatisation. The BVS claims that public funds are still 
needed to keep enterprises floating. The THA financial obligations (DM 100 billion) 
added to the THA loss ofDM 250 billion and total public transfers ofDM 848 billion 
between 1991 to 1995 produce a heavy toll on the German state. Thus from these 
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figures Homschild (1996) surmises that East Germany is still far from being an 
independently viable region. There are not just problems of privatisation but also 
problems in industry, especially in the sectors of construction, catering and a 
generally weak competitive capacity49• In other words the long-term effects of 
deindustrialisation of East Germany on future long-term economic health need yet to 
be ascertained. Similarly the problems in the sphere of economic institutional 
transference have yet to be fully manifested in terms of their social impact and effects, 
although already by 1994 political differences were beginning to emerge in the 
October 16th elections50• 
The 1994 business scandal in the united Germany invovling a West German property 
magnate and investment into Leipzig reflects the growing need to reassess, 
assumptions about the ability of imposed macro-economic reform, and in the case of 
eastern Germany, a transferred institutional and micro-economic model, to produce a 
society of responsible economic actors and ethical codes within the market place. 51 
The failure of a well entrenched banking system, within a relatively stable 
institutional and economic framework to monitor business, as in the case of the 
scandal surrounding the West German property magnate, Ji.irgen Schneider and his 
involvement in Leipzig, has called into question the very legitimacy of this type of 
political system for the citizens (of the former GDR), only recently persuaded of its 
virtues: 
"The phoney magnate may have disappeared with his millions, but the people 
who trusted him to rebuild their city out of the ruins of communism are left 
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with a collapse of confidence in the market economy itself'." 
Indeed one of the firms interviewed by the author is still owed 85 000 DM by 
Schneider for the furnishing of a hotel 53• 
Thus outstanding issues and problems of economic transference have been 
automatically transferred to the political and social arenas. Granovetter (1992) has 
called this fusion of networks and institutional building the intertwining of economic 
and non-economic motives', echoing his earlier emphasis on the important context of 
on-going social relations for economic activity (1985), and thus the implications for 
endogenous economic potential are clear54• 
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Part IV 
Chapter Ten 
A Cross-Country Comparison of Organisational Change and the 
Ownership-Control Relationship in Evolving Corporate Governance 
Models; reflections and conclusions on the case studies and other 
research literature 
The Revolution and the Present 
"I think that the revolution stopped too early, that it was not finished, ....... because I think that 
there was no movement, no clearing or cleaning of the country from the evil, from the 
communism ...... there is still this communist mafia everywhere." 
Lisa Svejdova, Czechoslovakian Student Leader, 1989, speaking in Prague, June 1992. 1 
Introduction 
The arrangement of rights and duties with regard to the shareholders, owners, 
employees, managers, business practise and business culture generally in the 
environment of economic system change are highly significant when trying to assess 
how organisations effect restructuring for survival. Ownership patterns and 
institutional arrangements for the regulation of economic activity especially 
managerial and enterprise performance are important ingredients in the corporate 
governance system. 
However, the analysis of the case study findings and the theoretical contributions, 
presented in the preceding chapters, highlight the inability of ownership change alone 
to effect organisational restructuring and indeed the constraints imposed on the 
process by this unique emphasis. What the theoretical and phenomenal analyses do 
profile, with regard to organisational restructuring, are the central issues requiring 
reform in order to achieve a permanent shift in management practise and 
organisational change. These areas are firstly in the functional sphere of management 
and organisational practise: finance and appropriate banking systems, the roles of 
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management and owners, their respective skills, experience and with regards to 
owners investment potential, personnel skills, legislative clarity, stability and 
enforceability; and secondly in the sphere of the underlying business culture or 
socio-economic 1ssues: the centre-locality dichotomy (with the inherited 
firm-bureaucratic and firm-political networks), inherited inter-firm networks and the 
inherited industrial sector structure, and finally the cultural (social, political and 
economic) inheritance which influences business culture. This chapter aims to assess 
the major emerging components of economic activity and corporate governance in the 
countries under discussion which influence organisations and any attempt to effect 
organisational change. 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter will first of all assess the ownership patterns resulting from large-scale 
privatisation in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia and the resulting constraints on 
organisational change. Within this context the following areas will be looked at: IPF 
(Investment Privatisation Funds), ownership patterns, shareholder behaviour and 
corporate control, the role of the career manager, cross-ownership, banks and 
indebtedness, regulation of economic institutions and activity, capital and equity 
markets corporate control and restructuring, MBO and control networks, large-scale 
enterprises and financial sector privatisation, and lastly local government. A 
cross-country comparison of enterprise restructuring will then be drawn between the 
Czech and Slovak Republics on the one side and Eastern Germany on the other, in 
order to highlight the Czech and Slovak characteristics of organisational change. 
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Ownership Change: the effect on restructuring 
In the field research conducted by the author in former state-owned companies in 
Czechoslovakia (and later in the two independent states), the new relationship of 
shareholders to firm management did little to effect restructuring of the firm and 
improve efficiency, as had been hoped when initially designed. What privatisation, 
especially voucher privatisation did create, in addition to the outstanding problems of 
restructuring and inefficiency mentioned above, was an unresolved relationship 
between two key stakeholders in terms of confused lines of ownership and control 
with often very different priorities informing the behaviour of the two parties. In other 
words an unclear corporate governance structure. This was not conducive to firm 
restructuring and successful survival. 
The case studies reviewed for this study and particularly those examined in the 
relevant chapters display different aspects of the same problem relating to ownership 
and control. The configurations of motivated interests may vary: management may be 
motivated by a professional interest in firm survival and shareholders by contrast may 
be motivated by short-term trading interests with little firm or market specific 
knowledge for ensuring restructuring and securing long-term firm success (as in 
Dfevodelny in the Czech Republic, dealt with in Chapter Seven); alternatively the 
opposite may be true, especiatly in firms where former cadre managers managed to 
retain power and use their positional ( for example old contact networks of suppliers 
or in the bureaucracy) and knowledge ( of the firm and industry and local council 
contacts) advantage to their own benefit against less well informed and therefore 
powerless owners, be they the National Property Fund (prior to privatisation) or 
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shareholders (post privatisation). The latter information asymmetries (McDermott 
1994) can have a number of outcomes2• Firstly managers could asset strip prior to 
privatisation. Secondly, asset stripping and limited information supplied to central 
authorities could result in a lower book value for the firm, from which managers could 
then profit in any privatisation project proposed by them. This positional advantage 
combines with old local-central networks (firm- council- central authorities) which 
enable managers to continue the established bargaining process, in this instance for 
ownership in the place of reduced plan targets, as appears to have happened in Kreslo 
in the Slovak Republic. In these cases the potential for managerial abuse of positional 
power to obtain ownership has been legitimised by the privatisation process itself, 
whether voucher or direct sale3• Although Management buy-outs have to compete 
with other privatisation projects, the above weighted opportunities for key personnel 
mean that such a sale does not always benefit a company. These variations occur 
throughout the Czech and Slovak Republics further enhanced by the different national 
macro-economic and political approaches post separation. Since separation Slovakia 
has relied to a greater extent on MBOs and Direct Sales as the preferred form of 
privatisation, with no second voucher privatisation wave occurring. These different 
economic and political approaches have begun to evolve different relationship 
patterns between ownership, control and restructuring. 
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The Czech Republic: Cross-Ownership. Shareholders and Capital Market 
Corporate Control 
IPF Ownership Pattern 
This type of pattern occurs predominately in the Czech Republic (as a result of the 
first and second waves of voucher privatisation), although the basic problems are 
shared by IPF ownership patterns in the Slovak Republic which resulted from the first 
wave of privatisation). 
The first type of scenario is that of short-term interested shareholders, most notably 
those represented by the IPFs. Although the Czechoslovakian government assumed 
that spontaneously arising IPFs would have a role in the privatisation process, they 
underestimated the degree of influence eventually held by them4• Indeed the wild 
success of the IPFs, particularly the independent IPFs, forced the government to pass 
hastily arranged regulatory legislation, which in fact has not proved to be very 
watertight. Kenway and Chlumsky (July 1995) report that the government's original 
plan did not include IPFs and that their appearance occurred in the wake of an 
initiative taken by a gypsy family in a small town in Bohemia (Jihlava). This was then 
developed by the Harvard Group and adopted by other funds5• 
IPF led ownership pattern is best depicted by the case study Dfevodelny, in Chapter 
Five. Ownership change has emphasised share distribution according to citizenship 
status which neither guaranteed any new sources of investment or an influx of new 
management skills. Investment was one of the major sources of the problems in 
Dfevodelny. Although voucher privatisation produced initially a very wide spread of 
ownership, the Investment Privatisation Fund linked with the regional bank, have 
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concentrated these shares into a single unit with little control being exerted by the 
original shareholders. Individual shareholders had little experience, information or 
organisational strength with which to oppose any major shareholder's decisions6• This 
situation of share concentration was repeated across the Czech Republic with some 
important and unexpected outcomes 
Share Distribution and Concentration 
Coffee (1996) and Claessens (1994, 3) have both assessed the extent and structure of 
IPF ownership and controF. Coffee's table of average share ownership over 1, 491 
firms privatised in the two rounds of voucher privatisation is perhaps the clearest 
indication of major investors by class (see below). It would appear from this table that 
IPFs, particularly the top I 0 could exercise effective control, especially if they acted 
co-operatively. However, both Coffee and Claessens question whether this actually 
occurs so unconditionally in practise. Claessens survey of 1, 491 Czech and Slovak 
firms questions whether effective control can be defined as stock ownership greater 
than, or equal to 50% of stock ownership by other major investors8• Claessens premise 
is that I 0% ownership would mean effective control if no other strategic investor 
owned more than 10% also. On the basis of this working definition of control, he 
finds that 273 firms would be effectively controlled by a single IPF, 793 firms by two 
IPFs and 1, 013 firms by three IPFs. However, Claessens accepts that this does not 
rule out the possibility of co-operation amongst other strategic investors which could 
dilute IPF control, especially if they gain seats on the board of the firm. 
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Table 10:1 Czech and Slovak Share Distribution in the Two Privatisation Waves 
(based on 1, 491 firms, in percentage) 
Investor Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Class Deviation 
State 8.37 15.38 0.00 84.00 
Individuals 36.53 21.62 1.56 96.82 
IPFs 39.39 22.22 0.00 90.89 
Domestic 3.25 12.51 0.00 84.00 Investors 
Foreign 1.34 8.00 0.00 80.00 Investors 
Not Sold 11.12 N.A. 1.14 92.83 
Total 100.00 
Investment 
Funds as a 
class 
Top I 13.42 6.26 6.00 32.44 
Top I and 2 22.20 10.86 0.00 49.97 
Top 10 38.36 21.32 0.00 86.52 
Source: from Coffee (1996}' p.l41. Table 4.3. Note that although Slovakia was not involved in the 
second voucher privatisation wave, it was in the first. 
Another aspect of share ownership which qualifies the success of IPF ownership and 
calls into question the scope and influence of their real control over any firm is the 
effect of IPF share ownership on equity price data. He finds that: 
'high absolute strategic ownership has a positive effect on prices, but effective 
control, particularly by investment funds, does not have a positive influence 
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on prices - actually a negative influence.' 10 
Coffee concurs with this finding and suggests the cause to be the assumption by the 
market that a majority shareholder will attempt to buy remaining shares or will have 
the motivation and capital to restructure the firm and make it profitable. However, 
when the majority ownership consists of a group of IPFs, Coffee notes a negative 
price impact even when compared to that associated with a dispersed shareholder 
structure. Coffee suggests that the reason for this may lie in the degree of 
cross-ownership between banks and IPFs. The market perceives even effective control 
of a firm through a bank affiliated IPF shareholding majority as negative. Coffee 
postulates the ultimate cause of this effect thus; 
'The most plausible (if speculative) explanation for this market reaction is the 
conflict of interests issue: the market may fear exploitation of minority 
shareholders by bank-affiliated IPFs, who are more interested in maximising 
their position as creditors.'![ 
It is important to note here, that the most successful IPFs are not all bank owned. 
Indeed Coffee points out that in the second round some independent IPFs, m 
particular HC&C (Harvard Capital and Consulting), did substantially better in 
attracting voucher points12• 
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Web of Cross-Ownership: Bank, IPFs and the National Property Fund 
Kenway and Klvacova (1996) have analysed their own data with regards to bank 
ownership, supplemented by data from Brom and Orenstein (1994) and have drawn an 
analysis of results with regards to the 'web of cross-ownership' between bank 
ownership and IPFs funds and ultimately the National Property Fund13 • This 
cross-ownership affects both privatised financial institutions and bank owned 
intermediary financial organisations on horizontal and vertical lines. The horizontal 
aspect of cross-ownership connects all the major financial institutions. For example, 
all the major IPFs, both private and bank owned, hold extensive shares in the biggest 
banks- Komercni banka (including Komercni banka's own IPF, the so-called IKS KB 
a.s.), Ceska spofitelna and the insurance company, Ceska pojist'ovna. Vertical 
connections link all these institutions to the state via the National Property Fund. 
Indeed Kenway and Klvacova surmise that state ownership· continued to exist but is 
masked by the various young financial institutions. 
Thus Coffee and Kenway and Klvacova point to the weak nature of the pattern of 
concentrated ownership in the Czech Republic, when viewed separately from IPF 
numerical control of shares. They all conclude, but with differing emphasis, the 
reasons as being thus: 
1) IPF shareholder motivation and behaviour. 
2) web of cross-ownership between bank, state and IPFs and 
3) the strength of insider (i.e. top management) positional power. 
Each of these shall be dealt with in turn. 
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Shareholder Behaviour and Corporate Control 
The IPFs had a rather specific orientation to the firm due to a number of interlinked 
factors relating to function (or success criteria), experience and status. Firstly, and 
most significantly, the IPFs' interest in dealing in shares were for the purpose of 
profiting in the short-term from ownership change, secondly few IPFs had any 
management experience, particularly not management in a market economy and 
thirdly their approach was reinforced by the popularity of the neo-classical advisors 
from abroad and neo-classical economic and political thought prevailing in 
Czechoslovakia at this time (Frydmao, Gray and Rapaczinski 199614). 
With regards to the first point the IPFs were fundamentally interested in trading in 
shares in order to repay and thereby attract future voucher holders. In addition revenue 
also comes from the management and start-up fees charged by IPFs to their firms and 
lastly from independent trading activities15• Coffee (1996) has also enumerated these 
success criteria for the IPFs and notes that independent trading could potentially be 
informed by insider tip offs, especially since so maoy of the IPFs were bank 
controlled, the banks often being creditors to the firms. This again raises the question 
of regulation. 
Thus success criteria for the IPFs were located outside the firm on the nascent stock 
market, and were not derived from the potential long-term profits emerging from a 
restructured, well managed firm with improved efficiency and a greater share of the 
market. Many economic commentators, including Komarek (director of the Institute 
of Economic Forecasting, aod one time Deputy Prime Minister), warned of the 
negative effects of this tendency in IPFs early on. Subsequent writers have reiterated 
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this interpretation (Coffee (1996), Schrnoegnerova (1993) , Kenway and Chlumsky 
(1995), Kenway and Klvacova (1996) etc.)16• 
Indeed many IPFs promised unrealistically high returns on vouchers in the attempt to 
compete for investors. As early as 1993, Mejstik and Burger (1993) highlighted the 
potential effect of bankrupt IPFs on the economy as a whole, the bankruptcies 
resulting from excessive option offers and the fall in the average book value of assets 
per coupon book. Average book value of assets fell from Kcs 70, 000 (US$ 2, 300) 
when IPFs began offers to Kcs 35, 000 when more than twice as many coupon books 
were registered before the deadline. Indeed, the Harvard Investment Fund began 
offering to redeem its options for cash early but at a discounted rate to try to remedy 
the situation17• This aspect ofiPF success criteria and lack of regulation of and control 
over their activity continued into 1995. 
In August 1995 Ceska Spofitelmi, one of the major banks which own an IPF, was 
having to deal with the problems arising from its inability to pay back shares after 
initially promising investors to its IPF fund (Spofitelna or SPAS) a large return18• 
In respect of the second point, most shareholders had of course been educated under 
the previous regime according to a Marxist critique of 'Manchester Capitalism' of the 
last century. This critique had been taught as a negative and still highly relevant 
account of modem day market economies around the world. (The influence of this on 
IPF managers were reported upon by many enterprise managers interviewed, and 
indeed the influence of this critique on enterprise managers themselves was observed 
both by the author and the re-trainers of managers and at various times the trainees 
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interviewed during the course of the study). The vision of capitalism drawn by this 
critique was one of an authoritarian owner-manager with no role for co-operative 
work between owners and managers (as they were one and the same), managers and 
employees (no trade unions) etc .. By contrast, the experience under state socialism 
was a combination of two influences: one of a centralised and controlling state 
passing down directives for production with little official participation by other levels; 
and, unofficially, the state and local levels entering into a bargaining process to 
achieve results, due to the state's lack of knowledge of tasks at enterprise level. As 
Casson (1995) points out with reference to the appeal of economic liberalism: 
'For citizens accustomed to a simplistic Marxist ideology, an equally simplistic 
ideology that puts everything into reverse has a natural appeal as an 
explanation of what went wrong under the previous regime.' 19 
Both these interpretations appeared to be informing the behaviour of shareholders, as 
represented by the IPFs, and supported an authoritarian interpretation of the role of 
ownership which took precedence over managerial authority and co-operative 
functioning within the enterprise. Both this author and Coffee (1996) found in 
interviews that unlike the US or UK system there was little official delegation of 
authority to a Chief Executive Officer or to the company management team. 
Contemporaneously, however, similar to the experience under state socialism, the lack 
of grassroots knowledge (knowledge asymmetries), and lack of managerial expertise 
forced IPFs to take a rather distanced approach, relying on managers to fill the gap. 
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The study by Kenway and Chlumsky (July 1995) suggests there are three equally 
probable IPF attitudes to control of firms and their restructuring: 
1) complete passivity 
2) supportiveness of changes initiated by others 
3) funds themselves initiating changes 
Kenway and Chlumskfs study, however, also points out that where funds have taken 
the initiative this usually means only a change in top management. Few changes in the 
way the firm functions were carried out. In these instances the effect on finance and 
investment were negative. Where the fund did initiate change in the functioning 
processes of the firm, the effect on finance was positive. Generally Kenway reports a 
modified passivity on the part of the IPFs activity in firm restructuring, partly due to 
IPF interests (and the belief that active management is the same as replacing the 
management team), and partly due to insider power networks20• 
The lack of managerial experience of IPFs was reported by enterprise managers 
interviewed by this author and indeed, Coffee (1996) (who interviewed amongst 
others IPF and enterprise managers), and Kenway and Chlumsky (1995) and Kenway 
and Klvacova (1996) also report the same findings from their surveys and interviews. 
The best anecdotal example of this is one quoted by Coffee, where the newly 
appointed general director of Prago a.s., was required to turn around the loss making 
enterprise in three months, despite the fact that 80% of its market had collapsed with 
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the insolvency of major Eastern bloc customers in Russia and Ukraine and the 
dissolution ofCOMECON. 
'I was given the task of within three months to move the company from red to 
black. I explained that that's nonsense in that short term, and, in the end, they 
said .... that the last quarter this year must be a profitable quarter'21 • 
Jan Suchanek, chief executive of YSE, the investment company, is critical of most 
IPF directors' performance, especially those appointed by bank affiliated funds. He 
sees IPF directors as 'trying simply to avoid risk' by staffing boards with 'old 
Communists' whose main aim was to 'avoid embarrassment'22 • 
Lastly the third point with regard to the popularity of neo-classical economic thought 
in Czechoslovakia until partition, and since in the Czech Republic was supported 
practically by the lack of regulation of economic institutions and economic activity of 
actors. It is indicative of this ownership versus control perspective that in Dfevodelny 
it was only once a domestic Czech owner with firm specific and sector specific 
knowledge took over the firm that the proposed changes were endorsed. Under IPF 
ownership little was changed. 
The neo-classical hope that a change in ownership status of a firm would 
automatically result in restructuring becomes patently untenable in the light of the 
above findings. Indeed Ken way and Chlumsky (July I 995) argues that privatisation 
transferred ownership but not control and control was the key to restructuring23 • 
However, it would appear that a firm oriented interest expressed by the economic 
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actor concerned, is also needed if effective control is to result in effective 
restructuring. 
Role of the Career Manager 
An important aspect of a functioning corporate governance system in a modem 
market capitalism has been described as the 'disinterested' manager (Chandler 1992)24• 
Myant (1993) points out that in a neo-classical market structure, only the career 
manager has the long term interests of the firm at heart. Casson (1995) has also 
highlighted the complicated institutional requirements necessary to foster 
entrepreneurial spirit and the imperfect operation of those institutions even in the 
'low-trust legalistic culture of the West', especially where economic institutional 
activity operates at a minimum level (that is in a more neo-classical economic 
oriented system)25• Parker (1993) has outlined amongst other measures, the 
agent-principal relationship as important for creating an incentive environment for 
managers26• None of these conditions are met in the situation of a newly established 
market system, where the relationship of owners to management is unclear, the quality 
of management in terms of ethical behaviour within an accepted code of business 
practice and the quality and appropriateness of 
management skill in the operational sphere is low or even non-existent. Therefore this 
type of 'self-disinterested' or firm-oriented entrepreneurial behaviour carmot be 
expected. 
It could be argued that the fact that managers interviewed by this author often felt 
themselves to be the guardians of the 'positive' social-communitarian aspects of the 
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firm organisation while trying to improve its effectiveness as an enterprise, is 
indicative of old cadre groups unwilling to move away from their familiar roles in the 
enterprise toward a new concept of management. Coffee (1996) also discusses this 
phenomenon. In addition Coffee (1996) quotes IPF managers as citing this reluctance 
to carry out lay offs as a problem with enterprise management. However, when 
measured against the facts, there seemed to be little evidence for this claim. Where 
managers interviewed by this author reported on the phenomenon, this did not prevent 
them from reducing the workforce often, before privatisation. Similarly, Coffee 
(1996) notes that in his sample most workforce reductions had occurred under 
enterprise management, before IPF ownership had been instated. 
Many of these same old cadre managers inherited positional power, firm knowledge 
and active insider power networks but had no formal stake in the privatisation process, 
or the improved efficiency and restructuring of firms. They were often therefore 
self-interested rather than firm-interested. McDermott (1994), Kenway and Chlurnsky 
(July 1995), Myant (1993), Frydman Gray and Rapacyzinski (eds.) (1996) and 
Grabber and Stark (1997) etc., have all referred to the positional power, old network 
systems and information asymmetry on the part of the old cadre managers and other 
insider groups27• Indeed, some commentators , Kenway and Chlurnsky (1995), argue 
that this negative influence of managers could have been mitigated by giving them a 
stake in the process28• Myant (1993) suggests only employees have the long-term 
interests of the firm at heart and should have been given a stake. Those advocating a 
complete purge (see quote at the beginning of this chapter) forget the lack of skill and 
management experience in the population generally. Indeed even the old cadre 
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managers are ill equipped to deal with the new circumstances. Whichever view is 
taken, more formal regulation of and guidelines for privatisation and economic reform 
could have prevented many excesses and made the aims of the reform process in its 
construction of corporate governance practise clearer. The fact that no 
acknowledgement was made of the distinction between ownership and control 
resulted in abuse and manipulation of loopholes in the reform process. 
Cross-Ownership, Bankruptcy and Disclosure oflnformation 
The cross-ownership of IPFs and banks creates yet further problems of conflicting 
interests. 
The two main areas of conflict are the lack of an informational firewall between banks 
and IPFs to prevent insider trading and secondly the compromised position of banks 
jmposing bankruptcy proceedings on firms. 
Coffee (1996) has noted that while all banks and IPFs claim that no insider 
information crosses the so-called 'informational firewall' between bank affiliated IPFs, 
there is evidence of insider trading, especially since IPF success criteria lie in stocks 
and share trading and banks are ultimately responsible for making returns to investors. 
On the other side of the situation there are many instances of banks hesitating to 
impose bankruptcy proceedings in accordance with new legislation because they are 
compromised by their joint creditor and ownership (through the IPFs) status. Any 
bankruptcy would incur loss to the bank in both these functions. In addition, as 
discussed already, bank loans carry high interest rates and this was a prime origin of 
revenue for banks (see Chapter Five). Although there was no evidence of this type of 
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debt versus ownership conflict in Dfevodelny, the regional bank concerned allowed 
the considerations of its IPF, as to the potential profit to be made from a resale 
without restructuring, to outweigh any consideration of longer term strategic thinking. 
Concern over the relationship of banks and IPFs continue to be reported upon and 
concern over the lack of regulation has not been adequately met with appropriate 
action. The siege of some major IPF funds by Plzenska Banka backed by Agrobanka 
and Motoinvest caused consternation in the winter of 1995 as large banks were 
suddenly under attack by a much smaller bank29• In general the concern over both 
insider trading between banks and IPFs and widespread fraud in IPF activity, as well 
as a number of malpractice scandals and lack of government control has resulted in a 
lack of domestic and foreign investor confidence in the Prague stock exchange and the 
junior market RM- system30• 
Regulation of Economic Institutions and Activity 
The modus operandi in business is influenced by on-gomg (Granovetter 198531) 
relations and by the instability brought about by the transition in terms of the lack of 
regulation and the residual lack of institutional (Jone Pearce32) and bureaucratic 
(Robert Jones33) trust has meant that there are many examples of old management 
using this instability to asset-strip companies for their own individual benefit'\ as 
there have been examples of corruption amongst civil servants35 , Privatisation 
Investment Fund managers36, government officials, most famously Jaroslav Lizner, 
head of the Centre for Coupon Privatisation. (Lizner was caught taking a bribe from 
businessmen in a Chinese restaurant in Prague on the 31/10/94)37• In Slovakia the 
372 
------------------- -- --------------
kidnap ofKovac's son by hitmen allegedly hired by MeCiar is an on-going news item 
in 1998 in the international press. 
This lack of regulation affected a number of different areas, many of which were 
pertinent to the survival of the firm. Firstly regulation of stocks and shares and 
shareholder activity was lacking. Even in the cases where it did exist, as in the 
Commercial Code which came into force in 1992 and was revised again in 1995, 
guidelines were limited and/or unclear. Finally many rulings were simply not 
imposed. Indeed according to Zdenek Bakala of Patria Finance by the end of 1996 
there was still: 
'no protection for minority shareholders, few disclosure requirements, and 
little enforcement as no punitive powers were given to the minister of 
finance.'38 
This combination of a lack of overt regulation and a lack of enforceability was 
displayed most spectacularly at the shareholders meeting of Agrobanka, a major 
Czech bank, which ensured a takeover by Motoinvest ( to the detriment of 
Agrobanka) and where certain key shareholders were deliberately excluded from the 
meeting39• Although illegal, the government did nothing to enforce the limited 
regulation pertinent to this type of action, therefore setting a precedent for other lower 
profile businesses. 
Indeed anti-monopoly agencies only began functioning in March I 991 and the power 
of those agencies were to prove inadequate to the task of monitoring a transient 
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economy"0• The problem of effective regulation continues currently (Summer 1997) 
with the rather late consideration by the government of establishing a Czech form of 
the British Securities and Exchange Commission to monitor the Prague stock market 
and the junior RM-system, planned for January 1998. Privatisation of the big banks 
have also been discussed as one of the means to separate bank lending status from 
ownership status. Whether this will actually be carried out and whether it will prove 
up to the task remains to be seen41 • 
With regards to the IPFs' business activity unethical behaviour ranges from the 
manipulation of a weak legal regulatory system and a lack of enforceability for IPF 
narrow self-interest to outright corruption in order to secure greater profitability. 
Indeed, this self-interest displayed by the IPFs in increasing their portfolios and 
increasing their value rather than being actively involved in restructuring enterprise, is 
displayed by their increasing preference for closed unit funds over open-ended trusts. 
In the closed unit funds there is no requirement for shareholder voting power or a 
supervisory board, nor assessment and potential replacement of the IPF management. 
In fact leading up to the second wave of privatisation in 1994, as new regulations were 
brought in to control IPFs, many IPFs began using the unit trust format rather than the 
joint stock company, alternatively they included clauses retaining the same 
management for a minimum of six years or so42• 
Coffee ( 1996) asks whether the government were simply inadequate in their attempt 
to control IPFs or whether they judiciously decided to avoid confrontation in the 
belief that the banks needed an incentive to get involved in IPF activity. This was 
perhaps felt to be a requirement in order to counterbalance the unexpected success of 
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the private IPFs and to encourage the success of the voucher privatisation scheme in 
rural areas, where people held more trust in the established banks43 • 
At the other end of the scale, the Harvard Investment Fund one of the largest and most 
successful private Investment Privatisation Funds (IPFs), and in indeed the prime 
innovator of the present IPF role in the economy, has been implicated in an 
political/economic scandal, throwing into question the degree of ethical operation of 
these funds. The legal process is continuing but insider information between senior 
government officials and politicians and the young founder, Viktor Kozeny, of the 
fund includes claims of blackmail and bribery involving members of the 
government44• 
Summing Up The Czech Republic 
Thus the emerging major components in economic activity and the evolving corporate 
governance structure in the Czech Republic can be listed as: the IPF ownership 
pattern, share distribution and concentration, cross-ownership between IPFs, bank 
founders and the National Property Foundation, role of managers, bankruptcy and 
disclosure of information, regulation of economic institutions and activity , and the 
effect of all of these on shareholder behaviour and corporate control. 
Slovakia: Control Networks, MBOs and Stagnation 
The post 1989 experience of Slovakia can be divided into two phases. Firstly the 
experience of a democratic Czechoslovakia and the beginnings of economic transition 
with an emphasis on macro-economic mostly monetarist reforms and voucher 
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privatisation, promoting initially a limited degree ofiPF ownership pattern. Secondly, 
the experience of post-independence Slovakia from January 1993 onwards, where 
unclear economic policies combine with a shift in privatisation emphasis to 
management buy-outs and direct sales. The broad backdrop of issues described above 
in the section on the Czech Republic are all relevant for Slovakia post 1989, with 
certain modifications post January 1993. Therefore similar issues will only be dealt 
with here if they differ fundamentally or where they have been significantly modified. 
IPFs in Slovakia 
Voucher privatisation in Slovakia finished in January 1993. The process until that 
time had been carried out by federal government although many other executive 
powers were shared by federal and republic (Czech or Slovak) governments. Thus the 
emerging ownership structure in the enterprise sector of the Slovak economy by the 
end of 1992 was dominated by institutional share ownership, although individual 
(especially as a result of restitution) and state ownership also existed. Among the 
dominant financial institutions, the most important form was also the IPFs. In 
Slovakia most of these had been established by commercial banks, savings and loan 
associations, and insurance companies. As a result of the cross republican process of 
voucher privatisation, Slovakia shared not only many of the main IPF investors with 
the Czech Republic (See Schmoegnerova (I 993) and by 1994, trading on the stock 
market was dominated by the top investment funds, including Harvard Capital and 
Consulting, Cassovialnvest, Creditanstalt and VUB45• 
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Similarities continue over and above names. Many of the problems associated with 
this type of ownership affected Slovakia also. Schmoegnerova (1993) highlights 
similar issues to Coffee (1996) in the context of lack of effective corporate control, 
such as problems of raising investment capital, insider information trading between 
IPFs and bank owners, lack ofiPF managerial ability and product and firm knowledge 
vis-a-vis an entrenched managerial insider group. 
One of the most significant aspects in the Slovak context, as in the Czech context, is 
raised by Schmoegnerova (1993) as IPF confusion over corporate control and the 
meaning of management. She demonstrates this by the findings on attitudes to 
corporate control by owners in a survey of29 Slovak IPFs carried out in March 1993. 
Of the 29, 14 wanted to shape corporate policy, 8 did not want to be active owners 
and only wanted to trade shares, and 7 wanted to combine the two approaches. 
However, of the IPFs attempting to establish control over firms, less than two-thirds 
wanted to change the chief managers. It is claimed that this lack of corporate control 
allows the possibility of 'spontaneous privatisation' by managers before property 
rights are transferred from the National Property Fund to the new owners. This 
tendency is also indicative of strengths being played out in direct sales to 
management. Another important aspect raised by Schmoegnerova (1993) is the 
development in Slovakia ofiPFs owned by large-scale enterprises, which differs from 
the Czech experience46 • These enterprise owned IPFs may possess better information 
on the firm (e.g. product markets, market position, suppliers etc.) while the IPFs 
established by other financial institutions possess better information on stock markets 
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and financial situation47• These two aspects intersect with the issues of MBOs and 
control networks and local governments. 
The State, Direct Sales, MBOs and Control Networks 
The predominant fom1 of privatisation after 1993 in Slovakia became public auctions 
and direct sales to private individuals, foreigners or to managers as discussed in the 
chapter on Slovakia. When former managers use positional power to gain ownership 
they usually do so with little experiential or capital justification, as the case study of 
Kreslo shows. In this scenario managers' behaviour also seemed to be informed by 
past critiques of capitalism as well as state socialist behaviour (similar to IPF 
behaviour referred to in the last section). In this case little was done to re-skill 
personnel, open new markets or change production. This situation appears to have 
reproduced itself across Slovakia, especially in large-scale enterprises. 
Large-Scale Enterprises . 
Indeed large-scale enterprises have persisted particularly in Slovakia. The reasons for 
this are complex combination of factors: the halting process of privatisation, the 
inherited industrial structure, bot!I already referred to as well as the persistence of old 
firm, local and central political networks highlighted in this chapter. 
The extent of their control is demonstrated by VSZ (Vychodoslovenske Zeleziarne or 
East Slovak Iron Works) although it is the most extreme example of t!Ie influence 
wielded by these. VSZ accounts for between 15% and 18% of Slovak total exports 
and I 0% of the country's industrial production. In October 1996 it emerged as the 
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dominant shareholding force in IRB, Investicmi a Rozvojova Banka (Slovakia's 
largest bank). It has also become a leading shareholder in Slovenska poistovn"a, the 
insurance group and acquired Narodna obroda (a leading Slovakian business daily) 
and taken over Sparta Prague (a prominent Czech football team). In addition it has 
sought to solidify its industrial presence with its takeover of Trinecke zelezarny, an 
important steel producer in the Czech Republic48• 
The continuing important role of these large-scale enterprises, particularly in the 
financial sector are highlighted below, but a further important aspect of their survival 
is the firm-based culture promulgated by them. As discussed throughout this thesis, 
enterprise culture continues to operate in a similar way in both the Czech and Slovak 
Republics as before 1989. 
Inherited Networks 
The elite networks retain elements of the old culture necessary to maintain their 
survival (i.e. a control on firm knowledge, a degree of authoriatian-paternalistic 
control with regards to the workforce and 'outsiders', etc.), while also adapting to the 
new situation and incorporating features in line with their new often neo-classical 
market approach49• 
In the Czech Republic, Rychetnik has surveyed and interviewed the senior 
management of35 firms with regards to 'Performance and Incentives of Enterprises in 
Transition and surveyed also, as a sub-sample, employee attitudes50• Rychetnik 
remarks on the lack of managerial change at the top of enterprises and that where 
change has occurred new personnel are promoted from within in the firm or the 
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management team searched 'professional networks for personnel.' In fact in only six 
cases did public competition take place for the top posts51 • Accompanying this 
stagnation of management personnel in firms, is an enterprise culture combining 
pre-war, state socialist and transitional practices. This has already been an intrinsic 
part of the discussion in this thesis for both the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
Rychetnik highlights particularly that Czech managerial culture has an engineering 
and technical orientation rather than a social or personnel orientation and that this has 
combined with a strong 'culture-focused management (combined with Fordism) in 
Bata's tradition. He also suggests that product orientation may be reinforced by a new 
attitude in small, private businesses of disregard to the worker, where the spread of 
information and personnel management are seen as second to the role of capital. 
Rychetnik suggests more research is required here, but quotes Vymetalik, who first 
noted this phenomenon, as remarking on: 
' ... a widespread opinion that what is decisive is capital which (in turn) will 
direct labour as necessary. Knowledge ... (is) considered valueless. Money (is) 
considered as the main engine of economic revitalisation'. 52 
It has been argued for the Czech Republic that a secured role for managers in the 
privatisation process could have averted certain excesses (Kenway and Chlmnsky 
(1995)). Schmoegnerova (1993) has argued that MBOs may avoid the problem of 
'spontaneous privatisation' on the part of management. It would appear then from 
these argmnents that MBO options in Slovakia would have avoided certain excesses 
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prevalent for example in the Czech Republic. However, this does not appear to have 
been the case. As in the Czech Republic, an increased role for employees could have 
averted instances of managerial corruption or excessive power. Employees have little 
to gain from asset stripping but much to gain from the survival of the firm (Myant 
1993). Kenway and Klvaeova have pointed out 'spontaneous privatisation' or asset 
stripping in the Czech Republic is only slight when compared to other transitional 
economies. No comparative study of the Czech and Slovak republics exist with 
regards to this phenomenon and it is not the focus of this thesis to carry out any such 
analysis. The specific and very strong resistance of old information and power 
networks in Slovakia has a number of causes. The pattern and structure of 
industrialisation has reinforced locality power (local enterprise as sole employer 
holding important political as well as economic power vis-a-vis the centre), and strong 
central authority direction (central authorities having been the cause of 
industrialisation strongly influence the interplay of its splintered economic units and 
industrial structure and their respective future directions) and a history of a highly 
authoritarian political culture, whether one considers the experience of independence 
under the nationalist cleric Tiso during the second world war or the experience of 
subjugation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was more oppressive in Slovakia 
than in the Czech Lands. As discussed in the chapter on the Slovakian economy, the 
regional policy under the past regime never managed to resolve this centre-locality 
dichotomy. So it appears that the present day political clientelist behaviour and slow 
and confused economic reform has done little to break with this tradition. 
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However, the Slovak socio-economic and political enviromnent appears to have 
reinforced certain of these phenomena to a greater degree than in the Czech Republic. 
Indeed the chosen course of privatisation, the role of MBOs in this and the financial 
importance of industrial giants in the financial sector (referred to below) due to the 
exclusion of foreigners and the absence of alternative domestic owners, suggests an 
even greater reinforcement of the evolving enterprise culture of informational and 
power networks considered by Rychetnik and others. 
Large-scale Enterprises and Financial Sector Privatisation 
Slovakian banks suffer from all the problems of the Czech banks. Continued bad 
debts, from which they suffer as well as reap benefits in the form of high interests rate 
payments53 • In many cases the three biggest banks Vseobecmi uverova banka (VUB), 
Slovenska spofiteliia, a savings bank and Investicna a Rozvojova Bank (Investment 
and Development Bank -IRB) are controlled by and often act in accordance with state 
policy. The state owner respectively 48%, 91% and 35% of each bank. The three also 
own 62% of total banking assets. The other 28% is spread over other smaller banks 
many of whom have alliances with foreign shareholders54• Furthermore, the OECD 
estimates that 29% of the SK45lbn of outstanding loans made out by Slovak banks at 
the end of 1995 were more than 90 days in arrears and another 9% were more severe 
and in a 'special mention' category. Boland concludes that the majority of these bad 
loans are made by the three biggest banks and therefore also underwritten by the state 
budget. Again this reflects a similar situation in the Czech Republic. Given the 
conditions giving rise to the domino effect of payment arrears in Czechoslovakia and 
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subsequently the Czech and Slovak Republics, most debt must ultimately be 
subsidised by the state. 
This situation complicates the ever more pressing need for privatisation of the 
financial sector. However, the slow pace of privatisation and the lack of enthusiasm to 
sell to foreigners has meant an emphasis on domestic buyers. In the context of 
large-scale bank privatisation, the only viable owners, if foreigners are excluded are 
the industrial giants such as VSZ or Slovnaft (the petrochemicals group) and other 
large concerns. However, there are a number of concerns associated with this option. 
The fact that many large-scale and therefore powerful enterprises have not 
restructured and run inefficiently does not bode well for the financial sectors. Indeed, 
many commercial banks are worried about becoming subsidiaries to such large 
concerns. Eudovit P6sa, general manager of Pofnobanka, a private bank, is reported 
by the Financial Times as saying that VSZ majority ownership ofiRB would: 
' ... make it a state within a state.'55 
This pattern of ownership and influence would suggest a highly corporatised structure. 
Local Government and Network Capital 
The problem of managerial abuse of positional power and knowledge is true for both 
the Czech and Slovak Republics. However the situation is further compounded in 
Slovakia by the evolving business and political-economic cultures. The government 
control of television and the appointment of media figures according to political 
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loyalty rather than according to ability testifies to this, as does the political scandal 
surrounding the Kovac kidnapping". The kidnapping of President Michal Kovac's son 
to Austria in 1995 has been linked to senior political figures and the security forces, 
headed by I van Lexa, one of Kovac's critics, and is an on-going issue between the 
President and Prime Minister Meciar57• Within this context, the stop-go process of 
voucher privatisation has given way to direct privatisation often according to political 
allegiances of managers, local authorities and individuals. The Financial Times notes 
in relation to direct sales: 
'While there is no suggestion that politicians are lining their pockets with the 
proceeds from sales, the close ties between the political and industrial 
establishments, and the difficulty in many cases of establishing details of 
individual privatisation agreements, have bred public cynicism about the 
direct sales approach.'58 
Thus the motivation for direct sale and MBOs in Slovakia until now has not operated 
within a context of ensuring economic stakeholding by key groups in order to secure 
an effective corporate control culture. Rather the context for MBOs and direct sales 
has been one of political clientelism, which interacts with firm-based management 
informational networks operating within a specifically evolving enterprise culture, all 
with as yet unknown effects. 
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The role of local government and the exploitation of old power networks comes fully 
into play here. Pickvance (1997) has written an initial investigation into the 
relationship between local government and enterprises in East/Central Europe and has 
pointed out that more research needs to be done in this area to gauge fully the role 
played and the potential for restructuring the relationships to the advantage of 
reform59• However, he refers to Bourdieu's 'social capital' which Bourdieu argues 
exists alongside economic and cultural capital. Indeed Bourdieu has specifically 
argued that in socialist societies these elites are well able to translate the 'cultural 
capital' of education and training from an old order into a new6°. Czako and Sfk (1993) 
have referred to 'network capital' in respect of research in Hungary, as has Grabher 
with regards to East Germany and Sfk (forthcoming) generally in capitalist, 
communist and post-communist societies61 • Sik claims that: 
'since post-communism follows communism and since in communism 
network capital was very widespread, it follows that network capital cannot 
be less widespread in post-communism, except if it was destroyed or became 
useless.'62 
There are a number of conditions, however, which Pickvance highlights as potentially 
'devaluing', or heightening the value of network capital. Conditions which may cause 
devaluing are as follows: 
1) ' ... changes in occupational and other roles which accompany transition'63 and 
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2) ' ... a reduction in the level of trust and the development of one-off deal-making.'64 
Pickvance goes on to explain that first condition as one in which the networks 
'by which industrial managers tried to cope with the obstacles to production 
and which involved party officials as well as other managers (which Si'k, 
forthcoming, calls 'managers' reciprocal transactions')'65 
decline because 
'party strnctures collapse and market processes take the place of network 
linkages. Likewise occupational changes among network members are as 
likely to devalue network capital as to maintain it, and will create the basis for 
new networks.'66 
The second condition refers to the relationship of reciprocity as opposed to one of 
power relations between a dominant and weak partner67• Thus 
'Network relations are enduring and can be contrasted with one-off 
transactions which are instantaneous and where there is no necessary equality 
of status between partners.'68 
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However, the adaptation of network partners and their activity, to new situations 
cannot be ruled out. Indeed during a time oftransition where all definitions of role and 
accountability are in flux, it is quite likely that the inherited and very embedded 
cultural practices, in this case the culture of networks and network capital, be relied 
upon to breach the gap both in terms of personal survival and economic maintenance. 
In fact, Pickvance refuses to deny the importance of 'network capital' despite the 
existence in transforming economies of the conditions for its devaluation69• 
Ultimately, Pickvance argues that the role of local government is one of a: 
'key mediating institution in the transition from state socialism because it 
controls resources which can play an important part in the development of 
marketization. 00 
However, the lack of empirical research on local government is highlighted in that the 
extent to which local government is an 'active or a passive mediating institution' and 
whether this activity reflects: 
'autonomous internal interests rather than the interests of external bodies such 
as central government and local firms. m 
Summing Up of the Slovakian Situation 
The major characteristics influences the Slovakian socio-economic situation appear 
therefore to be: Direct Sale privatisation with a more limited role for IPFs; old control 
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networks based on information and old power centres, and within this the roles of the 
centre-locality dichotomy and local government and large-scale enterprises; financial 
sector issues, such as bankruptcy and bank privatisation and the role of industrial 
corporation control. 
East Germany: Deleted Networks and Model Transplantation 
Eastern Germany has felt the greatest effect of ownership change on organisational 
restructuring due purely to the bonus of investment finance and skills brought in 
especially from western Germany. However, where privatisation has occurred to East 
German individual entrepreneurs (whether through privatisation or restitution) or 
through the limited number ofMBOs, the problems faced by management/owners are 
similar to those faced by their contemporaries in the Czech and Slovak Republics, that 
is lack of investment capital, lack of the appropriate skills. 
However, the combination ofthe government transplanting an economic, political and 
legal system wholesale from western Germany with the influx of economic actors 
with the appropriate management skills and experience of a market economy (whether 
as owners or managers) has enabled government to avoid much of the discussion 
regarding the most appropriate form of corporate governance necessary to aid 
organisational change at enterprise level. What appears to be more prominent in firm 
management minds here, is not the forms of corporate governance and the 
delineations of ownership and control but rather the more pressing problem of lack of 
motivation amongst the workforce, expressed by both West and East German 
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management and/or owners. Although recognised in the other two countries, this 
aspect was not regarded as so pressing. 
The govermnent's politically influenced approach to economic restructuring, however, 
has also brought with it high economic costs in the form of the radical 
deindustrialisation of eastern Germany and the destruction of endogenous economic 
potential, as discussed in Chapter Nine. 
This has both an overt side and a more subtle side. Overt action was taken by the new 
government in favouring fast economic union, the hiving off of research and 
development facilities from East German firms for privatisation purposes and to break 
old inter-firm and Kombinat networks, and the pre-eminence of West German or 
foreign entrepreneurs in privatisation sales. Subtly, the looser and economically 
stronger network systems between West German producers, suppliers and retailers, 
meant that West German firms 'imported' all their western networks with them when 
relocating to the east, thus producing little economic growth at the local level and 
leading to the even greater demise of local industries and networks. Indeed relocation 
to the east provided West German firms with a retail boom in the early 1990s, and the 
further shrivelling of any potential endogenous growth. 
Summing Up Eastern Germany 
Thus, eastern Germany initially faced similar problems to the other two countries but 
the transplantation of a new system and its 'foreign' network patterns and the deletion 
of indigenous regional network patterns has been both advantageous and 
disadvantageous. Advantageously, old entrenched socio-economic networks have 
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been destroyed but at the cost of long-term economic decline (in terms of regionally 
located production potential) and potentially severe social dislocation (e.g. massive 
unemployment), expressing itself through political concerns of a right-wing revival. 
Comparison of Factors in Enterprise Restructuring in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics and Eastern Germany 
All the previous evidence dispels the argument of the property rights school and new 
theories of capital structure, referred to in Chapter Four, which claim that 
management performance can be adequately monitored in market economies by debt 
and equity information. In the ideal situation of capital and equity led economies, 
control rights rest uniquely with managers unless debt highlights problems. In such 
cases banks take over control rights and introduce restructuring measures and new 
management72• However, this is an unreliable instrument in transforming economies 
due to the lack of effectively operating institutions. 
Begg and Portes (1993) also consider it doubtful whether such a streamlined approach 
is (as advocated by Lipton and Sachs (1990) for Poland and Russia and as 
implemented in Czechoslovakia post 1989, and subsequently in the Czech Republic), 
possible in Central/Eastern Europe given the inherited debt situation (debt inherited 
from the past regime, now between banks and firms, and the practise of payment 
arrears between firms) and the transitional nature of the economic enviromuent. In 
this view the role of the capital structure as a management control device is only 
possible when the following three criteria are met: 
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'(i) the correlation of individual enterprise performance with the ability of its 
management team. 
(ii) the ability of incumbent managers relative to the managers who feasibly 
could be brought in to replace them, and 
(iii) the relative effectiveness of managers and their bank monitors. 
The more the fate of an enterprise depends on factors outside its managers' 
control, the less important is capital structure as a device to alleviate moral 
hazard. The benefits to potential external control also depend on the realistic 
possibility of being able to find alternative management talent with which to 
displace failed managers. Finally, the control structure depends critically on 
the willingness of external monitors to play the role assigned to them. ' 73 
As can be seen in the case studies and in the analysis of the economic situation carried 
out in this thesis, the macro-economic policy in the Czech and Slovak Republics did 
not provide an adequate structural and regulatory framework for such institutional and 
socio-economic conditions to emerge. Certain outstanding problems run contrary to 
the above recommendations for capital and equity market control. The problems of 
payment arrears, both primary and secondary, was external to the firm (i.e. it was 
independent of profitability or non-profitability criteria), there were few alternative 
sources of skilled managers and managers and their banks were sometimes unable and 
sometimes unwilling to monitor the situation. For the Czech Republic the change in 
ownership has effected no change in effective corporate control. Thus some 
commentators have suggested, as Kenway and Chlumsky (July, 1995) do: 
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'We believe that our findings are consistent with the view that privatisation to 
funds has transferred ownership but not control. It therefore follows that 
transition requires a further restructuring in the relationship between firms and 
funds: the stage reached now is not the completion of the process.'74 
Indeed Mertlik (1996) points to a 'silent secondary privatisation' which is underway as 
foreign and individual domestic investors buy major shares in firms from the IPFs, 
occurring especially from 1995 onwards75 • Whether these new owners will make more 
effective strategic management decisions regarding firm restructuring remains to be 
seen. Anecdotal evidence of this author's research would tend to support this 
hypothesis, but further empirical research is required, perhaps in the form of a 
widespread survey. Thus the Czech Republic shares many of the phenomena evident 
in Slovakia, e.g. informational networks, but the development and integration of these 
into a new macro-economic framework have been very different.The prime role of 
IPFs in the privatisation process and their position in corporate control of the 
enterprise (even if not effective) have caused many more of these phenomena to adapt 
to change, not always, however, with unmitigated success with regards to 
restructuring. Thus the main characteristic of economic activity in the Czech Republic 
is one of 'on-going' social relations and economic activity incorporating and merging 
with old and new socio-economic phenomena. 
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Table 10:2 Elements Influencing Corporate Governance and Organisational 
Change 
Elements Czech Republic Slovak Republic Eastern Germany 
Inheritance from Socialism High degree of state control, As in Czech Republic, but Strong centralisation, 
institutionalsied informal with even greater emphasis economic sectoral structure 
networks. Great degree of on heavy industrial similar to West Germany. 
inter~enterprise debt, development due to Advanced technologiy. One 
infonnallinks between firms~ complete lack of it until after of 10 richest countries in 
especially within Vhjs for Second World War. As a world. Lack individual 
plan fulflllrnent. result, stronger regional responsibility, 
fragmentation of production entreprenuership. Networks 
processes within firms and also operating around 
Vhjs. Planerfl11lungspakt. 
Inheritance of older Austro-Hungarian Empire- Austro-Hungarian Empire- Prussian state, active part of 
ne a-traditions ruled from Austria: greater ruled from Hungary: more Third Reich. In South 
degree of freedom. Czech autocratic, no indigenous economic powerhouse of 
nationals among educated, development of economic Germany (Saxony). High 
middle-class involved in activity. Feudal, peasant level of engineering and 
business. Advanced society. advanced precision 
engineering and precision production. 
production. 
Privatisation Process Mass voucher scheme. Mixed: mass voucher Administative privatisation 
Process completed. scheme gives way to direct through Treuhandanstalt. 
Since 1995, beginning of sale, esp. MBOs and Preference given in most 
si!ent'secondary wave of tendency to institutional sales to West Germans or 
privatisation by Czech and corporate buy~outs. Process non-indigenous investors. 
other individuals. stop/go. Political patronage MBOsfew. 
strong. 
Political Institutions/ Civil Stable state, developing civil Tendency to stagnate. Transplantation of systems 
Society Spheres society. Institutionalised Autocratic/paternalistic state, and networks with cultural 
corruption. weak civil society. tag resulting in political and 
Increasing industrial economic disillusionment 
corporatism with political 
influence especially in 
regions 
Ownership Firffis largely privatised via Some IPFs, MBOs and Almost completely 
IPFs, banks, fewer MBOs, Corporate ownership, much privatised. Mostly West 
but state ownership strong still state owned. Limited German owners and 
through cross-ownership of entrepreneurial sector. management. Very few 
the above. Moderate private MBOs. Stunted endogenous 
sector. economic potential. 
Legislation Commercial/company law Overlap with Czech Transplanted from West 
follows German style. Republic (first 2 years). German 
Development unclear. Legal 
approach German/Hungarian 
case tradition. 
Control Rights Information assymetries. As opposite with less change As in West Gennany f:irmly 
Persistance of entrenched in ownership rights, and with managers, where 
social groups, often relocated greater political and separate from owners, but 
to different spheres of economic stagnation. Passive greater role of institutional 
economic activity (i.e. banks, blocks of entrenched social owners in decisions than in 
government, IPFs, 
managemenil. 
groups, less relocation. Anglo-saxon system. 
Source: F~rst development as a cross-country companson between th1s author's findmgs and those of 
Dr. Beth Kewell on Poland as a publication draft in 1995. 
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By contrast the main characteristic of the Slovak situation, is the predominance of the 
adaptation of old socio-economic phenomena to 'on-going' social relations and 
economic activity, in the form of a gradual corporatisation of old networks' interests76• 
In Slovakia the potential effect of industrial groups' shares in IPFs and banks, the 
continued effect of strong locality political-economic networks and continued 
management positional advantage in direct sale privatisation and continued business 
operations and corporate control on the Slovakian economy remains to be seen. Little 
restructuring of firms appears to have been effected. However, the effect of bank 
privatisation being discussed in 1997 in both republics will undoubtedly affect the 
financial environment of firms and may also influence the corporate control of many 
enterprises in both republics. 
Lastly, in eastern Germany the radical surgery of deleting old networks and the 
wholesale transplantation of a new, 'foreign', corporate governance system with 
pre-eminence given to West German owners and managers, has highlighted the less 
obvious, but as effective, network systems of western European market systems. 
These West German network systems, especially those between producers, 
wholesalers and retailers and the central role of the research and development role in 
future developments of the firm, have combined with a macro-economic policy 
designed to break up inherited East German network systems through sale to and 
management by West Germans, and destruction of the indigenous research and 
development facilities 'feeding' East German firms. This has resulted in East Germany 
becoming an industrial backwater, due to the fact that surviving East German firms 
could not break into these networks (even if, on the rare occasion, they could do so 
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competitively) and has also lead to the stunting of endogenous business potential. The 
political advantages of short-term economic policy appears set to ensure long-term 
economic decline of an entire region, with the concomitant financial and social strain 
on the rest of the country. The table above sums up this comparative analysis between 
the three countries. 
Conclusion 
The key aspects constraining restructuring in the situations of the Czech and Slovak 
Republics have been dealt with above The Czech and Slovak governments' policies 
did little to counteract the functional problems faced by firms or to counteract the 
economic institutional practices and cultures with a view to modifying management, 
bank and ownership (whether IPF or management) behaviour. It is with regards to this 
that the requirements of an explicit corporate governance model, where duties, 
responsibilities and expectations of owners, manager, employee and civil society 
behaviour (that is acceptable business practices) were not adequately considered. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Corporate Governance Models and Theories of Progress and Change 
in the Czech and Slovak Republics; the reassertion of the concept of 
economic embeddedness in a social and cultural reality 
'To shift in natural science from one conceptual framework to another is one thing; to do so 
in social sciences is quite another. It is like rebuilding a house, foundation, walls, fittings and 
all, while continuing to live in it. We must rid ourselves of the ingrained notion that the 
economy is a field of experience of which human beings have necessarily always been 
conscious. To employ a metaphor, the facts of the economy were originally embedded in 
situations that were not themselves of an economic nature ..... The crystallization of the 
concept ofthe economy was a matter oftime and history. But neither time nor history have 
provid~d us with those tools required to penetrate the maze of social relationships in which 
J 
the economy was embedded. This is the task of what we here call institutional analysis.'' 
'For Aristotle, man, like any other animal, was presented ... as naturally self-sufficient. The 
human economy did not, therefore, stem from the boundlessness of man's wants and needs, 
or, as it is phrased today, from the fact of scarcity.'' 
Introduction: A New Stakeholder Model 
The 'corporate governance' model of the old regime (a bureaucratically administered, 
or command economy), was inadequate both in economic provision and in the attempt 
to use it as a replacement for civil society. The transformations of 1989 challenged the 
model and called for a new more legitimate model to be built in its place3• Hilary 
Wainwright (1994) describes the dissidents and youth of this period as being 
influenced by neo-liberal ideas in the fields of social and political activity; that is they 
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were in favour of the prevention of state interference in the arena of politics and the 
private social arena4• She questions however whether this really included the 
neo-liberal view of the market economy, one totally (or near as) devoid of regulation 
by state or other bodies. 
The points made throughout this thesis correspond in different degrees to the various 
findings of many authors arguing explicitly or implicitly for a more institutional 
approach to economic reform in East/Central Europe and the former states of the 
Soviet Union, such as Beggs and Portes5; van Brabant 6 ; Zdislav Sulc, Czech 
economist, closely identified with the Czechoslovak Economic Forurn7; Valtr 
Komarek as Head of the Czechoslovak Institute of Forecasting and Deputy Prime 
Minister in the first post-1989 government8; the Czechoslovak High School of 
Economics as represented by Milan Matejka9; Jan Vrba, Czech Minister of Industry, 
in the first post-1989 government; Myant10; Myant, Fleischer, Homschild, Vintrova, 
Zeman and Soucek11 , Cassonl2, Kenway3 etc .. A central critique of this approach is 
firstly and primarily the questioning of the neo-classical emphasis on ownership 
change (in the form of privatisation) as the catalyst to economic reform and growth. 
It would appear that privatisation is only one step on the road to a market economy 
which adequately provides for its citizens not only in terms of the efficient supply of 
consumer goods and basic commodities but also in terms of a democratic, regulated 
framework which enables effective and open participation in society, at either 
economic or political levels. Any macro-economic policy applied alone will not 
produce the important function of competition without other 'deeper' institutional 
reform measures. Fair competition requires an environment of thorough 
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demonopolisation (not assured by privatisation), clear delineation of corporate 
ownership and control and the responsibilities of economic actors within this (owners, 
managers, banks, local government, employees etc.), and a clearly regulated and 
enabling environment. Laws alone will not be enough to ensure the respect of such 
regulation. A culture based upon a new stakeholder model is required, one which 
emphasises access to information for the shareholder, the manager, employee and 
local citizen, and also which emphasises a wider notion of privatisation and the 
efficient operation of market forces. Only a wider understanding of the processes 
involved in economic activity and thus the implications for the very necessary process 
of privatisation (expropriation of the state from the national economy), can ensure the 
re-emergence of a truly ethical and operational civil society, which in turn is requisite 
for stabilising economic change and innovation. In other words rather than a narrow 
interpretation of market system prerequisites, a new and wider corporate governance 
model is required. Ultimately the governments of the Czech and Slovak Republics 
failed to recognise the importance of creating a forum for discussion of the issue of 
corporate governance models. In Germany the political importance of creating a 
united Germany effectively stifled any debate affecting action in the interests of 
Eastern Germany, which consequently appears to have become an industrial 
backwater. 
This chapter attempts to assess the findings of all previous chapters in the above 
context. It sets out to ascertain to what extent the evolving corporate governance 
models can be defined for each country under discussion. The comparison of the three 
countries aims to highlight the different roles played by the various actors in the 
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corporate governance models and the transformation process as a whole and to 
reinforce the argument of embeddedness and the social nature of economic activity 
(Grabher and Stark 1997)14• Ultimately the chapter will challenged the 'transitionist' 
theory approach where the destination of 'capitalism' is assumed. The teleological 
assumption of such approaches first of all assume that the end state is static and 
known, and secondly that once the first changes have been made, the rest of the 
picture will automatically fall into place15• It will also raise questions as important for 
Western Europe in the throes of developing a 'global economy', and will highlight 
areas for future research, reasserting the importance of the neglected area of the social 
and cultural embeddedness of economic life, or simply the sociology of economic life. 
This would include not only an appreciation of the role of institutional economics, but 
also a further exploration of network analysis and locality ecology (covering inherited 
and on-going socio-economic phenomena), and convergent ownership-control 
delineations (Sabell991), or asset ambiguity (Grabher and Stark 1997)16• 
Chapter Outline 
The chapter will first of all compare emerging corporate governance systems with 
Western models, before assessing the evolving characteristics of the Czech, Slovak 
and German models independently. The most important elements shaping the 
emergent domestic corporate governance models from the stages of the present 
transforming phase, from the state socialist phase and the pre-state socialist 
experience, will be reiterated from previous chapters. The main issues arising from 
this cross-country analysis will also be highlighted. Finally the diversity of models 
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and choices to be made, due to the active principal of economic embeddedness will be 
discussed. 
Comparison of Emerging Corporate Governance Systems 
Comparison with Western Models 
In discussions of the merits and disadvantages of different types of market systems 
throughout the world many commentators have ignored, the concept of economic 
embeddedness (or the sociology of economic life) and thus also institutional 
economics as well as the possibilities for further evolution and change of any such 
economic models (e.g. Hayek, von MisesY7• They do so from a macro-economic point 
of view, rather than accepting the influence of inherited culture. Where the influence 
of institutional economics is appreciated it is done so in a rather limited scope. Thus 
Estrin (1991) argues that specific institutional economic forms in East/Central Europe 
have influenced the choice of privatisation, that is the chosen form has emphasised 
transferral of ownership rights (von Mises 1951), rather than control rights (Yarrow 
1986), or the importance of regulation in privatisation (Vickers and Yarrow 1988, 
Estrin and Whitehead 1988)18• However this analysis of the role of institutional 
economics in the context of the Czech and Slovak Republics ignores the influence of 
issues embedded in past relations with on-going significance, as enumerated 
subsequently in this chapter. Similarly in discussions of the evolving corporate 
governance models of East/Central Europe many contemporary commentators have 
either ignored institutional economic theory and /or have used what they consider to 
be fixed model concepts. Thus Lipton and Sachs (1990) err on both counts with their 
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promotion of capital markets and an highly neo-classical view of the outsider model, 
and Dittus and Prowse (I 996) on both when contrasting the Czech corporate 
governance system to both the Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and Japanese models in tum19• 
However Kenway and Klvacova (1996) and Coffee (1996) err only on the latter, in 
that they overlook the flux of such models, when comparing to the insider or 
Germanic modeF0• Conversely Grabher and Stark (1997) take both these issues into 
consideration when comparing to the German and Japanese models, question both 
applicability and the assumption that these models are no longer evolving21 • Lastly 
Sabel continues to assess changes and transformations in market and other economies, 
especially with regard to an emerging, so-called 'global economy'22• 
Therefore the value of such 'Western model' comparisons and fixed concept models 
are useful as a system of mapping differences and similarities in corporate governance 
structures, but limited as a tool for analysing change. The likelihood of East/Central 
Europe and the states of former Soviet Union being able to reproduce the necessary 
preconditions for a Western style social market economy, especially with regards to 
the so-called spontaneous development of social institutions has been questioned (e.g. 
Barry, 1993)23 • Much more appropriate for such an analysis is an investigation into, 
and comparison of, economic organisations, actors and conditions in the countries 
under discussion. The bulk of this thesis has attempted to satisfy these conditions of 
investigation. 
Indeed, this is one of the most fundamental problems of the many 'Western' 
comparisons which assume the validity of Fukuyama's argument of an End to History 
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and the supremacy of the Western capitalist modeJ24 • In fact the 'Western' or market 
economy model is so diverse as to question the notion of a Western modef25• In 
addition mature market economies, which are often assumed to be fixed and stable, 
are, in fact, in decline or undergoing dramatic change themselves (Sabel 1991 ), which 
have lead some authors to claim the rebirth of history (Glenny 1990) and the decline 
of the Western model (Gray 1993)26• 
Evolving Czech Corporate Governance Model 
In the Czech Republic the production of the Anglo-Saxon outsider financial model of 
corporate governance was left to the supposedly automatically efficient mechanisms 
of the market, created by means of shock therapy (as counselled by Lipton and Sachs 
and the IMF), which involved stabilisation policies (freeing prices, currency 
conversion, opening of markets) and privatisation27• The discrepancies between the 
imposed macro-economic model and the grassroots micro-economic system highlight 
the difficulty of imposing a supposedly 'disembedded economy' or a neo-classical free 
market economy onto a more 'embedded economic' system inherited from the 
previous regime and the need for a design of corporate governance structures to create 
an economic model appropriate to a transient economy28• 
Instead, what does appear to have happened is that the organic model growing at the 
firm or micro-level of the system in response to the unresolved and on-going 
socio-economic and political problems has influenced the macro-economic level 
model originally conceived as a singular panacea. Thus, from this interplay of factors 
407 
has resulted the vagaries of the ownership-control dichotomy and lack of restructuring 
outlined in this thesis. 
Resolution of this problem can only come about by a decision to begin structuring 
governance of corporations and a model to be adopted in both the Czech and Slovak 
Republics. This means that issues of both physical and cultural infrastructure and 
institutional arrangements (similar to Bourdieu's financial capital, social capital and 
network capital) must be dealt with, rather than relying rather optimistically upon the 
vagaries of the market to sort them out29• Thus the issue of embeddedness of any 
economic system in a social and cultural landscape which has on-going relevance for 
the functioning of that system needs to be recognised and dealt with30• 
Imposition of the Outsider Model at Macro-Economic Level. 
In the Anglo-Saxon model institutional arrangements for industrial investment are 
minimal and the trading of shares, often by investment funds and groups, on the stock 
market is relied upon to regulate firm efficiency and allocate investment and share 
value according to success. 
Tom Carman (1994) has described corporate governance as follows: 
'The governance of an enterprise is the sum of those activities which make 
up the internal regulation of the business in compliance with the 
obligations placed on the firm by legislation, ownership and control. It 
incorporates the trusteeship of assets, their management and their 
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deployment. The responsibilities of the trustee centre on the disinterested 
care of assets belonging to another party. The executor is an agent 
entrusted with the deployment of resources on behalf of another. A 
manager is expected to marshal assets to get the best returns for his 
employers. Each of these components are included in the notion of 
effective governance. The separation of ownership from control in most 
large firms shaped a view ofthe senior management of the firm as the 
'elected' government of the firm. They are elected by and responsible to, 
their electors, i.e. the voters or shareholders in the enterprise.' .... 31 
This type of definition is more appropriate for Anglo-Saxon system. It functions to 
a certain degree in the UK and USA, despite the problems of this type of 
ownership arrangement, due to firstly, relatively stable patterns of business 
practice, a strong entrepreneurial social grouping with experience and capital for 
investment and secondly due to long established dealings with international 
corporations and markets and experience with banking systems. 
However, in the Czech Republic all institutions and economic relationships are 
nascent and still evolving and the scope for independent Czechoslovak and, 
subsequently, Czech investment is limited due to a lack of domestic saving. The 
lack of capital causing, in part, primary payment arrears, and almost all of 
secondary payment arrears. 01 esely I 992), is not altered by a change in ownership. 
In addition the Investment Privatisation Funds, due to the lack of an established 
entrepreneurial class and stock market and therefore a lack of competition, are able 
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to act without any opposition from other sources of capital. This, in turn, allows the 
Funds to act with free license according to their own wishes and requirements. 
Lastly during the time of study (late '89 to Spring 1995) there was also little 
external governmental or legal regulation of these trusts and even of banks 
resulting in unprecedented take-overs and abuses. 32 In effect government policy, 
shareholder behavioural expectations and IPF and bank priorities for short-term 
gain combined to endorse the minimum legal and regulatory framework of the 
neo-liberal model, to a far greater extent than it had evolved in the US. and the UK. 
Given that this model was imposed, albeit inappropriately, from above, the 
question must be asked: what was the inherited model from the enterprise and 
grassroots level and whether it is closer to the Anglo-Saxon (outsider) or Germanic 
(insider) model. 
Inheritance and On-Going Issues 
The following issues have been raised throughout this thesis and have a direct role 
to play in establishing the nature of the actual evolving corporate governance 
model. 
Firstly, the immediate inheritance from the socialist regime has been referred to as 
follows; 
* networks and 'network capital' - firm-locality links, firm-state links, local 
government-central government link. 
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* the problem of primary and secondary payment inabilities, or arrears 
originating from the previous regime and being propagated in the present 
* inherited industrial structure reformed since the 1950s but still rooted in that 
plarming with an emphasis on heavy industry and central directives - lack of 
investment in traditional areas of expertise, and in potential growth areas, such as 
brewing, glass-making, and light engineering and electronics etc. 
Secondly, on-going phenomena from the present 'transforming' system: 
* inadequately reformed banking system - large state ownership in banks; new 
commercial banks unwilling to make out loans; high interest rates (only form of 
real financial revenue for banks); lack of regulation of insider trading, especially no 
'informational firewall'33 enforced between banks and IPFs; no limit on bank 
owning through its IPF substantial shares in competitor enterprises34• 
* 'weak character of concentrated ownership'35 pattern - cross-ownership 
between banks, financial intermediaries, IPFs and state via National Property Fund; 
banks owning shares in competing enterprises; IPFs have no management 
experience and no industrial sector and firm specific knowledge; banks and IPFs 
have neither the incentive nor the resources to become active owners in firms and 
carry out restructuring, as there are fewer overheads and more money to be made in 
trading in voucher shares. Banks hold no equity directly in firms owned by their 
IPFs, therefore the only advantage to a bank of an increase in the value of a stock is 
an increase in the management fee it receives (2% of net asset value of fund)36; 
there is little stock market trading (that which exists tends to be in IPF shares 
themselves) and no further privatisation waves. 
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* Management knowledge - of firm, industrial sector and appropriate networks; 
no experience of market systems, nor of restructuring, and naturally not of 
management of transformation on such a large scale. 
*Lack of work discipline in workforce but a strong/passive or limited bargaining 
role from past37• 
This combination of factors reflects a tradition more in tune with a German or 
continental corporate governance model (an insider model). 
The Germanic or Insider Model 
Teichova (1974) has noted the existence of strong participation by joint-stock 
banks in industrial enterprises and in transport and trade companies in the inter-war 
period in Czechoslovakia. She has described the resulting relations between 
industrial companies and banks as being 'a net of relationships of varying degrees 
of dependency'". In 1997 the cross-ownership between banks, IPFs and control of 
firms, and thin equity markets as well as the position on the boards of directors and 
supervisory boards of firms of bank-owned IPFs parallel certain elements in the 
German system. Thus some commentators such as, Dittus and Prowse (1996) 
suggest that once openness of information and monitoring of banks is adequate, the 
German/Japanese model will make a more appropriate model for the Czech 
Republic to emulate than the Anglo-Saxon version39 • To this end they suggest 
banks being allowed slowly to swap debt for equity to gain the necessary 
experience of management and managerial responsibility to function in the 
required way. Unfortunately it is questionable as to whether this single measure 
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would effect such improvement. It misses the point, that firstly, in a sense banks do 
own equity through their financial intermediaries which control the respective 
IPFs; and secondly, while IPFs do actually own equity, this makes little difference 
_--·: to their involvement with the enterprise for reasons already outlined, such as: lack 
of management experience; lack of financial and other resources to aid 
restructuring; lack of competition in the financial sector; lack of fluidity on the 
stock market; and the nature of incentives and success criteria for shareholders in 
the form of IPFs and ultimately banks owners. Therefore existence of the same 
factors in the environment and behaviour of banks suggests that bank ownership of 
equity alone would not effect any efficient development of responsible firm 
management. Indeed, Kenway and Klvacova's (1996) insight into the nature of 
equity in the Czech Republic emphasises the importance of the last three factors 
noted above. They refer to the fact that the acquisition of shares in the first place 
are a result of voucher privatisation and not the result of: 
'past decisions to raise finance for these firms through new equity issues'40, 
and thus are unlikely to produce greater access to credit on the part of the firm. 
Kenway and Klvacova (1996) consequently point out important differences 
between the Germanic system and the Czech one, which temper any easy 
comparisons. Until recently it was assumed that because German banks often hold 
firm equity and often sit on supervisory boards (although this is not always the 
case), this allows an ease of access to loans for firms (from their bank owners) and 
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access to information on the firm for the banlc However, Edwards and Fischer 
(1994) have questioned this assumption by claiming that fewer banks hold equity 
in firms and sit on supervisory boards in Germany than previously supposed41 • 
Similarly, only 3% of value of loans are equity supplied finance. They conclude, 
therefore, that there are few advantages to either banks or firms under this system 
over the Anglo-Saxon one, unless the bank or a majority shareholder is interested 
in and has the ability to fulfil the role of being actively involved in the firm. 
Despite this, it has been argued by Gorton and Schmid (1994) for West Germany, 
that where banks do hold firms' equity, they improve firm performance42• 
Consequently, Edwards (1995) suggests that the role of interested and able 
shareholder is the one IPFs must take over in the Czech Republic for the same 
insider model to work43• However both this author and Kenway and Klvacova 
(1996) question the incentive for and ability of present day IPFs to carry out any 
such a role44• 
In addition to the aspects noted above, the problem of loans is an important one. 
Many banks are reluctant to make out new loans while preferring to charge high 
interest on the loans they do make out. The reason for this behaviour is that the 
interest on loans is the only source of revenue, as has been reported in previous 
chapters. In the German system, the importance of banks making loans available to 
companies is one of the supposed hallmarks of this system. However, such ease of 
access to credit does not occur in the same way in the Czech Republic. What does 
signify a special relationship between banks and IPFs and firms is the reluctance of 
banks to initiate bankruptcy proceedings, compromised by their ownership status 
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through their financial intermediaries, which hold the IPFs. The chances of a bank 
with any such a relationship embarking on inevitably risky firm restructuring is 
unlikely. Thus while also arguing for banks to be given equity, Coffee (1996) has 
pointed out that: 
'Indeed, to the extent that the major banks are also lenders to the major 
industrial firms, their self-interest is not for fierce, cost-cutting competitive 
battles to break out, but for stable, sustained growth and shared markets. In 
particular, because the banks (and their controlled investment companies) 
do not own much equity in the industrial sector, but rather simply advise 
IPFs for a fee, their economic center of gravity is that of risk-averse 
creditor with a distaste for uncertainty and volatility .'45 
Thus the concerns over any bank's ability to carry out such a management function 
in the German context (unless they become an interested and able majority 
stakeholder) mirror the same concerns for the Czech Republic. The important 
difference is that in the German context these concerns refer more to potential 
characteristics or deficiencies of actors within the system. In the Czech Republic, 
however, these concerns centre on the actual inability of the very economic 
structure to deliver the preconditions for such characteristics to emerge. 
Consequently, it would appear that the cross-ownership structure in the Czech 
Republic superficially mimics the Germanic arrangement, but cannot operate in the 
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same way due to the lack of similar economic institutions and institutional fabric 
(including legal provisions and a wider competitive environment). 
However, important similarities do exist between banks and firms in the Czech 
Republic and in advanced market economies with regards to risk-aversion 
behaviour. Sabel (1991) notes from observations of the US and German advanced 
manufacturing sectors that market flexibility of firms is increased by ambiguous 
property delineation and not dissaggregated property as claimed by the property 
rights school46• Kogut et. al. (1992) finds that economic actors engage in 
relationships with other economic organisations (competitors or otherwise) to 
survive in situations of extreme market volatility47• Thus there are great parallels 
with the inherited and adapted patterns of socio-economic networking behaviour 
observed within and between firms and between central and local authorities and 
the enterprise which have prevented either the pure insider or the outsider model of 
corporate governance from operating fully, as if transplanted into a cultural 
vacuum. Stark's findings support this thesis as follows: 
'The existence of parallel structures (however contradictory and 
fragmentary) in these informal and interfirm networks that 'got the job 
done' means that the collapse of the formal structures of the socialist 
regime does not result in an institutional vacuum.Instead, we find the 
persistence of routines and practices, organizational forms and social ties, 
that can become assets, resources, and the basis for credible commitments 
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and co-ordinated actions in the post-socialist period (Bourdieu I 990; 
Nelson and Winter 1982). In short, in place of disorientation, we find the 
metamorphosis of sub rosa organisational forms and the activation of 
pre-existing networks of affiliation.'48 
Evolving Slovakian Corporate Governance Model 
The 'Pure' Insider Model? 
The Anglo-Saxon model envisaged by the first wave of voucher privatisation and 
macro-economic policies across the united Czechoslovakia gave way in Slovalda 
to a subsequent emphasis on Management Buy-Outs through Direct Sales and a 
slower and more erratic macro-ecomomic platform. These policies were successful 
in maintaining stability in the short-term, but also in provoking a potential 
long-term stagnation, yet to be fully realised. 
Schmoegnerova (1993) argues that while the ownership structures initially suggest 
the insider model of institutional stakeholders, the lack of interest and expertise of 
the IPFs in the long-term restructuring of a firm suggests the evolving model falls 
short of the 'pure' insider corporate governance structure usually associated with 
this type (similar to the Czech situation). However, when viewed in the context of 
specifities of the Slovaldan situation; the inherited centre-locality relations, 
Schmoegnerova's analysis is further qualified. 
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The centre-locality dichotomy intersects with political patronage to produce 
privatisation and other economic action according to old and re-intrenched power 
and informational networks. 
Slovakia's achievement of status as a Rechtstaat (state where rule of law 
predominates), and thus ultimately its strength and nature as a liberal democracy 
rest on its ability to properly execute law without political clientelism and faction 
fighting. The fact that privatisation has become a weapon of political clientelism 
resulting in a stop-go process endangering the very legitimacy of new ownership 
and thus a market order would suggest that this problem had not been averted. 
Political patronage also influences choice of personnel in key posts in the media 
and economics and elsewhere. 
Inheritance and On-Going Issues 
Slovakia shares similar characteristics with the Czech Republic inherited from their 
common past and separate experience under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The 
differences, however, are also striking. Previous chapters have enumerated the 
properties of the Slovakian situation influencing current events. 
Firstly from state socialism: 
* general tradition of strong state-weak society relationship 
* relatively young industrial development (beginning in the state socialist period) 
- emphasis on heavy industry, especially steel and armaments; few domestic 
418 
~--------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
traditional success industries (as with Czech glass-making and brewing); little 
indigenous entrepreneurial skill; few domestic entrepreneurial skills 
* uneven and splintered distribution of industrial and regional development 
under state socialism, unreformed post-1989 - most localities dependent on one 
employer; production processes splintered down to small villages; dependence on 
centre for much direction and guidance 
Secondly from the post-1989 transforming system: 
* more gradualist macro-economic change post 1989- slower pace of 
privatisation 
* developing political favouritism/clientelism/patronage with regard to 
privatisation and important media and other positions and regular political faction 
fighting affecting political processes. 
* charismatic and populist but essentially weak political leadership, especially 
in the sphere of economics 
* unresolved financial field - banks yet to be privatised (1997); stock market 
weak, little trading 
* re-intrenchment of old informational and power networks amongst and 
between management, local authorities and the central state apparatus 
* strong unrestructured firms, often comprising whole industrial sectors, with 
old networks still in place, e.g. East Slovakian steelworks 
* intersection of unresolved centre-locality dichotomy with informational 
management and local power networks 
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*corporatisation-large industrial conglomerates moving into the financial sector, 
thus becoming important stakeholders. 
Corporatism, Localities and Clientelsim 
Thus so far, in Slovakia the inherited conditions and present policies have 
produced strong, unrestructured firms, whose management networks, often with 
the ignorance of the shareholders (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development with Slovnaft49), amass political, economic and financial power from 
their bases in the regions. Although it is too soon really to typifY the type of 
corporate governance model evolving in Slovakia, it appears that MBOs and 
ownership of firms and financial institutions by former domestic industrial sectors, 
(which are now evolving into national corporations), are now beginning to take on 
an important role. These phenomena define the Slovak situation as opposed to the 
Czech. 
It is interesting to note that the form of management capitalism of 19th century 
Britain was primarily characterised by ownership management, as compared to the 
German form in the same period, in which the banks and institutions had already 
begun to figure strongly in the ownership and therefore in the market structure. 
Slovakia displays characteristics from both these 19th century systems. Thus, at the 
cost of potential stagnation, Slovakian policies have created domestic owners and 
a national economy based on inherited and re-intrenched old power structures and 
network capital. This has not been purely a by-product of patchy reform and 
inadequate policies as in the Czech Republic, but also a result of the very choice of 
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processes themselves. In Slovakia, the government intervened in the development 
of a market economy for reasons of political self-interest and rising nationalism. 
However, the intervention was characterised by short-term thinking rather than 
strategic choices, resulting in an increasing stagnation and unhealthy 
corporatisation of economic and political life. This has implications for the 
development of civil society, which in turn underpins all spheres of social and 
economic life. The extent to which this economic form will remain productive is 
questionable. 
It is also interesting to note that the centre-locality dichotomy in terms of a lack of 
state legitimacy in the eyes of a disempowered society has also been expressed as a 
reality in more mature market economies such as Italy, where the political and state 
corruption crisis have resulted in a complete breakdown of civil society trust in 
both the political processes and to a certain extent the state apparatus. This is not 
yet the case in Slovakia, although one could argue that the parallels to the former 
states of the Soviet Union and some other East European states is more evident. 
Thus, it could be argued that this situation is not only one of so-called 'transitional' 
economies in the former state socialist states but also one of post-modernity in the 
mature capitalist economies. Indeed Illner (1996) also refers to Putnarn's (1993) 
work on Italy with regard to the relevance of mapping social and cultural 
mechanisms which ensure the transmission of different regional political cultures 
and patterns of civic engagement50• 
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Issues for the Czech and Slovak Republics Arising from Cross-Country 
Comparison 
A number of points arise from the cross-country comparisons: 
First of all, one cannot assume appropriate end models for transforming societies. 
Stark (1997) notes the different patterns of networking in South-East Asia, but 
quite rightly argues that these are valuable for East/Central Europe not as models 
but as comparisons, by which regional features become more distinct51 • 
Second, once a comparison with the Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and the Japanese 
Keiretzu system and other South-East Asian forms has been carried out it becomes 
clear that one cannot draw simplistic conclusions. As a result Stark (1997) argues 
that the answer lies not in 'the right mix of public and private' but in the 'right mix 
of adaptability and accountability' arising from the right 'organization of 
diversity'52• 
Third, the author of this thesis argues that the issue of economic embeddedness or 
the essentially social nature of economic activity and thus networks is as important 
in mature Western societies and South-East Asian societies as it is in post-socialist 
societies. Indeed, Stark (1997) refers with reference to Gereffi (1994), to the 
importance of 'social embeddedness and local organizational innovation of East 
Asian corporate networks'53• 
Fourth, the importance of the ability to regulate economic institutions and actors 
adequately and to provide a system whereby economic actors accept degrees of 
social and institutional trust becomes apparent. 
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Fifth, this author argues that the conception of civil society holds a key to this last 
point as reflected in the on-going differences of opinion between President Have! 
(representing an emphasis on aspects of 'positive freedom' and the importance of 
civil society) and Prime Minister Klaus (representing the 'negative freedom' 
emphasis of the neo-classical economic approach) on the approaches to political 
involvement of citizens54• As Klaus's reforms now come under a new critical 
approach the processes of an emerging political and socio-economic culture 
continue to be debated 55• 
Sixth, on the positive side, however difficult the evolution of such a model may be, 
both the Czech and Slovak Republics have the unique opportunity to develop their 
own forms of business and legal practice in accordance with their specific historic 
experience and cultural setting. This is not the case in "eastern" Germany, which 
has additional implications for the stakeholder model. Nuti (1996) argues that since 
elements have appeared in transforming economies which should not be there, 
'post-communist mutations', there is a chance that these forms may develop 
negatively, i.e. descent into mafiya corruption and nomenklatura privatisation, or 
may develop a better form of market economy, considering the concessions made 
to employees (in the form of shares), achieving greater economic democracy56• 
This is a rather optimistic view, but does make the point that the transformation of 
post -communist economies brings into relief the discrepancies in the advanced 
capitalist market systems advocating change. 
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Diversity or Choices of Freedom ; the reassertion of theories of economic 
embeddedness 
Systems and cultures ansmg from choices of freedom have been explored in 
relation to market versus command economies in Chapter One of this thesis. The 
reality of choices of freedom is still however relevant to transforming societies in 
two ways: firstly in relation to the positive cultural inheritance of 'freedom to' 
(referred to by Illner (1996) as the 'heritage of "real socialist" society'), and 
therefore a strong awareness of the issue; and secondly and subsequently in 
relation to the present choices of social and economic transformation and 
behaviour57• The 'real socialist' society is the culturally accepted form of state 
socialism, which sought to legitimise its authoritarian political control by means of 
satisfying positive or economic freedom. Although it did not succeed entirely in 
this respect, where it did achieve equality of economic provision, this became 
embedded culturally as a good and necessary form of real socialism. Similarly, 
writers assuming transition to a liberal democratic system , such as Dahrendorf 
(1990) and Habermas (1990), ignore this potential choice offreedoms, and thus by 
implication, choice of corporate governance systems, by emphasising the deviation 
from the 'norm' by the socialist experiment. Thus Dahrendorf (1990) describes the 
legacy of state socialism as the 'long and tragic historical deviation which had 
begun in 1917', and Habermas (1990) refers to the events of 1989 as 'rectifying 
revolutions'58• 
The reality of choice of freedom reinforces the argument of economic 
embeddedness (Polanyi 1944). Granovetter's (1985) further development of this 
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principle into the concept of the 'on-going phenomena' resulting from the interplay 
of inherited internalised behavioural patterns and existing external conditions, e.g. 
of economic change, is also highly significant for transforming economies. In this 
context 'on-going phenomena' are similarly located in the interplay between past 
and present behaviour and conditions in a multi-sphere context, that is in the 
economic, political, social and cultural spheres (or capitals as Bourdieu might call 
them). It is within this context of inheritance, present radically changing conditions 
and on-going phenomena that organisational reform and the evolution of a 
corporate governance system must be located. Five important issues arise from this 
contextualisation. 
Firstly, the inability of the simplistic neo-classical and usually Western inspired 
models and assessments of transition such as those ofLipton and Sachs (1990) and 
(1991), Friedman (1990), Kornai (1990a), (1992) and (1993) (although his 1997 
work reassesses these views), the IMF and the World Bank to take into 
consideration the interplay of the economic, political, social and cultural, as well as 
the role of inheritance, present conditions and ongoing phenomena59• Thus the 
economic models applied were inappropriate to the task in hand. Thus Casson 
writes: 
'Western experts advising East European countries on the transition to a 
market economy face an embarrassing problem: namely, that there is no 
adequate economic theory of institutions on which to base their policy 
recommendations. As a result, the advice given by Western economic 
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experts stresses those aspects of the economic system which can be 
understood using the limited range of concepts employed by conventional 
economic theory .'60 
Where an acknowledgement is made in the neo-classical literature of other 
influences, there is no attempt to integrate them into economic policy advice 
(Lipton and Sachs 1991), except to suggest that boards of directors should control 
management and that those boards should be made up of pension fund, bank and 
investment trust representatives61 • No questions are raised as to the shortcomings of 
this suggestion, i.e. lack of management skills and experience, lack of investors' 
incentive to monitor for long-term restructuring etc .. Thus the recommendations 
barely reach the level of the institutional economic approach. Illner (1996) has 
called this the 'economic fallacy' of transition. However, the institutional economic 
approach has a similar weakness, in that it emphasises exclusively the importance 
of changing institutions in order to effect any real economic change. This ignores 
issues of 'on-going', that is adaptive socio-economic behaviour of actors and their 
practices in the firm and its environment, e.g. network capital, inter-firm networks, 
centre-locality networks, etc. This Illner refers to as the 'institutional fallacy'. 
Illner also raises the question of 'voluntaristic fallacy' whereby it is believed that 
'the successes and failures of the post-communist transformation depend 
predominantly on the configuration, behaviour and strategies of political actors, 
political parties and movements, the leading politicians - the Havels and Walesas, 
foreign political and economic institutions - NATO, the European Union, the 
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World Bank, the IMF, foreign capital, the conspiracies of the former nomenklatura, 
Mafias, ethnic minorities etc.'62• This thesis does not cover the political aspects of 
change in any great detail although it does refer to its importance. 
I would like to add to this 'organisational theory fallacy', which although referred 
to by Illner in the above in terms of organisational factors, I do not believe covers 
the economic organisational area adequately. Here I would include writers such as 
Jone Pearce . At the micro-level Pearce (1993) argues that Western organisational 
change models are more applicable to post-Communist enterprise organisational 
change in Eastern Europe than the prescribed Western economic models63• 
However, this approach has led to claims that there is more resistance to change in 
stable Western economic organisations, where employees can use their residual 
power base as a block, than in Hungarian organisations where all is in flux, and 
thus no power base remains unchallenged64• From the evidence of this thesis, it 
would appear that in fact firm and local power networks have had adequate 
opportunity in the largely unregulated environment of East/Central Europe and the 
former Soviet Union to adapt and profit from various economic strategies and to 
resist organisational change, whether they be old static networks or reinvented 
professional ones. Zeleny (1993) notes similar mistakes in attempts by 
organisational theorists and practitioners under past systems to import models65 • 
Thus, while accepting that many capitalist and state socialist organisational forms 
were more similar than different, the environment for those organisational forms 
were completely different. Thus socialist theorists, who under the past regime 
attempted to run the country as General Motors Co., a huge and successful 
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corporation, failed because although 'General Motors was run as a command 
economy according to such principles', the society in which it operated was not66• 
Therefore, it can be argued that while the purely neo-classical economic approach 
resting on Hayek's arguments for an unfettered market free of state interference (as 
advocated from 'Harvard, from IMF, and from the experience of Bolivia'67), and 
control can be rejected as the panacea to post-Communist societies undergoing 
economic transformation, so too can the micro-level theory of organisational 
change which seeks to define itself within a functional understanding of 
organisational change separated from the surrounding social, cultural and political 
environment. 
All the above points are rejected as fallacies when promoted as the sole explanation 
and solution to transformation. However, they are all accepted as factors which 
combine to influence transformation. How are they to be organised under an 
integrated approach to analyse and promote opportunities for transformation? I 
suggest here the approach which I define as 'theories of progress', after Sztompka's 
(I 990) title68• Theories of progress 
acknowledge the interplay of inheritance from the past which in turn fuel the 
on-going phenomena, or an adaptive behaviour of old socio-economic actors and 
practices at micro-level (Myant [1993], [1997], Begg and Portes [1992], 
McDermott [1994], etc)69• In theories of progress (Sabel [1991], Grabher and Stark 
[1997], and Stark [1997]), the corporate governance model relies on the state of the 
inherited environment in which it must take root7°. Therefore any economic system 
is embedded in society and social processes (Polanyi [1944]). In a situation of 
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system transformation this relationship of embeddedness is doubly emphasised due 
to the influence firstly of inherited socio-economic, political and cultural practices 
from the previous regime and secondly the process of a newly evolving system of 
rapidly changing paradigms in the above areas and thirdly on-going behavioural 
and cultural practices. The first two factors fuel the on-going phenomena (or 
adaptive behaviour). Unlike gradual transformation of a society, where only certain 
aspects of certain areas may be evolving at any one time, in system transformation 
all areas are simultaneously under pressure to change. Thus the very dynamism of 
the process may cause completely new, and radically different, practices to be 
introduced while certain inherited practices go unchallenged (Sztompka [1990], 
Nuti [1996])71 • 
The importance of the latter sociological and cultural factors and their parallel 
development and intrinsic connectedness to the socio-economic and political 
changes have been highlighted by many sociologists and philosophers: Grabher 
(1997), Illner (1996), Machonin (1992), Musil (1992) and (1993), Offe (1991), 
Sabel (1991), Stark (1997), Sztompka (1993) and (1996), van Zon (1994), etc72• 
However, Stzompka and Illner offer perhaps the most succinct view of the 
processes involved, and the closest to this author's findings and indeed from a 
East/Central European (Polish and Czech respectively) perspective. Sztompka 
(1990) has produced a diagrammatic description of sociological and cultural 
processes influencing progress. He asserts that any existing state of society is only 
a phase of a process, a product of past operation (according to historical tradition) 
and a preconditipn for future operation. However, Sztompka also refers to an 
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essential constitution of society which is the human individual with the potential 
ability to be reflective and self-conscious. Thus, issues of freedom and 
self-trandscendence forms the core , but not the exclusive part, of this process. In 
this conception neither the economy nor politics holds sway. Rather progress or 
otherwise is a synthesis of all these elements. The findings of this thesis both at 
organisational and theoretical levels have promoted the author's argument for a 
participative and overt design of corporate governance structures to promote 
change. However, the one of the biggest hurdles to the effective design and 
implementation of appropriate corporate governance models in East/Central 
Europe and the former states of the Soviet Union is the often absent or at least 
compromised issues of social and institutional trust and the difficulty of providing 
for this in the form of an economic programme73• This trust can be interpreted as 
the awareness of, and willingness to honour, individual and group responsibility to 
ethical practise in the various situations of economic and social engagemenf4 • 
Indeed Sztompka refers to this as a lack of'civilizational competence075 • 
Under the former context of institutional trust can be listed situations of economic 
and administrative actors, managers and employees. Under the later context of 
social trust can be listed social and political activity aimed at engaging in and 
effecting change, i.e. civil society. 
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Source: Sztompka, Piotr (1990) Rethinking Progress Movements. forces and lrteas at 
the Endoftbe Twentieth Centurv. Figure 12.4, p.254 
Thus a new corporate governance model for each of the countries under discussion 
cannot be reduced to a mimicking of Western model, already in decline, but must 
be part of an organic, participative process. Within this two important constituents 
must be taken into account, participative economic organisation and 
decentralisation from the centre to the regions regarding economic reform and 
privatisation. It is would be necessary for this to occur within a context of overt 
and officially regulated involvement of employees, managers, citizens and local 
regions. Similarly Zeleny (I 993) called for a transition to capitalism to occur along 
the diagonal line of his conception of the relationship of ownership to control; that 
is from socialism (anonymity), characterised by state ownership and control, to 
capitalism (public), where control rests with public corporations and ownership 
rests with the public (shareholders), to capitalism (private), where control resides 
with private corporations and ownership resides with the private sphere 
(employees)"6• This, he claims, avoids the problems and failures of other 
combinations of ownership and control: for example 'Perestroika ('as-if 
pseudo-ownership), resulting from public corporations holding control and the 
state retaining ownership; or 'participation with no responsibility' (as in the 
Yugoslav experience), resulting from control resting with private corporations and 
the state retaining ownership; or Fascism (state holdings), where the state controls 
and the public (shareholders) own; or Nazism (state dictate), where control rests 
with the state and ownership with the private sphere (employees)"7• Thus Zeleny 
(I 993) also argues for decentralised regional and local economic reform and 
privatisation with rigorous demonopolisation along with other measures7&. 
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All views which fall into the category of 'theories of progress' provide a richer 
perspective from which to view the transformations in East/Central Europe and 
overcomes the problems with what has been accepted as the standard type of 
economics but which is in fact the neo-classical type. 
In other words the choice for future development is not a choice between Marx or 
Adam Smith's theses. It must include the understanding of inheritance from the 
past, which Illner refers to as follows: 
'The "lost-child-returning-home" model of post-Communist transformation 
is simplistic and ahistorical: we hypothesise that irrespective ofthe 
programmatic intentions of the transformation's designers -
politicians and intellectuals, the societies that are developing in Eastern 
and Central Europe on the ruins of the Communist regime will not just 
become late-arrivals to the family of the Western liberal capitalist states 
and will not be passive copies of some of them. Nor will they be 
reproductions of what Eastern and Central European societies used to be 
before the Communist takeover or before World War u.m 
It is in this sense that cultural inheritance forms the bedrock of the contextual 
paradigm for economic, political, social and cultural transition. It is for this reason, 
as Grabher and Stark (1997) point out, that economic sociologists and legal 
scholars study East Asian economies from a network approach80• According to 
Redding and Whitley (1990:79), the: 
433 
'Anglo-Saxon conceptions of the legally bounded firm as the basic unit of 
economic action are inadequate to explain the economic actions and 
structure of chaebol and Chinese family businesses, both of which have 
complex extra-firm linkages influencing decision making'.81 
If one subsequently accepts this view of the theories of progress approach in 
East/Central Europe, then the interpretation of data from the field becomes 
immediately richer. Thus Jones (1993) argues for a return to 'diversity' of 
distinctive national developments of the new administrative systems as in other 
areas of reform in these societies82• Grabher and Stark (1997) also refer to 
diverisity when talking about enterprise restructuring and corporate governance 
and economic activity in East/Central Europe83• If this approach is taken, the level 
of democratic functioning and the processes of civil society need to be properly 
appreciated in order to create the best environment for a new corporate governance 
model at organisational level. Similar issues need to be considered for Western 
Europe and other mature market systems. 
This, in turn, provokes questions for societies of Western Europe and North 
America. Charles Sabel (1991) has written about the problem of our old language 
of organisational and social and economic change not being adequate to the task of 
describing economic transformation (specifically) in capitalist systems. He argues 
that the development of new vocabulary needs to take place away from the old 
terms of proletarianism. This is because the economic system previously exploited 
citizens, but now excludes them from it84• Also he claims that in volatile Western 
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markets, a new form of organisation which learns to adapt rapidly from declining 
to new markets, rather than diversify into unrelated activities to avoid danger, is 
developing and this requires a questioning of the relationship between the 
corporate and local society. However: 
'The precondition of this strategy is increased internal flexibility, and its 
consequence is the opening ofthe borders between corporations and 
between the economy and local society. But flexibility and openness create 
new problems of coordination .... responses to these vulnerabilities are 
consistent with the reintergration of conception and execution and depend 
on overcoming the distinction- traditional in theories of organization of the 
firm-between learning and monitoring or trust and control.'85 
If in the Czech and Slovak Republics ownership-control responsibilities are unclear 
and the role of owners, managers, employees, and local-central government 
organisations are in flux and continue to be undefined and unplanned for, then the 
future, given the above global scenario, is even more unclear. 
What becomes pertinent to both mature market economies, transforming market 
economies and developing economies in the global context of state divestment of 
economic power to multi-national corporations are issues of democratisation and 
regulation. What happens when at the locality level, economic disempowerment 
(i.e. unemployment and inability to affect decisions influencing the locality) 
becomes a feature across the globe. 
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What will develop in East/Central Europe or indeed in the former Soviet Union is 
still not clear but the outcomes will not only be influenced by the global economy 
but also by the national characteristics outlined above. Ultimately Polanyi's (1944) 
thesis, as also developed and argued by Granovetter (1985) offer the best approach 
of analysis; one of economic embeddedness which allows an open analysis of 
economic preconditions, sociological processes and national-cultural influences. 
The Future or A Postscript 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Two 'holes' of knowledge appear from this research which are mirrored and 
referred to in other works specifically dealing with transformation in East/Central 
Europe and the former states of the Soviet Union, and more theoretical works 
dealing with the issue of economic embeddedness and the sociology of economic 
Iife86• 
Sociology of Economic Life in East/Central Europe and Generally 
* The difference between networks in post-communist (inherited from an 
administrative system of communist economy) and capitalism requires further 
work. Although differentiation of networks between the two is real, excessive 
resort to this differentiation without appreciation of the role of networks in 
capitalist societies gives rise to the problem experienced at the beginning of the 
transformations in East/Central Europe of simplistic models being recommended 
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without due understanding of institutional economics, and the sociological 
practices of economic life. 
* Within this the roles of employees and local citizenry as supposedly 'passive' 
networks in organisational change need to be assessed. 
* The role of owners in, and the possibility for, effective strategic management 
arising from secondary privatisation in the Czech Republic. 
* The role of local government as a mediating institution between centre and 
locality, enterprises, citizenry and power networks. 
Firstly, assessing the role and nature of network capital, in advanced, as well as 
transforming and developing economies, would feed usefully into organisational 
and economic theory approaches enabling a more accurate and contextualised 
view. An example of this in the transforming context would be a comparison 
between East and West German entrepreneurs and enterprises in post 1989 for a 
window of a few years until the culture gap or firms closed. 
Secondly, with regards to the important role of local government. This author 
would argue on the basis of the present research for a view of local government as 
being active in the process. The question of direction and orientation, as well as 
motivation for any action, requires in-depth research into linkages between local, 
central government and a set number of firms. 
Thirdly, a question with regard to the participatory role or otherwise of employees 
in restructuring of enterprises needs to be answered. This is particularly important 
with regard to the true effect of restructuring at enterprise level. The role and 
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manner of dealing with employees at the 'bottom' of the pyramid in terms of 
information, participatory management, discipline in production or otherwise. 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic, because of similarities and differences, would 
make a very good comparison for such a study. Both these sets of actors form part 
of the corporate governance structure. 
Fourthly, more monitoring of corporate governance evolution and the role of 
owners and managers within any such development, and the effect of secondary 
privatisation in the Czech Republic and industrial ownership in Slovakia. 
Theoretical Issues 
* Arising from the comparison of networks it would be useful to carry out an 
investigation into the degrees and styles of economic embeddedness in a social or 
cultural reality in a mature market economy and a transforming economy and a 
traditional market economy, e.g. the North African souk. Granovetter has already 
attempted the latter with regards to Malaysian business and market practices and 
the 'Entrepreneurship and African Cultures Research Programme Workshop' 
(1993-1994) has highlighted the rational nature of economic activity for 
neo-classical economists versus the relational nature for Africans87 • Indeed von 
Zon (1994) notes the importance of certain aspects of 'Third World economies' 
experience for East/Central Europe (especially the deindustrialisation of Argentina 
and the experience of Mexico, and the experience generally of third world 
countries and their relationship with the IMF), rather than the Western European 
and North American models88• 
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A cross-cultural comparison may throw into relief the networks active in mature 
market economies. Similarly the importance and constellation of centre-locality 
relationships in all of the above societies need to be explored. The increasing 
power of multinationals vis-a-vis national governments and locality 
self-determination are as relevant, if not more so, in mature market economies as 
elsewhere. 
It is interesting to note here that in relation to the issues of networks and economic 
embeddedness, Polanyi (1944) has referred to the three basic principles influencing 
the consciousness of Western man/woman and thus influencing our conception of 
society's relationship to the economy89• These three principles are as follows: 
knowledge of death, knowledge of freedom, and knowledge of society. The first he 
remarks comes from the Old Testament story, according to Jewish legend; the 
second, the idea of the unique individuality of each person, comes from the 
teachings of Jesus, according to the Gospels; and the third, the awareness of the 
importance of society comes from Robert Owen, industrialist, social reformer and 
utopian. Owen points to the fact that the Gospels ignored the reality of society and 
that the potential for individual freedom cannot be realised in this form in a modern 
complex society unless it takes place in a truly co-operative commonwealth. 
In other words the cultural as well as the social context provide the bedrock for 
economic and political activity in which human beings locate themselves. The 
experience of East/Central Europe has throwri into question the very economic 
systems that seemed to have superseded it (i.e. those of Western Europe), and 
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emphasised the complex nature of change. The claims of the end of history have 
begun to be replaced by claims of the rebirth of history. The rapid evolution of 
complex modem society and its socio-economic and political forms questions the 
provision of economic and ultimately political freedoms and how these are 
arranged and expressed. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Translation ofKunze in Chapter One 
'Seven Year Old' 
In each hand he holds a revolver, a toy machine gun hangs from his chest. 
"What does your mother say about all ofthese weapons?" 
"Well she bought me them." 
"What for?" 
"Against the baddies." 
"And who is good?" 
"Lenin." 
"Lenin. Who is Lenin?" 
He thinks hard but he does not know what to answer. 
"Don't you know who Lenin is?" 
"The Sergeant." 
KUNZE, RAINER (1978). Die Wunderbaren Jahre. Fisher Taschenbuch Verlag. 
Appendix2 
Government Wage Bands in Dr"evode"lny' (1/8/93) 
Wage Band Remuneration Position Comment 
I 2.500KC Technical and Unskilled workers (I or 2), Porters (I), 
(per month) Administrative maintenance personnel (2). 
Workers 
2 2.800KC As above As above 
(per month) 
3 3.220KC Secretarial and e.g. drivers, machine operators, wood workers etc. 
(per month) skilled workers 
4 3.680KC Junior accotmtants Junior accountants are those who can work only 
(per month) with supervision. 
5 4.140KC Senior Accotmtant Designers covered here are those who are 
(per month) and some instructed 
designers. 
6 4.600KC Mistr (masters) Planners are responsible for costing and drawing up the 
(per month) supervisors, fmancial side of a proJ'ect. Creative designers are those 
planners and working alone. 
Creative designers. 
7 5.060 KC Workshop Workshops with up to 50 employees. 
(per month) managers, 
technologists, 
chief designers and 
the Commercial 
department. 
8 5.520 KC Workshop Workshops with over 50 employees. 
(per month) managers 
Source: OriginalS. Bygate 512196. Drawn from interview data in DrAevodeAJny~ 
Appendix3 
Questionnaire in Czech 
IPEE Buckinghamshire College Research Questionnaire Page 1 
Nazory pracovniku v ceske Republice 
==-==------=-========="Doktorandsky Vyzkumny Projekt: Dotaznik~========================~ 
UDAJE 0 VASEM PODNIKU 
.k se jmenuje podnik, pro ktery 
'racujete? 
an Bygate 
Q2. Ozna~te, prosim, poli~ko, ktere 
nejp~esn~ji vystihuje oddeleni, ve kterem 
pracujete? 
(Mu~ete ozna~it i vice poli~ek). 
Nakupni a zasobovaci odd~leni 
Osobni odd~leni 
Odd~leni marketingu 
Odd~leni ~ozu a dovozu 
Odd~leni vyroby 
/ D 
o. odbytu a distribuce vyrobku 
Finan~ni/ekonomicke/u~etni odd. 
Pravni odd~leni 
Odd~leni vyzkumu a v~oje 
V V t Oddeleni informacnich systemu 
Generalni ~editelstvi 
Sekretariat 
.J v Sluzby(napr. stravovani,doprava) 
,. / Q3. OSOBNI UDAJE 
Jste ••• ? 
Jine 
Nelze hodnotit 
Zen a 
V 
muz 
SNAP 
SNEMPEE Buckinghamshire College Research Questionnaire Page 
Nazory pracovniku v Ceske Republice 
F--=-=-===-=--==========~Doktorandsky Vyzkumny Projekt: Dotaznik~===================-­
V Q4. VEK 
Je vam ... ? 
\1 ./ 
16-18 
19-25 
26-35 
36-40 
41-55 
56-60 
nad 60 
let 
let 
let 
let 
let 
let 
let 
Q5. VASE POSTAVENI V PODNIKU 
, v 
Jaky typ zarnestnani zastavate v podniku? 
(Mu~ete ozna~it i vice poli~ek). 
u~eclnicke 
nianu&lni 
manualni odborne 
sluiby (napE.stravovani) 
'fidici (mistr) 
veclouci (odd~leni a vys~i) 
Siobhan Bygate 
/ , 
vyzkum a vyvoj 
jine 
Q6. Jake postaveni zaujimate v odd~leni 
nebo podniku? 
zam¥stnanec 
pracovnik s me~i~nim platern 
mistr 
vedouci odd~leni 
~editel odboru nebo ustavu 
generalni l'ec!itel 
jine 
Q7. Kolik let pracujete v tornto poclniku? 
0-2 roky 
3-5 let 
6-10 let 
ll-20 let 
vice ne~ 20 let 
QS. Kolik hodin ~ini va~e normalni 
tydenni pracovni cloba? 
0-10 hoc!. 
11-20 hoc!. 
21-30 hoc!. 
31-40 hoc!. 
41-50 hod. 
51-60 hoc!. 
vice 
SN 
IPEE 
I 
Buckinghamshire College Research Questionnaire 
Nazory pracovniku v Ceske Republics 
Page 3 
~-----=============~Doktorandsky Vyzkumny Projekt: Dotaznik~==============-=========~ 
1. Jak lze charakterizovat val(i 
lou~asnou pracovni dobu? 
jako praci na plny uvazek 
\1 " ' jako praci na castecny uvazek 
d!J·,od8. 
jako placenou dovolenou 
jako praci ve zkracenem pracovni~ t"jch~ 
jk vv •. 1 .,. a o prescasovou pr .. cl. +_.. p ny 
" vllc:l?.el:. jako jiny typ prace 
/ "V / V Jaky je Vas hruby vydelek? 
0-3000 Kc 
3001-6000 ICe 
6001-9000 I<c 
9001-12000 I<c 
12001-15000 I<c 
15001-16000 Kc 
vice ne'f 16000 Kc 
nechcete uvest 
V 
• Kolik vam bylo let, kdyz jste 
on~il ¥adne denni studiurn? 
16-19 let 
20-25 let 
26-30 let 
vice 
n Bygate 
Q12. \1 Jste vyucen v oboru? 
ano 
ne 
Q13. Kde jste se vyu~il? 
v podniku, v n~mt pracujete 
v jinem podniku 
v odborne ~kole (u~ili~ti) 
v odborne skole(ucilisti). a v 
pcd/1 d<i.l 
0. / 0 b Jl.nym zpuso em 
Ql4. Ziskal jste kvalifikaci mistra? 
ne 
a no 
Q15. Absolvoval jste universitu? 
ano D 
ne~ 
SNAP 
SNEMPEE Buckinghamshire College Research Questionnaire Page ~ 
Nazory pracovniku v Cesk~ Republice 
rr----------=-===========~Doktorandsky Vyzkumny Projekt: Dotaznikb-====================== 
Ql6. Jste-li vedoucim odd~leni, odboru 
(ustavu) nebo generalnim ~editelem, 
nastaly u vas od r. 1989 nasledujici 
.., 
~meny? 
(MJfete ozna~it i vice poli~ek). 
zml!>'na podniku 
zV1f~eni zodpov~dnosti 
v~t~i pracovni uspokojeni 
vy~~i postaveni v podniku 
vy~~i spole~ensk~ postaveni 
vy~~i platov~ za~azeni 
v~t~i rozdily v platech 
~adn~ z t~chto zm~n 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
Ql7. Pfed r.l989 jste byl obcanem ••• ? 
v cesk~ republiky 
Slovensk~ republiky 
jin~ho statu 
nelze hodnotit 
Q18. Pat~ite k etnicke, nabo~ensk~ nebo 
jazykov~ men~in~? 
ano D 
ne~ 
Siobhan Bygate 
Ql9. / v v UDAJE 0 VASEM PODNIKU/SPOLECNOSTI 
Je va¥ podnik ••• ? 
neprivatizovanY 
gaste~n~ privatizovan{ 
v /' plne privatizovany 
V , 
zrizeny po r.l989 
Q20. Kdo je vlastnikem va~eho podniku? 
Fond narodniho majetku 
Soukromy vlastnik 
ob a 
nelze hodnotit 
Q2l. V jak~m typu soukrom~ho vlastnictvi 
j~yas podnik? 
(Muzete ozna~it i vice poli~ek). 
V / V V, .,; .,. 
cesky vets~novy pod~l 
1 k / o/ V • / d•l s ovens y vets~novy po ~ 
~eske soukrom~ vlastnictvi 
slovensk~ soukrom~ vlastnictvi 
zahrani~ni soukrome vlastnictvi 
dr!titel~ 
banka 
privatiza~ni fond 
• V G ~nvesticnich kuponu 
(PI'<O"< ) 
jine 
s 
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Vyzkumny Projekt: Dotazntk~======================~ 
Q24. Ve kterem odd~lent jste pracoval 
tcoval jste v tomto podniku pred r.l989? 
ne 
a no 
nelze hodnotit 
I, Jestli~e jste pracoval v tomto 
•dniku i p~ed r.l989, vykonaval jste 
•hdy stejnou praci? 
a no 
ne 
an Bygate 
pred r.l989? 
(M&tete ozna~it i vice poli~ek). 
zasobovaci a nakupni 
osobni 
odd~leni marketingu 
odd~leni ~ozu a dovozu 
oddeleni vyroby 
oddeleni odbytu a distJ,ibuce ~ robio.o;) 
finan~ni/ekonomicke 
pravni 
odd~leni vyVoje a vy~kumu 
odd~leni informacnich system~ 
generalni reditelstvi 
sekretariat 
"' sluzby 
jine 
nelze hodnotit 
Q25.v Jake postaveni jste zastaval v tomto 
oddeleni p~ed r.l989? 
zaml>stnanec 
zam~stnanec s mesictm platem 
mistr 
vedouct odd~leni 
teditel odboru/ustavu 
generalni reditel 
jine 
SNAP 
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/ V / 
Q26. UDAJE 0 ZAMESTNANECKYCH ORGANIZACICH 
Existuje ve Va~em podniku odborova 
organizace? 
ne 
a no 
Q27. Jste ~lenem odborove organizaee? 
a no 
ne 
nelze hodnotit 
v V ~ Q28. Je v soucasne dobe na vasem 
pracovi~ti aktivni stejna odborova 
organizace jako pred r.l989? 
(Uveci'te prosim jeji jmeno, na leve strane 
t~to str&nky~ at uZ je p&·,Podn! tlebo n~va.) 
ne 
a no 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
Q29. za~tupuje v sou~asne dobe va~i 
odborovou organizaci stejna osoba jako 
p:r'ed r.l989? 
a no 
ne 
nelze hodnotit 
Siobhan Bygate 
Q30. / V UDAJE 0 MOZNOSTECH KOMUNIKACE 
r V Radim se se svym predstavitelem odborove 
organizace ••• 
v 
denne 
v / / kazdy tyden 
v ' J kazdy mesic 
dvakrat za rok 
jednou za rok 
men~ ne~ jednou za rok 
nikdy 
nevirn 
nelze hodnotit 
Q3l. Radim se se zastupcem odbort nebo 
zamestnanc~ 0 ot&zk&ch •.. 
{ A.;1el~ 
Oznac<t i vice poli~ek) 
zdravi a bezpe~nosti pr&ce 
mezd 
V V ,.. V 0 propousten~ zamestnancu 
vedeni podniku 
kontroly rizeni prace 
uzavfeni podniku 
v pracovni naplne 
~ jinych 
V ' zadnych 
nelze hodnotit 
PEE Buckinghamshire College Research 'Questionnaire Page 7 
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2. Mate vedouciho linky nebo mistra? 
ne 
a no 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
3. Do;lo od r.l989 ke zm~ne vedouciho 
inky nebo mistra? 
a no 
ne 
nevirn 
nelze hodnotit 
4. S vedoucim linky nebo mistrem se 
adim ••• 
an Bygate 
denne 
/ V 
tydne 
V .. v V 
meeJ.cne 
dvakrat za rok 
jednou za rok 
mene ne~ jednou za rok 
nikdy 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
Q35. S vedoucim linky se radim o 
nasledujicich zale~itostech ••• 
IAJ2dc Ozna~•t i vice policek) 
pracovnich zalezitostech 
uzavreni podniku 
mzdach 
propou~teni zam~stnancU 
zdravi a bezpecnosti prace 
vedeni podniku 
kontrole prace 
' jinych 
~zadnych z vy~e uvedenych 
nelze hodnotit 
v Q36. ZMENY V PODNIKU 
Zmenili se od r. 1989 reditele odbor~ 
{ustavti)? 
vSichni 
V V V 
vetsina tj. pres 60% 
n~kteri, tj. 30-60% 
n~kolik, tj. men~ nez 30% 
'£adnych 
nevirn 
nelze hodnotit 
SNAP 
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" """ c Q37. Doslo po r.l989 k vymene pracovniku 
generllniho ~editelstvi? 
vS'ech 
vet~iny, tj. pfes 60\ 
nekter~h. tj. 30-60\ 
n~kolika, tj. men~ ne~ 30\ 
Q3S. Po r.l989 
~ v 
vyznamne zmeny 
/ 
zadnych 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
v 
vedeni neprovedlo zadne 
V mem pracovn1m procesu ..• 
naprosto soulasim 
souhlasirn 
nenastala zadua 7rn~na 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasirn 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
Q39. ve srovnlni s podminkarni p~ed r.l989 
jsem nyni formllne kontrolovan 
V prav idelnej i. 
naprosto souhlasirn 
souhlasirn 
v V 
nenastala zadua zrnena 
nesouhlasirn 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
ne vim 
nelze honotit 
Siobhan Bygate 
Q40. Ve srovnani s podrninkami pred r.l989 
jsern nyni neformalne kontrolovan 
pravideln'~ji. 
naprosto souhlasirn 
souhlasirn 
nenastala 'Zadu§. zm~na 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
nevim 
nelze honotit 
Q41. ve srovnani s podrninkarni pred r.1989 
jsern nyni mene pravidelne kontrolovan 
pokud se ty~e dodr~ovani pracovni doby, 
V v jako napr. pozdni prichody do prace, 
V v predcasne odchody z prace atd. 
naprosto acuhlasim 
souhlasirn 
nenastala Zactua zmena 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
SN1 
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I 
12. Mate vedouciho linky nebo mistra? 
I 
ne 
a no 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
3. Do~lo od r.l989 ke zmene vedouciho 
inky nebo mistra? 
a no 
ne 
ne vim 
nelze hodnotit 
4. s vedoucim linky nebo mistrem se 
adim ••• 
denn~ 
/ " tydne 
V ..,\1 V 
mes1.cne 
dvakrat za rok 
jednou za rok 
mene ne~ jednou za rok 
nikdy 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
an Bygate 
Q35. s vedoucim linky se radim o 
nasledujicich zale~itostech ••• 
(,11J2 t~ Ozna~ ,( i vice poli.cek) 
pracovn1ch zale~itoetech 
uzavreni podniku 
mzdach 
V v" V 4< propousten1 zamestnancu 
zdravi a bezpe~noeti prace 
vedeni podniku 
kontrole pr&ce 
' jinych 
.... "" ..V / 
z&dnych z vyse uvedenych 
nelze hodnotit 
" Q36. ZMENY V PODNIKU 
Zmenili se od r. 1989 reditele odbor~ 
(ustavu)? 
v~ichni 
v~tSina tj. pres 60% 
" " nekteri, tj. 30-60% 
nekolik, tj. men~ nez 30% 
z&dn[ch 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
SNAP 
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2. Ve srovnAni s podminkami p~ed r.l989 
sem ~ni pravidelneji kontrolovan pokud 
e tyce nedostate~ne kvality prace nebo 
luZ'eb .. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nenastala ~adua zrn~na 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
Ve srovnani s podminkami p~ed r.l989 
ern ~ni rnene pravideln~ kontrolovan pro 
atny vztah k praci. 
naprosto souhlasirn 
souhlasim 
nenastala ~Adua zrn~na 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasirn 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
n Bygate 
Q44. Ve srovnani s podminkami p~ed r.l989 
jsern nyni pravideln~ji kontrolovan z 
j inych df:.vod~. 
naprosto souhlasirn 
souhlasirn 
nenastala %&du& zmena 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
v _.. Q45. VASE NAZORY 
Mim d~v~ru ve sve odborove/zam~stnanecke 
pr:edstavitele. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
Q46. Mam d~v~ru k vedoucirnu 
linky /rnistrov i. 
naprosto souhlasirn 
souhlasim 
nesouhlasirn 
naprosto nesuhlasirn 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
SNAP 
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047. Mam dtveru ve schopnosti vedoucich 
oddeleni, ~editele odbor~ a generalniho 
reditele. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesuhlasim 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
Q48. Pozoruji zm~nu ve zptsobu ~izeni me 
prace po r.l989. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nenastala ~actua zm~na 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto souhlasim 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
Q49. Domnivam se, ie po r.l9B9 se vztahy 
s vedoucim oddeleni zlep~ily. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nenastala ~!dua zm~na 
nesouhlasim 
naproeto nesouhlasim 
Siobhan Bygate 
QSO. Oomnivam se, ~e k zlep~eni vztahu s 
vedoucim oddeleni do~lo v nasledujicich 
oblastech... C-'IJ[~e 
oznacf,t i vice policek). 
v~tSi moZnost kontaktu 
lepsi kontrola 
lep~i rozhodovani 
lep~i komunikace 
lep~i fe~eni pracovnich problemu 
lepsi jednani s lidmi 
v ~adnem ohledu 
nevirn 
nelze liodnotit 
QSl. Domnivam se, ze vztahy s generalnim 
~editelstvim se pc r.l989 zhor~ily. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nenastala ~adua zm~na 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
s 
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2. Domnivam se, ~e vztahy s generalnim 
editelem se zlepsily pokud jde o •••• (-'4-:i~ 
znac;.t, i vice policek). 
zlep~enou mo~nost kontaktu 
v 
zlepseni odborneho vedeni 
V lepsi kvalitu rozhodovani 
~ast~jsi delegovani ukol~ 
zlepSenou komunikaci 
V V v kvalitnejsi reseni problemu 
lepsi jednani s lidmi 
zlepseni ve vsech aspektech 
nedo.~lo k 'fadnemu zlep~eni 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
3. Oomnivam se, ~e ve srovn&ni s 
>dminkami p~ed r.l989 se ~oje 
>dpov~dnost za praci nezvysila. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nenastala ~adu& zrn~na 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesuhlasim 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
an Bygate 
" Q54. Domnivam se, ze vedeni podniku ma 
V 
zajem 0 nazory zamestnancu. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
V " V .., QSS. ·Marn pocit, ze vyznamne prispivam k 
praci podniku. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
QS6. od r.l989 se v praci citim men~ 
St'astnf. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nenastala Zactua zmena 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesuhlasim 
SNAP 
----------------------
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Q57o Moje pracovni podminky se po ro 1989 
zlepsily v nisledujicich oblastechool.u~~ 
pznacii i vice policek) o 
uspokojeni z price 
krat~i pracovni doba 
vyesi prijem 
zlepseni kvalita rizeni 
vyssi pracovni jistota 
zlepsen~ zdravotni a bezpe9n~sti 
f'odm • "~j 
vztahy pracovni spoluprice 
V V,, jsem casteJl. dotazov&n na ev~j 
1'/l>o "t.e(' 
v jin~m ohledu 
v ~adn~m ohledu 
nevim 
nelze hodnotit 
Q58o ,Moje ~ivotni Grove~ se po ro 1989 
zlepsilao 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nenastala ~adua zrnena 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
Siobhan Bygate 
Q59. 
stal 
Mam pocit, ~e po ro1989 
celkov~ obtiznejsio 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nenastala ~ldua zmena 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto souhlasim 
Q60o Po ro 1989 se moje prace stala 
cbti'%nej$i. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nenastala ~adua zmena 
nesouhlasirn 
naprosto nesouhlasirn 
Q61. soucasne vedeni podniku pracuje 
efektivnl>o 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasirn 
nesouhlasirn 
napro.sto souhlasirn 
s 
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M&m pocit nejistoty sv~ho zam~stnani. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nevim 
nesouhlasim 
IlL 
naprosto souhlasim 
" • Domnivam se, ze podnik nese.za mne dpov~dnost. 
naprosto souhlasim 
souhlasim 
nevim 
nesouhlasim 
naprosto nesouhlasim 
Domnivarn se, ~e podnik nese za mne 
pov~dnost v techto oblastech. 
/ bytovych 
zdravotni p~~e 
pel:e o d<lti 
zabezpeteni pracovni prile~itos~ 
dalsiho vzd~lavani 
; ~ u V 
mzdovych pr~davk~ (napr. 
neMoctt"'.5kfch "+d.~) 
/ V 
mzdovych v dobe omezeni prace 
/ 
v jinych oblastech 
v ~adn~m ohledu 
nevim 
n Bygate SNAP 
I 
1 
S: 
f: I 
Appendix4 
Questionnaire in Slovak 
- . ?EE Buckinghamshire College Researcn Questionnaire Pase l 
Employee and Management The Slovak Republic 
------------------~Nazory Zamestnancov V SlovenskeJ' Republike~'------------------------~ 
- :1 l"tt V <./ VAS PODNIK/SPOtOCNOST 
> sa vola podnik, v ktorom pracujete? 
n Bygate 
" Q2. Ozna~te odpoved, ktori najviac 
zodpoveda oddeleniu, kde pracujete. 
(Ozna~te v~etky odpovede, ktore su pre 
vhodne.) 
Zasobovanie a materialy 
Personalne oddelenie 
Marketing 
Import/Export 
/ Vyroba 
Predaj a distribucia 
Ekonomicke oddelenie/u~~are~ 
Q3. POHLAVIE 
Pravne oddelenie 
v{skum a ryvoj 
•./ ,.. .,.. 
Informacny system 
Generilny management 
sekretariat 
l v. 5 uzoy 
I ne 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
-./ 
zena 
-' muz 
!I 
il 
i 
vas 
I 
SNAP 
S!IE!1?EE Buckinghamshire College Research Questionnaire ?age 
Employee and Management The Slovak Republic 
~-=-------------------=--~Nazory Zamestnancov V Slovenskej Republike~~--~~==========~ 
Q4. VEK 
16-lS 
19-25 
26-35 
36-40 
41-55 
56-60 
nad 60 rokov 
v QS. VY A VASE POSTAVENIE V PODNIKU 
Aky druh prace vykonavate vo va~om 
podniku? 
(Ozna~te v~etky odpovede, ktore su pre 
vb vhodne). 
/ 
Uradnicka 
tyzicka 
Odborna fyzicka 
Slu¥by (napr. zasobovanie atdJ 
Ni~~i riadiaci pracovnici(majster 
vv, Veduci (oddeleni a vyss~e) 
/ _,. 
Vyskum a vyvoj 
ostatne 
Siobhan Byqate 
Q6. Ake miesto :astavate vo va~om 
podniku? 
zamestnanec 
:amestnanec s riadnym platom 
niZ~i ri~diaci pracovnik/majs~er 
Veduci oddelenia 
Veduci odboru/ustavu 
~eneralny riaditel' 
Ostatne 
Q7. Kol'ko rokov pracujete v tomto 
podniku? 
0-2 roky 
3-5 rokov 
6-lO rokov 
ll-20 rokov 
Viae ako 20 rokov 
Q8. Kol'ko hodin ty~denne pracujete? 
0-10 
ll-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
Sl-60 
Viae 
~ 
s 
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/ 9. vas pracovny pomer sa klasifikuje ako. 
LO. 
/ / 
Plny pracovny uvazok 
J .J' ,. 
Ciastocny pracovny uvazok 
Platena dovolenka 
/ /v ../ 
skrateny pracovny tyzden 
PlnY pracovn{ Uv2izok + nad~as 
I ne 
" ·.J / Aky je vas hruby plat? 
0-3000 Sk 
3001-6000 Sk 
6001-9000 Sk 
9001-12000 Sk 
1201-1500 Sk 
15001-16000 Sk 
nad 16000 Sk 
Nechcem odpovedat• 
ol 
.1. Kol'ko rokov ste mali, ked ste 
:iskali svoju kvalifikaciu? 
16-19 rokov 
20-25 rokov 
26-30 rokov 
InS 
han Bygate 
Ql2. Skon~ili ste odborne u~ili~te? 
/ 
A no 
Nie 
., " Q13. Kde ste ziskali svoju ucnovsku 
kvalifikaciu? 
;' 
V podniku,pre ktory teraz 
V druhom podniku 
V odbornom u~ili~ti 
Kombinacia odborne u~ilit'tejpodn•~ 
Ql4. Mate kvalifikaciu majstra? 
QlS. Mate univerzitne vzdelanie? 
rne 
Nie 
;' 
A no 
,.. 
A no 
Nie 
SNAP 
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Q16. V pripade, ak ste veduci riadiaci 
pracovnik, zaznamenali ste od roku 1989 
' nejakU z uvedenych zmien? 
V v (Oznacte vsetky odpovede, ktore sU pre vas 
vhodne). 
Zmena podniku 
va~~ia zodpovednost' 
va~~ie pracovne uspokojenie 
vyS~ie postavenie V podniku 
Vy~~ie soci&lne postavenie 
• J- l Vyss2 p at 
vaC~ie rozdiely v odmeKovani 
Ani jedna z mo~nosti 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Q17. Pred rokom 1989 ste bo1i ob~anom •. ? 
Slovenskej repub1iky 
" Ceskej republiky 
'h v -Ine o statnu 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Ql8. Patrite k etnickej, nabo~enskej 
alebo jazykovej men~ine? 
Siobhan Bygate 
/ 
A no 
Nie 
Q19. "'v v -.J VAS PODNIK/SPOLOCNOST 
Je vas podnik ... ? 
/ 
Neprivatizovany 
V v / 
ciastocne privatizovany 
. . / Plne prLvatLzovany 
V / Zalozeny po roku 1989 
Q20. Kto je majitel'om v&¥ho podniku? 
Fond narodneho majetku 
" Sukromny majitel' 
Obidvaja 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Q21. 0 aky typ vlastnictva v pripade 
va~ho podniku sa jedn&? 
" ~ (Oznacte vsetky odpovede, ktore sU pre vas 
vhodne). 
/ '1/o/ / 
slovensky vacsinovy podiel 
1/ / V..t 
Cesky vacsinovy podiel 
Slovenske sUkromne vlastnictvo 
~eske sUkromne vlastnictvo 
Zahranibne sUkromne vlastnictvo 
Bank a 
,V / . V / Invest~cny pr~vatizacny fond 
Dr~itelia investitny~h kupon~v 
( Ditt.IJV lA ) 
S' 
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;/ / 
!22. VY A VASA PRACA PRED ROKOM 1989? 
·racova1i ste tomto podniku pred rokom 
1989? 
Nie 
/ 
A no 
23. V pripade, ¥e ste pracovali v tom 
istom podniku aj pred rokom 1989, 
vykonavali ste tU istU pr&cu? 
han Bygate 
, 
A no 
Nie 
Neaplikovatel'n9 
Q24. Na ktorom useku ste pracova1i pred 
rokom 1989? 
(Ozna~te vtetky odpovede, ktore su pre vas 
vhodne). 
Zasobovanie a materia1y 
Persona1ne oddelenie 
Marketing 
Import/Export 
/ Vyroba 
Predaj a distribUcia 
Ekonomicke oddeleniejuCtare~ 
Pravne oddelenie 
/ "' . Vyskom a vyvoJ 
J / Informacny system 
Gener&lny management 
Sekretari.3.t 
" S1uzby 
InS 
Neaplikovatel'n9 
Q25. AkS miesto ste zastavali na tomto 
useku pred rokom 1989? 
Zamestnanec 
Zamestnanec s riadnym p1atom 
Ni~~i riadiaci pracovnik 
Veduci odde1enia 
Vedenie odborufustavu 
Genera1ny riadite1' 
I ne 
SNAP 
- - - - - - - -- ------------------- -
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-Q26. ORGANIZACIE V POONIKU 
Je vo va~om podniku odborov& organiz&cia? 
Q27. Ste ~lenom va~ej odborovej 
organiz&cie? 
, 
/ 
A no 
Nie 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
.· ····. .j 
'Q2B. Je to ta ista odborova organizacie 
l v 
• .. vo vasom podniku ako pred rokom 1989? 
(Napi~te prosim na l"avej strune nazov 
va~ej odborovej organiz&cie gi u~ starej 
alebo novej)? 
~0\1 Nie 
. ·-
,-., 
\ ,·.: 
/ 
A no 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Q29. Je su~asna odborova organizacia 
zastupena tfm istfm ~lovekom ako pred 
rokom 1989? 
Siobhan Bygate 
/ 
A no 
Nie 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Q30. KONTAKT 
Som v kontakte so predstavitel'mi 
odborovej organizAcie •.. 
Denne 
.., .,. ,.., "' 
Kazdy tyzden 
~ ~ 
Kazdy mesiac 
Dvakrat do roka 
Raz za rok 
Menej ako raz za rok 
Nikdy 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Q3l. S predstavitel'mi odborovej 
orgc,.nizacie I zamestnan·cov prejednAvam 
otazky ..• 
(Oznagte vtetky odpovede, ktore sU pre vas 
vhodn<o). 
Zdravia a bezpe~nosti prAce 
Odme~ovania 
PrepU~t'ania zamestnancov 
Riadenia podniku 
Kontroly riadenia prace 
Zru~enia podniku 
Pracovne otazky 
I ne 
Vobec neprejednavam 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
SI 
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)32. Mate priameho nadriadeneho/majstra? 
Nie 
/ A no 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
33. Mate ineho priameho 
nadriadenehofmajstra po roku 1989? 
/ 
A no 
Nie 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
4. Som v kontakte s mojlrn priamym 
'I . adradenym maJstrom ... 
han Bygate 
Oenne 
..; / /.J J 
Kazdy tyzden 
~ / 
Kazdy mesiac 
Dvakr§.t do roka 
Raz do roka 
" Menej aka raz rocne 
Nikdy 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel•ne 
Q35. S mojim priamym nadriadenym 
prejednavam tieto otazky .•• 
"' J (Oznacte vsetky odpovede, ktore su pre vas 
vhodne). 
Pracovne otazky 
Zru~enie podniku 
Odrne~ovanie 
Prepu~t'anie pracovniko 
Zdravie a bezpe~nost' 
Riadenie podniku 
Kontrola riadenia prace 
rne 
Ani jedna z uvedenYch 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
/ Q36. ZMENY V PRACI 
Soli nejake zmeny v person&lnej zostave 
veducich oddeleni od roku 1989? 
v 
Vsetci boli zameneni 
va~~ina, viae ako 60% 
Niektori, 30-60\ 
M&lo, menej aka 30% 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
SNAP 
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Q37. Boli nejake zmeny v personalnej 
zostave generalneho riaditel'stva roku 
1989? 
V~etci boli zameneni 
va~~ina, viae aka 60% 
Niektori, 30-60% 
Malo, menej ako 30% 
" Ziadne 
Neviem 
Neaplikovat_el 'ne 
Q38. Od roku 1989 vedenie nepreviedlo 
nijake vyrazne zmeny v mojom pracovnom 
procese ... 
Plne slihlasim 
SU.hlasim 
..J 
Ziadne zrneny 
Nesllhlasim 
VObec nesllhlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'n§ 
Siobhan Bygate 
Q39. V porovnani s podmienkami pred rokom 
1989 teraz formalne ~astej~ie podlieham 
disciplinarnym opatreniam ••• 
Plne suhlasim 
Suhlasim 
V 
Ziadne zmeny 
NesCthlasim 
VObec nesCthlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
·Q40. V porovnani s podmienkami pred rokom 
1989 teraz neformalne ~astej¥nie 
podlieham disciplinarnym opatreniam. 
Plne suhlasim 
SU.hlasim 
v 
Ziadne zmeny 
NesG.hlasim 
VObec nesG.hlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovtel'n9 
s 
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41. V porovnani s pracou pred rokom 
eraz som rnenej postihovanf za 
edodriiavanie pracovnej doby, napr. 
eskory prichod do prace at d. 
Plne suhlasl.rn 
Suhlasim 
Z'iadne zrneny 
Nesuhlasim 
Vobec nesuhlasirn 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
1989 
V porovnani s pracou pred rokom 1989 
raz som c'astej~ie postihovanf za 
primeranU kvalitu pr&ce alebo slu~ieb. 
Plne suhlasim 
Suhlasim 
./ 
Ziadne zmeny 
NesUhlasim 
VObec nesO.hlasim· 
Neviem 
Neaplikovate1'ne 
Bygate 
Q43. V porovnani s pracou rokom 1989 
teraz som menej postihovanY za zl{ vzt'ah 
k praci. 
P1ne suh1asim 
Suh1asim 
., 
Ziadne zmeny 
Nesuhlasim 
Vobec nesuhlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Q44. V porovnani s pracou pred rokorn 1989 
teraz som ~astej~ie postihovanY z in{ch 
d6vodov. 
Plne suhlasim 
Slihlasim 
Ziadne zmeny 
NesO.hlasim 
VObec nesUhlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovate1•ne 
SNAP 
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" / Q45. VASE NAZORY 
D6verujem svojim odborom/ zastupcom 
zamestnancov: 
Plne suhlasim 
Suhlasim 
Nesuhlasim 
V6bec nesuhlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel"ne 
Q46. DOverujem svojmu priamemu 
nadriadenemufmajstrovi. 
Plne suhlasim 
Suhlasim 
NesUhlasim 
VObec nesUhlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Q47. D6verujem kompetencii a schopnostiam 
vedUcich oddeleni a vedenia podniku. 
Plne sUhlasim 
Suhlasim 
Nesuhlasim 
VObec nesuhlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Siobhan Bygate 
Q48. Myslim si, te sposob riadenia sa po 
roku 1989 zmenil. 
Plne suhlasim 
Suhlasirn 
oJ 
Ziadne zrneny 
Nesuhlasim 
VObec nesUhlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel 'ne 
Q49. Myslim si, ~e moje vzt'ahy s vedUcim 
oddelenia sa po roku 1989 zlep~ili. 
Plne suhlasim 
SUhlasim 
v 
Ziadne zmeny 
NesU.hlasim 
VObec nesUhlasim 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
s 
... 
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tSO. Mysli.rn si, te rnoje 
oddelenia sa zlepsili v 
oblastiach. 
vzt'ahy s vedUcim 
nasledujucich 
v v • Oznacte vsetky odpovede, ktore su pre vas 
vhodne.) 
va~~ia moinost kontaktu 
Lep~ia kontrola 
Lep~ie rozhodnutia 
Lep~ia komunikacia 
Lep~ie rie~enie problemov 
Lep;ie jednanie s l'udmi 
v 
Ziadna oblast" 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
51.. H.yslim sit ~e moje vz.t' ahy s vedenim 
sa pc roku 1989 zhor~ili. 
Plne suhlasim 
SUhlasim 
V 
Ziadne zmeny 
NesUhlasim 
VObec nesUhlasirn 
han Bygate 
QS2. Myslim 
sa zlep'Sili 
si, ~e moje vzt'ahy 
v nS.sledujUcom: 
s vedeni.m 
V " (Oznacte vsetky odpovede, ktore sU pre vas 
vhodne.) 
va~iia mo~nost kontaktu 
"' Lepsie riadiacie schopnosti 
LePSie rozhodnutia 
Lep~ie zadel'ovanie Uloh 
Lep;ia komunik&cia 
Lep~ie rie~enie probl9mov 
Lep~ie jednanie s l'udrni 
V ' V / Zlepsen>e vsetkych aspektov 
v V v Nedoslo k ziadnernu zlepseniu 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
Q53. Myslim si, ~e nenesiem vaC~iu 
zodpovednost• za svoju pracu aka pred 
rokom 1989. 
Plne suhlasim 
Siihlasim 
"' Ziadne zmeny 
Nesiihlasim 
VObec nesiihlasim 
Neviem 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
SNAP 
. -· 
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Q54. Myslim si, ~e vedenie podniku sa 
zaujima o n&zory svojich zamestnancov-
Q55. Myslim si, 
na praci svojho 
Plne suhlasim 
Suhlasim 
v 
Ziadne zmeny 
Nesuhlasim 
VObec neslihlasim 
Neaplikovatel'ne 
"' / podiel'am ze sa vyrazne 
podniku. 
Plne siihlasim 
SUhlasim 
~iadne zmeny 
Neslihlasim 
V6bec nesUhalsim 
Q56. Po roku 1989 sa citim v praci menej 
spokojne. 
Pine suhlasim 
suhlasim 
'fiadne zmeny 
Neslilasim 
VObec nesUhlasim 
Siobhan Bygate 
Q57. Moje pracovne podmienky sapo roku 
1989 zlepsili v tychto ablastiach. 
(Ozna~te v;etky odpovede, ktore su pre vas I 
vhodne). 
Uspokojenie z prace 
v, • d b Krats~a pracovna o a 
vv. Vyssl. plat 
Lep~ia kvalita riadenia 
Vy~Sia pracovna istota 
zdravotne a bezpe~nostne 
po;rnierll<j 
Vztahy spoluprace 
V ' castejsi z&ujem om6j n&zor 
v inej oblasti 
v ~iadnej oblasti 
Neviem 
Neaplikovate1 'ne L 
Q58. Moja ~ivotna urove~ sa po roku 1989 
zlep~ili. 
Plne sUhlasim 
suhlasim 
.J Ziadne zmeny 
Nesuh1asim 
Vobec nesuh1asim 
SI 
. t . 
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!59. Mam pocit ~e po roku 1989 je m6j 
~ivot celkove ta~~i. 
Plne sllhlasim 
suhlasim 
V 
Ziadne zmeny 
Nesllhlasim 
VObec nesUhlasim 
60. Po roku 1989 moja praca je aro~nej'§ia. 
1. su~asne vedenie 
fektivnejllie. 
Plne suh1asim 
SUhlasim 
v 
Ziadne zmeny 
Nesiihlasim 
V'Obec nesUhJ asim 
podniku pracuje 
Plne suhlasirn 
Suhlasirn 
'Ziadne zmeny 
NesUhlasim 
V6bec nesUhlasim 
an Bygate 
Q62. Mam pocit neistoty vo svojej praci. 
Plne sUhlasim 
Suhlasim 
Neviem 
Nesuhlasim 
VObec sUhlasim 
V Q63. Myslim ~i, ze podnik nesie za mna 
zodpovedno!J 1 
P1ne suhlasim 
SUhlasim 
Neviem 
NesUhlasim 
V6bec sUhlasim 
v v Q64. Myslirn si, ze podnik je za mna 
zodpovedn{v t{chta oblastiach ... 
Bytove' otclzky 
Staroslivost o zdravie 
Starostlivast"' o deti 
ZabezpeCenie pracovnYch prile~itoL { 
oalSie vzdel&vanie 
Mzdove pridavky (nemocenske atd) 
V Mzda pocas doby obmedzenia prace 
Ina oblast 
Ziadna oblast 
Neviem 
SNAP 
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l. USER DAS UNTERNEHMEN . 
le heisst das Unternehmen, 
~rbeiten? in dem Sie 
Q2. Bitte kreuzen Sie die Kategcrie an, 
die Ihre Abteilung am treffendsten 
beschreibt. 
Einkauf und Lieferplanung 
Personal 
Marketing 
Import/Export 
Produktion 
Verkauf/Vertrieb 
FinanzenjSuchflihrung 
Rechtsabteilung 
Forschung und Entwicklung 
EDV 
Betriebsleitung 
Sekretariat 
Service(z.B. Fahrer, Restaurant) 
And ere 
Nicht zutreffend B 
Q3. USER SIE •.• ? 
Sind Sie ... ? 
weiblich 
mannlich 
SNAP 
--- -- --~---~~~~~~~---- - -
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Q4. sind Sie •••. ? 
16-18 Jahre alt 
19-25 
26-35 
36-40 
41-55 
56-60 
tiber 61 
QS. UBER S!E UND IHRE ROLLE IM 
UNTERNEHMEN 
Was fUr eine Tatigkeit Uben Sie aus? 
Bliroarbeit 
1\.ngPV="rnte .l\rbeit /Ril.f.sarheit 
Facharbeit 
Vorarbeiter/Aufsichtspersonal 
Service 
Management 
Forschung/Entwicklung 
And ere 
Q6. In welche der hier aufgefUhrten 
Katergorien ist Ihre Tatigkeit 
einzuordnen? 
Arbeiter(in) 
Angestellte(r) 
Meister/Aufsichtspersonal 
Abteilungsleiter 
Betriebsleitung 
GeschiiftsfUhrer 
And ere 
Q7. Wie viele Jahre haben Sie in diesem 
Unternehmen gearbeitet? 
0-2 Jahre 
3-5 Jahre 
6-10 Jahre 
11-20 Jahre 
tiber 20 Jahre 
QS. Wie viele stunden arbeiten Sie 
normalerweise in der Woche? 
0-10 stunden 
11-20 Stunden 
21-30 Stunden 
31-40 Stunden 
41-50 stunden 
51-60 Stunden 
tiber 60 Stunden 
si 
I 
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)9. Arbeiten Sie in .•. ? 
:sitte alles Zutreffende ankreuzen). 
Gan:r.tagsarbeit 
Teilzeitarbeit 
Kurzarbeit 
I 
PlusfUberstunden 
! Andere 
I 
I 
I 
~10~ Wie viel verdienen Sie pro Monat 
I(Brutto)? 
I 
0-600 OM 
601-1200 OM 
1201-1800 OM 
1801-2400 DM 
2401-3000 DM 
3001-3600 DM 
over 3600 DM 
Mochte lieber nicht antworten 
11~ Wie alt waren Sie als Sie Ihre 
allgerneine Ausbildung(Schule/Universitat 
sw.) abgeschlossen haben? 
16-19 Jahre alt 
20-25 Jahre alt 
26-30 Jahre alt 
Andere 
Ql2. Haben Sie eine Lehrlingsausbildung 
absolviert? 
Ql3. Wo haben Sie Ihre 
Lehrlingsausbildung absolviert? 
Ja 
Ne in 
In diesem Unternehmen 
In einem anderen Unternehmen 
An einer Hochschule 
HochschulejUnternehmen 
Nicht zutreffend 
Ql4~ Haben Sie eine MeisterprUfung 
abgelegt? 
Ne in 
QlS. Haben Sie ein Studium an der 
Universitat abgeschlossen? 
Ja 
Ja 
Ne in 
SNAI 
I 
I , 
I 
I 
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Ql6. Wenn Sie Abteilungsleiter oder 
Mitglied der Geschaftsleitung sind, haben 
Sie seit 1989 folgendes erfahren ••. ? 
(Bitte alles Zutreffende ankreuzen). 
Firmenwechsel 
Zunehroende Verantwcrtung 
zunehrnende Arbeitszufriedenheit 
Hoherer Status im unternehrnen 
HOherer Sozialstatus 
Lohnerhohung 
GrOssere Lohnunterschiede 
Keines van den Oberen 
Ich bin nicht sicher 
Nicht zutreffend 
Ql7. Vor 1989 waren Sie 
Staatsangehorige/r .•. ? 
der alten Bundeslander 
der DDR 
eines anderen Landes 
Nicht zutreffend 
Ql8. GehOren Sie einer ethnischen, 
religiOsen oder sprachlichen Minderheit 
an? 
Ja 
Ne in 
Ql9. USER OAS UNTERNEHMEN 
Ist das Unternehrnen •.. ? 
Nicht privatisiert 
Teilweise privatisiert 
Vollkommen privatisiert 
Eine Neugrtindung nach 1989 
Q20. Wem gehort das Unternehrnen? 
der Treuhandanstalt 
einern Privat-Unternehmer 
Mischung THA/Privatunternehrner 
einer staatl./Landeabehorde 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q21. Was fUr einem Unternehrner gehort das 
Unternehmen? 
(Bitte alles zutreffende antworten). 
Management Buy-Out 
Besitzer aus den neuen Landern 
Besitzer aus den alten Landern 
Auslandische Besitzer 
In Besitz van einer Bank 
Keines van den Oberen 
Nicht zutreffend 
s 
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)22. UBER SIE UNO IHRE ARBEIT SEIT 1989 
I 
!aben Sie vor 1989 in diesem Unternehmen 
gearbeitet? 
Ne in 
Ja 
Nicht zutreffend 
23. Wenn Sie vor 1989 in diesem 
Unternehmen gearbeitet haben, hatten Sie 
dieselbe Stelle inne wie jetzt? 
Ja 
Ne in 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q24. In welcher Abteilung haben Sie vor 
1989 gearbeitet? 
(Die treffendste Beschreibung ankreuzen) 
Einkauf und Lieferplanung 
Personal 
Marketing 
Import/Export 
Produktion 
(Verkauf)/Vertrieb 
Finanzen/Buchfuhrung/Okonomie 
Rechtsabteilung 
Forschung und Entwicklung 
EDV 
Betriebsleitung 
Sekretariat 
Service(z.B. Fahrer, ~estaurant) 
Andere 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q25. Was fUr eine Stelle hatten Sie in 
dieser ehemaligen Abteilung inne? 
Arbeiter (in) 
Angestell te ( r) 
Meister/Aufsichtspersonal 
Abteilungsleiter 
Geschaftsleitung 
And ere 
5 
SNAP 
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Q26. UBER ORGANISATIONEN AM ARBEITSPLATZ 
Ist die Gewerkschaft in Ihrem Unternehmen 
aktiv? 
Ne in 
Ja 
Q27. Haben Sie einen Betriebsrat? 
Ja 
Ne in 
Q28. Sind Sie Mitglied der .•.• ? 
(Bitte alle Zutreffende ankreuzen) 
Gewerkschaft 
Retriebsrat 
Uberhaupt nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q29. UBER KOMMUNIKATION 
Ich berate mich rnit dem zustandigen 
Betriebsratvorsitzender(in) ••. 
taglich 
wochentlich 
monatlich 
zweirnal jahrlich· 
einrnal jahrlich 
weniger als einrnal jahrlich 
Nie 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q30. Ich berate rnich mit dern zustandigen 
Betriebsratvorsitzender(in) Uber •.• (Bitte 
alles Zutreffende ankreuzen) 
Gesundheit und Sicherheit 
Lohnniveau 
Entlassung 
Betriebsleitung 
Unternehmenschliessung 
Uber Arbeit 
Aufsichtspersonal/Meister 
And ere 
Uberhaupt nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q31. Ich habe Vertrauen in rneinen · 
Eetriebsratvorsitzender(in) 
Sehr viel 
Ziernlich viel 
Wenig 
Uberhaupt nicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
I 
!j 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
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132. Welche 
laktiv? 
Gewerkschaft ist jetzt hier 
I 
IG Metall 
IG Nahrung/GaststattenfGenuss 
IG Medien 
IG Bau/Steine/Erden 
IG Chemie 
IG Holz und Keramik 
An de re 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
3. Ist der/die 
ewerkschaftsvertreter/in noch dieselbe 
erson wie vor 1989? 
Ja 
Ne in 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q34. Ich berate mich mit dem zustandigen 
Gewerkschaftsvertreter{in) ... ? 
taglich 
wochentlich 
monatlich 
zweimal jiihrlich 
eirunal jahrlich 
weniger als einmal jahrlich 
Nie 
Bin nicht sicher 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q35. Ich berate rnich mit dem zustandigen 
Gewerkschaftsvertreter(in) Uber 
(Alles Zutreffende bitte ankreuzen) 
Ges·...1ndheit und Sicherheit 
Lohnniveau 
Entlassung 
Betriebsleitung 
Unternehmenschliessung 
ilber Arbeit 
Aufsichtspersonal 
Uberhaupt nicht 
Andere 
Nicht zutreffend 
7 
SNAP 
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Q36. Haben Sie einen Linienmanager oder 
Meister? 
Ne in 
Ja 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q37. Hat Ihr Linienmanager/Meister seit 
1989 verwechselt? 
Ja 
Ne in 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q38. Ich berate mich mit meinem 
Liniemanager/Meister ... 
taglich 
wochentlich 
monatlich 
zweimal jahrlich 
einmal jahrlich 
weniger als einmal jahrlich 
Nie 
Bin nicht sicher 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q39. Ich berate mich mit meinem 
Liniemanager oder Meister Uber folgendes •. 
• ? 
(Bitte a11es Zutreffende ankreuzen) 
Uber Arbeit 
Unternehrnenschliessen 
Lohnniveau 
Entlassung 
Gesundheit und Sicherheit 
Betriebsleitung 
Aufsichtspersonal 
And ere 
Keines von den Oberen 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q40. UBER VERAENDERUNGEN AM ARBEITPLATZ? 
Haben die Abteilungsleiter gewechselt seit 
1989? 
Alle 
die meisten, Uber 60% 
Manche 30-60\ 
Einige, weniger als 30% 
Keiner/Keine 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
s. 
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!41. Haben/Hat der/die 
Geschaftsftihrer/Geschaftftihrung 
gewechselt seit 1989? 
Ja 
Ne in 
Nicht zutreffend 
Ich wiess nicht 
,42. Management hat se it 1989 keine 
'wesentlichen Veranderungen in meiner 
IArbeitsweise vorgenommen. 
Stimmt 
Stimrnt grOsstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Stimmt eher nicht 
St immt Uberhat,_pt. nicht 
Weiss Nicht 
Nicht Zutreffend 
3. Im Verg1eich zum alltaglichen 
rbeitsleben vor 1989, werde ich jetzt 
aufiger disziplinarisch zur 
erantwortung gezogen ... 
Stimmt 
Stirnmt grOsstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Stimmt eher nicht 
Stimmt Uberhaupt nicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q44. In Vergleich zu frllher, bekomme ich 
jetzt Ofter eher milndliche Hinweise 'fUr 
meine tagliche Arbeit ••. 
Stimmt 
Stimmt grosstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Stimmt eher nicht 
Stimmt Uberhaupt nicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q45. Im Vergleich zum alltaglichen 
Arbeitsleben vor 1989, werde ich jetzt 
wegen UnpUntlichkeit weniger 
disziplinarisch zur Verahtwortung gezogen. 
Stirn•nt 
Stirnrnt grOsstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Stimmt eher nicht 
Stimmt Uberhaupt nicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
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Q46. Im Vergleich zum alltaglichen 
Arbeitsleben vor 1989, werde ich jetzt 
ftir nicht ausreichende Qualitat in der 
Herstellung oder in der Ausfuhrung meiner 
Tatigkeit haufiger disziplinarisch zur 
Verantwortung gezogen ... 
stimmt 
Stimmt grosstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Stimmt eher nicht 
Stimmt uberhaupt nicht 
Weiss. nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q47. Im Vergleich zum Arbeitsalltag vor 
de.r. Wende, werde ich j etzt wegen 
mangelnder Arbeitsmotivation nicht so oft 
diszipliniert ... 
Stimmt 
Stimmt grOsstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Stimmt eher nicht 
Stimmt uberhaupt nicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
I Q48. Im Vergleich zum Arbeitsalltag vor 
1989, werde ich jetzt aus anderen Grunden I 
haufiger diszipliniert... I 
I 
Stimmt 1. 
Stimmt grosstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Stimmt eher nicht 
Stimmt uberhaupt nicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q49. UBER IHRE MEINUNGEN 
Ich habe Vertrauen in meinenjmeine 
Gewerkschaftvertreter(in) 
Sehr viel 
ziemlich viel 
Wenig 
Uberhaupt Nicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
QSO. Ich habe Vertrauen in meinen 
Meister/Linienmanager •.• 
Sehr viel 
Ziemlich viel 
Wenig 
Uberhaupt nicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
SriAPI 
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!51. Ich habe Vertrauen in die 
Fahigkeiten der Abteilungsleitung, 
Geschaftsleitung, oder des 
Geschaftsfuhrer ••• 
Sehr viel 
Ziemlich viel 
Wenig 
iiberhaupt nicht 
Weiss nicht 
52. Wie ich gefUhrt werde, hat sich seit 
1 
er Wende verandert ... 
Stimmt 
Stirnrnt grCsstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Eher umgekehrt 
das vollige Gegenteil 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
3. Ich glaube, dass sich seit der Wende 
ie Beziehungen zu meinem 
teilungsleiter verbessert haben .•. 
Stimmt 
Stirnmt grOsstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Eher umgekehrt 
das vollige Gegenteil 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q54. Ich glaube, dass sich die 
Beziehungen zu meinem/meiner 
Abteilungsleietr(in) verbessert haben in 
Bezug auf ••• 
(Bitte alles Zutreffende ankreuzen) 
mehr Kontaktzeit 
Bessere Fuhrungsqualitaten 
Bessere Entscheidungsprozesse 
Bessere Kommunikation 
Bessere ArbeitsproblemlOsung 
Besserer Umgang mit Menschen 
Schlechtere Aufgabendelegation 
In keiner Hinsicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q~S. Ich glaubo, dass oeit 1989 die 
Beziehungen zu der Geschaftsleitung 
verschlechtert haben •.• 
Stimmt 
Stimmt grosstehteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Eher umgekehrt 
das vOllige Gegenteil 
Nicht zutreffend 
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Q56. Ich glaube, dass sich die 
Beziehungen zur Geschaftflihrung 
verbessert haben in Bezug auf ••• (Alles 
zutreffende ankreuzen). 
Mehr Kontaktzeit 
Bessere Flihrungsqualitaten 
Bessere Entscheidungsprozesse 
Bessere Aufgabenqelegation 
Bessere Kommunikation 
Bessere LOsung Probleme 
Bessere Umgang mit Menechen 
Besser in jeder Hinsicht 
Besser in keiner Hinsicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q57. Ich glaube, dass ich jetzt genauso 
viel Verantwortung fUr meine Arbeit trage 
wie vor der Wende ... 
Stimrnt 
stirnmt grosstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Stimmt eher nicht 
Stimrnt Uberhaupt nicht 
Weiss nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q58. Ich glaube, dass sich das Management 
fUr die Meinungen der Arbeitnehmer und 
Angestellte interessiert ... 
Stimmt 
Stimmt grOsstenteils 
Stimmt eher nicht 
das vollige Gegenteil 
Weiss nicht 
QS9. Ich glaube, dass ich einen wichtigen 
Beitrag flir das tiberleben der Unternehmen 
leiste ... 
Stimmt 
Stimmt grOsstenteils 
Stimrnt eher nicht 
das v5llige Gegentei\ 
Weiss nicht 
Q60. Ich fUhle mich seit der'wende 
unglUcklicher an meinem Arbeitsplatz ... 
Stimmt 
Stimmt eher nicht 
Keine Veranderung seit 1989 
Eher umgekehst 
das vollige Gegenteil 
Nicht zutreffend 
~ 
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1. Meine Arbeitsbedingungen haben sich 
eit 1989 verbessert in Bezug auf ... 
lles Zutreffende ankreuzen) 
Arbeitszufriedenheit 
Kilrzere Arbeitszeit 
Hohere Lohne und Gehalte 
(Bessere) Fuhrungsqualitaten 
Mehr Arbeitsplatzsicherheit 
Sicherheit am Arbeitsplatz 
zusammengehorigkeitsgefuhl 
meine Meinung wird Ofter gefragt 
in anderer Hinsicht 
in keiner Hinsicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
62. Mein Lebensstandard hat sich seit 
1989 verbessert ••• 
Stimmt 
Stimmt gr6sstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Eher umgekehrt 
das vollige Gegenteil 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q63. Ich glaube, dass mein Leben seit 
1989 irn allgemeinen besser geworden ist ... 
Stimmt 
Stimmt grosstenteils 
Keine Veranderung 
Eher umgekehrt 
das vollige Gegenteil 
Weiss Nicht 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q64. Meine Arbeit ist seit 1989 
schwieriger geworden .•. 
Stimmt 
Stimmt gr6sstenteils 
Keine V0randeru~~ 
Eher umgekehrt 
das v6llige Gegenteil 
Nicht zutreffend 
Q65. Ich finde, dass meine 
GeschaftsfUhrung eine gute Arbeit leistet. 
Stimmt 
Stimmt gr6sstenteils 
Eher umgekehrt 
das vollige Gegenteil 
Weiss nicht 
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Q66. Ich glaube, dass mein 
Arbeitsplatzgefahrdet ist .•. 
Stimmt 
Stimmt grosstenteils 
Stimmt eher nicht 
das vollige Gegenteil 
Weiss nicht 
Q67. Ich glaube, dass das Unternehmen mir 
gegenUber eine bestimmte Verantwortungen 
tragt in Bezug auf ••. 
stimmt 
Stirnrnt grOsstenteils 
Stimmt eher nicht 
das vollige Gegenteil 
W~iss nicht ~ 
Q68. Ich glaube, dass das Unternehmen mir 
gegenUber eine bestimmte Verantwotung 
tragt in Bezug auf •.. 
Unterkunft 
Medizinische Versorgung 
Kinderkrippe 
Arbeitsplatzsicherheit 
Weiterbildung 
Lohnfortzahlungen(Krankheit,usw) 
Bezahlung trotz Mangel an Arbeit 
in anderer Hinsicht 
in keiner Hinsicht 
Weiss nicht 
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